



The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Republic of Vietnam.

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To: The world leader – The world of Ocean Protection - Organizations map the sea in the world. - International and Vietnamese media. - The Vietnamese people

Please find enclosed these documents " for your information ". We sincerely appreciate your help for the Human Rights, the Environment Right, the Peaceful to the Southeast Asia Sea and the Vietnam sea : Freedom, Democracy and Sovereignty of Vietnam.

Respectfully yours and with our gratefulness.

Thank you so much

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Avec nos sentiments respectueux et dévoués.

Updated Monday, August 03, 2020; Friday, January 19, 2018

January 19, 2018, 44th Anniversary battle of the Paracels islands (Jan 19, 1974 – Jan 19, 2018); 50th Anniversary of the Hue Massacre (January 29, 1968 – January 29, 2018); and Commemorated 1070th years of the Bach Dang river battle/victory (December, 938 – December, 2018)

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

Co-edited: SOS Vietnam (Dang Phuong Nghi <http://sosvietnam.net>); The Vietnamese American Science & Technology Society – VAST and the Vietnamese Environmental Protection Society – VEPS (<https://maithanhtruyet.blogspot1.com>); The Government de Jure of the Republic of Vietnam in North America, Europe and Australia (<http://vietnamconghoaphapdinh.com/>); The ‘Committee to prosecute all Vietnamese communist criminals of war; Paracels forum-The discussions proceed for peace (Vu Huu San - <http://paracels.freetzi.com/>); Vu Huu San water world (<http://vanminhnuoc.freetzi.com/>); Diep My Linh (<http://diepmylinh.com>); Viet Ecology foundation (<http://vietecology.org>); The maritime historical library (<http://xishananshaislands.org>); The Vietnamese Paracels-Spratly forum (<http://vietnamparacels.org>); The Vietnamsea social networking (<http://vietnamsea.org>); <http://vnafmamn.com> website; The Vietnamese Historical Association (<http://www.truclamventu.info>)



Paracels, Spratlys islands is part of the Vietnam Sea and the Vietnam Sea obviously isn't the South China Sea.

The Parcel islands, Spratly islands belong to the Vietnamese people; not Chinese this decade.

No South China Sea on the Vietnam Sea map; Our Vietnam Sea is part of the Southeast Asian Sea and not part of the South China Sea.

Preface:

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

The Vietnamese archipelagoes of Hoang Sa (aka Paracels; Xisha) and Truong Sa (aka Spratlys; Sansha, Nansha) are both situated in the Southeast Asian Sea off the Republic of Vietnam's shore;

China is a big threat for the peace and stabilization in Southeast Asia region and the whole world as well;

No militarization processes allowed on our Paracels, Spratly islands and vicinities;

China must retreat immediately from ours Paracels, Spratly islands, and our Vietnam East Sea;

Beijing China must accept Hague ruling on Vietnam sea (Southeast Asia Sea) case;

No Human rights, no Environmental Rights, no Freedom, no Democracy, no trade with China.

No Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic

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Timeline of Ancient Vietnam

A Proposal by Vu Huu San

Around 70,000 B.P. First known evidence of Southeast Asian Crossing the Sea by Bamboo Raft to Australia

> 20,000 B.P. Proposed date for the beginning of the Hoabinhian Culture in the North VietNam (by Solheim)

> 20,000 B.P. Partially Polished Stone Tools of Hoabinhian Culture presented in Northern Australia.

Around 15,000 B.P. Sea levels began to rise. From BienDong (Eastern Sea) plains, Viet (Yüeh) people moved upward, along the Yangtze, West, Red and Ma Rivers, settled in the half-submerge coastal areas, or to the higher-level grounds inside.

15,000 B.C. First domestication of plants in the world was done by people of the Hoabinhian Culture.

10,500 B.C. Cord-marked pottery invented.

8,000 B.C. Use of wild rice (Southeast Asia, Southern China, Northern India)

7,000-3,000 B.C. Bac Son Culture

5,000 B.C. Wet rice farming in the Bach Viet Areas (present-day South China)

3,500 B.C. Socketed bronze Ax (Thailand)

2,897-258 B.C. Kingdom of Van Lang (Hung Kings), Lac Viet Navy Ships were heavily equipped with "Fleche Magique" (No Than), some of them made by bronze.

2,500-1,500 B.C. Phung Nguyen Culture

Around 2,000 B.C. Bach-Viet Boat People landed in America Continent, soon after the beginning of the Chinese expansion to the South

800 B.C.-200 A.D. Dong Son Culture

258-207 B.C. Kingdom of Au Lac

207 B.C. Foundation of Kingdom of Nam Viet by Trieu Da

111 B.C. Conquest of Nam Viet by Han Dynasty in China

39 A.D. Revolt of Trung Sisters against Chinese rule

43 Suppression of Trung Sisters Revolt by Ma Yuan

192 Foundation of Kingdom of Lam Ap, predecessor of the state of Champa, in Central Vietnam

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248 Revolt by followers of Lady Trieu (Ba Trieu)

542-545 Ly Bi Rebellion against Chinese rule

722 Mai Thuc Loan Rebellion

939 Restoration of Vietnamese Independence by Ngo Quyen after first battle of Bach Dang

939 Foundation of Ngo Dynasty (939-965)

965-968 Period of the Twelve Warlords

968 Foundation of the Dinh Dynasty (968-980)

Vu Huu San

<http://vanminhnuoc.freetzi.com/vntimeline.htm>



Vietnam Water Culture

Vietnam and the Origins of the Water Civilization

The Indigenous of the Eastern Sea

Living by the Eastern Sea, Vietnamese are all-around naturally seamen. In the contrary with the Chinese nature, Vietnamese have always been considered as the experts in the arts of naval warfare and maritime transportation since the very ancient time.

The Han Chinese wrote of southerners Viet people as follows "The Yüeh people by nature a indolent and undisciplined. They travel to remote places by water and use boats as we use carts and oars as we use horses. When they come (north - to attack) they float along and when they leave (withdraw) they are hard to follow. They enjoy fighting and are not afraid to die." (See "Eighth Voyage of the Dragon", Bruce Swanson, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1982, page 11-12).

The vessels of the Yüeh in the Warring States period, however, were not all naval, and we can be sure that there were trading expeditions at least along the coasts of Siberia, Korea and Indochina. There were also some explorations of the Pacific itself. And of course, as ever, inland water transport. (See Needham, Joseph, Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-Djen, "Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 4: Physics and Physical Technology, part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics" Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971, Page 441)

The off-shore ships of the Tonking (North Vietnam) Area were surprisingly big and so technically advanced for the Chinese observations. A 3rd-century text of capital importance does so, however. It occurs in the Nan Chou I Wu Chih (Strange Things of the South), written by Wan Chen, and run as follows:

The people of foreign parts (wai yu jen) call chhuan (ships) po. The large ones are more than 20 chang in length (up to 150 ft.), and stand out of the water 2 or 3 chang (about 15 to 23 ft.). At a distance they look like 'flying galleries' (ko tao) and they can carry from 600 to 700 persons, with 10,000 bushels (hu) of cargo.

The people beyond the barriers (wai chiao jen), according to the sizes of their ships, sometimes rig (as many as) four sails, which they carry in a row from bow to stern. From the leaves of the lu-thou tree, which have the shape of 'yung', and are more 1 chang (about 7.5 ft.) long, they weave the sails.

The four sails do not face directly forwards. but are set obliquely, and so arranged that they can all be fixed in the same direction, to receive the wind and to spill it (Chhi ssu fan pu cheng chhien hsiang, chieh shih hsieh i hsiang chu, i chhufeng chhui feng). Those (sails which are) behind (the most windward one) (receiving the) pressure (of the wind), throw it from one to the other, so that they all profit from its force (Hou che chi erh hsiang she, i ping te feng li). If it is violent, they (the sailors) diminish or augment (the sails) to receive from one another the breath of the wind, obviates the anxiety attendant upon having high masts. Thus (these ships) sail without avoiding strong winds and dashing waves, by the aid of which they can make great speed."

This indeed a striking passage. It establishes without any doubt that in the +3rd century southerners,

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whether Cantonese or Annamese, were using four-masted ships with matting sails in a fore-and-aft rig of some kind. The Indonesian canted square-sail is not absolutely excluded, but it would be unwieldy on a vessel with several masts, and some kind of tall balanced lug-sail seem much more probable. (See Needham, Joseph, Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-Djen, "Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 4: Physics and Physical Technology, part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics" Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971, Page 600-601.)

Viet Nam is a maritime country. None of the plains on which the great bulk of the population is concentrated lies very far from the coast.

"The sea therefore is constantly present in Vietnamese life. Its products, salt and fish, play a vital role in the diet. The legendary emperors who founded the Vietnamese monarchy are said to have had their thighs tattooed with sea monsters in order to ensure a victorious return from their fishing expeditions. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries English agents sent to Viet Nam by the East India Company acknowledged that the Vietnamese were the best sailors in the Far East. Even more than the often narrow coastal corridor of Central Viet Nam, the sea represents the main line of communication between north and south- it is therefore an essential element of Vietnamese National unity in the economic sphere." (Jean Chesneau "The Vietnamese Nation - Contribution To A History, Translated by Malcolm Salmon, Current Book Distributors Pty. Ltd. Sydney, 1966)

Western merchants also testified to the hospitality of the Vietnamese. By the old tradition of the sailors, they have especially expressed the genuine kindness towards other mariners, as described in a memo on trade with this region written probably between 1690 and 1700:

When a vessel is shipwrecked, it get a better welcome (in Cochinchina) than anywhere else.. Ships come out from shore to salvage the equipment; nets are used to recover merchandise which has fallen overboard. In fact, no effort is spared to put the ship back into good condition. (See Taboulet, "La geste française en Indochine." Paris, 1955, Vol. 1, p. 87.)

Like his fellow Jesuits Ricci and de Nobili in China and India, de Rhodes never looked on the oriental Vietnamese as "underdeveloped" or even as just plain hungry, benightedly awaiting the benefits of Western technocracy and superior social structures. (See Rhodes Of Vietnam, The Travels and Missions of Father Alexander de Rhodes in China and Other Kingdoms of the Orient, Translated by Solange Hertz, The Newman Press - Westminster, Maryland, 1966.)

Two years before the "Mayflower" put ashore at Massachusetts, a Portuguese Jesuit priest, Cristoforo Borri (the same Father Borri, have mentioned above), landed with brother missionaries in Faifo, a Vietnamese port located near the present city of Danang in Central Vietnam. (The Portuguese called all of Vietnam below the 18th parallel Cochinchina; they called the people Cochinchinese, to distinguish them from the Chinese of China proper.)

Father Borri came as a friend and was so received by Vietnamese. This delightful mathematician expressed great enthusiasm for the local inhabitants, even commenting on the women's feminine charms! Extolling their attire, he wrote that "though decent, it is so becoming that one believes one is witnessing a gracious flowering springtime." (See Georges Taboulet, "La geste Française en Indochine," Paris, 1955, p. 59.)

The record he left compares the people with those of China, where his journeys for the faith had also taken him. To his evident delight, he found the Cochinchinese truly hospitable and "superior to the Chinese in their wit and courage" (See Helen B. Lamb, "Vietnam's Will to Live - Resistance to Foreign Aggression from Early Times Through the Nineteenth Century", Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1972.)

Viet or Yueh -The undauntable seafaring people

"A seafaring people," C. P. Fitzgerald had written in *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People*, "the Yüeh fought against the incorporation in new empires." To this day, "in Kwangtung, the homeland of the 'Cantonese' retains their distinctive character and restless attitude toward northern rule," he wrote; for "the main constituent of the population of Kwangtung and also in Fukien is a stock originally-non-Chinese and largely Yüeh."

Who were these people? "The Yüeh people, from whom the old kingdom had taken its name, were in ancient times wide-spread along the coast of eastern Asia.... Vietnam is the modern center of the Yüeh, and the word Viet is simply the local pronunciation of the Chinese form Yüeh," Fitzgerald said. "The more northerly Yüeh were annexed by the Han empire and lost their national identity, although it is probable that a very large proportion of the present inhabitants of Fukien and Kwangtung are descendants of this people."

These seafaring people were among the masters of the seas. From the beginning of known history, the "coastal people turned to the sea, as long tradition suggested," wrote Fitzgerald. "They had, probably before the Christian age, moved south across the sea." And "the pattern of Chinese emigration therefore settled, at a time which has not been fully recorded, into a shape which it has retained until modern times."

It may have been these traditions that made them so self-reliant and independent. They fought foreign invasions with the same resilience with which they fought the storms at sea. (Fusang, *The Chinese Who Built America*, Stan Steiner, New York, 1979, p.70-71.)

Cochinchinese- The boldest Seamen

Under the observation of George Windsor Earl, of England, the South Vietnamese or so-called Cochinese Mariners were the boldest Seamen of the world. He wrote in his diary:

The weather continued very indifferent during the remainder of the passage. On the 27th, when near the entrance of Singapore Straits, we fell in with six Cochin Chinese prahus, similar to that which we had seen at Tringanu. Although exposed to a severe squall, these brave fellows were carrying all sail on their little vessels, and seemed determined to start nothing. Our Chinese jerratulis watched them for some time in silent admiration, and at last he cried out- "Ah ! dia brani berlayer itu orang Cochin China "- "they are bold seamen those Cochin Chinese ;" and indeed they may be so pronounced when compared with the Chinese themselves. I do not know how the Cochin Chinese would behave on board square-rigged ships, but they work their little vessels in a manner that would not disgrace the best European seamen. These prahus, none of which exceeded fifty tons burden, had beat down the China sea against the monsoon. a feat which a Company's ship would scarcely have attempted twenty years ago.

The Cochin-Chinese are deservedly great favourites with those who are well acquainted with them, and from their liveliness and vivacity, they have often been compared with the French. In their commercial intercourse with Singapore, they have to struggle against many disadvantages. In the first place the selfish government of their country not permitting a foreign trade, they are consequently, when engaged in this forbidden pursuit, obliged to steal away and risk all their little property, and probably their lives also and being unable to procure arms, become the favourite prey of the cowardly Malay pirates, many of them, perhaps to the annual amount of one hundred and fifty, being killed or taken., within a day's sail of our settlement at Singapore... (See: *The Eastern Seas On Voyages and Advantures in the Indian Archipelago*, in 1832-33-34, George Windsor Earl, London 1837, - Reprint: *The Eastern Seas*, Oxford U. Press, 1971.)

(to be continued)


<http://vanminhnuoc.freetzi.com/vnwaterculture.htm>



Questions about History ?

Here are several comments on the issue of South China Sea.

- (1) By the law of sea, merely discovery of an island does not guarantee a sovereignty.
- (2) The first time China sent its stationed troop to Nansha Islands (Taiping) is 1910 by the navy minister Li Zhun. Due to the Xin Hai Revolution of 1911, they starved there soon.
- (3) The sovereignty over one island does not guarantee the sovereignty over uninhabited surrounding islands unless the military takes regular patrol around them.
- (4) The sovereignty over one island grants China the territory claim 12 nautical miles around it, not the entire sea.
- (5) Zeng Mu An Sha is 20 meters below sea-level. It can not be a basis for a territory claim. Its original name is James, after its discoverer. Zeng Mu was made up arbitrarily by the ROC government.
- (6) The PRC declared in 50's (signed by Zhou En Lai), that Yellow Sea and Bo Hai are China's inner seas, East Sea (including the Taiwan Strait) and South Sea are open waters.
- (7) China has been asked by foreign countries the historical or legal background for Chinese maps about the South Sea. The PRC foreign ministry has not been able to give an answer.



Chinese Territory ???!!!

Opinions about Vietnam's legal rights

For its part, Vietnam asserts that: "[It] has maintained effective occupation of the two archipelagos [Paracel and Spratly islands] at least since the 17th century when they were not under the sovereignty of any country, and the Vietnamese State has exercised effectively, continuously and peacefully its sovereignty over the two archipelagos until the time when they were invaded by the Chinese armed forces."

Hanoi also claims that France administered the islands as part of its protectorate and that these rights passed to Vietnam with the demise of French Indochina. France claimed to have occupied Spratly Island itself in 1930. In April 1975 North Vietnamese forces seized six of the Spratly Islands which had been held by South Vietnamese troops. Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed in the Spratly Islands in March 1988. The 'Battle of Fiery Cross Reef' left about 75 Vietnamese killed or missing and three Vietnamese ships ablaze.

Vietnam currently occupies 25 Spratly Islands features, the most of any claimant state. It claims all the Spratly Islands, whether on the basis of sovereignty over the islands themselves or as a consequence of claims based on its mainland continental shelf jurisdiction.

[Jane's information Group: A code of conduct for the South China Sea?](#)

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Vietnamese Culture v/s Chinese Culture

Short Arcicles by Vu Huu San

Did you ever watch a Chinese Movie?

Surely, you heard the expressions: "The Need for Revenge"

There are "something" every Chinese knows and believes that the non-Chinese, like Vietnamese, cannot possibly understand.

For centuries the "Great Wall" of the Chinese language and writing system has served to diminish the impact non-Chinese have had on Chinese society. These same linguistic and cultural walls that preserved Chinese culture also transmit it from one generation to another in what amounts to a "secret code."

Please take some minutes to read the following article of Boye Lafayette, from "NTC's Dictionary of China's Cultural Code Worlds", De Mente, 1996 : "The Need for Revenge Baochou (Bah-oh-choe-ou)" - "Bao Oan Tra Oan" in Vietnamese."

*

Chinese history is gory with stories of Imperial usurpers, victorious warlords, generals, criminal chieftains and others wiping out entire families, including uncles, aunts, and cousins, as a way of ending family lines and future threats.

The same "final solution" has also traditionally been used by those in power to eliminate intellectual dissidents and military leaders who failed in revolutionary attempts.

Part of this propensity for killing one's enemies came under the heading of baochou (bah-oh-choe-ou) or 'revenge,' the need for which was built into Chinese culture.

The Chinese were never restrained by any religious beliefs in the sanctity of life or in the concept of forgiving one's enemies and thereby avoiding sin and gaining favor in the eyes of some deity.

Quite the contrary, they felt under deep obligation to extract their own revenge because there was no God in Chinese heaven who would eventually do it for them, and no body of law on earth that could be depended upon to protect and preserve them.

They were ruled by personal, hierarchical relationships rather than by laws based on equality and human rights. It was left up to individuals to keep these relationships in order.

Without equitable laws to guide, restrain and protect them, the Chinese had to depend upon their personal connections and their reputations or "face" to survive and function within their society.

Because this system was based on personal rather than objective factors, the Chinese developed extreme sensitivity to slights, insults and actions they perceived as threatening to their "face."

Every blemish that they suffered or believed that they had suffered had to be wiped clean. If they were not in a position to revenge themselves overtly, they felt compelled to do it behind the scenes, no matter how long it took.

Baochou thus became a characteristic trait of Chinese behavior, and survived from tribal times down through the ages. Much of the mass slaughter that occurred during the 20-year war between the Nationalists and Communists resulted from this revenge factor.

Chinese Communist Party leaders have routinely taken revenge against critics as well as against competitors within the Party, either imprisoning them or exterminating them.

It is not likely that this trait will be fully exorcised from the psyche of most Chinese until they have lived for two or three generations in a society in which human rights are protected by law, and behavior is based on rational, universal standards of fairness rather than political power and personal idiosyncrasies. Fortunately, the growing number of Chinese who are exposed to Western educations and cultures, and become involved in foreign trade, are leading the way in putting this tribal trait behind them.

*

Vietnamese people are open-ended. One will find in Vietnam a tradition of tolerance inherited from the ancient culture. To them, even one religion is right, others are not necessarily wrong. There is not a such traditional "Bah-oh-choe-ou".

We are proud to be born Vietnamese!

<http://paracels.freetzi.com/vnvschin.htm>



Paracels - Legends of the Vietnamese Watery Realm

Compiled by Vu Huu San

1- Introduction

Vietnam is a country of Legends and Myths.

Several legends which were remembered by the Vietnamese generations, expressed their earliest identity as a super-maritime people.

Beyond the details of these legends lies a basic psychological truth of ancient Vietnamese society: sovereign power came from the sea. Lac Long Quan belonged to the watery realm. As we have seen, certain elements of these legends are similar to legendary themes found in the island and coastal world of Southeast Asia. The idea of an aquatic spirit's being the source of political power and legitimacy, which attended the formation of the Vietnamese people in prehistoric times, is the earliest hint of the concept of the Vietnamese as a distinct and self-conscious people. This idea was given clear visual form in the art of the Dong-son bronze drums, where sea birds and amphibians surround boats bearing warriors. (The Birth of Vietnam, Keith Weller Taylor, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, 6-7.)

Vietnamese legends tell of sea kings and mountain kings; of dragons and fairies ... These stories have been passed down from generation to generation for hundreds of years. The stories are a mixture of truth and fantasy. Some of the stories explain Vietnamese customs. Some tell about the history of Vietnam. The stories also have a moral purpose. They teach that those who commit evil deeds will come to a bad end, while those who do good will be rewarded. They teach us important lessons about friendship, family loyalty, and forgiveness of others. They also point out the duty that people owe to their king and their country. (Legends from Vietnam, A Language Arts Program; University of Iowa, 1983, p. 5.)

2- Non-Confucian Traditions in Legends and Myths.

Professor Nguyen Ngoc Bich once wrote: Many traditional Vietnamese myths were originally conceived as instruments of protest, as weapons in the struggle against foreign invaders and foreign ideologies, especially the Chinese Confucian ideology. This form of protest is found again and again in later centuries in Vietnamese history: in the 13th and 14th centuries (through the reaffirmation of old Vietnamese myths); in the 18th century with the protest literature represented by Cong Quynh (or Trang Quynh) and Chang Lia; in the 19th century with the creation of new myths, in the 20th century with the creation of new religions incorporating a great deal of myths (such as Hoa Hao and Caodaism in South Vietnam); and even in the present day with the spontaneous creation of a vast folk literature of protest. (Conclusion: Vietnamese Myths Through the Ages.)

Almost every Vietnamese legends represented the background of an aquatic scenery with water creatures and under-sea form of living: dragon, turtle, serpent, fish, pearl, under-water palace...

Some tales seem not understandable by the continental Chinese. The main reason was that the vast land-mass of China absorbed their energies. 2634 B.C. The Chinese did not develop as a seafaring nation. Equally, the absence of neighboring nations with whom to trade played a large part in the

development of the introspective conservatism of the Chinese...In the legends of China, chronicled in the Shu Ching (Canon of History), the first three emperors, Fu Hsi, Shen Nung and Huang Ti, are each credited with a share in the invention of all the main activities of the people, including matrimony, building houses and the introduction of a calendar, but no mention is made of the sea, ships or of fishing (although hunting is mentioned). It is against this background that the virtual absence of Chinese sea-legend and sea sagas has to be viewed. (The Maritime History of the World, by Duncan Haws and Alex A. Hurst-A Chronological Survey of Maritime Events From 5,000 B.C. until the present Day, Teredo Books LTD., Brighton Sussex MCMLXXXV (1985).

<http://vanminhnuoc.freetzi.com/legendswaterrealm.htm>



Vietnam Sovereignty

PREFACE & POSTFACE

(Eastern Sea Geography and Paracel, Spratly Archipelagoes by Vu Huu San)

I - PREFACE

At present time, five countries in the area are claiming that a number of islands in Vietnam's Spratly Islands belong either wholly or partly to their sovereignty. These countries are: Communist China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The Paracel Islands were absorbed militarily by Communist China in 1974.

In addition to using force and violence to occupy some islands, Communist China has carried more systematic actions. In 1983, Communist China produced a new map that expands the limits of the Eastern Sea, which they renamed South Sea. On that new map, the entire South China Sea falls within the sovereignty of China, extending eastward to the Philippines coastline, westward to the Vietnam seacoast, and southward to Malaysia. In February 1992, the Chinese Communists issued a law stating that military vessels and scientific vessels (meaning oil rigs) going through these waters must request their permission. In May 1992, they agreed to let the American oil company, Crestone, start drilling operations within an area of 25,000 square kilometers lying west of the Paracel Islands. They have on several occasions allowed oil survey vessels to sail deeply into the Gulf of Tonkin, close to Haiphong seaport and within seventy miles of Thai-Binh. To support these assertions of sovereignty they sent a group of mainland scholars to Taiwan to cooperate with local scholars to set up a joint China-Taiwan agency that categorically announced that the entire maritime area mentioned above belongs to China! That joint agency has the responsibility to collect, study and disseminate materials that would demonstrate China's sovereignty over the entire Eastern Sea area. Beside using the intellectual approach, Communist China during the past several years has prepared military measures to protect those "territorial waters". Because both the Hoang-sa and Truong-sa Islands are located very far from China, the Chinese Communists have reinforced and are reinforcing the Blue Water Fleet in their scheme to control the area through three different measures: (1) They bought from Ukraine an aircraft carrier that can accommodate eighteen SU-27 planes, and also converted a gigantic cargo ship into another aircraft carrier. (2) They bought from Iran the technique of midair refueling in order to increase the range of their fighter planes. (3) They built on Hoang-sa Islands a naval base that has an airfield where fixed-winged airplanes can land on and take off, they also built fresh-water reservoirs, and have presently thousands of troops on that base.

The Chinese Communists' naval strength has also been boosted with twenty-four US-27s newly purchased from Russia as the equivalents of the most up-to-date US-made F-15s, while at the same time has been reinforced the submarine force within their fleet. Thus far the Chinese communists have occupied eight islands in the Spratlys, setting up sovereignty markers on each of them. During the past few months, they have built a base in the area of underwater reefs which the Philippines had previously claimed as part of their sovereignty. When the Philippines protested, the Chinese communists first denied, then confirmed that the area simply serves as living quarters for Chinese fishermen working there. Just a few days ago, the Philippines ordered that base destroyed despite the fact that the day before both sides had just started negotiations in Beijing with a view to resolving the differences.

No one can deny that both the Spratlys and the Paracels belong to Vietnam. No one has the right to

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

take advantage of the current weakness of the Vietnamese Communists due to the wasting of national resources during the past few decades to try to parcel out and occupy the territory or the sea space of Vietnam.

The Vietnamese Communists must bear total responsibility for having let the Spratlys and the Paracels fall into the hands of foreign countries, and they must assume the task of recovering those lost islands. The Vietnamese Communists cannot ignore these vital facts. If they invoke the inferiority of their navy and air forces in the defense of territorial waters, they will be even more guilty. Indeed, they have deliberately destroyed the national strength, they have imprisoned or obliterated the powerful South Vietnam's armed forces led by superior cadres of intelligent, experienced and courageous officers. They have used national resources for the aggressive war against Cambodia in order to assist in the hegemony scheme of the Soviet Union. All this has resulted in the exhaustion and bankruptcy of national union, the breakup of that solidarity which is so essential to the national defense.

Rather than to the other countries, the Spratlys and the Paracels belong to Vietnam from the viewpoints of geography, history and legislation as well as sovereignty.

In late July 1994 when a minority of Chinese Communist scholars in cahoots with a minority of Taiwan scholars brazenly claimed sovereignty over those archipelagoes, Vietnamese intellectuals in the United States met in California to issue a statement affirming Vietnam's sovereignty over the Spratlys and the Paracels in the Eastern Sea.

In response to that declaration, Scholar Vu Huu San undertook a research project on the geography of Bien Bong (Eastern Sea) and over those islands to demonstrate Vietnamese sovereignty over them. The research has been completed, resulting in this book "*Địa lý Biển Đông Vôi Hoàng-Sa và Trường-Sa*" (Eastern Sea Geography and the Paracel, Spratly Archipelagoes).

This study is extremely rigorous and quite revealing. The author has demonstrated solid knowledge in oceanography, geology, biology, botany, and culturology. His study has linked data on those islands with the Vietnamese mainland to prove that the archipelagoes are a natural extension of Vietnam's continental shelf. Moreover, being a former high-ranking officer of the Republic of Vietnam Navy who had led many operations around those islands and observed them closely, the author is able to describe in details those islands, with regard to their forms and shapes, dimensions, flora, geology, resources, etc... including the exact location of each island vis-a-vis other ones, the Vietnamese coastline, and the coastline of each of those countries that have made claims, namely Communist China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

The author does not overlook aspects of international maritime law that pertain to the Spratlys and the Paracels. Even the problem of historical implementing Vietnamese sovereignty over those islands has been appropriately addressed.

The data presented in this research work have clearly demonstrated that Vietnam has sovereignty over these waters.

The materials cited in reference are both abundant and pertinent. Scholar Vu Huu San has referred to many important documents written by the most authoritative authors. The book also contained 133 maps, graphs and pictures.

The Committee for the Protection of Vietnam's Territorial Integrity, founded by a group of Vietnamese intellectuals in the USA, is very honored to present this valuable book by scholar Vu Huu San.

Stanford University, March 24, 1995

The Committee for the Protection of Vietnam's Territorial Integrity,

Chairman of the Board,

Dr. Nguyen Van Canh, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

II - POSTFACE

In the Preface, Dr. Nguyen Van Canh has just stressed both the high scientific standard and the timely significance of *Dia Ly Bien Dong voi Hoang-Sa va Truong-Sa* by Scholar Vu Huu-San.

This postface will confine itself to summarizing the book's main points and to the confusion to be cleared away between the Vietnamese called *Bien Dong* and the Chinese-called *Nan-Hai*.

Concerning the book's main points, they may be briefly summarized as follows:

- 1) From the remotest times, *Bien Dong* (The Vietnamese Eastern Sea) was the cradle for the sea-oriented culture of the sea-faring Viet people.
- 2) *Bien Dong* shows a great deal of marvelous physical phenomena which have never been known in any other sea in the world.
- 3) *Bien Dong* is obviously characterized by both its specific fauna and flora.
- 4) *Bien Dong* is a gigantic reservoir of natural energies and resources which have been accumulated therein from time immemorial down to our own days. The oil field which has been formed at its bottom by organic substances driven from the Vietnam's rivers to *Bien Dong* is unmistakably a Vietnamese national heritage.
- 5) The sea-faring Viet people who were our remote ancestors did have the run of *Bien Dong* several millennia ago. *Hoang-Sa and Truong-Sa* Archipelagoes located in that sea have been their centers of activities since the end of the Ice Age.
- 6) For their geographic location, both *Hoang-Sa and Truong-Sa* Archipelagoes are quite nearer Vietnam than China's mainland. Both in terms of physical geography, are obviously located on the natural prolongation of Vietnam's mainland.

With regard to the Vietnamese-called *Bien Dong* and the Chinese-called *Nan-Hai*, some clarification should be made about them as follows :

Vietnam has more than 2000 kilometers of sea-coast starting from its northern frontier with China to the Gulf of Siam/ Thailand.

The eastern part of that long sea-coast has had, since time immemorial, the appellation of *Bien Dong*. This appellation has been widely used among the common people in Vietnam as evidenced by its frequent appearance in Vietnamese folk-songs and common sayings.

It has been found translated into foreign languages, particularly into French as *l'Ocean Oriental* (cf. *Methode pour etudier la geographie*, 1736, by l'Abbe Nicolas DuFresnoy [1674-1755]).

Following are a few instances of those folk-songs and common sayings related to *Bien Dong*:

-- "*Our debt of gratitude to our father is like a soaring high mountain !*

*Our debt of gratitude to our mother is like the **Bien Dong** immense waters !"*

-- "If husband and wife get along well together,

*They would easily drain of even the **Bien Dong's** waters !"*

*-- "Poor Da-trang (a kind of small crab) vainly attempting to carry sand for filling up the **Bien Dong** !"*

-- "In case someone ("ai" implying some damsel addressed to by a young man) has seen enough of Huong-Thuy and Ngu-Binh,

Let her go together with me to Binh-Dinh, if she is pleased with the proposal.

True, Binh- Dinh is not as smart as the Capital of the Kingdom,

But Binh-Dinh has no dry, arid ground.

Furthermore, it has six chains of high mountains.

*There are also the **Bien Dong** with its overflowing waves,*

And the high older tower which will be used as a pen-brush to

write down your hero's name on the blue clouds !"

*-- 'This morning as I (King Dinh Tien-Hoang) got to the **Bien Dong** for a bath,*

I have subdued an emerging nine-twisted dragon, Heigh-ho !

Where are you going to, riding on that kind of snake ?

I am going to stroke the Tiger's beard ! (= to face up to my formidable enemy ! Heigh-ho !"

(cf. *So-thao dia-danh Viet-Nam qua Ca-dao, Phong-dao va Tuc-ngu* by Ha Mai-Phuong & Chu Thu-Hang).

As can just be seen, the Bien Dong appellation has so deeply entered the popular consciousness that it has been commonly used by the Vietnamese to denominate the Eastern Sea of Vietnam. However an awkward question may arise: Why has that Vietnamese-called *Bien Dong* also been called *Nan-Hai* by the Chinese and *Mer de Chine (meridionale)* and *South China Sea* by the Westerners ?

To properly solve the question, let us try looking up the above mentioned appellations in the most authoritative dictionaries !

According to the Chinese dictionary *Ts'u Hai*, "*Nan-Hai* is the name of a sea located to the South of *Kwangtung and Fuchien*, to the West of the Taiwan Straits, to the East of Vietnam, a French colony. In the South there are the Malay Peninsula, Borneo Island, a British colony, the Philippines, an American colony. For these reasons, the sovereignty over the Sea is common to such countries as China, England, France, USA and Japan (cf. *Ts'u Hai*, reprinted in 1948, p. 218).

Another Chinese dictionary, *Ts'u Yuan* gives a similar definition of *Nan-Hai* and also locates it to the *south of Kwangtung and Fuchien*, however we find here a novel detail: the demarcation between the

Hai-Nan Straits and the Gulf of Tonkin (Ts'u Yuan, 1949 re-edition, p. 234).

Always in Ts'u Yuan but in its Hong Kong 1951 revised edition, reprinted in 1984, Nan-Hai is presented as follows: "Nan-Hai is the name of a sea which was formerly called Chang-Hai (Sino-Vietnamese: Chuong-Hai). It is called by the foreigners South China Sea, located to the South of Fuchien and Kwangtung, to the West of Taiwan and the Philippines, to the East of Indochina Peninsula and the Malay Peninsula, to the North of Borneo Island and Sumatra Island. For sometime in the past *Nan Hai* did cover even the Indian Ocean; therefore, we should not confine its limits to the areas as just mentioned above." (cf. Ts'u Yuan, Kai Pien Pan, Hong Kong 1984, p. 94.)

In the preceding definitions of Nan-Hai as just quoted, there are the following note worthy details:

1) *Chang Hai*, the former name of *Nan Hai* is located in the south 50 miles from *Hai Phong* (Kwangtung) district. Thus, Nan Hai is located to the South of Fuchien and Kwangtung as also mentioned in the preceding documents.

2) Let us note a new detail in *Ts'u Yuan, Kai Pien Pan* namely: *Nan Hai* is called South China Sea by the foreigners (that's the Westerners).

3) We don't know on what historical basis, *Ts'u Yuan Kai Pien Pan* has claimed that "for sometime in the past *Nan Hai* did cover even the Indian Ocean" !

A comparative reexamination of the three preceding documents on Nan Hai has led us to the following remarks:

a) All the three have located *Nan Hai* to the South of *Fuchien and Kwangtung*.

b) The first document, that is *Ts'u Hai* (1948) stated that *Nan Hai* is stretching far to the south to reach the Malay Peninsula and advocated that China shared sovereignty over *Nan Hai* together with England, France, the US and Japan.

c) The second document, that is *Ts'u Yuan* (1949) was the only one to give a demarcation between the *Hai Nan* Straits and the Gulf of Tonkin then a French colony.

d) The last document, that is *Ts'u Yuan, Kai Pien Pan* (1951, 1984) took advantage of the ambiguous appellations *Mer de Chine (m+ridionale)*, *South China Sea* to suggest that *Nan Hai* might have stretched away very far to the South, for sometime as far as to and beyond the *Indian Ocean* !

In our humble opinion, formerly *Nan Hai* of China might have stretched to around the *Hai Nan* Straits whose name precisely means "*an island off South-China*".

Our above opinion is based on the following definition of *Nan Hai* found in a Chinese-English dictionary whose authors are all highly respectable Chinese Scholars: "*Nan Hai*: (1) name of a county in Kwangtung Province. (2) *the Southern Sea*, stretching from the Taiwan Straits to Kwangtung. (3) in old China, a term *far faraway places in the South* ." (cf. A New Practical Chinese - English Dictionary - Editor in Chief: Liang Shih-Chiu; Editors: Chu Liang-Chen, David Shao, Jeffrey C. Tung, Chung Lu Shen - The Far East Book Co. LTD, Hong-Kong 1971, page 121, column 2).

We have found in the *Ts'u Yuan, Kai Pien Pan* the new appellation *Nan Chung Kuo Hai* for Nan Hai, appellation which must have been influenced by such appellations as *South China Sea*, *Mer de Chine (meridionale)* given by the Westerners. (cf. supra Ts'u Yuan, Kai Pien Pan: "*Ngoai nhan xung Nam Trung-Quoc Hai*").

All these three appellations are very vague terms that may be interpreted variously, they have been obviously interpreted by the Ts'u Yuan, Kai Pien Pan as meaning the *Chinese Sea to the South* whereas, in fact, they only mean the sea off South-China as evidenced by the definition No 2 in the Chinese - English dictionary by Liang Shih Chi et alii.

The real meaning of Nan Hai as being: the Sea off South-China has been clearly confirmed by the definitions respectively given by the *Dai Kanwa Jiten* by T. Morohashi, vol. 2 (Tokyo 1957, page 566, column 2) and the *Longman Dictionary of English. Language and Culture* (London 1992, p. 209, col. 2) as follows: "*Nan Hai* = Minami - Shina Kai" (= Sea of South-China). *China Sea* = the part of the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of China."

*

After the Chinese mainland fell to the Communists' control and especially since 1954, for political reasons, the Chinese Maoists have rewritten the histories and reconstructed the maps of both China and the Southeast Asia to carry out Mao Zedong's expansionists designs. One of their urgent tasks is to redefine the name *Nan-Hai* so as to achieve their hegemonist policy.

At present, Communist China has declared its sovereignty over 80 per cent of the so-called *Nan-Hai*, leaving only a small portion of the adjacent international waters to Vietnam and other disputing coastal countries. Due to historical, economical and political reasons, it has no regards for protests from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. It considers *Nan-Hai* as its "*inner waters*", in the same way as the Roman Empire had dubbed the Mediterranean Sea *Mare Nostrum*, claiming Roman sovereignty over it !

Communist China did not recognize the 1954 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea (CLOS) with its regulations regarding the territorial, contiguous waters and continental shelf of the coastal countries. However, in fact, it had no protest against the 1968 Republic of Vietnam's claim to the Vietnamese continental shelf. After defeating South Vietnam, Hanoi also reclaimed its sovereignty over the territorial and continental shelf waters. Again, there was no protest from Communist China.

The most recent wrong doing by Communist China was to build up several military installations on the Mischief Reefs and other underwater reefs in the extreme-east of the Spratly Archipelago which the Philippines have been claiming as part of their territory. Communist China has beefed up its islands' occupational forces and naval power in its so called "*Inner waters*", showing thereby its will to control the Eastern Sea Archipelagoes with their ample petroleum and gas potential resources, much as if "a breast-feeder forcing her big breast onto the baby's mouth to stop him from crying" ! Communist China is used to quiet down the weaker countries by pressuring them into bilateral negotiations in view to finally getting the upper hands over them.

In accordance with the Vietnamese common belief in the respect for the whole truth and the international justice, the Committee for the Protection of Vietnam's Territorial Integrity solemnly requests that all matters of disagreements must be taken to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

Dia-ly Bien Dong voi Hoang-Sa va Truong-Sa by Scholar Vu Huu-San is a strictly scientific essay, leaving out for the time being the most decisive historical and legal considerations.

We totally agree with him that the Vietnamese have always a genuine love for the Truth and a scrupulous respect for the Law, that they are always the devout and earnest believers in the splendid future resulting from a fair international cooperation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is just capable of bringing back the now disturbed harmony between the rival countries by realizing a stable agreement on an international regime for the Sea.

If the mankind and civilization have made so far such an advance as today, It is obviously due to a universal consciousness of the established international order.

With the current international Public Law, there is no reason at all for a bellicose country to attack and occupy by force another weaker country's territory !

Dia-ly Bien Dong voi Hoang-Sa va Truong-Sa aims primarily at telling out all the truth about the Eastern Sea.

Once the common people and the finest Chinese independent scholars of China have become quite aware of the real situation, they will certainly be ready to thoroughly sympathize with the Vietnamese

and from the Eastern Sea will hopefully disappear for ever the "men killing men" horrible misdeeds! There is no reason why so many different human races living together around the Eastern Sea cannot make good their long overdue dream of everlasting peace and mutual cooperation !

Nguyen Du-Phu -- Ha Mai-Phuong

<http://paracels.freetzi.com/vnsovere.htm>



Chinese-Perfect Strangers of the Eastern Sea

Vu Huu San

Chinese are Purely Land Men

Ricci and his fellow priest, Michele Ruggieri, stayed for seven years in Chao-ch'ing, a town west of Canton. They built a mission house, and despite popular suspicion and occasional hails of rocks from the hostile populace, they were accepted as men of learning. On the wall of the mission's reception room Ricci mounted his map of the world. As Ricci himself reported:

Of all the great nations, the Chinese have had the least commerce, indeed, one might say that they have had practically no contact whatever, with outside nations, and consequently they are grossly ignorant of what the world in general is like. True, they had charts somewhat similar to this one, that were supposed to represent the whole world, but their universe was limited to their own fifteen provinces, and in the sea painted around it they had placed a few islands to which they gave the names of different kingdoms they had heard of. All of these islands put together would not be as large as the smallest of the Chinese provinces. With such a limited knowledge, it is evident why they boasted of their kingdom as being the whole world, and why they call it Thienhia, meaning, everything under the heavens. When they learned that China was only a part of the great east, they considered such an idea, so unlike their own, to be something utterly impossible, and they wanted to be able to read about it, in order to form a better judgment....

Ricci also gave some notes about the Chinese nature as following:

We must mention here another discovery which helped to win the good will of the Chinese. To them the heavens are round but the earth is flat and square, and they firmly believe that their empire is right in the middle of it. They do not like the idea of our geographies pushing their China into one corner of the Orient. They could not comprehend the demonstrations proving that the earth is a globe, made up of land and water, and that a globe of its nature has neither beginning nor end. The geographer was therefore obliged to change his design and, by omitting the first meridian of the Fortunate Islands, he left a margin on either side of the map, making the Kingdom of China to appear right in the center. This was more in keeping with their ideas and it gave them a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction. Really, at that time and in the particular circumstances, one could not have hit upon a discovery more appropriate for disposing this people for the reception of the faith....

Because of their ignorance of the size of the earth and the exaggerated opinion they have of themselves, the Chinese are of the opinion that only China among the nations is deserving of admiration. Relative to the grandeur of empire, of public administration and of reputation for learning, they look upon all other people not only as barbarous but as unreasoning animals. To them there is no other place on earth that can boast of a king, of a dynasty, or of culture. The more their pride is inflated by this ignorance, the more humiliated they become when the truth is revealed. (See "The Discoverers", Daniel J. Boorstin, Random House, New York, 1983, pp. 56-64)

Another Western scholar, James Fairgrieve, in his books "Geography and World Power" (London, 1921), 242, has written: "China has never been a sea-power because nothing has ever induced her people to be otherwise than landmen, and landmen dependent on agriculture with the same habit and ways of thinking drilled into them through forty centuries."

In a recent work, we find this statement in a very fine book: "Essentially a land people, the Chinese cannot be considered as having possessed sea-power.... The attention of the Chinese through the centuries have been turned inward towards Central Asia rather than outward, and their knowledge of the seas which washed their coast was extremely small." (E. B. Elridge, *The Background of Eastern Sea Power*; Melbourne, 1948, 47.)

There are many reasons that The Chinese did not develop as a seafaring nation. (since 2634 B.C.) The main reason was that the vast land-mass of China absorbed their energies. Equally, the absence of neighbouring nations with whom to trade played a large part in the development of the introspective conservatism of the Chinese. However, Taiwan (Formosa) was noted for its fishing and an active local trade existed with the mainland.

In the legends of China, chronicled in the *Shu Ching* (Canon of History), the first three emperors, Fu Hsi, Shen Nung and Huang Ti, are each credited with a share in the invention of all the main activities of the people, including matrimony, building houses and the introduction of a calendar, but no mention is made of the sea, ships or of fishing (although hunting is mentioned). It is against this background that the virtual absence of Chinese sea-legend and sea sagas has to be viewed. (See Duncan Haws and Alex A.Hurst, *"The Maritime History of the World, -A Chronological Survey of Maritime Events From 5,000 B.C. until the Present Day, Supplemented by Commentaries"*, Teredo Books Ltd., Brighton Sussex, 1985.)

In the Introduction Chapter of "The Nanhai Trade", Wang Gungwu also writes: The Chinese civilisation rose from the land, from the Huang Ho Plain far from the mouth of the river. When it rose, its world consisted of the fields in which the people tilled and for which they often fought, the rivers they feared and tried to control and the towns and fortresses where they hid from their enemies. The sea was only known as a peaceful boundary to the east that yielded salt and fish and as a deep and limitless boundary that divided prince, sage and common man from the saints and immortals. (See "The Nanhai Trade", Kuala Lumpur, 1959, page 3.)

Scholar Pin Ti Ho, who found out the backwardness in the Chinese ability to adapt with the water environment, have clearly identified that: "...It is sufficiently clear, therefore, that the rise of agriculture and civilization bore no direct relation whatever to the flood plain of the Yellow River, and that, of all the ancient peoples who developed higher civilizations in the Old and the New Worlds, the Chinese were the last to know irrigation." (See Pin Ti Ho, "The Cradle of the East", Chicago Press, 1975, page 48.)

Vietnamese are Naturally Seamen and Indigenious of the Easter Sea

On the contrary with the Chinese nature, Vietnamese have always been the experts in the arts of naval warfare and maritime transportation since the very ancient time.

The Han Chinese wrote of southerners Viet people as follows "The Yüeh people by nature a indolent and undisciplined. They travel to remote places by water and use boats as we use carts and oars as we use horses. When they come (north - to attack) they float along and when they leave (withdraw) they are hard to follow. They enjoy fighting and are not afraid to die." (See "Eighth Voyage of the Dragon", Bruce Swanson, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1982, page 11-12).

The vessels of the Yüeh in the Warring States period, however, were not all naval, and we can be sure that there were trading expeditions at least along the coasts of Siberia, Korea and Indochina. There were also some explorations of the Pacific itself. And of course, as ever, inland water transport. (See Needham, Joseph; Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-Djen, "Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 4: Physics and Physical Technology, part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics" Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971, page 441.)

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The off-shore ships of the Tonking (North Vietnam) Area were surprisingly big and so technically advanced for the Chinese observations. A 3rd-century text of capital importance does so, however. It occurs in the Nan Chou I Wu Chih (Strange Things of the South), written by Wan Chen, and run as follows:

The people of foreign parts (wai yu jen) call chhuan (ships) po. The large ones are more than 20 chang in length (up to 150 ft.), and stand out of the water 2 or 3 chang (about 15 to 23 ft.). At a distance they look like 'flying galleries' (ko tao) and they can carry from 600 to 700 persons, with 10,000 bushels (hu) of cargo.

The people beyond the barriers (wai chiao jen), according to the sizes of their ships, sometimes rig (as many as) four sails, which they carry in a row from bow to stern. From the leaves of the lu-thou tree, which have the shape of 'yung', and are more 1 chang (about 7.5 ft.) long, they weave the sails.

The four sails do not face directly forwards. but are set obliquely, and so arranged that they can all be fixed in the same direction, to receive the wind and to spill it (Chhi ssu fan pu cheng chhien hsiang, chieh shih hsieh i hsiang chu, i chhufeng chhui feng). Those (sails which are) behind (the most windward one) (receiving the) pressure (of the wind), throw it from one to the other, so that they all profit from its force (Hou che chi erh hsiang she, i ping te feng li). If it is violent, they (the sailors) diminish or augment (the sails) to receive from one another the breath of the wind, obviates the anxiety attendant upon having high masts. Thus (these ships) sail without avoiding strong winds and dashing waves, by the aid of which they can make great speed."

This indeed a striking passage. It establishes without any doubt that in the +3rd century southerners, whether Cantonese or Annamese, were using four-masted ships with matting sails in a fore-and-aft rig of some kind. The Indonesian canted square-sail is not absolutely excluded, but it would be unwieldy on a vessel with several masts, and some kind of tall balanced lug-sail seem much more probable. (See Needham, Joseph, Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-Djen, "Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 4: Physics and Physical Technology, part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics" Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971, Page 600-601.) Viet Nam is a maritime country. None of the plains on which the great bulk of the population is concentrated lies very far from the coast.

"The sea therefore is constantly present in Vietnamese life. Its products, salt and fish, play a vital role in the diet. The legendary emperors who founded the Vietnamese monarchy are said to have had their thighs tattooed with sea monsters in order to ensure a victorious return from their fishing expeditions. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries English agents sent to Viet Nam by the East India Company acknowledged that the Vietnamese were the best sailors in the Far East. Even more than the often narrow coastal corridor of Central Viet Nam, the sea represents the main line of communication between north and south- it is therefore an essential element of Vietnamese National unity in the economic sphere." (Jean Chesneau "The Vietnamese Nation - Contribution To A History, Translated by Malcolm Salmon, Current Book Distributors Pty. Ltd. Sydney, 1966)

Western merchants also testified to the hospitality of the Vietnamese. By the old tradition of the sailors, they have especially expressed the genuine kindness towards other mariners, as described in a memo on trade with this region written probably between 1690 and 1700:

When a vessel is shipwrecked, it get a better welcome (in Cochinchina) than anywhere else.. Ships come out from shore to salvage the equipment; nets are used to recover merchandise which has fallen overboard. In fact, no effort is spared to put the ship back into good condition. (See Taboulet, "La geste française en Indochine." Paris, 1955, Vol. 1, p. 87.)

Like his fellow Jesuits Ricci and de Nobili in China and India, de Rhodes never looked on the oriental

Vietnamese as "underdeveloped" or even as just plain hungry, benightedly awaiting the benefits of Western technocracy and superior social structures. (See Rhodes Of Vietnam, The Travels and Missions of Father Alexander de Rhodes in China and Other Kingdoms of the Orient, Translated by Solange Hertz, The Newman Press - Westminster, Maryland, 1966.)

Two years before the "Mayflower" put ashore at Massachusetts, a Portuguese Jesuit priest, Cristoforo Borri (the same Father Borri, have mentioned above), landed with brother missionaries in Faifo, a Vietnamese port located near the present city of Danang in Central Vietnam. (The Portuguese called all of Vietnam below the 18th parallel Cochinchina; they called the people Cochinchinese, to distinguish them from the Chinese of China proper.)

Father Borri came as a friend and was so received by Vietnamese. This delightful mathematician expressed great enthusiasm for the local inhabitants, even commenting on the women's feminine charms! Extolling their attire, he wrote that "though decent, it is so becoming that one believes one is witnessing a gracious flowering springtime." (See Georges Taboulet, "La geste Française en Indochine," Paris, 1955, p. 59.) The record he left compares the people with those of China, where his journeys for the faith had also taken him. To his evident delight, he found the Cochinchinese truly hospitable and "superior to the Chinese in their wit and courage" (See Helen B. Lamb, "Vietnam's Will to Live - Resistance to Foreign Aggression from Early Times Through the Nineteenth Century", Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1972.)

The "South China Sea" has never been Chinese.

The Vietnamese Eastern Sea (Chinese South China Sea) probably did not enter the Chinese geographical lexicon any earlier than the Han dynasty with the absorption of southern China. During that era, Ma Yuan led a fleet of approximately 2,000 vessels to carry out the conquest of Northern Vietnam. As a result of this successful military venture, the South China Sea might become an area of interest to Chinese historians and geographers, but they made no specific references to its islands and atolls - since then - for several centuries.

Though recent announcement of Chinese archaeological findings in the Paracel Islands confirm some contact with the islands as early as the Wang Mang interregnum, there is no proof that such contact was exclusively Chinese. On the contrary, the sea route connecting T'ien-chu (India) and Fu-nan (Cambodia) with Canton (known as Nan-hai chun or commandary of the Southern Sea) was well established by the first century, but was dominated by non-Chinese seamen for many centuries thereafter. Even as the importance of the Southern Sea trade grew in the third and fourth centuries, there is not any textual evidence to suggest any official Chinese cognizance of the island atolls. Indeed, not even the otherwise well chronicled voyages of the monks Fa Hsien and I Ching, offers indirect, let alone unequivocal mention of the islands of the South China Sea". (See Jon M. Van Dyke & Dale L. Bennett, "Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South China" Yearbook 1993, The University of Chicago.

Fa Hsien was surely a traveling Buddhist Monk. Like any other Chinese at that time, they all rode non-Chinese ship as the common passengers.

Chinese shipping on the South China coast was usually insignificant; and the passage makes it clear that some 'transfer" must have taken place. The fact is that the chief ships sailing along the China coast were those of the Yüeh. Since the majority of the people of the southern coasts were not "sinicized" till much later one, in some cases not until the T'ang dynasty (618-907) would be wrong to call the Yüeh sailors and shipbuilders of this early period "Chinese" just because their territories were under Chinese rule. Theirs could well have been the ships which first took the imperial agents out to some Nanhai mart where a transfer was made to "barbarian" vessels for the rest of the journey. But as the Yüehs had

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

now become the subjects of the Han empire (-206 to 219), the author of the passage might have thought of them as Chinese. In this text, however, it is still necessary to make the distinction between the Yüehs and the Chinese... (See "Nanhai trade," Wang Gungwu, Kuala Lumpur, 1959, page 23.)

South Sea, the places so stranger and so far-away with the Chinese

Since the third century B.C., when Chinese armies invaded the South, the settlers from the north first came to the region, they occupied the land and displaced the indigenous Yueh peoples. Slowly and steady migrations of Chinese had made their way to the water world.

But, because their high plateau originality, the Chinese did not know much about the vast sea located right next to their southern borders until very recently. The Viet bronze vessels were described so vaguely in Chinese books and even the river water in the Nam Nam Areas was completely out of the natural matter!

Attention was drawn by Julien (Stanislas, Notes sur l'Emploi Militaire de Cerfs-Volants, et sur les Bateaux et Vaisseaux en Fer et en Cuivre, Tire'e des Livres Chinois, Comptes Rendus hebdomadaires de l'Acad. des Sciences, Paris, 1847, no. 21, p. 1070.) to the fact that Chinese writings of the early + 4th century refer to the covering of junk bottoms with copper. Thus the Shih I Chi, by Wang Chia, referring to an embassy from the Jan-Chhiu I kingdom in the legendary reign of Chheng Wang, says: a 'Floating on the seething seas, the ambassadors came on a boat which had copper (or bronze plates) attached to its bottom, so that the crocodiles and dragons could not come near it.' (Among the Chinese texts which mention boats of bronze or copper are the Lin-I Chi, Shui Ching Chu, Nan Yüeh Chih, Thai-Phing Huan Yü Chi, Fang Yü Chi, and the Yuan-Ho Chün Hsien Thu Chih (+814.)

It has now been shown that stories of metal boats occur abundantly in the early Chinese literature of folklore and legend. They are particularly common in South China and Annam, where they often form part of the epic exploits of the Han general, Ma Yüan, who restored the far south to Chinese allegiance in the campaign of + 42 to + 44. The bronze or copper boats of which people see the vestiges are thus associated with the setting up of bronze columns to mark the southern limits of the empire, the casting of bronze oxen as landmarks, and the building of canals to shorten sea voyages or make them more safe. (See Hou Han Shu, also in the late +7th-century encyclopaedia Chhu Hsüeh Chi, and Thai-Phing Huan Yü Chi.)

The evidential texts date from all periods between the + 3rd and the + 9th centuries, but the only one which specifically mentions the bottom of a ship is the early + 4th century Shih I Chi. Although it is quite possible, as sinologists tend to think, that the idea of using metal in the construction of boats was purely magical and imaginary in origin, it is at any rate equally possible that some southern group of shipwrights in those ages had the services of smiths who beat metal into plates fit for nailing to the hulls of their craft to protect the timbers ... But iron armour for (Viet) warships was no legend, as we shall see ... (See Needham, Joseph; Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-Djen, "Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 4: Physics and Physical Technology, part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics" Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971, page 665.)

Further more, in one of Chinese tall stories about the south; the early +6th-century Shu I Chi describes a river in Tshang-chou the water of which is so dense that metal and stone will not sink in it - the opposite of the 'weak water' - , and conceivably an echo of the Dead Sea ... So the (South Barbarian) people make boats of stoneware and iron when they want to cross it. (See Needham, Joseph; Note f, page 665.)

Chinese Junk in History, Art and Literature

Among the meager arts and crafts practiced by primitive man, the knowledge of how to propel himself

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

in or on some form of floating vessel was so certainly acquired from the very earliest time that this fact has been taken for granted by all ethnologists and antiquaries.

According to Chinese legendary history, all useful inventions, together with the philosophy of the sages, were said to be mentioned in the earliest of the classics, the "I Ching", or "Book of Changes," and its appendices. The art of boatbuilding is also claimed by some (although this is difficult to believe) to be represented in the system of symbols of which the "I Ching" consists. One of these appendices, written after the time of Confucius, describes how Fu Hsi, the first of the five great rulers, traditionally dated 2852 B.C., taught the people many useful arts, including that of fishing with nets and how to make the first boats. These were built by "hewing planks and shaping and planing wood."

Tradition makes a lot of Fu Hsi, who was credited with being the offspring of a nymph and a rainbow. One of the most outstanding of the legends describes how celestial aid was sent him in his efforts for the enlightenment of his people by the sudden appearance of a "dragon" horse bearing a scroll on which were inscribed the eight mystic trigrams known as the pa-kua, which play so important a part in Chinese divination and philosophy. Little more is told us of this interesting personality except that he "dwelt in a hall, wore robes, introduced rafts and carts," and fittingly terminated his picturesque career by ascending to heaven on a dragon's back. (The Junks & Sampans of the Yangtze, G. R. G. Worcester, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 1971, pp. 7.)

More or less authentic descriptions and paintings, dating back to 2600 B.C., exist of the ships of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and even of India and Persia. That is to say, the data available can be safely assumed to be so tolerably accurate in general that these ships can be reasonably reconstructed, and many old pictures of them are to be found which would not offend the historian or the sailor; but there is nothing of the kind relating to ancient Chinese junks'. No chapter in the history of China is so incomplete - as that concerning ships and sailors. There is no general collection of pictures, nor can literary sources be regarded as satisfactory. (The Junks & Sampans of the Yangtze, G. R. G. Worcester, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 1971, pp. 9.)

The Shang people lived by agriculture, herding flocks and cattle, and by hunting. They were by no means a nautical people.

Excavations carried out at Anyang show that the Shang people buried with their dead a great variety of objects, some of exquisite workmanship. Moreover, their royal tombs were most elaborately constructed and decorated. It is infinitely to be regretted that nothing nautical, apparently, has come down to us. The inclusion of but one model boat would have been of inestimable assistance to nautical research. So cultured were these people, unlike some of the dynasties which followed them, that great reliance could have been placed on any contribution they made.

The Shangs were conquered by the Chous, who founded the dynasty of that name. At first they were vastly inferior in their culture and quite unimportant from a nautical point of view except that they produced that great man the Duke Chou, who is credited by some with the invention of the compass, and this dynasty provided much literary material, notably the "I Ching", or "Book of Changes"; the "Shang Shu", or "Book of History"; the "Shih Ching", or "Book of Poetry," and others which will be referred to later.

Interesting as all this may be, it casts no real light on the subject of nautical research in China. In default, therefore, of any reliable records of Chinese craft, the would-be historian, in trying to trace their evolution, is naturally led to make researches into the craft of contemporary or more ancient civilizations in that cradle of all civilizations, the Near East, and then to endeavor to link up with, or in some way explain, the Chinese types. The more this method is pursued, the more similarities come to light, so that it would seem that so many licenses could not be due to mere coincidence. Yet, unhappily, the exact opposite is equally easy to prove.

In seeking to trace the origins of the various types of craft it is natural to study not only the sculpture, literature, drawing, and painting of a country, but also its ceramic art, together with coins and seals, which have all, in the West, proved such a fruitful field for nautical research.

Very little can be gleaned from the earliest known representations of Chinese craft. Probably the oldest are three sampans on a sculptured slab of stone from a rock tomb of the Later Han dynasty, A.D. 25-221, situated fairly close to the tomb of Confucius at Hsiao T'ang Shan. These are depicted as assisting in the operation entitled "the Urn of Chou being brought out of the river." The seated occupants of the boats use a paddle, while in one boat a man stands with a pole, which he may be using either as a quant or as a sounding-pole.

Probably the second oldest portrayal of sampans is similarly sculptured on the walls of a stone tomb of a family named Wu, at Tzù Yün Shan, also in Shantung, dated about A.D. 147. These craft are heavier in type and have a more characteristic shape. The method of propulsion seems to be more in the nature of an oar than a paddle and is still operated from the stern.

As sculptors in stone the Chinese have produced very little else that is of interest to the nautically-minded. It is notable that in their stone or earthenware tomb figures and articles junks play no part at all. Except for those described above and the much-quoted fresco at Ajunta, in India, to be described later, which, even if it represents a Chinese junk, was probably not executed by a Chinese artist, there are no other murals of note showing junks, and the only examples of junks carved in stone are the fanciful jade or soapstone objets d'art from the curio shops or, last and worst of all, the Dowager Empress's marble boat in the Summer Palace in Peking. This stone atrocity of dreadful design was built from funds which had been ear-marked for the navy.

As regards drawing and painting, junks and sampans frequently appear as motifs in early Chinese paintings of all dynasties after the Han dynasty, of which no authentic drawing or painting has come down to us. Some of the early representations clearly incorporate many features and fittings still in use to-day; but these are accidents reflecting more credit on the artist's powers of observation than his knowledge of rigging and seamanship. It is noteworthy that the Chinese artists confine themselves to painting the craft of river and lake, never do they attempt the sea-going type of junk. They never drew a boat for the sake of the boat, but only as an accessory because a sage, philosopher, or high official happened to be meditating in the vicinity.

Landscapes, in particular those depicting mountains and streams, rank highest in Chinese paintings, after which come studies of birds and flowers, dragons, and mythical creatures and animals. Chinese art is so stylistic that everything is cast in a stereotype mould. The rules require that any large sheet of water portrayed should be studded with sails, and a recognized technique was developed. (The Junks & Sampans of the Yangtze, G. R. G. Worcester, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 1971, pp. 14.)

It is difficult to arrive at any conclusion from many of these drawings owing to the obviously inadequate knowledge some of the artists had of the craft they illustrated. The Chinese practice of repeating famous pictures, with variations sometimes, and their habit of copying earlier masters is a great help to the student of the periods and styles of ancient artists but it is unfortunately no help to nautical research. In the study of Chinese art due allowance must always be made for the conventionality of the drawing, and this applies with equal force in the matter of Chinese junks.

In Chinese literature there is much more material upon which to draw, although the allusions are not very specific or instructive. There are always references to junks and sampans in the classics and the old dictionaries. Vague mention is made to the tribute brought by various tribes to the Emperor Yü, which are described as "floating along down the rivers Huai, Ssü, and Huang ." The semi-barbarous kingdom of Yüeh, comprising what is now Chekiang, about 472 B.C. had the largest navy of any of

the feudal states and fought always on water, never using war chariots. There was a 21-years' war between this tribe and the state of Wu. The state of Yüeh became a maritime power, and it is probable that, when it is said that the Chinese reached the Yangtze cape in 1200 B.C., this was the occasion of the foundation of this maritime tribe.

Although the date of 1200 B.C. has been asserted with some confidence as being the time that the sea coast in the vicinity of the Yangtze was first reached, it seems far more probable that the Chinese had started their maritime adventures at a very much earlier date, although their excursions would have doubtless been at first confined to fishing, fighting, and other purely local activities.

Sea fights are specifically mentioned as early as 473 B.C., and it is stated in the "Shih Chi", the first general history of China, dating back to about 90 B.C., that:

The King of the Wu kingdom made an attack upon the Ch'i kingdom from the sea, but was defeated and turned home.

Two years later, in a contest between these two marine kingdoms, the ruler of the Yüeh ordered his general to proceed along the coast and carry out an attack up the Huai River, which at that time entered the sea by its own estuary.

Among the many voluminous Chinese dictionaries, there is the " Shuo Wen by Hsu Shen, who died in A.D. 120. It comprises some 10,000 characters, but, despite numerous references to ships, there is nothing really descriptive of any craft that can be used as evidence of the existence of any definite type at any particular time.

In respect of one of the earliest mentioned voyages to the East, researches into the "Book of History " and the " Book of Odes " reveal how it is recorded that in 219 B.C. the Emperor Shih Huang, of the Ch'in dynasty, ordered Hsu Shih to go on an expedition with "several tens of thousands of youths and maidens to search for the three fairy Isles of the Blest." Other authorities have described how they started off from Shantung, and it is confirmed by various sources that they actually reached Japan. Unhappily, history does not appear to relate what success attended their mission. (The Junks & Sampans of the Yangtze, G. R. G. Worcester, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 1971, pp. 16.)

In Europe, coins and, later, seals form a useful source of our knowledge of the craft of the ancients. From seals especially the evolution of the sailing ship can be followed. By their aid the development of the rudder, the growth of the fore-castle and poop, rigging, the bowsprit, and even fenders can be accurately traced and, which is so important, dated. Unhappily there is nothing of the kind in China.

The Ku Pu spade coins, so called on account of their shape, are said to originate from the middle of the Chou dynasty, 1122-255 B.C., but it was not until some 2,000 years later, in 1931 to be exact, that anything nautical made its appearance. This was on the Sun Yat Sen 1 yuan. The very fine representation of a junk thereon is said to typify the ship of state, with Sun Yat Sen's Three Principles depicted by the three birds overhead, the Kuo-min-tang, being the sun's rays. This was issued at a time when Japan took the Three Eastern Provinces. The issue was recalled and the dies changed as it was thought that the three birds were the three provinces flying away from China under the influence of the sun rays of Japan. This coin is now very valuable and is extremely artistic. (The Junks & Sampans of the Yangtze, G. R. G. Worcester, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 1971, pp. 14.)

Finally, Worcester went to an conclusion like this: "And so we leave our researches with a final regret that Chinese painting, literature, and culture in all its many forms and with its amazing and continuous tradition of 2,000 years should contain so little about her ships and sailors."

Acquisition by Discovery ?

"Discover" is defined in "Webster's Dictionary" as :

1. to be the first to find out, see, or know about.
2. to find out; learn of the existence of, realize.
3. (a) to reveal; disclose; expose; (b) to uncover. [Archaic.]

Syn.- invent, manifest, declare, disclose, reveal, divulge, uncover.
China claims: China discovered the Nansha and Xisha Islands over 2,100 years ago, during the Han Dynasty. The discoverers, Admiral Yang Pu and his subordinates, were sent by the Emperor of the Han Dynasty".

People realized that the Chinese has just known Southeast Asia, especially Bien Dong very late, supposedly 2,100 years ago. Long time before, as least 4,000 years ago, the local people Southeast Asian, including Vietnamese had adventure to go out the Sea to reach the most remote shores of Siberia, India, Africa.... In more ancient time, the first "Boat People" of Bien Dong certainly reached Australia after long raft journey. Such 60,000 years old expeditions for sea discoveries was already certified by Scientists.

According to international law and custom at the time, "who discovers the territory, holds its sovereignty." Since Southeast Asians, the local inhabitants; clearly maritime oriented, discovered the Nansha and Xisha Islands; Chinese, originally land people from a far away country, can not hold the sovereignty over these islands.

Before the eighteenth century, discovery and symbolic occupation were enough for a claim of sovereignty, and China's claim of sovereignty over Truong-Sa and Hoang-Sa (Chinese Nansha and Xisha Islands) could have been sufficient to be recognized as valid. However, since the eighteenth century, claims of sovereignty by discovery need to be followed by effective occupation and acts of authority. All these facts was never qualified for the Chinese verifications.

Because there was not Vietnamese writing 2,100 year ago, the Chinese Han history books must be considered as the best evidence and we invite a joint study. Even the best investigation can not reveal any clues about Paracels/ Spratleys discovering. No any trace relating the "knowing" or "seeing" was mentioned in there!

After reading Han Shu, Vietnamese or anybody else believed that Chinese Admirals as Yang Pu or Ma Yuen, in most of their war-times, walked. Yang Pu walked to P'an-yu (the modern city of Canton) then stopped there. Ma Yuen marched with his armies thousand miles more. Both of them seldom rode Nam-phuong Lau-thuyen (Viet's boats) hundred miles the most, they did not go South very far, and nothing in History can prove that they went offshore!


It is necessary to give a short comment here. These were the first two Chinese wars invading the South (Nan Yüeh then, Viet Nam now), Commanding Generals betitled Admirals but Chinese Admirals had no Chinese-build ship. All their vessels were "nan fang lou hsiang" -nam phuong lau thuyen in Vietnamese. Nan fang was, at that time, named for the People of State in the South, Nan Man or Nan Yüeh People. The ship crew may be South People too! Chinese could build ship but in much later time...

The cases of Paracel and Spratly Archipelagoes

Chinese officials, long preoccupied with their continental empire and more specifically with the northwest, had an equally vague sense of the sea as a separate world in its own right, different from

the land in its movements, rhythms, and dynamics. Although they implicitly recognized the zones of the water world—coastal strip, inshore waters (nan-hai), and creep sea (nan-yang)—they did not conceive of them as an integrated whole.

It is not surprising, then, that the vocabulary they used to describe their maritime environment is at best imprecise and unclear. Whereas in the West the terms sea and ocean are roughly differentiated to the extent that a sea is thought of as being bounded in some way, for the Chinese hai (sea) and yang (ocean) were completely interchangeable." Although a few cartographers did make a vague distinction between hai as the shallow waters lying immediately off the coast and yang as the deep waters farther out, it is impossible to find a Chinese map showing where one gave way to the other. Most Chinese maps label all expanses of water as one or the other. The only important distinction for the Chinese was between the "inner" (nei) sea or ocean and the "outer" (wai) sea or oceans. In the study of Dian H. Murray (1987), the waters referred to as the "inshore seas of the Nan-hai" usually appear on Chinese maps as either nei-hai or nei-yang; and those referred to as the "deep seas of the Nan-yang" usually appear as wai-hai or wai-yang.



Map shows the "inner" and "outer" oceans off Kwangtung province's south coast. Note how close to land the Chinese of the day thought the outer (largely unknown) ocean lay. Officials tended to perceive the "inner" ocean as the farthest extent of their authority. From Kuang-tung hai-fang hui-lan, Comp. Lu K'un and Ch'eng Hung-ch'ih, n.d.. Vol.

Although the (above) Map has no scale, it shows where Chinese cartographers and officials believed the outer-ocean lay. Places no farther from shore than the Ladrone Islands at the mouth of the Pearl River were placed in the wai-yang. For all practical purposes, that is to say, the outer-ocean began just beyond where the eye could see. In effect this meant that all outlying areas were virtually unknown.

They were also of little concern (about offshore lands). For example, although the Chinese made sweeping claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands, they made little attempt to incorporate them into their empires. As late as the nineteenth century cartographers still disagreed about their exact location, and Confucian literati regarded them as little more than "a series of navigation hazards [at] the eastern edge of China's maritime gateway."

Accordingly, the narrow zone of the inner sea marked the farthest seaward extent of active Chinese governance. In choosing not to make coastal control a high priority, Chinese officials forfeited the

opportunity to seize the military initiative in maritime China. As a result, theirs was a weak and passive presence in the heart of the water world. (See more arguments in *Pirates of the South China Coast 1790-1810*, Dian H. Murray, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1987.)

Conclusion: Chinese are Landmand and Perfect Strangers of the Easter Sea

The "have boat, will travel" argument, of course may not enough to convince China, but people also have many more critical arguments about the Chinese anti-maritime nature. So, this paperwork is long enough to go to the firm conclusion :

"Chinese are Purely Land Men and Perfect Strangers in the Eastern Sea".

<http://vanminhnuoc.freetzi.com/chinese1.htm>

The Paracels and Spratly islands history



The Tay Son dynasties and then the Nguyen Gia Long have defined Vietnam's sovereignty over the East Sea as well as the two archipelagos of Paracels (aka Hoang Sa) and Spratly (aka Truong Sa). Like the former Nguyen warlords, the Tây Sơn reign of Quang Trung - Nguyễn Huệ continued to organize Hoang Sa and Bac Hai teams with the main function of protecting and exploiting the remote archipelago of the East Sea. – Excerpt from “Emperor Quang Trung with Paracels (aka Hoang Sa) and Spratly (aka Truong Sa).”




John Barrow was an envoy of the Macartney mission who traveled from England to China and visited Da Nang in June 1793 (under Emperor Quang Toan). In “A Voyage to ‘Đàng Trong,’ in the year 1792-1793, it was described as follows: "The boat of Cochinchina has many different designs, which are used in trade along the seashore, fishing, gathering seafood and birds nest in the group of islands called Paracels (Hoang Sa). – Excerpt from “Emperor Quang Trung with Paracels (aka Hoang Sa) and Spratly (aka Truong Sa).” The boats from ‘Đàng Trong’ means under the period under the reign of Emperor Tay Son’s

... After the fall of Tay Son dynasty, Nguyen Gia Long continued its policy towards the East Sea, affirming Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels (aka Hoang Sa) and Spratly (aka Truong Sa) archipelagos. Under the Courts of Gia Long, Minh Mang, and Thieu Tri, they exercised their sovereignty in various forms of activities such as exploring, inspection, patrolling, harvesting artifact objects and seafood products, organizing tax collection and rescuing wrecked ships in the area; surveying, mapping, building worship shrines, setting up sovereignty postmarks, recording and building memorabilia on wood, planting trees for passers-by to recognizing. – According to “Emperor Quang Trung with Hoang Sa, Truong Sa.”

By Dong tinh hoai Ngo; English version by V.G.Tran

<http://www.truclamientu.info/library/the-paracels-spratly-history.html>

The President Ngo Dinh Diem to maintain sovereignty over the “East” Sea especially the Paracels (aka Hoang Sa) and Spratly (aka Truong Sa) Islands



On April 20, 1954, the Geneva Accords was signed; and divided the country into two regions: The north, Ho Chi Minh communist governed the so-called “Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” The South, the Republic of Vietnam was led by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem.

According to the Geneva Accords, after two years of dividing the country, the two regions of Vietnam must hold elections to unify the country. However, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam protested based on the arguments that it was not accepting the division of the country as well as not taking part of signing the Geneva Accord. As such, it has no obligation to enforce this provision of the Accord.

Thus, the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are two separate nations, with two completely different political regimes. The Republic of Vietnam advocated democracy, peace, humanism, free economy; The Democratic Republic of Vietnam upheld the dictatorship, party rule, centralized economy, and the development of communism doctrine.

On October 26, 1955, President Ngo Dinh Diem announced the founding of the Republic of Vietnam and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (formerly the Vietnam National Army).

To maintain sovereignty over the “East” Sea, President Ngo Dinh Diem issued decrees defining the inviolable sovereignty of Vietnam in the East Sea, especially the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

The 1954 Geneva Accord divided Viet Nam but also recognized that the two archipelagos Hoang Sa, Truong Sa are the Republic of Vietnam’s integral parts. In April 1956, when French troops withdrew from South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government troops took over the said islands and archipelagos in the East Sea.

On August 22, 1956, the Republic of Vietnam Army landed on the main islands of the Spratly Islands, set up a pillar of sovereignty and hanged the Yellow Flag with Red stripes on the islands.

On October 22, 1956, President Ngo Dinh Diem, via Decree No. 143 / NV, ordered to change the 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

boundaries of provinces and towns in the South. According to the re-listing of all administrative units, Ba Ria - Vung Tau was changed to Phuoc Tuy; and Hoang Sa (Spratly) in Truong Sa archipelago belonging to Phuoc Tuy province with the same name as Paracels in the north.

On July 13, 1961, the President of the Republic of Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem signed the Decree No. 174 / NV in which, it placed the Hoang Sa archipelago directly under Thua Thien (now Quang Nam province). – According to “President Ngo Dinh Diem: who has left historical footsteps on Hoang Sa” by Han Giang Tran Le Tuyen.



Photo of President Ngo Dinh Diem visited Ly Son Island, also known as Cu Lao Re, in the Hoang Sa archipelago in 1961.

President Ngo Dinh Diem in the late 1950s and early 1960s also exercised Vietnamese sovereignty over the East Sea, the Spratly Paracel Islands as the Tay Son and the Nguyen Kings did. The picture above is the eloquent confirmation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam.

The East Sea, the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands have a great strategic importance to dominate Southeast Asia and the maritime world, as well as abundant oil reserves. For those reasons, the communist bloc, especially the Chinese communists have tried to take over with any price.

By Dong tinh hoai Ngo

English version by V.G.Tran

<http://www.truclamientu.info/library/the-president-ngo-to-maintain-sovereignty-over-the-east--sea.html>



Bauxite Central Highlands is the real Chinese Domination

Letter from Hoang Trung Hai (HTH) to Vice President of Communist Vietnam Nguyen Thi Binh on December 16, 2008 - This is the reply of the Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai responded to the Vice President of Vietnam Communist CS Nguyen Thi Binh after receiving her comment letter on the exploitation of bauxite ore in Dak Nong can cause much environmental and climatic harm to the vast "South Central" (ie South Central Vietnam). The letter consists of 4 pages (see note 1 below).

1- Who is Hoang Trung Hai?

Since the beginning of 2008, many newspapers in Vietnam have reported on the exploitation of bauxite ore in the Central Highlands of Vietnam with many titles as follows:

- NguoiViet published an article that shocked the public: "China almost grasped all the mineral mines in Vietnam";
- Tuoi Tre newspaper publishes "Vietnamese enterprises in the name of the Chinese digging for "minerals", in which Nguyen Van Thuan, General Director of the General Department of Geology and Minerals (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment) "For example, in the north, more than 60% of the mines have traces of businesses from China. The Chinese are almost behind our mining operations. "; "If it continues to dig, it will be a catastrophe for the country. If we do not exploit resources, our children continue to exploit in the future ";
- The New Life newspaper with the title "Disseminating the reality that the Chinese disguise as private enterprises of Vietnam exploring the minerals;
- Dat Viet newspaper stated: "The Chinese are behind the mining of Vietnam minerals"; Next day, "China wants to take over the mining industry of Vietnam"; And then again, "60% of mining licenses sold to China are ... modest!", quoted Dr. Nguyen Thanh Son as saying that 60% of mining license was sold to China is also "modest "and does not adequately reflect the magnitude of the situation." The consequence is that mineral resources are cheaply sold, exploited brutally, and the environment is compromised. No one will take responsibility".

Behind all the above-mentioned projects, the Chinese "hairy hands" could be seen everywhere, it is actually very simple and easy to understand. That is the Vice Prime Minister Hoàng Trung Hải (HTH) in charge of economic Hoang Trung Hai is a Han Chinese in disguise. Previously, there was a Hanh's heart in the name of the Han Chinese, whose father was Sai Su, who was born in Long Khe, Zhangzhou, Fujian, China.

And the person who directly promoted Hoang Trung Hai to the second most important seat in the new government: Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy (from August 2, 2007) for the purpose of carrying out the above projects.

Hoang Trung Hai titles held by consumers are:

- Directly in charge of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Agriculture and Rural Development, Construction, Transportation, and Natural Resources and Environment.
- Chairman of the National Water Resources Council;
- Head of the State Committee for key oil and gas projects;

- Head of the Committee for Coordination in the Development of Key Economic Zones;
- Head of the National Target Program to respond to climate change;
- Head of Central Committee on housing policy and real estate market;
- Chairman of the Committee for Planning and Investment for Construction of the Capital Region of Hanoi;
- Head of the State Committee for major projects and projects of the Transport sector;
- Head of the National Committee for Ninh Thuan Nuclear Power Project;
- Chairman of the Committee of the Son La Hydropower Project;
- Head of the State Committee for the Construction of the National Museum of History;
- Chairman of the National Assembly House Steering Committee;
- Head of the State Committee for Basic Surveys of Natural Resources and Environment;
- Head of the State Committee on Electricity Planning VI,
- Head of the State Committee on National Electricity Development Plan;
- Head of ODA (National Development Aid);
- Chairman of the National Civil Aviation Security Committee;
- Chairman of the National Committee for Search and Rescue, etc.

We imagine a person with such an important role as above, whether only a ... dummy or a "robot" only!

It all means Vice Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai almost fully grasp the whole economy of Vietnam in his hand.

And Formosa Hung Nghiep Steel Company, Vung Ang in 2013: It is the Deputy Prime Minister Economic Affairs Hoang Trung Hai licensed through Official Letter No. 323 / TTg-QHQT March 4, 2013 "agree on policy for Formosa Heavy Industries Group - Taiwan to set up the project of steel mill and Son Duong deep-water port in Vung Ang economic zone, Ha Tinh province "and Official Letter No. 869 / TTg-QHQT dated 6 / June 2008 "agreed with Formosa Heavy Industries Group to carry out the project to build a steel complex and Son Duong Port in Vung Ang Economic Zone, Ha Tinh Province." (See Note 2).

Mostrecently, onAugust 13,2017 the staffof the "congestion" in BOT Cai Lay, andafter the "Cai Lay fall" caused a seriesoftrafficboilsexposed. According to Official Letter No. 1908 / TTg-KTN dated 11/11/2013, Hoang Trung Hai only agreed to build a road to avoid national highway 1 through Cai Lay town, not mention to the QL1 road surface reinforcement. Does he have any self-reproach or continue to "pitch foot" as in the environmental disaster named "Formosa Ha Tinh" that he is the culprit?

Last but not least, in 9 years holding the second most important position in the government (just after the Prime Minister), Hoang Trung Hai has also contributed to deciding on the "achievements" of the Hanoi planning shred, or "surging" 90% of national key infrastructure projects for China, etc.

The question is whether, thanks to these "achievements" or for any other reason, the former Deputy Prime Minister had blatantly stepped into the Ministry of Sovereignty and then "grasped" the party apparatus - government - HaNoi's army. Inside the "thousand years of culture and civilization from the 12th Congress?"

The article would add to the task and role of Hoang Trung Hai in a typical task is to exploit Bauxite in the Central Highlands of Vietnam

2- Contents of Hoang Trung Hai's letter of explanation

Recognizing that there are "many" explanations in the letter representing an unscientific and completely unsophisticated spirit, in the name of a scientist who specializes in the purification of liquid and mud waste (sludge), the writer will analyze each point one letter in turn.

The letter consists of four pages. The first page discusses the generalization of the site as well as the decision of the Xth Party Congress on the direction of social development in 2006-2010; That led to Decision 167 of the Communist Party General Nguyen Tan Dung on 1/11/2007.

Stage of exploitation is expected to deploy 6 projects, but in 2010 only exploit 3 only. They are Tan Rai (Lam Dong), Nhan Co (Dak Nong) and Kon Ha (Gia Lai). The following pages describe the planning, environmental impact, and problem-solving approach:

3. On transport planning

"The policy of building the Tay Nguyen-Binh Thuan railway line and the seaport in Hon Ke Ga (Binh Thuan province) to serve the transportation and consumption of alumina products, ensuring synchrony with the exploitation and processing of bauxite ores and combine freight and passengers, contributing to the socio-economic development of the Central Highlands is a prerequisite condition has been directed by the Prime Minister.

According to the above plan, we find that the Central Highlands of Viet Nam is at a height of 400 to 600 meters above sea level, and the hills from west to east are often interrupted by deep valleys. Setting up a railroad is not easy in a hilly, rolling mountain. With the financial status and professional skills of the personnel available in the place, the construction must take at least 5 years (!) After the implementation of technical details for the project... Just as the construction of Binh Thuan port needs to be done in parallel, it can be put into operation. Therefore, only these two projects show that the timetable for implementation will certainly not be as planned and only in the planning of the "state".

In addition, the content, as well as purpose, built just to "serve" the transport of alumina. The author further speculates that net aluminum transport in mining will never be carried out as it is not included in the above planning!

And until today (21/8/2017), there is no 1m railway that is "lined" on this "virtual" railway!

4- On water and electricity for the project

"The water supply is mainly from the Dong Nai River (with an average flow of 11m³/s) and some streams in the area. alumina (for example at the Dak Nong project, three 3x30 MW generating units

are planned) and the national grid. " (2)

In a number of "remedies" later and in the details of the project, the writer is known to be in the planning to carry out a hydropower plant in De Tuat with a capacity of 144 MW and taking water from four large lakes running along the Serpent River to supply water to the dam. At the same time, in the letter, it would build three units (apparently a coal or diesel generator?).

So, are there probably two ore mining projects in Nhan Co?

Or is there a drum beat in the back?

Or is it the same project that was implemented by two different agencies?

Or would the project be described in general terms and experience would be taken during the process of making?

Or merely aiming at formalization of the previous exploitation was to "legitimize" the presence of workers and Chinese experts due to the urgent need of powerful China in the intention of penetrating the Central Highlands of Vietnam?

Maybe, part ... Or the last one is right!

5- On the environmental impact

"On the environmental impact of bauxite mining and alumina production, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group have studied and proposed measures to reduce red mud pollution. as follows: "(3)

"Impact on the land surface area: Solution: Due to the large area of bauxite distribution, the exploitation method is expected to apply" rolling method and sequence of exploitation ". To divide the field into several areas, to exploit the new areas to move to another area, and to exploit the area in the next area. In the process of removing the topsoil, the topsoil (layer of soil) (?), piles separately to spread with hummus, organic fertilizer on the area to complete. This is most effectively applied at bauxite mines in China ... "(4)

If this method was successfully implemented in China, why did TC cease mining hundreds of mines in the water, so that the "wrappers" rushed to send people and machines to a distant place?start to do that again"?

We can visualize a chessboard, make a square, then finish (?), Then do it again. It is suggested that after planting, it is necessary to plant trees or exploit industrial plants to return nature to nature, ie to protect the environment and increase the productivity of exploitation, bringing high economic efficiency!

6- About the reclamation of bauxite ore

And even more transcendent is the "stitching" of bauxite ore.

"In order to recover bauxite ore in the Central Highlands, the bauxite ore mines in the Central Highlands have to be sorted. All tailings are designed for recirculating water collection systems, and tailings reservoirs will be leveled and covered with soil after finishing dumps and drains. (5)

Reading to this ore wash, the writer feels ashamed of more than 20 years of experience in purifying

sludge and wastewater in the United States, this "sublime" technique has not yet been "learned"! How to extract all of the "huge" amount of sludge in the reservoirs made up of valleys, ravines, and cover the fertile soil. But this is not a job to do, but a "rock break" that turns the valleys into new agricultural areas to increase the welfare of the socialist people!

7- On reducing red mud pollution

"Red mud pollution mitigation measures: Red mud sludge: The red mud of the plant will be treated in the form of backlog, ie in the process of red mud, the maximum content of water in red mud To reduce the amount of liquid in the red mud slurry to 54.4%, the solid red mud is 45.6%, the red mud slurry will use the pump through the pipeline into the red mud reservoir ... "(6)

Normally in the "wet" industry of mining bauxite, after the separation of alumina, the ratio of water in the red mud is 2/1 ... so it is necessary to dry a large amount of " Bring red mud to 54.4% (?) of water. And with this rate of red mud becoming a solid... So, how to use a pump to put (solid or near solid (hard mud) into the reservoir?

As information, sludge after treatment and biological leaching in our Los Angeles factory has been working, the mud has been drained by pressing under 330 psi pressure, This means that 330 times the air pressure, the dry mud after pressing has a moisture content of over 60% and the hardness is called "cake" (stiffer than green bean cake).

In terms of "red water from mud," it reads: "Regarding the recovery of alkaline water in red mud: using water pipes and towers to collect water for the wells of the circulating pump station red, then the water collected from the red mud reservoir will be pumped back through the backup system to the alumina plant for cleaning the red mud slurry ... "(7)

In 2013, we analyzed a well of water near the Tri An Falls area and discovered the remains of NaOH in the water source. This is a toxic chemical found in the red mud and loose waste of the method of separating alumina from bauxite ore.

With the aboveprocess, we do notneed to build reservoirs forming because this is a closedcycle, the waterused in the orecleanupwill be recreated through drainage, from the redmud.

"Also to prevent red water from spilling out into the environment, red mud reservoirs will be constructed to prevent surface runoff from entering the red mud pond. protect trees, prevent the blooming (landslide) of the dam ". (8)

Indeed, the author does not understand at all, though trying to "brainstorm" to find out because of the discourse on the opposite and opposite contrast with the lower part. The water in the red mud has been regenerated and re-used where it is necessary to plant trees to avoid "blooming". And the dry red mud layer is covered with colored soil to recreate the area where industrial crops can be grown!

8- Observation, inspection, and water source

But not yet, the stage has come toobserve and check the water source timely: To ensure the solution in the red mud (where it has been used again?) would not affect the water source, Tan Rai, and Nhan Co project will follow four observation wells (actually called monitoring wells) to check the upstream and downstream water sources near the red mud lake ... "(9)

With a catchment area and red mud reservoir area in the middle of valleys (which has been cleared and reclaimed, does pollution need to be checked?).

And the observation wells have been set according to any standards or designated according to the resolution to establish the mining site?

The sludge was dried and filled up to the excavated ground, how to get water to pump up and analyze the pollution?

9- Radioactive substance impact

And finally the radioactive substance in the red mud. The letter reads: "The bauxite sample analysis of the Tan Rai mine and some foreign mines in Dak Nong (France, Australia) analyzed that the bauxite and red mud in The Central Highlands have absolutely no radioactivity".

Another "socialist" assertion. Please, in natural soil (including air and water) always contains the radiation as alpha, beta, radium and have a concentration in the range of ~ 20 PicoCurie / L depending on the region ... As far as information is concerned, industrial leaks such as mine sites or landfill sites have far higher levels of radiation (for more than 25 years, the average radiation found in the vast Los Angeles area is 40 PicoCurie/L). Is this an excuse for "disclosing their hiding place?" (See the article by the same author, "From Bauxite to Uranium?" on maithanhtruyet.blogspot1.com)

10- Conclusion

To conclude on the letter of Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai sent to Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Thi Binh, we can draw some thoughts as follows:

- Vietnam, in spite of the fact that the bauxite mines are being made to produce pure aluminum, are actually in the project, as well as the comments and remarks made by the Communist Party and the Communist Party Politburo. "expanded" to alumina production i.e. alumina Al_2O_3 only;
- It can be concluded that this exploitation was not completely studied for the submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and gas, liquid and solid waste disposal project. This is a mandatory provision of Vietnamese Environmental Laws before the project is licensed;
- The project has not been transparent and has been hidden for more than 10 years, and only the Politburo has been cleared by the Prime Minister of the Communist Party, Nguyen Tan Dung in 2009, after being "discovered" by the people;
- In order to assure public opinion and to explain completely unreasonable scientific and paradoxical explanations of the typical letter of Hoang Trung Hai, one of the highest levels of power, the letter reveals the spirit of disdain for the people and for their knowledge of mine exploitation;
- The project is not feasible because there are too many technical contradictions in the project.

In short, the Tan Rai and Nhan Co projects and six other bauxite ore projects planned in Dak Nong can be considered as a front for world opinion and the point is to formalize the presence of the Chinese in the Central Highlands of Viet Nam, hiding a Chinese military-political plot in the process of invading Vietnam and Southeast Asia through the Han expansion.

At present, no gunshot at the frontier, no cry for help in international public opinion, the Politburo of North Vietnam, the highest authority has colluded or compromised with Beijing to legalize the invasion through mining in the highlands and elsewhere from the North to the South. This form of aggression is treacherous that the international countries cannot condemn the Chinese invaders.

That is a great disaster for the land and water in the current period.

Read here, you have clearly identified:

Who is Tran Ich Tac?

And who is Le Chieu Thong?

Just like no Central Commissioner or pro-American Central!

They all focus on offering their country to Communist China!

What must we do to put an end to the tragedy caused by the communist?

Could the "civil disobedience" solution apply to the urgent situation of Vietnam today?

Dr. Mai Thanh Truyet

Chairman, Vietnamese American Science & Technology Society – VAST

Chairman, Vietnamese Environmental Protection Society - VEPS



Communist China's Roads Towards The South

In the history of China and the experience of 1026 years of domination during the 17th century of Vietnam, China, after the occupation of Xinjiang in 1949, controlled Tibet in 1950 and was blocked in South Korea. In 1953, Korea thought of Vietnam as a buffer zone. In the defensive position, the intention to occupy Vietnam was to protect the entire Central Highlands, and in the aftermath of World War II, it expanded into South East Asia and reached a sea area of over 3,000 km in the South Sea.

Remember, with the help of the Soviet Union during the Cold War in 1948 and the goal of the PRC from the early days of the People's Republic of China (or China Communist Party – CCP) founded by Mao in 1949 was to follow Ho Chi Minh's mission. Since its inception in South-East Asia since 1924, the Communist Party of Vietnam has long been recognized as the backbone of the communist bloc in Southeast Asia. Liberating the South is only a natural result.

Thus, this is one of the many causes of the ideological war that has been triggered by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), resulting in a fratricidal war that has drained national power with more than five million victims from both regions.

In the present and (CCP) with the mind of a large country, plus the subtext of the Communist Party, the need to occupy Vietnam and encroach over the whole of the South China Sea, has gradually been transforming the Han dream to become reality.

1- The reallocation of the CCP

Apart from the paranoid concept and with the world-conscious ideology that mimics "China," there is something that sometimes we pay little attention to geographically, China is just an isolated "continental island". China was besieged from all four directions. Among the deserts, savannah wilderness and rugged mountain forests in three directions south, west and north with the Pacific Sea in the east. There only one way of expansion is on the land. It is the North of Vietnam. The last time they tested the expansion was in 1979 when Hanoi chiefly thought that it had defeated the United States and signed the Security and Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union in 1978. However, Hanoi was "taught a lesson" by Deng Xiaoping as a teacher in 1979.

When the Berlin Wall collapsed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis and slaughter, everything turned upside down. As the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate, the fear of internal chaos would have focused control over the political system above the market economy mechanism. And the leader of Hanoi as an orphan lost patron. Thus, saving the party has been a lifelong priority since 1990.

From that time on, Hanoi returned to the TC, ending its 10 years of independence under the shadow of the Soviet Union and the CVP returning to the current power (at that time) to carry out "renovation", but in accordance with Beijing model.

And back to the trend of inherent expansion without spending, spending money and still achieve the results: North Vietnam naturally became a military buffer from the time of Chengdu 3-4 / 9/1990.

2- The role of the Communist Party

When Beijing expanded its buffer zone into the South China Sea, Vietnam once again became the home of China. The Vietnamese sea is the South China Sea.

Hanoi leaders are aware of this, through a book (internal) published by the truthful publisher entitled "30 years of diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam (1949-1979)" through which, the BCT stated clearly China is always trying to ... swallowing Vietnam. But shortly after the 1979 war and lasted until 1988, after China took over the Spratly islands in Vietnam, the North Vietnam Communist (NVC) was subjected to TC and accepted "16 golden words and 4 goods" to protect power, party, and thereby protect the interests of high-ranking party members. If it is said that country to save the party is not wrong.

As a consequence, all of the world's problems, as discussed above, have arisen in Vietnam, from security, diplomacy through the environment, economics, education, health or foreign trade. Most recently, the Chinese People Newspaper reportedly said, "There is no need to fight Vietnam!" With the following excerpt: "No gunshots is more powerful than stuffing money in their mouth, then we, the Great Han, could be seated on the roof of their houses, excavate their selling the ancestor tombs and dump toxic wastes into their environment, and their politburo still insisted that the strategy was that the modern industrialization policy of the country could not be stopped".

It is ashamed of a once-sovereignty and respected nation in the world.

But even more shabby, "they" continue to face the more serious expression of Hanoi's position is very close to China in the hot record of the world's countries, especially Hanoi avoid the issue of the Paracel or Spratly Islands in multilateral international forums that seek bilateral solutions in the "master" relationship. And the most recent submission of Nguyen Phu Trong in front of the Emperor Xi Jinping, signaling the end of the land and water of Vietnam if the Northern communist rulers are still present and govern the country.

3- A malicious plot of China to change the present system of writing in Vietnamese

At the end of November 2017, Dr. Bui Hien stated that: "Vietnamese scripts have a lot of unreasonable and illogical words, which is why many people learn but still misspellings. The Vietnamese language has been existed for more than 200 years, thanks to the work of foreign priest Alexandre de Rhodes, who contributed greatly to the spread of Christianity and the formation of Vietnamese national language. The script is a human-made convention for communication. For example, ABC can be read as a,b,c kike French.

Therefore, Dr. Bui Hien has released a new Vietnamese dictionary with the idea of reforming the Vietnamese alphabet. Dr. Bui Hien has spent many years researching and publishing in recent books. The work entitled "National language and International integration".

However, after this research went to public, his proposal is immediately reacted by many people coming from the different level of society. Many different sources, from educators and the general public, have largely argued that his literary reforms were unreasonable and completely non-sense.

On November 30, 2017, the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) made an announcement that MoET was not competent and had no intention to apply any improvement option in writing. After all, we can see immediately that Bui Hien's new dictionary was initiated by the dirty hands of China to begin to change the Vietnamese language and script in Vietnamese with Chinese pronunciation.

Remember, over the past eight years, China has experimented with the Chinese language curriculum in elementary education in some deserted locations in Vietnam. And until now, this program continues

to develop progressively. This shows that the new Vietnamese dictionary and the Han scripture program are a malicious attempt to completely conquer Vietnam by eliminating the Vietnamese language. From this point of view, the writer can assert that Dr. Bui Hien is only on the name of the dictionary, which the real author is actually the China's creation.

4- Our current position

It should be made clear that "we" are Vietnamese children living in the country and overseas who are fighting for a free Vietnam. The country and people of Vietnam are having problems with China, which may be more dangerous because of its neighboring position, but it is no different from neighboring Asian countries. Therefore, the China problem of Vietnam is in the framework of the common problems of the world with China.

From this view point, Vietnam is not really alone and must face China alone! But, unlike the other countries, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is under the leadership of the Communist Party. The problem of Vietnam is in Hanoi. That is the difficulty of the people, who experienced in coping with China and having the will to fight for independence.

The problem of Vietnam is in Hanoi because the Communist Party disarms the people, depriving the traditional and most powerful weapon of the nation which is the will to resist the situation of the Han.

Hanoi implements stupid policy:

- Control the media and thought, putting people reflex in conditions as the dog;
- Promoting the economic instinct of the lower organism that needs to "eat three meals" and destroy all the will and potential power.

Hanoi's leaders behaved as imperialistic mandarins of the Beijing dynasty, during the four periods of domination. They are corrupting society and pushing people into slavery for small groups of interests. These are the Vietnamese-speaking governors of the politbureau and members of the Central Committee.

5- How do we behave in the face of these problems?

To solve the problem of China, the Vietnamese have to solve the problem of disarming the people to mobilize to protect the independence, it is the Communist Party. Vietnam's priority should be to remove the communist regime's tactics by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

That is the dissolution of the Communist Party of North Vietnam.

Listen to former Communist Party member Le Minh Duc: "The genocidal catastrophe has come to light, no one can save the Vietnamese people from this disaster, in addition to 90 million Vietnamese. Everybody needs to see death coming to oneself and their descendants ". For other countries, Vietnam must be a member of a multilateral effort to address the world's China problem. When it comes to the same goal, one can talk about cooperation, equally for the common good.

In short, the global problem of the world must be solved by the world and Vietnam is willing to participate as a member. But Vietnam will not be the attacking force or anti-China outpost of the world.

From that point of view, there are still many overseas people who have questioned the current situation in the world such as:

- Should Vietnam stand next to the United States or China?
- Or in bilateral US-China relations, where should Vietnam go?
- Or should Vietnam be wise to keep neutral?

But in fact, things are more complicated than what happened during the Cold War between the two communist blocs and, more precisely, between the two "capitalist" and " "

In fact, the TC has problems with the United States, problems with Japan, problems with India, with South East Asia, with South Korea, with Taiwan, even with Australia. In a network of bilateral relations, such as United States, United States, United States, United States, etc.

6- Where do you stand?

- Obviously, we have to stand with the people, in an independent position, not simply neutral.
- How to maintain neutrality in a multilateral relationship? Vietnam is willing to cooperate with the world to solve the China problem in international multilateral efforts.
- But first of all, it must solve the problem of Vietnam, which is located in Hanoi.

Once the Vietnamese people at home and abroad let the world understand that, the danger of China is Hanoi, and Hanoi is the problem, not the solution. Then, we could go a long way to achieve our national independence.

Therefore, fighting for democracy and independence is two inseparable aspects of live birth and death for Vietnam.

7- Conclusion

It is because of the complex and intertwining nature of the nations of the world, according to the interests of each nation, such as the United States of America, to "cooperate" with all dictators, communists, and militants. and so on, depending on the current status of each country, raising the "virtual" banner as the struggle for "democracy and human rights for Vietnam". The world cannot imagine the situation of the Vietnamese people under the rule of Vietnamese communists, especially the United States with the policy of "transforming them" by ... education!

Therefore, when addressing a wide range of environmental issues, such as the damage water resources, illicit competition or the threat of social exclusion from China, apart from the widespread annexation of Vietnam into a southern province of China ... all became an evidence that was happening to Vietnam.

Certainly, other countries may be more interested in our national stance. To do so, right from consciousness, we should be the solution rather than a problem for other countries.

The question here is whether WE have prepared ourselves or not?

After all, China is not as strong as many people think and is at risk of crisis, even disintegration, because their development strategy is unstable, unbalanced, and unprofitable with 600 million Chinese citizens are living in poverty and under absolute poverty based on United Nations standards of US \$ 2.00 and the US \$ 1.25 / person/day.

Once China has had the same disorder as it has seen many times in history, Hanoi, with its current policy of over 93 million Vietnamese, will surely not leave the Communist Party alone. A political scientist, Dr. David Shambaugh, said in his book in 2014, "The possibility of China is still a" partial power ", not a real power in the future."


With what we have been mentioned previously, all Vietnamese should think about "what to do" for a future Viet Nam.

We need to prepare for The Future of Vietnam right now!

Mai Thanh Truyet, Ph.D

Chairman, Vietnamese American Science & Technology Society – VAST

Chairman, Vietnamese Environmental Protection Society - VEPS



Call to all lovers of justice and freedom, nature and Democracy

S.O.S. VIETNAM

Under threat of genocide and annexation by China!

A machiavellian plan by China for the annexation of Vietnam is being implemented with the complicity of the communist power in Hanoi to the general indifference!

In 1979, China invaded Vietnam in retaliation for Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. The resulting Sino-Vietnamese border war lasted not only a few months as per the official version, but ten years, until 1989. It was marked by unheard-of atrocities from a 620,000 strong Chinese army that razed everything in its wake: they destroyed four entire cities and villages, massacred all their inhabitants including children after gang raping the women. Yet, when their ally and sponsor the Soviet Empire fell in 1990, the dictators in Hanoi, rather than lose their power by reconverting themselves as democrats as in Eastern Europe, preferred to pledge allegiance to China and offered their country in exchange for Beijing's support. The secret treaty signed in Chengdu had its brief content only disclosed in April 2013: documents stolen from the Vietnamese Secret Service of Defense were handed over to Foreign Policy Magazine by General Hà Thanh Châu, after he applied for asylum in the United Statesⁱⁱ. According to this treaty, the dictators in Hanoi commit themselves to the gradual transformation of Vietnam into a Chinese province like Tibet. The evolution will take place in three stages of twenty years each:

2000-2020: Vietnam becomes an autonomous province,

2020-2040: Vietnam becomes a dependent province,

2040-2060: Vietnam trades its name for Âu Lạc (named after two ancient ethnic groups living between the two countries) and will be subject to the administration of the governor of GuangZhou.

The 1990 surrender was merely the explicit execution of what Hồ Chí Minh pledged in return for the military aid granted by Mao ZeDong during the First Indochina War. By the "Vietnam-China Cooperation Agreement" signed on June 12th 1953 in GuangXi, Hồ promised to thereafter "merge the Vietnamese workers' party with the Chinese Communist Party" and to make "the Vietnamese democratic republic an element of the People's Republic of China"ⁱⁱⁱ.

Under the pretense of active cooperation with the Big Brother from the North, the process of tibetization of Vietnam took place as follows:

Political Bringing to Heel:

- In 1999, a land border treaty stipulated the transfer to China of 900 km²^{iv} (equivalent to 60% of the area of the Thái Bình province), including half of the Bản Giốc waterfall and the Nam Quan border crossing, two historical sites dear to the heart of the Vietnamese.

- In 2000 by a treaty on the Gulf of Tonkin the dictators in Hanoi ceded to China nearly half (44% or 16000 km²) of the territorial waters^v in the gulf as well as the beach of Tục Lãm. The Chinese were also granted the right to exploit economically the riches of the gulf in the Vietnamese zone, under

guise of cooperation. These two treaties are actually but the application texts of three treaties signed by Hồ Chí Minh with Beijing in 1957, 1961, 1963^{vi}.

- In 2013 ten resolutions on cooperation allow Beijing to control the entire policy-making of Vietnam. Chinese people from China or formerly from Vietnam (those who left in 1978) were specially trained and placed by the Chinese government in various leadership positions at all levels within all Vietnamese institutions, especially in the police and the army, up to the highest state positions: At present, President of the Republic Trần Đại Quang, Deputy Prime Minister Hoàng Trung Hải considered Beijing's right-hand man, Deputy Speaker Tô Huy Rứa and Minister of Police Tô Lâm are Chinese or from Chinese origin. Thus, executives and dignitaries who are rebellious to sinicization are quickly spotted and neutralized: Some twenty high-ranking officers known for their hostility to China, including General Staff Đào Trung Lịch and the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Military Zone Trần Tất Thanh, disappeared in an "aircraft accident due to fog" in May 1998; more recently, in July 2016, just three months after his appointment, General Lê Xuân Duy, another commander-in-chief of the same zone (very important because of its neighborhood with China and Laos), war hero of the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, experienced a rather "sudden death".

- In 2014, the treaty on a "project for two strategic corridors" grants China the right to economically exploit the six border provinces (that is, actually, the destruction of the country's magnificent primary forests) and the Điện Biên region, as well as the establishment of two strategic corridors, Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng and Móng Cái - Hà Nội.

- In January 2017, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, the current secretary-general of the party, went to Beijing to sign 15 conventions promoting closer cooperation between the two countries, in particular in the fields of the military, the police and culture. This cooperation should be understood as a greater subjection, with the eventual incorporation of the Vietnamese army and police into the Chinese army and police^{vii}, that is, the end of Vietnam.

- As for the occupation of the Paracel and Spratly islands^{viii} by China, the dictators in Hanoi endorse it in a way for they repress any public demonstration against it, and they do not protest much or with much vigor against the Chinese building and drilling there.

All these treaties were followed by economic agreements enabling Beijing to send en masse its nationals to the most strategic places of Vietnam, under cover of being employees and workers:

- Agreement for two joint ventures (actually Chinese ventures since the majority of the capital comes from China) to exploit bauxite. These companies are installed on the "roof" of the Highlands of the Center region, from where one can dominate all Indochina.

- Agreement for the exploitation by the Chinese of the primary forests, which amounts to letting China destroy the most beautiful natural resources of Vietnam while giving it control on the most crucial points of the north of the country.

- Permission for Chinese companies to settle on all the Vietnamese coast, from Móng Cái to Cà Mau.

- Possibility for the Chinese to found Chinese cities throughout the country as in Bình Dương, where the only language used is Chinese and where trade is made in Chinese yuan.

- Permission for Chinese nationals to come to Vietnam without a visa, to move and settle freely in Vietnam where they can marry Vietnamese women whose children will become systematically Chinese. On the other hand, a visa is still required for Vietnamese people going to China, and many Chinese districts in Vietnam are prohibited to Vietnamese people, and even to Vietnamese public authorities.

The tacit recognition of Vietnam's belonging to China shows up in the adoption of a 6-star Chinese flag: a large star surrounded by five instead of the four small official stars. There the Vietnamese people are symbolically represented as one new conquered people, on an equal footing with the peoples of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and the Uighur country. This Chinese flag appeared for the first time in 2011 in the background behind a speaker of the VTV official television; it aroused such an indignant interrogation that it was quickly withdrawn; yet it was seen again in thousand copies agitated by the Vietnamese schoolchildren for the welcome of the Chinese vice president Xi Jinping in 2012. Faced with the general outcry, the government bald-facedly blamed the fact on a technical mistake by the flag manufacturers (sic!). This did not prevent said flag from appearing in a meeting room of Vietnamese and Chinese high-ranking officers in Lào Cai in 2015 and currently in many police stations.

Moreover, the red flag with a yellow star in the middle which officially represents communist Vietnam, as imposed by Hồ Chí Minh to Vietnam, is but the emblem of the young Chinese communist pioneers (and not that of the Fujian province as the rumor claims)^{ix}. This adds up with the strong probability that the famous Hồ Chí Minh, identified with the Vietnamese revolutionary Nguyễn Tất Thành alias Nguyễn Ái Quốc, was in fact a Chinese imposter, his look-alike Hu ZiZheng (Hồ Tập Chương) alias Hu Guang (Hồ Quang): he had been commissioned by the Communist International to personify the Vietnamese Soviet spy after his death in 1932 in the jails of Hong Kong. This identification was revealed in 1946 by a Taiwanese author, Wu ZhuoLin (Ngô Trọc Lưu), in a book titled "Hồ Chí Minh" written in Japanese; it was confirmed in 1949 by a local CCP newspaper, Gang Shan (Cuong Son); and it was clearly reaffirmed in a controversial biography on "Hồ Chí Minh's half-life" published by another Taiwanese scholar, Hu JunXiong (Hồ Tuấn Hùng)^x in 2008. This trait speaks volumes about the annexationist machination of Chinese leaders and the depth and duration of their determination to conquer Vietnam.

There is no surprise after this that the Chinese behave as arrogant masters. Some high dignitaries in Beijing do not deprive themselves of publicly calling Vietnamese leaders "ungrateful bastards" when Hanoi dares shyly protest against one of their abuses.

Vietnam's submission to China means the violent repression of all anti-Chinese demonstrations: demonstrations against the occupation of land on the northern border; against the occupation of the traditionally Vietnamese Paracel and Spratly Islands coveted by most countries in the region for its rich oil deposits amounting to 25% of the world's reserves (according to Chinese experts), that China took from Vietnam in 1974 and 1988; or against the establishment of bauxite plants in an environmentally sensitive region in 2009-2011; etc. Hundreds of patriotic activists were arrested, beaten and sent to prison where many of them died as a result of ill-treatment. Repression, moreover, is still the norm, as for instance in recent months towards protestors against the Formosa company (Taiwanese by its name, with its seat in Formosa, but Chinese by its capital and therefore its management).

Cultural subjection:

Political expansion is hardly conceivable without cultural influence. For Beijing this influence can only be understood by the sinicization of the conquered people. Since the Vietnamese are destined to merge into the great Chinese melting pot, it is necessary to erase the traces of hereditary antagonism in them and to deprive them at the same time from the pride of their historical past. Thus, Beijing imposed various measures on Hanoi:

- Obliviate the valiant resistance to the Chinese army in the war of 1979-1989: To the helpless indignation of the veterans, Hanoi had to desecrate the graves of Vietnamese soldiers who died on the northern border. Anything about that war and their heroism was erased from their graves. On the other

hand, cemeteries and monuments were erected in honor of the Chinese soldiers who fell in Vietnam. Anti-Chinese publications, abundant during the war, went missing entirely; and henceforth the rare mentions of this war in official history textbooks fit in eleven lines, such that the young Vietnamese ignore its very existence. On the annexations of frontier lands as well as of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, a radio silence is strictly observed, and also on the frequent abuses by the Chinese army such as the strafing of fishing boats or the shooting down of Vietnamese aircraft off the territorial waters of Vietnam, half of which was appropriated by China.

- Avoid the glorification of the great heroes of history honored for their victorious struggle against the Chinese invader. There were discussions about removing their statues from public places, but the overly sensitive subject was put aside and the authorities were content to remove those in private houses (a recent case being the statue of General Trần Hưng Đạo, a great victor against the Mongols, erected in the house of a resident of the province of Lâm Đồng).

- No assimilation can take place without language adoption. Unlike English, a language that is very flexible and easy to learn, unfortunately for China's hegemonic ambitions, the Chinese language with its ideographic writing lends itself poorly to spreading internationally and does not appeal to the Vietnamese. If you do not want to learn it voluntarily, you will learn it by force: decrees were therefore issued at the end of 2016 to impose for the following year onwards Chinese as a compulsory first foreign language in secondary school and to introduce Chinese as a second language in primary school. At the moment programs entirely in Chinese are broadcasted by the Vietnamese radio and television; and even in the Vietnamese programs, Chinese songs are interspersed among national music.

Destruction of the economy:

Hanoi and Beijing both had to keep secret the contents of the 1990 treaty for fear of the unanimous revolt of the Vietnamese people—who as a result of the lessons of the history are animated by a visceral hostility towards the predatory neighbor. On the one hand, Beijing wanted to avoid having to face 90 million resistance fighters when they officially proclaim the annexation; on the other hand, they coveted Vietnam mostly for its mineral wealth (especially bauxite and oil) and its favorable strategic situation in South-East Asia; thus, they verily connived an enterprise of genocide against the Vietnamese people, with a view to a repopulation by Chinese people; and this enterprise began immediately after they signed the treaty. Faced with the methodical destruction of the economy and the parallel poisoning of all their sources of life, young able Vietnamese have been and will be driven to emigrate; those who remain will be reduced over the years to the sick and impotent, while coming children are destined to be weak or deformed.

Destruction of agriculture:

Vietnam derives its main resources from its thriving agriculture that still occupies more than half of its population, from its fisheries, its tourism, and also its oil (since 2000). The food crop for which Vietnam is still the second largest producer in the world and the third largest exporter, was therefore Beijing's first target:

The vast Mekong Delta, Vietnam's rice granary, depends on the annual alluvial floods that ensure its fertility. But China established a series of 6 dams in Yunnan upstream of the Mekong (4 more are planned, besides the project of two canals that will divert the water of the river in the surroundings), in particular the gigantic dams of Xiaowan (Capacity: 15 billion m³, 2010) and Nuozhadu (capacity: 23 billion m³, 2012); and now the other countries that live on the Mekong are helpless before the decline of their river economy. They cannot hold accountable the powerful China; and so the Chinese manipulate the flows of the river at their whim, without even warning the residents; they ignore the complaints of the Mekong Regional Commission in which they refuse to belong; and so these

countries prefer to participate in the scramble by building their own dams with Beijing's blessing and financial contribution (11 planned in Laos who dream of being a major supplier of electricity to the region, including the enormous Xayaburi on the main river, already being build; 2 projects in Cambodia and 2 more in Thailandxiii).

Vietnam, downstream in the delta, can only take notice of the damage: facing prolonged droughts and devastating floods, soils are depleted due to lack of sediments, compounded by salinization due to the increase in temperature and the rise of seawater; fresh water levels are declining dangerously, leading to shortages and to the fall of fish stocks; with the change of temperature, insects and fungi multiply, spreading diseases (notably the dengue fever) and destroying the cropsxiv. To the action of dams, add the destruction of the mangroves, especially in the extreme south, in order to raise shrimps for export, at the instigation of seafood freezing companies, most of which are run by the Chinese. Without the trees to fix the land, the coasts erode and each year 500 ha (1200 acres) disappear in Cà Mau which will soon no longer have the shape of a point.

As a result, the area of rice fields is decreasing and their yield has dropped by 15% over the last decade; the situation is deteriorating so rapidly that there may be a risk of famine in the years to come. For paradoxically, whereas Vietnam is a large exporter of rice, its residents are often forced to eat imported rice; this is due to the fact that the major part (60%) of the crops is pre-empted by the State which buys it at very low prices from the producers (3000 đ/kg instead of 4500 đ/kg on the market), for export. Where to? mostly (40%) to China (at the price of 6000 đ/kg), which in exchange for good Vietnamese rice sells to the Vietnamese population its own poor quality rice, sometimes mixed with plastic beans called "faux rice", at a price double or triple (up to 30000 đ/kg). Exploited and discouraged by poor working conditions, driven from a land that has become arid, a growing number of peasants abandon the profession, emigrate to the city or to neighboring countries, abandoning land to the Chinese who are eager to acquire it.

Determined to grab as much land as possible for their colonization, the Chinese find a thousand tricks each more diabolical than the others to ruin the reluctant peasants and push them to abandon their homes. Their subtle cruelty finds an easy prey in the little peasantry, that is poor hence greedy, ignorant and credulous :

- Chinese traders traveling all over the country locate peasants in difficulty and offer to buy the four clogs of their buffalo at the price of the animal; the poor things accept, thinking they can earn double since the animal killed for its hooves can thereafter be sold as meat. Since the buffalo is the working tool for the peasant, once it has disappeared, the peasant will have no choice left but to acquiesce to any suggestion from the Chinese: to fill his rice field to plant subsistence crops or shrubs, using toxic Chinese fertilizers and pesticides (which do not comply with any international standards) sold to him on credit by the merchant, who promises in return to buy him the product of his harvest at a good price. The promise is often held at least the first year; then, under any pretense (e.g. the product in question is no longer required) the merchant or another of his accomplices refuses the purchase of the product at the expected price. The peasant must content himself with selling his perishable goods at a low price. Finally over-indebted, he is obliged to cede his land to the Chinese or one of his accomplices to emigrate elsewhere.

- Alternatively, in areas where certain crops prosper, the trader offers to buy all the leaves of the tuber (e.g. cassava) or of the plant, or also all the roots of the plant, at a much higher price than the harvest itself. As a result, the tuber can not grow, the plant dies and the farmer is deprived of seed or seedling for the next season, while the product becoming rare on the market grows in price for the profit of Chinese importers. Again the trader offers fertilizers and pesticides for the planting of a fruit, a flower, etc., with very good yield, etc. The trick of buying the roots was used for the destruction of pepper crops, one of the riches of Central Vietnam.

- A hundred-year-old cultivation on the border with Cambodia, the sugar palm, is being eradicated "thanks" to the Chinese who come to propose to the peasants to buy at high prices the trunks of this palm tree. Cut in half the palm tree can only die and there is no question of replanting because the tree produces only after twenty years^{xv}.

The Chinese will to destroy has no bounds: They spread news that they are ready to buy tons and tons of leeches (or cockroaches...) for medicine purpose at good price so that poor peasants neglect field work to catch leeches, and even to breed them; some time after the Chinese merchants stop the buying, and the peasants, encumbered with huge amount of pointless leeches, set them free in the nature where they damage environment, ravage livestock and harm humans, particularly cultivators in padding fields. For somewhat smarter farmers, Chinese "experts" come to advise an increase in income by the breeding of a variety of whelk (pomacea), freshwater lobster (Procambarus), or red turtle, the flesh of which is indeed prized. However, these three species, imported from America, are terribly invasive; they soon invade rice fields, rivers and lakes, canals... killing local flora and fauna, especially young rice plants, to a degree that the FAO is alarmed^{xvi}.

Better or worse, strangers were surprised throwing baby crocodiles in the Mekong. Maybe it was only a rumor. However last month, a buddhist monk, who was even "elected" to the house of representatives, - and who is known for publicly criticizing Lý Thường Kiệt, the Great general who in 1075 won against the Chinese Song dynasty, in a war for the first time offensive and not defensive, for his "insolence" towards the Empire - certainly a Chinese agent, before a public of hundreds of people, threw into the Red River under cover of a rite of deliverance of souls, ten tons of piranhas, enough to infest the entire river and prohibit any activity there. Can you imagine such an act? Facing the general indignation, the authorities have tried to minimize the fact by declaring that those piranhas belonged to an inoffensive variety^{xvii}!

The coffee plantations, for which Vietnam is the world's second largest producer (and the first for the robusta variety), do not undergo a routine destruction by the Chinese, first because it is rather a product for export (only 5% is used for domestic consumption), not indispensable to the life of the population, and secondly because they want to control it: always on the lookout for the slightest opportunity to purchase at a discount, they already count on the sharp fluctuation in the price of coffee, which is causing ruin to planters who are unable to absorb a sharp fall in prices (for example in 2012).

Destruction of forests, Vietnam's lung:

Thirty years of war with massive bombardment destroyed only 16 per cent (not 60 per cent, as claimed by official propaganda) of Vietnamese forests, based on mutually conflicting figures given in various articles, which show that in 1943 Vietnam was forested at 43% (i.e. 140,000 km² out of a total area of 330,000 km²), and from 1943 to 1973, 22,000 km² of forests were destroyed. But 17 years after the war, in 1990, the official forest coverage was only 92,000 km², which means that in peace time 26,000 km² of forests were destroyed, a greater area and faster than during the war. Deforestation is ongoing, despite a massive effort towards reforestation. In 2013, forests covered 39% of the territory, but 25% of these forests are made out of reforestation using low-shade and low-diversity species such as pine and eucalyptus. What more, with deforestation comes the erosion and degradation of bare soils of which 40% becomes unfit for cultivation^{xviii}.

Among the causes of deforestation, the main one is population growth, with its consequent need for space, construction, firewood (for cooking) and for agricultural and industrial development. But the most disastrous factor is organized looting of forests by Chinese operators to whom the Vietnamese government granted the concession to thousands of square kilometers near the northern border and on the highlands of the Center region^{xix} This is compounded by the plunder organized by traffickers whose chiefs are usually Chinese, in collusion with local authorities, who derive from this illegal

tradexx, accounting for half of the timber trade, a profit of 2.5 billion USD per year. The deforestation of Vietnam is all the more deplorable since its ravages include beautiful rainforests, especially primary forests that are rare and valuable for their biodiversity (they shelter or used to shelter more than a thousand different species, of which 8.2% are endemic and 3.4% are protected by the United Nations): out of 10% of the area in 1996, there only remained 0.6%, i.e. 80,000 ha in 2012. In a mere 20 years, the communist regime in Hanoi managed to squander the fabulous ancestral inheritance of the golden forests (rừng vàng)xxi.

Environmental pollution :

Facing the pollution that poisons their own country, Beijing had the idea of using chemical poisoning to get rid of the Vietnamese. Through political as well as financial pressures, they made Hanoi accept the installation throughout Vietnam of its most polluting industries. Already in 1990, after the end of the Sino-Vietnamese War, many Chinese people who came to or returned to Vietnam went back to trading and opening small businesses, by taking Vietnamese individuals first as front men, then as a partners in a joint venture. Even after 100% foreign-owned companies were accepted starting in 2005, knowing the Vietnamese distrust of China, many 100% Chinese companies prefer to claim to be a joint venture by allying themselves with corrupt executives, and one can say that today the vast majority of companies in Vietnam have Chinese ownersxxii.

Taking advantage of the population's ignorance and of the lack of Vietnamese laws, small Chinese production units, like those of the Vietnamese themselves, we must admit, were rejecting their wastes in rivers without restraint, to the dismay of the residents. But for Beijing that was not enough, and the Chinese authorities decided to switch to a higher gear. Whereas China itself closed all its bauxite plants due to environmental damage, after repeated pressures starting in 2001, Beijing eventually obtained in 2007 the signing by Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng of the agreement for a project of 6 bauxite plants on a 1800 km² concession, to be exploited jointly by the two countries on the Highlands of the Central region, where the third richest deposits of bauxite in the world are locatedxxiii. The location of the first two sites chosen, in DakNong and Lâm Đồng, once known, raised for the first time in Communist Vietnam a protest by scientists, intellectuals and various personalities (petition with 2,600 signatures), who mentioned considerable dangers for the environment and, consequently, for the men and for the cultivation of tea-trees and coffee-trees in the neighborhoods, not to mention the danger of installing thousands of Chinese alleged workers on the "Roof of Indochina"xxiv. The government ignored these concerns and arrested the leaders of the revolt. Construction of the factories therefore started in 2009. And the people are forbidden to circulate into the area as has become the rule for any large Chinese corporation. What is the result? To install the plants, thousands of acres of primary forest and crop land have been sacrificed, causing impoverishment of the inhabitants (defenseless mountain people); there is now a shortage of fresh water, much of which is captured for the manufacture of alumina; and in the event of heavy rain there are risks of spillage of red sludge out of the two pits where it is stored in the openxxv. An unknown number of Chinese alleged workers are present in the restricted areas, who may or may not actually be factory workers. As for the two factories supposed to bring back a lot of foreign currency to Vietnam, they have not stopped making lossesxxvi to the point that in 2016 the Ministry of Industry and Commerce had to ask for government assistance to replace obsolete and inefficient Chinese equipments by machines with more advanced technology from other countries.

The ultimate in Chinese duplicity and inhumanity (until now at least) as well as in Vietnamese governmental complicity, was reached with the company Formosa. In 2008, Beijing pressured Hanoi to grant Formosa Plastics group, a Taiwanese company infamous for lawsuits against it for environmental damages, permission to establish a steel plant in the province of Hà Tĩnh in the Center region of Vietnam. For this project, the group formed a subsidiary, the Hung Nghiep Formosa Ha Tinh Company, known simply as Formosa in Vietnam, whose shares were soon bought back by Chinese companies, which in fact made it a Chinese company and no longer a Taiwanese company as many

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still believe. In 2010, as always through corruption and intimidation, Formosa obtained a 70-year concession for 3300 hectares in Vũng Áng in Kỳ Anh district, just in front of a deep-water port with great military importance, since 500-ton ships and submarines can shelter there. This was already an enormous privilege, since according to Vietnamese laws in force, land ownership is not recognized, only land use, and no individual or group in Vietnam can be issued a land use license for more than 45 years. Yet in addition, Formosa also benefited from a rebate on its property taxes and on its importation taxes, which did not prevent it from practicing fraud in their payment (discovered in 2016) for nearly \$300 million. It also was granted the right to develop infrastructure at its leisure!

Despite the protests of the expropriated inhabitants, the factory was put under construction in 2012, and in 2015 a huge complex was created on its site, which can be seen on Google maps.

On April 6th 2016, right after the factory was completed, the inhabitants of Vũng Áng found a frightening number of dead fish on their beaches. The following days, till the 18th of April, the phenomenon spread on the coasts of the Center region, affording the spectacle of miles of dead fish estimated to number several millions. The death of the sea, which will prove to be the greatest ecological catastrophe ever seen so far, did not at first provoke any reaction from the authorities. Looking for the cause of the disaster, fishermen-divers detected pipes from Formosa that were spitting out continual jets of a strange red liquid. Then began protests throughout the country against the Chinese company. The Vietnamese authorities did not wake up until 6 weeks after the massacre to speak of a catastrophe and to induce Formosa to accept its responsibility. But instead of immediately shutting down the factory and ordering an investigation into the effects of the pollution, the government was content with a \$500 million payment. This was a paltry sum with regards to the damages caused, and none of the victims saw any of it, which leads to wondering whether it was actually paid and if so who pocketed it. Yet, according to the few scientists who came to take stock of the damage, it will take decades or even centuries for the sea to heal from millions of m³ of liquid filled with heavy metals and toxic chemicals (lead, mercury, cadmium, manganese, phenol, cyanide, etc., according to a laboratory independent from the Vietnamese authorities) that Formosa rejected and keeps rejecting in its waters^{xxvii}. Today it is no longer the two provinces neighboring Formosa but all four central provinces (Hà Tĩnh, Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên - Huế) that are affected and the body of red waters continues to expand and begins to reach the southern coasts. In order to survive, fishermen try to get fish from the open sea where they risk being slaughtered by armed Chinese fishermen and the Chinese navy, who have seized the Eastern sea.

As if Formosa were not enough, in the same region, taking advantage of the rainy season, about twenty Chinese-owned hydroelectric plants discharge the water from their basin without warning into the surrounding countryside, destroying crops and killing several hundreds of people. This kind of flooding caused knowingly and often without notice by the hydroelectric factories has finally aroused in the population a feeling of detestation towards the 7000 dams that produce 40% of the national electricity^{xxviii}, that Hanoi is spreading throughout the country, in imitation of the Chinese in China.

More importantly, in the midst of the Formosa scandal, the Chinese, in contempt of the entire world, and using the Vietnamese company Hoa Sen as a front, were granted the license for the installation of another steelworks plant of equal size in Cà Ná, Province of Ninh Thuận, in the south of the country^{xxix}. If this plant comes into existence and starts to dump its waste into the sea like that of the Center region, there is no doubt that all the coastal provinces of Vietnam will become uninhabitable for its natives and that the maritime economy will collapse completely.

Meanwhile, to better devastate the Vietnamese environment, Beijing urged Hanoi to choose thermal power stations, particularly very polluting coal-based ones that China just banished from its own territory, instead of windmills, much cleaner and more suitable for a country with a coast of 3260 km, to develop its energy production. While at it, Beijing got Hanoi to accept the setting up of Chinese thermal power plants on the most important areas of Vietnam, especially all along the littoral, for

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example the Vĩnh Tân 1 plant, at the moment the biggest thermal power plant in Vietnam, worthing \$1.75 billion, located on 58 ha nearby a maritime protection zone in Bình Thuận province. All these units using Chinese outdated technology have bad impact on environment : thus the Duyên Hải 1 plant, hardly in activity on January 2016 already causes respiratory problems to neighbouring inhabitants and threatens their salt productionxxx.

To perfect the destruction of the South, in 2008 the Chinese, through the company Lee & Man, were granted the construction of a gigantic paper mill to produce 420,000 tons of paper per year on the Sông Hậu, the great river feeding the delta, in the face of unanimous protestsxxxxi. This plant, which is supposed to be in operation this year, will certainly kill the river with its enormous quantities of toxic waste including hydroxide, and will ruin rice crops as well as aquaculture in the West.

Unlike other foreign companies, that are not harmful, Chinese companies located all over Vietnam are all very polluting by the nature of their products and blithely dump their waste into the atmosphere, the soil and the waters. Vietnamese lakes and rivers are already blackish or reddish depending on the substances that are spilled there. The soil is impregnated with fertilizers and pesticides that contaminate crops. China is even suspected of exporting its own toxic waste to Vietnam, with or without a license from Hanoi, and of burying it in various parts of the country, based on the testimony of a few repentant accomplices. Besides, where does Formosa get so much toxic waste from, when, according to their own declaration, their stoves will not quite be ready until some time in 2017?

Consequences of pollution:

The Vietnamese population is extremely scared now for its health. Beside the air that they breathe, the water they use for their ablutions and their washing, all their food is now likely to poison them. Fruits and vegetables are not only stuffed with highly harmful Chinese pesticides but also dangerous Chinese chemicals that either magnify them or prolong their apparent freshness. Moreover, since the Sino-Vietnamese treaties, food products imported from China invade the Vietnamese markets and they are even worse: there is no week without the newspapers reporting cases of intoxication caused by one of these products, or without revealing cases of fake rice, fake eggs, fake noodles, fake meats, fake coffee, and so onxxxii, all faked with industrial chemicals. How can you protect yourself since you must eat to live? How to know if the fruit or vegetable you eat is not contaminated, if the meat you are enjoying is not tampered with, if the fish you buy is not packed with toxic metals, if the nước mắm you are consuming is not made from these intoxicated fish and if the salt that is used does not come from a polluted coastline? Vietnam has become a country with a high rate of cancer patients; the death toll from cancer, estimated by WHO in 2015 based on reports from Vietnamese hospitals, is 350 per day; there are 130,000 new cases every year, and these figures are expected to increase sharply after the Formosa disasterxxxiii.

However, the government, complicit of the polluters, refuses to take sanitary measures. It rejects any request for analysis of the water. After the Formosa scandal, it even forbids doctors to examine the blood of the inhabitants of the Central provinces, for fear of exploitation by "enemy forces" (a term that refers to groups of opponents of the regime). The "genociders" of Beijing can rub their hands. The Southwest Vietnam and Central Vietnam are gradually being emptied of their population, driven by the misery to emigrate abroad on the incentive of the government. And most of these uneducated emigrants have no other resource than to join the lumpenproletariat of the host country which receives them badly and despises them. Ironically, following the example of Donald Trump, the Cambodian prime minister recently spelled out plans to build a wall on the Vietnamese border to prevent the paperless Vietnamese from entering Cambodia! Meanwhile, thousands if not millions of Chinese people have been settled in Vietnam, where the authorities have reserved the best places for them, wherein the Vietnamese who have been living there for generations have been expropriated for an insignificant indemnity, thus creating groups of "dân oan" (victims of injustice) that can be seen gathered around the capital or prefectures to claim a reparation that will never be made.

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Military threats:

Unlike free countries that host foreign companies only with a view to procuring work for their citizens, the Vietnamese government suffers without objection that Chinese companies import all their personnel to the tens of thousands or even more, and refuse any control on the part of its administration. Also part of this behavior of servility/arrogance is a concern to conceal a much more worrying reality. The immense areas conceded to China for their factories that do not require as much, moreover located in the most strategic locations of the country, protected by barbed wire and prohibited to all Vietnamese, even to representatives of public authority, may house only military complexes whose staff consists of alleged factory employees. Arms of all sizes passed through the open border can be easily camouflaged, especially if tunnels are dug. Moreover, if we are to believe the rumor, the Chinese are in the process of (or have finished) constructing in secret two tunnelsxxxiv large enough for the use of tanks and lorries, to connect the region of the Highlands and The Mekong Delta.

At present, in the event of an armed invasion, China can move regiments at any time through North Vietnam, whose border region and Tonkin Bay are already under its control; in the Center region it has bases on the Highlands as well as on the coast with the port of Vũng Áng where its submarines and large ships can enter. Farther away, the south will be reached by troops descended from the Center region, and also by aircraft from the recently built airports on the Paracel and Spratly Islands stolen from Vietnam. If current intrigues succeed, China will soon become the owner of several regional airports on the brink of bankruptcy, that it can transform into military airfields.

In order to complete the encirclement of Vietnam and to control all its supply lines by either land or sea, China has established a solid alliance with Laos and Cambodia; the latter has even leased to China a naval base for 90 years in the port of Sihanoukville from where Chinese can monitor the South Sea. In case of necessity, for example of American intervention, they deployed a row of ground-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands. Where are these missiles pointed at, if not towards Vietnam, barely thirty kilometers away.

All these military preparations merely materialize China's warlike ambition. This is an ambition China never concealed: on the website of the Chinese army sina.com, the authors of articles published on September 5th 2008 and then on December 20th 2014 explain how China can quickly conquer Vietnam! But, as good followers of Sun Tzu and lovers of the game of go, especially after the failed invasion of 1979, the Chinese prefer to use force only as a last resort after stifling the opponent. Thus, for decades China has patiently applied to its little neighbor the "strategy of the silkworm", a small animal that is able to overcome a large pile of mulberry leaves by nibbling it bit by bit.

The Vietnamese population, caught between the Chinese hammer and the government anvil, prefers for the most part to live in denial or in fatalism. But the deniers of the Chinese threat can not dispute the omnipresence of the Chinese in the country; and since the leaks on the 1990 treaty, especially since the development of the "livestream" technique on Facebook that allows the direct exchange of information, they become aware of the imminent danger that the communist power wants to hide from them. For their part, the traitors of the State apparatus, who have been in the know for a long time, seek only to build up a substantial personal fortune through racketeering and corruption, and then to transfer this fortune abroad by means licit or illicit. Vietnam is in danger of bankruptcy with a current debtxxxv of \$117 billion equivalent to 64% of GDP, that it cannot pay (on the deadline of July 2017, servicing the debt will amount to 24% of the national budget)xxxvi, at a time that country's coffers are empty (in many places, civil servants and employees of government companies haven't been paid for monthsxxxvii). Meanwhile, it is estimated that more than \$600 billions of money stolen from the Vietnamese people by the apparatchiks was deposited in the United States, and more than \$200 billions in Swiss banksxxxviii. All these Communist felons continue to assuage the people with lies, to

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praise the sweetness of living in a Vietnam moving towards modernity; but they themselves take the precaution of sending their wives and children in advance to capitalist countries, preferably in the most "detested", the United States. The "spoilsports" who oppose this travesty of justice, those who assist victims, the "democrats", the citizens who are openly hostile to the Party or to China, are tolerated for a certain time in order to convince international opinion that they live in a free country. Then on a beautiful day or rather on a beautiful night (as is the custom in dictatorships) they are arrested, beaten, imprisoned, sometimes killed. A few days ago, the political police thus kidnapped the most notorious democrats, and detained them in places unknown, so as to discourage those who are tempted to participate in the general demonstration of March 5th 2017xxxix. In Saigon, those who had the courage to demonstrate were harshly repressed, and on this occasion they discovered that the most brutal police officers who beat them cruelly are in fact Chinese.

Apart from the minority of the watchdogs of the regime, the Vietnamese people refuse the idea of any Anschluss with China. But, betrayed by their own leaders who have become the "domestic enemy," how can they oppose the powerful "foreign enemy" when the fateful hour comes? The only hope for Vietnam to remain independent is a general uprising large enough to overthrow the power of Hanoi and install in its place a democratic government that will take national interests to heart and establish military alliances with free countries. And that before a Chinese military deployment. Yet, submitted to the cruellest political regimes in existence for nearly half a century in the South of Vietnam and nearly a century in the North, the Vietnamese have lost their energy and confidence in themselves. To revolt, they must overcome the paralyzing fear of the wrath of the regime, a fear that is instilled in them from childhood.

Meanwhile, time is short and we cannot watch without reacting the slow death of a once proud and courageous people. You all men and women of good will, who love justice and freedom, I beseech you to look into the drama of Vietnam! Alert international public opinion to counter Beijing's annexationist machinations! Especially those among you, who by your vociferations against the Vietnam War in the 1960s, helped push America to abandon the republic of South Vietnam to bring it into the hands of the sinister clique of assassins from Hanoi, take your responsibilities and redeem yourself by denouncing the Chinese political crimes as strongly you formerly denounced the US! Show the Vietnamese that they are actively supported, and by the warmth of your sympathy communicate to them the flame they lack to overcome their fear! Help them to take back their right to live free in a free country!

Paris, 2017-03-09, revised version 2017-04-19

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Translation from French by François-René Rideau

1/ Read the rare written mentions of these war crimes by the chinese army in: WT news, "NY Times viết gì về sự tàn bạo của TC trong chiến tranh biên giới 1989" (<http://www.vtc.vn/quoc-te/new-york-times-viet-ve-su-bao-tan-cua-trung-quoc-trong-chien-tranh-bien>) and Hùng Dũng, "Trung Quốc ra lệnh hễ gặp người VN nào là giết hết, in Người Việt Ukraina", 2016-02-18 (<http://nguoivietukraina.com/chien-tranh-bien-gioi-1979-tq-ra-lenh-gap-nguoi-vn-la-giet-het.nvu>).

2/ There exists a mystery about the article by Kerby Anderson Nguyễn who gives these informations with excerpts from the documents because the blog "hoilatraoi" that first published them in June 2013 cannot be found anymore; but the article was immediately spread, and it can be read on several

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vietnamese sites that republished it in its entirety. One must be reminded that the Internet has become the platform for all kinds of manipulation and disinformation, and that an effort is required from the reader to analyze and sort the information to avoid being deceived. Having myself fallen for some hoax claiming to be Wikileaks revelations, that I cited in the first version of this text, I had, to appease my conscience, to consult every document available on the Internet regarding this infamous treaty. Taking into consideration the fact that any claim about a "secret" document are by definition unverifiable and therefore subject to caution, one may at the very least hypothesize that it is a cleverly disguised leak by some disgruntled high-level party official, because the tone and the style of the excerpts seem authentic. In any case, in 2014 the rumor about the annexation of Vietnam in 2020 grew to great proportions -- especially after two corroborating excerpts were circulated in two Chinese newspapers, New China press and Global times, that only repeat a statement published after the 1990 conference in the Sichuan Daily (cf. part 1 of the series of articles by Huỳnh Tâm on the conference, published in his blog, where he cites the chinese original: <http://huynh-tam.blogspot.fr/201410/ly-bang-tiet-lo-hoi-nghi-thanh-o-1990.html> : Hội nghị vừa kết thúc, nhật báo Tứ Xuyên loan tải một thông điệp của phái đoàn Việt Nam: "Việt Nam bày tỏ mong muốn sẵn sàng chấp nhận làm một khu vực tự trị thuộc chính quyền trung ương tại Bắc Kinh như Trung Quốc đã dành cho Nội Mông, Tây Tạng, Quảng Tây... Phía Trung Quốc đồng ý và đồng ý chấp nhận đề nghị nói trên và cho Việt Nam thời gian 30 năm để Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam giải quyết các bước tiến hành cần thiết cho việc gia nhập đại gia đình các dân tộc Trung Quốc!" (越南表示愿意接受作为中央政府在北京的一个自治区为中国的内蒙古, 西藏, 广西...中国方面同意接受并同意上述建议和越南为期30年的越南共产党解决必要加入中国民族的大家庭中的步骤!). The scandal was such that many voices arose to demand the publication of the treaty; but instead of the requested transparency, the Establishment merely let the party's central Bureau of propaganda deny the treasonous act in a long explanation of the treaty that fails to convince anyone. Since then, many confirmations by high-level officials have leaked via Youtube, including for instance one certified by the daughter of a general (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpZai9CV14I>).

3/ Cf. the article by Đặng Chí Hùng, "Bằng chứng bán nước toàn diện của đảng cộng sản VN", in the blog Sinicization of Indochina, that gives a copy of this agreement (<http://namviet.net/blog-hanhhoa/?p=657#.WNaot7g8acM>): Giao ước có tên "Ghi nhớ hợp tác Việt Trung" - số hiệu (VT/GU-0212) ký ngày 12/6/1953 tại Quảng Tây giữa Hồ và Mao như sau: "Trước tình hình quân đội thực dân Pháp đang củng cố xâm lược Việt Nam. Đảng cộng sản nước cộng hòa nhân dân Trung Hoa và đảng Lao động Việt Nam dân chủ cộng hòa nhận thấy cần có sự tương trợ và giúp đỡ lẫn nhau để giữ tình đoàn kết hai đảng, chính phủ và nhân dân hai nước như sau:

Điều 1: Chính phủ Tàu cộng sẽ đồng ý viện trợ vũ khí theo yêu cầu chi viện của quân đội nhân dân Việt Nam. Ngoài ra sẽ gửi các cố vấn, chuyên gia quân sự để giúp đỡ quân đội nhân dân Việt Nam.

Điều 2: Đảng Lao động do đồng chí Hồ Chí Minh lãnh đạo đồng ý sáp nhập đảng Lao Động Việt Nam là một bộ phận của đảng cộng sản Tàu cộng.

Điều 3: Hai bên thống nhất Việt Nam dân chủ cộng hòa là một bộ phận của cộng hòa nhân dân Tàu cộng với quy chế của một liên ban theo mô hình các quốc gia nằm trong Liên Bang Xô Viết (Phụ lục đính kèm).

Điều 4: Trước đảng và chính phủ hai nước cần tập trung đánh đuổi thực dân Pháp và giành lại chủ quyền lãnh thổ cho Việt Nam. Các bước tiếp theo của việc sáp nhập sẽ được chính thực thi kể từ ngày hôm nay 12/06/1953.

Điều 5: Chính phủ cộng hòa nhân dân Trung Hoa đồng ý cung cấp viện trợ kinh tế cho chính phủ Việt Nam dân chủ cộng hòa theo thỏa thuận đã bàn giữa chủ tịch Mao Trạch Đông và chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh (Phụ lục đính kèm).

...Ký tên: Hồ Chí Minh và Mao Trạch Đông”

4/ Until there are on-site verifications backed by maps, the lost area can only be estimated with more or less reliability. Yet, from a simple subtraction of the official data on the total area of Vietnam published before and after 2000, a valid number can be extracted. Therefore, it is recognized by the geographers and scientists of the current Establishment that in 1943, forests used to cover 43% of the area of the country for a total of 14.3 million hectares, which corresponds to a total area of 33.26 million hectares or 332,600 km²; no official number is given for the current total surface area, but the study by Will de Jong, Đỗ Đình San and Tran Van Hung, "Forest rehabilitation in Vietnam", made in Hanoi in 2006, mentions the number of 331.210 km² for the total surface area of the country, which implies a loss of 1,500 km²!

5/ To get an idea on the issue with borders, read the article of 2013-11-06 by Trương Nhân Tuấn, "Việt Nam có mất đất mất biển qua hai hiệp định phân định biên giới", in the blog "Những vấn đề Việt Nam" (<http://nhantuantruong.blogspot.fr/2013/11/viet-nam-co-mat-at-mat-bien-qua-hai.html>).

6/ See part 4 of the series of articles by Huỳnh Tâm cited above.

7/ As a sign of this incorporation, in December 2009, the Vietnamese government modified the uniforms of the Vietnamese army. And they were found to be almost identical copies of those of the Chinese army, the only difference being a stripe on the hat of the Vietnamese uniform. If a Chinese invasion takes place, how will the people be able to distinguish friends and foes (assuming that the "Vietnamese People's Army" remains a friend!). See the article by Nguyễn Văn Tuấn, "Liệu quân phục VN có made in China?" of 2011-07-18 in Vietinfo: <http://m.vietinfo.eu/tu-lieu/lieu-quan-phuc-viet-nam-co-made-in-china.html>.

8/ Historically and traditionally the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos are part of Vietnam. These unoccupied and wind-struck islands were ignored by all countries except the Vietnamese royal power, that even created a special sea patrol to watch them in the 18th century. At the start of the 20th century, the acknowledgement of their strategic position in controlling the sea traffic as well as their abundance of guano started to inspire covetousness from neighboring countries, particularly China; and this covetousness only grew with the discovery of large underwater deposits of oil and natural gas. In 1974, taking advantage of the USA retreating from the Vietnamese conflict, China seized by force the Paracel islands, then in 1988 it profited from its war with Vietnam to occupy, also by force, the Spratly. Chinese audacity was encouraged by a kind of concession from the power in Hanoi as attested in a letter to Zhou Enlai by prime minister Phạm Văn Đồng dated from 1958, in which Vietnam recognizes the sovereignty of China within a limit of territorial waters that includes the two archipelagos. This document, long hidden by Hanoi, was divulged by Beijing in 1980 in an anti-Vietnamese propaganda pamphlet during the border war; but fearing the reaction of the people that is very attached to these islands, the Vietnamese communist power feigned ignoring their existence then tried to minimize their significance! This explains why in May 2014, when the arrival of a Chinese drilling platform on the waters around these islands gave raise to large anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam (see article: "Des tensions qui poussent le Vietnam à s'allier avec un vieil ennemi", in Openmind, news, 2016-07-12 (<https://www.openminded.com/2014/11/07/nouveaux-lieux-paris-eko-monseigneur-club-phantom.html>)), a Vietnamese language broadcast by the Beijing television "People's Voice" dated 2014-05-18 responded with this statement: "... we admit that Paracel and Spratly and the coasts (?) belong to Vietnam, but the Vietnamese communists (represented) by prime minister Phạm Văn Đồng signed a diplomatic note on 1958-06-07.

China possesses all the indisputable documents about the maritime region and China has the right to exploit Vietnamese oil and natural gas. The Vietnamese communists cannot do anything about it. You all, leaders in the political bureau of the Vietnamese communist party, we do not understand for what

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reason you do not proclaim to all your people that you have signed and recognized that the Paracel, Spratly and Vietnamese coasts (?) are under Chinese sovereignty and why you let the Foreign affairs Ministry and the Navy be mistaken and continue their aggression... We have enough forces ready to crush all the Vietnamese warships; with the might of China we will vanquish all of Vietnam in merely one hour. We will seize the Vietnamese coasts and we will take everything that Vietnam owes to pay the lesson, as in 1979. You, leaders of the political bureau of the Vietnamese communist party, you are the "gruel eaters who piss in the bowl", you owe to China a debt of over 870 billions (of yuans or of dollars?) for the war of Điện Biên Phủ and the war against the United States. And now that you have handed over the islands and the sea to the People's Republic of China, nothing justifies that you should not make it publicly known to the entire population and that you should keep opposing China; that is an impudent action by Vietnam, we denounce it categorically and we will teach Vietnam a lesson." This is a precious document for it is the first time that we see China publicly declaring that the Paracels and Spratly belong (or at least used to belong) to Vietnam, whereas it always claimed based on dubious evidence that its sovereignty over these islands date back to ancient times. (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RCLlsvpRNhg>)

9/ Cf. Wikipedia (the French and not the English version) in the article: flag of People's Republic of China. Young pioneers of China (Large detachment). On the other hand, the Fujian flag (yellow star on red and blue background) was chosen as emblem of the ephemeral "Liberation of South Vietnam movement" with a little difference in the intensity of the blue color.

10/ The publication of the translation of the book by Hồ Tuấn Hùng gave rise to many articles and critical commentaries. The most solid line of argument in my eyes is that of Trần Việt Bắc, "Hồ Chí Minh: Đồng chí Nguyễn Ái Quốc và tôi" (http://www.geocities.ws/xaohantuong/tvb_hcmdongchi.htm).

11/ Cf. Interview of Vũ Minh Giang, vice-president of the association of historical sciences, in "Ghi nhận sự hy sinh của các liệt sĩ trong chiến tranh biên giới 1979", in Báo mới, 2017-02-16 (<http://www.baomoi.com/ghi-nhan-su-hy-sinh-cua-cac-liet-si-trong-chien-tranh-bien-gioi-1979/c/21554895.epi>).

12/ Cf. article in RFA of 2017-01-12, "Cưỡng chế tượng Trần Hưng Đạo tại tư gia là trái luật": http://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/in_depth/will-statue-inside-private-property-be-evicted-illegally-ha-01122017080011.html/.

13/ About the dams upstream of the Mekong, read: Question Chine 2011-11-27 (<http://www.questionchine.net/controverses-autour-des-barrages-chinois-sur-le-mekong>); Samuel Bollendorff, "Le rapt du Mékong", on his website <http://www.samuel-bollendorff.com/fr/le-rapt-du-mekong/>; for a more scientific view, the study by Michel Ho Ta Khanh, "Le Vietnam et les aménagements hydrauliques dans le bassin versant du Mékong" <http://www.recherches-internationales.fr/RI98/RI98HoTaKhanh.pdf>.

14/ About the consequences of the dams, read: Arnaud Vaulerin, "Delta du Mékong, le triangle des inquiétudes", in (newspaper) Libération, 2016-02-07 (http://www.liberation.fr/planete/.../delta-du-mekong-le-triangle-des-inquietudes_1431029); Arnaudet Lucie, Arnoux Marie, Derrien Allan, Schneider Maunoury Laure, "Conséquences environnementales, sociales et politiques des barrages, Etude du cas du Mékong", ENS, Ceres-Erti, 2013 (<http://www.environnement.ens.fr/IMG/Mekong.pdf>).

15/ The tactics by Chinese businessmen are so cruel and so twisted that many people attribute them to malicious rumors. Unhappily they are all too true. One may read the recurring articles in Vietnamese newspapers, for instance the very official "An ninh thủ đô" (Security of the capital city) of 2015-06-18 (<http://anninhthudo.vn/chinh-tri-xa-hoi/muon-van-thu-doan-ban-cua-thuong-lai-trung-quoc-nhieu->

loan-thi-truong-viet-nam/616728.antd) and to look at video clips on the topic, for instance like this one: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nlsf6BrniVg>.

16/ About the deliberate introduction of these destructive stocks, see the article by Lê Thọ in the newspaper Thừa Thiên of 2016-07-06 (<http://baodatviet.vn/kinh-te/thi-truong/dan-bo-lua-trong-sen-bai-hoc-oc-buou-vang-lap-lai-3328574/>), and that by Ngọc Tài and Thành Nhân, "Bất thường một dự án trồng sen", in Tuổi trẻ, 2017-02-04 (<http://baodatviet.vn/kinh-te/thi-truong/dan-bo-lua-trong-sen-bai-hoc-oc-buou-vang-lap-lai-3328574/>).

17/ Cf. one of the many articles on that topic in VT news of 2017-02-10: (<http://www.vtc.vn/xahoi/phong-sinh-ca-chim-trang-xuong-song-hong-nhieu-co-quan-chuc-nang-vaoc-cuoc-d302781.htm>).

18/ About deforestation in Vietnam a serious but slightly old study: Yann Roche and Rodolphe de Koninck, "Les enjeux de la déforestation au Vietnam", in Vertigo, vol.3, n°1, 4/2002 (<https://vertigo.revues.org/4113>).

19/ The concession of forests to chinese timber companies was officially acknowledged in 2014, but started since at least 2010. Cf. public protestations in 2010 by two old generals, Đồng Sĩ Nguyên and Nguyễn Trọng Vĩnh against the decision of 10 provinces "allowing 10 foreign companies to rent over a long duration the land of primary forests so as to grow raw material forests on a total surface area of 305,533 ha of which 264,000 ha are attributed to Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, 87% of these forests being in the important border provinces... The provinces that sell their forests are suicidal and harm the rest of the country, as for the countries that buy our forests that destroy our country on purpose and sow heartlessly and ruthlessly a catastrophe for our people." (http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2010/02/100222_forestation_projects.shtml)

20/ Cf. Daniel Drollette Jr, "A plague of deforestation sweeps across SEA", Yale environment 360, 2013-05-20 (http://e360.yale.edu/features/a_plague_of_deforestation_sweeps_across_southeast_asia); "Deforestation in Vietnam is condoned by authorities: official", in Thanh niên news, 2015-04-11 (<http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/deforestation-in-vietnam-is-condoned-by->).

21/ The Vietnamese expression for the precious ancestral heritage is "rừng vàng biển bạc" = forest of gold and sea of silver. The forests has almost disappeared; as for the sea, it is half dead since the Formosa catastrophe.

22/ Officially however, China is only the second investor in Vietnam. Cf. "Le courrier du Vietnam", 2017-03-16 (<http://lecourrier.vn/flux-dinvestissement-direct-chinois-au-vietnam/393651>).

23/ Cf. Jean-Claude Pomonti, "Le Vietnam, la Chine et la bauxite", in le monde diplomatique, 2009-07-03 (<http://blog.mondediplo.net/2009-07-03-Le-Vietnam-la-Chine-et-la-bauxite>).

24/ The protests against these bauxite factories were the topic of a PhD thesis: Jason Morris, "The Vietnamese bauxite mining controversy: the emergency of a new oppositional politics", University of California, Berkeley, 2013 (http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Morris_berkeley_0028E_14018.pdf).

25/ Already the pollution caused by these factories affects the health of the neighborhood inhabitants. Cf. the article by Tuệ Lâm, "Vỡ đường ống nhà máy bauxite..." republished by the site of Viet An group: <http://www.vietan-enviro.com/vo-duong-ong-nha-may-bauxite-nguy-co-tham-hoa-moi-truong-giong-formosa-o-tay-nguyen/>.

26/ Cf. "After many years Vietnam authority, investor, still struggle to justify bauxite plants", in Thanh niên news, 2015-04-07 (<http://www.thanhniennews.com/business/after-many-years-vietnam->

[authority-investor-still-struggle-to-justify-bauxite-plants-40660.html](#)).

27/ Cf. Brian Hioe, "Continued protests in Vietnam against Formosa steel", 2016-10-14, in New Bloom, Octobre 2016 (<http://newbloommag.net/2016/10/14/formosa-steel-vientam-october/>) .

28/ Cf. Prashanth Parameswaran, "Vietnam may crack down on dam investors", in The diplomat, 2015-01-03 (<http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/vietnam-may-crack-down-on-dam-investors/>). The number of 7000 dams given by the author, that must also includes small dams by individuals, non officially registered, is far beyond what one obtains by adding the projects of hydroelectric units recognized by the national electricity company EVN: 888 units in 2016, 1586 in 2030 – Cf. Phạm Thu Hương, "Hồ Hồ và nghịch lý thủy điện nhỏ ở Việt Nam", in CVD, 2016-11-03 (<https://cvdvn.net/2016/11/03/ho-ho-va-nghich-ly-thuy-dien-nho-o-viet-nam/>).

29/ Cf. "Revival plan for massive steel plant tests Vietnam after Formosa disaster" in VNExpress, 2016-09-14 (<http://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/revival-plan-for-massive-steel-plant-tests-vietnam-after-formosa>).

30/ About the deliberate poisoning of Vietnam by thermal power stations, read: Lê Anh Hùng, Trung tâm nhiệt điện Vĩnh Tân và hiểm họa mất nước, Chân trời mới media (<https://www.facebook.com/chantroimoimedia/posts/901893309854222>).

31/ Cf. video clip on the pollution of the Hậu river, that will completely die after the paper factory starts production: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRqrGDnWkc8>.

32/ Cf. ZS, "10 aliments en provenance de Chine remplis de plastique et cancérigènes", in Alnas, 2015-11-02 (<http://www.alnas.fr/actualite/alimentation-sante/article/sante-10-aliments-en-provenance-de>); Alain Sousa, "Aliments chinois, faut-il en avoir peur ?", 2008-12-05, in Doctissimo nutrition (<http://www.alnas.fr/actualite/alimentation-sante/article/sante-10-aliments-en-provenance-de>).

33/ Cf. article in Saigoneer of 2016-04-07: "Vietnam could have most cancer cases worldwide by 2020..." (<http://saigoneer.com/saigon-health/6714-vietnam-could-have-most-cancer-cases-worldw>).

34/ Cf. a video clip by Jenny Trần: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wk7W2hizZg8> .


35/ The official numbers are quite minimized. According to Vũ Quang Việt, a former head of statistics at UN, the actual public debt of Vietnam is as high as 431 billion USD, a number that includes both debt due by the State and by State-held companies (324 billion USD), which amounts to 210% of GNP; however, the State bank itself admits that the country's foreign currency reserves only amount to 40 billion USD, and every year the national budget has a deficit of 5 to 6% of GNP. Cf. article by Lê Dung "STBN, Không phải 62% GDP mà nợ công VN đang là 210% GDP", in Việt Nam thời báo, 2017-02-20 (<http://www.ijavn.org/2017/02/vntb-khong-phai-62-gdp-ma-no-cong-viet.html>).

36/ Cf. article by Bích Diệp, "World bank sẽ chấm dứt...", in Dân trí, 2016-03-22 (<http://dantri.com.vn/kinh-doanh/world-bank-se-cham-dut-oda-uu-dai-voi-viet-nam-vao-nam-2017-20160322141524964.htm>).

37/ For instance as of 2017-03-19, the 3700 employees of the irrigation service of Hanoi still haven't been paid since November 2016.

38/ These numbers are likely considering the every time increasing sums of millions of USD each seized among mid-level corrupt officials that the authorities decide to prosecute, and most importantly they are in agreement with the revelations by Poliburos.net in 2000 and by the officer of a swiss bank in 2005 about the astronomical amounts deposited in foreign banks. (<https://hon->

viet.co.uk/NT_VietNamCoKhoang700DangVienCoTaiSanTu100Den300TrieuDoLa.htm). This evasion of money stolen from the people explains the drying up of the State's currency reserves and the exhaustion of its resources.



S.O.S. VIETNAM En danger de génocide et d'annexion par la Chine

APPEL A TOUS LES ESPRITS EPRIS DE JUSTICE ET DE LIBERTE, A TOUS LES DEMOCRATES ET ECOLOGISTES AUTHENTIQUES

S.O.S. VIETNAM En danger de génocide et d'annexion par la Chine

Une annexion du Vietnam machiavéliquement programmée par la Chine avec la complicité du pouvoir communiste de Hanoi est en passe de se réaliser au Vietnam dans l'indifférence générale !

A la fin de la guerre frontalière sino-vietnamienne, menée par la Chine en représailles de l'intervention du Vietnam au Cambodge, qui dura non pas seulement quelques mois selon la version officielle, mais 10 ans (1979-1989) marqués par des atrocités inouïes de la part d'une armée de 620.000 chinois rasant tout sur leur passage (destruction de 4 villes et de villages entiers, massacre de tous leurs habitants enfants compris avec viol en réunion préalable des femmes), les dirigeants de Hanoi aux abois devant la chute de l'empire soviétique, jusqu'alors leur allié, plutôt que de perdre leur pouvoir en se reconvertissant en démocrates comme en Europe de l'Est, préférèrent en 1990 aller à Canossa ou plus exactement à Chengdu faire allégeance à la Chine et leur offrir leur pays en échange de l'appui de Pékin en vertu d'un traité secret dont la teneur n'a été divulguée en partie qu'en 2014 par Wikileaks puis confirmée par deux journaux chinois dont le très officiel New China press: Selon le traité, les traîtres à la patrie de Hanoi s'engageaient à la transformation progressive du Vietnam en province autonome de la Chine à l'instar du Tibet, 2020 devant être la date limite.

Sous prétexte de coopération active avec le Grand frère du Nord, un processus de tibétisation du Vietnam se déroula comme suit :

Mise au pas politique:

- En 1999 un traité sur la frontière terrestre stipule la cession de 900 km² (équivalents à la superficie de la province de Thái Bình) y compris la moitié de la cascade Bản Giốc et le poste Nam Quan, deux sites historiques chers au cœur des Vietnamiens.

- En 2000 par un traité sur le golfe du Tonkin le pouvoir de Hanoi cède à la Chine le tiers des eaux territoriales dans le golfe ainsi que la plage de Tục Lãm.

- En 2013 dix résolutions sur la coopération permettent à Pékin de contrôler l'entière politique du Vietnam. Des Chinois de Chine ou anciennement du Vietnam (ceux qui partirent en 1978) spécialement formés furent placés par le pouvoir chinois à divers postes de direction de tous les échelons dans toutes les institutions vietnamiennes, surtout dans la police et l'armée, jusqu'aux plus hautes charges de l'Etat : Actuellement, le président de la république Trần Đại Quang, le vice-premier ministre Hoàng Trung Hải considéré comme le bras droit de Pékin, le vice-président du Parlement Tô Huy Rúa et le ministre de la police Tô Lâm sont des chinois ou d'origine chinoise. De la sorte, les cadres et dignitaires à l'esprit rebelles à la sinisation sont vite repérés et mis hors d'état de nuire, comme ce fut le cas en décembre 2016 du ministre de la défense Phùng Quang Thanh.

- En 2014 le traité sur un «projet de deux couloirs stratégiques» donne à la Chine le droit d'exploiter économiquement les six provinces frontalières et la région de Điện Biên, ainsi que l'établissement de deux couloirs stratégiques, Lào Cai – Hà Nội - Hải Phòng et Móng Cái – Hà Nội.

- En janvier 2017, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, le secrétaire général du parti actuel est allé à Pékin signer 15 conventions promouvant une plus étroite coopération entre les deux pays, en particulier dans les domaines militaire, policier et culturel, laquelle coopération doit être comprise comme une plus grande sujétion, avec à terme l'incorporation de l'armée et la police vietnamiennes dans l'armée et la police chinoise, c'est-à-dire la fin du Vietnam.

Ces traités furent suivis d'accords économiques permettant à Pékin d'envoyer en masse ses ressortissants sous couvert d'employés et d'ouvriers dans les endroits les plus stratégiques du Vietnam :

Accord pour deux entreprises conjointes (en fait chinoises car la majorité du capital vient de Chine) de bauxite installées sur le «toit» des Hauts Plateaux du Centre, d'où l'on peut dominer toute l'Indochine.

Accord pour l'exploitation par les Chinois des forêts primitives, ce qui revient à laisser à la Chine le contrôle des points les plus cruciaux du Nord du pays.

Permission aux entreprises chinoises de s'installer sur tout le littoral vietnamien, de Móng Cái à Cà Mau.

Possibilité pour les Chinois de fonder des villes chinoises dans tout le pays comme à Bình Dương, où la seule langue utilisée est le chinois et où les échanges se font en yuan chinois.

Permission aux ressortissants chinois de venir au Vietnam sans visa, de circuler et de s'installer librement au Vietnam où ils peuvent se marier avec des Vietnamiennes dont les enfants deviendront systématiquement chinois. Par contre, un visa est toujours exigé pour les Vietnamiens allant en Chine, et de nombreux quartiers chinois au Vietnam sont interdits aux Vietnamiens, même aux autorités publiques vietnamiennes.

Reconnaissance tacite de l'appartenance du Vietnam à la Chine par l'adoption d'un drapeau chinois à 6 étoiles (une grande étoile entourée de 5 au lieu des 4 petites étoiles officielles) sur lequel le peuple vietnamien figure symboliquement comme un des peuples conquis à l'égal des peuples de la Mandchourie, de la Mongolie intérieure, du Tibet et du pays Ouïghour. Ce drapeau chinois, apparu pour la première fois en arrière-fond derrière une speakerine de la télévision officielle VTV suscita une telle interrogation indignée qu'il fut vite retiré ; on le revit pourtant en millier d'exemplaires agité par les écoliers vietnamiens pour l'accueil du vice-président chinois Xi Jinping en 2012. Face au tollé général, le gouvernement se contenta d'imputer le fait à une erreur technique des fabricants du drapeau (sic!). Ce qui n'a pas empêché ledit drapeau de figurer dans une salle de réunion de hauts-gradés vietnamiens et chinois à Lào Cai en 2015 et actuellement dans de nombreux commissariats.

D'ailleurs, le drapeau rouge avec une étoile jaune au milieu qui représente officiellement le Vietnam communiste que Hồ Chí Minh imposa au Vietnam n'est que l'emblème des jeunes pionniers communistes chinois (et non pas celui de la province de Fujian comme le prétend la rumeur). Additionné avec la forte probabilité que le fameux Hồ Chí Minh identifié avec le révolutionnaire vietnamien Nguyễn Tất Thành alias Nguyễn Ái Quốc est en fait un imposteur chinois, son sosie, dénommé Hồ Tập Chương alias Hồ Quang, chargé par l'Internationale communiste de personnifier l'espion soviétique vietnamien après sa mort en 1932 dans les geôles de Hồng Kông (d'après la révélation dès 1946 apportée par un auteur taiwanais, Ngô Trọc Lư, dans un livre intitulé « Hồ Chí Minh » écrit en japonais, confirmée en 1949 par un journal local du PCC, Cương Sơn, réaffirmée nettement dans une biographie controversée sur « La moitié de la vie de Hồ Chí Minh » publiée par un autre universitaire taiwanais, Hồ Tuấn Hùng en 2008), ce trait en dit long sur la machination annexionniste des dirigeants chinois et leur détermination mûrie depuis très longtemps de conquérir le

Vietnam.

Nul étonnement après cela à ce que les Chinois se comportent en maîtres arrogants, certains hauts dignitaires de Pékin ne se privant pas de traiter publiquement les dirigeants vietnamiens de « bâtards ingrats » quand Hanoi ose protester timidement contre l'un de leurs abus.

La soumission du Vietnam à la Chine se traduit par la répression violente de toute manifestation anti-chinoise (contre l'occupation des terres sur la frontière du Nord ; contre celle des îles Paracel et Spratley, traditionnellement vietnamiennes, convoitées par la plupart des pays de la région pour ses riches gisements de pétrole représentant 25% des réserves mondiales, que la Chine a arrachées au Vietnam par les armes en 1974 et en 1988 ; ou contre l'implantation des usines de bauxite dans une région particulièrement sensible du point de vue environnemental en 2009-2011) : des centaines de militants patriotes furent arrêtés, battus et mis en prison où beaucoup moururent par suite de mauvais traitements. Répression d'ailleurs toujours de mise, comme par exemple ces derniers mois envers les protestataires contre l'entreprise Formosa (taiwanaise par son nom et son siège en Formose, mais chinoise par son capital et donc sa gestion).

Sujétion culturelle :

L'expansion politique ne se conçoit guère sans influence culturelle, et pour Pékin, cette influence ne se comprend que par la sinisation du peuple conquis. Puisque les Vietnamiens sont destinés à fusionner dans le grand chaudron chinois, il faut effacer les traces d'antagonisme héréditaire chez eux et leur ôter en même temps la fierté de leur passé historique. C'est ainsi que Pékin imposa à Hanoi diverses mesures :

Faire oublier la vaillante résistance à l'armée chinoise dans la guerre de 1979-1989 : A l'indignation impuissante des anciens combattants, à la frontière nordique, Hanoi dut faire gratter sur la tombe des militaires vietnamiens morts pour la patrie tout ce qui a trait à cette guerre et à leur héroïsme. Par contre, des cimetières et monuments grandioses y furent édifiés en l'honneur des soldats chinois tombés au Vietnam. L'abondante publication hostile à la Chine durant la guerre disparut de la circulation et désormais aucune mention de cette guerre ne se retrouve dans les livres d'histoire et ouvrages officiels, si bien que les jeunes Vietnamiens ignorent jusqu'à son existence. Sur les annexions des terres frontalières comme des îles Paracel et Spratly et sur les exactions fréquentes de l'armée chinoise tel le mitraillage des bateaux de pêcheurs ou l'abattage des avions vietnamiens au large des eaux territoriales vietnamiennes dont la Chine s'est approprié les deux tiers, un silence radio est strictement observé.

Eviter la glorification des grands héros de l'histoire honorés pour leur lutte victorieuse contre l'envahisseur chinois. Il fut même question sous des prétextes oiseux de retirer leurs statues des lieux publics, mais le sujet trop sensible fut remis de côté et le pouvoir se contente de les déboulonner dans les habitations des particuliers (cas récent pour la statue du général Trần Hưng Đạo, grand vainqueur des Mongols, édifiée chez un habitant de la province de Lâm Đồng).

Aucune assimilation ne peut s'exercer sans adoption du langage. A l'inverse de l'anglais, langue très flexible et aisée à apprendre, malheureusement pour les ambitions hégémoniques de la Chine, la langue chinoise avec son écriture idéographique se prête mal à la propagation internationale et ne séduit guère les Vietnamiens. Si tu ne veux pas l'apprendre de ton plein gré, tu l'apprendras de force : des décrets furent donc arrêtés en fin 2016 pour imposer le chinois comme une première langue obligatoire au secondaire et pour introduire le chinois comme deuxième langue dès le primaire. Pour le moment des émissions entièrement en chinois sont diffusées par la radio et la télévision vietnamienne et même dans les programmes vietnamiens sont intercalées au milieu de la musique nationale des chansons chinoises.

Destruction de l'économie :

Hanoi comme Pékin devaient tenir secret le contenu du traité de 1990 par crainte de la révolte unanime des Vietnamiens, animés par suite des leçons de l'histoire d'une hostilité viscérale envers le grand voisin prédateur. Pour éviter d'avoir à faire face à 90 millions de résistants au moment de la proclamation officielle de l'annexion, et ne convoitant le Vietnam que pour ses richesses minières (en particulier bauxite et pétrole) et sa situation favorablement stratégique en Asie du Sud-Est, Pékin machina une véritable entreprise de génocide contre la population vietnamienne en vue d'un repeuplement par des Chinois, qui débute aussitôt le traité signé. Devant la destruction méthodique de l'économie et l'empoisonnement parallèle de toutes leurs sources de vie, les jeunes Vietnamiens sont et seront poussés à émigrer, ceux qui restent seront réduits au fil des années à l'état de malades impotents et les enfants à venir étant destinés à naître chétifs ou difformes.

Destruction de l'agriculture :

Le Vietnam tire ses ressources principales d'une agriculture florissante qui occupe encore plus de la moitié de sa population, du produit de ses pêches, du tourisme, et aussi du pétrole (depuis 2000). La culture du riz nourricier pour lequel le Vietnam est encore jusqu'à peu le 2e producteur au monde et le 3e exportateur, fut donc la première cible de Pékin :

Le vaste delta du Mékong, grenier à riz du Vietnam, dépend des crues alluvionnaires annuelles qui lui assurent sa fertilité. Depuis la mise en activité d'une cascade de 6 barrages chinois dans le Yunnan en amont du Mékong (4 autres sont prévus, sans compter le projet de deux canaux qui détourneront dans les alentours l'eau du fleuve), en particulier les gigantesques barrages hydroélectriques de Xiaowan (capacité : 15 milliards de m³, 2010) et Nuozhadu (capacité : 23 milliards de m³, 2012), les autres pays qui vivent du Mékong assistent impuissants à la détérioration de leur économie fluviale. Ne pouvant s'en prendre au puissant chinois qui manipule les débits du fleuve à sa guise sans même prévenir les riverains et s'assoit sur les mises en garde la Commission régionale du Mékong dont il refuse de faire partie, ces pays préfèrent participer à la curée en construisant leurs propres barrages avec la bénédiction et l'apport financier de Pékin (11 prévus au Laos qui rêve d'être un grand pourvoyeur d'électricité pour la région, dont l'énorme Xayaburi sur le cours principal du fleuve, déjà en chantier ; 2 en projet au Cambodge et 2 autres en Thaïlande).

Le Vietnam, en aval dans le delta ne peut que constater les dégâts : en butte à des sécheresses prolongées et des crues dévastatrices, les sols s'appauvrissent faute de sédiments et à cause entre autres de la salinisation due à l'augmentation de la température et la montée des eaux de mer ; le niveau de l'eau douce baisse dangereusement jusqu'à parfois la pénurie entraînant la chute des réserves de poissons ; avec le changement de température se multiplient les insectes et les champignons qui provoquent des maladies (développement de la dengue) et détruisent les récoltes. A l'action des barrages, s'ajoute la destruction des mangroves surtout dans l'extrême sud pour y élever des crevettes à l'exportation, à l'instigation des entreprises de congélation de fruits de mer pour la plupart tenues par des Chinois. Sans les arbres pour fixer la terre, les côtes s'érodent et chaque année 500 ha disparaissent à Cà Mau qui n'aura bientôt plus la forme de pointe.

En conséquence la superficie des rizières se réduit, et leur rendement baisse de 15% depuis une dizaine d'années ; la situation se dégrade si rapidement que l'on parle même de risque de famine dans les années à venir. Car paradoxalement, dans le Vietnam grand exportateur de riz, les habitants sont obligés souvent de manger du riz importé ; cela tient au fait qu'une bonne partie (60%) des récoltes est préemptée par l'Etat qui l'achète à très bas prix au producteur (3000 đ/kg au lieu de 4500 đ sur le marché), pour l'exportation. Où ? en priorité (40%) vers la Chine (au prix de 6000 đ), laquelle en échange du bon riz vietnamien revend à la population vietnamienne son propre riz de mauvaise qualité, parfois mélangé de grains en plastique appelé « faux riz » à un prix double ou triple (jusqu'à

3000 đ). Exploités et découragés par les mauvaises conditions de travail, chassés d'une terre devenue aride, un nombre grandissant de paysans abandonnent le métier, émigrent en ville ou dans les pays avoisinants, abandonnant la terre aux Chinois qui s'empressent de l'acquérir.

Décidés à s'emparer du maximum de terre pour leur colonisation de peuplement, les Chinois trouvent mille astuces plus diaboliques les unes que les autres pour ruiner les paysans récalcitrants et à les pousser à abandonner leur foyer. Leur subtile cruauté trouve en la petite paysannerie pauvre d'où cupide, ignorante et crédule une proie facile :

Des commerçants chinois voyageant par tout le pays repèrent les paysans en difficulté et proposent de leur acheter les quatre sabots de leur buffle au prix de l'animal, ce que les pauvres hères acceptent en pensant gagner double puisque l'animal tué pour leurs sabots pourra ensuite être vendu comme viande. Le buffle étant pour le paysan son instrument de travail, celui-ci disparu, il ne restera d'autre choix au paysan que l'acquiescement à n'importe quelle suggestion du chinois : combler sa rizière pour en faire une terre pour culture vivrière ou plantation d'arbustes en utilisant des fertilisants et pesticides chinois toxiques (qui ne respectent aucune des normes internationales) que lui vend à crédit le commerçant, lequel lui promet en retour de lui acheter à bon prix le produit de sa récolte ; promesse souvent tenue au moins la première année ; ensuite, sous des prétextes quelconques (ex. le produit en question n'est plus demandé) le commerçant ou un autre de ses congénères refuse l'achat du produit, lequel devra être bradé à vil prix par le paysan, trop heureux de pouvoir écouler rapidement des matières périssables. Le paysan finalement surendetté se voit obligé de céder sa terre au chinois ou à un de ses complices pour émigrer ailleurs.

Autre variante : là où la région prospère grâce à une certaine culture, le commerçant offre d'acheter toutes les feuilles du tubercule (par exemple le manioc) ou de la plante, ou aussi toutes les racines de la plante, à un prix bien supérieur à la récolte elle-même ; résultat, le tubercule ne peut se développer, la plante meurt et le paysan se trouve démuné de semence ou de plantule pour la prochaine saison ; de nouveau offre de vente d'engrais et de pesticides pour la plantation d'un fruit, d'une fleur, etc. de très bon rapport, etc.. L'astuce de l'achat des racines a été utilisée pour la destruction des caféiers, richesse du Centre-Vietnam lorsque les Chinois n'arrivent pas à faire main basse sur les plantations.

Toute une culture centenaire aux frontières du Cambodge, celle du palmier à sucre, est en train d'y être éradiquée « grâce » aux Chinois qui viennent proposer aux paysans d'acheter à prix fort des troncs de ce palmier ; coupés en deux le palmier ne peut que mourir et il n'est pas question d'en replanter car l'arbre ne produit qu'au bout d'une vingtaine d'années.

La volonté destructrice chinoise n'a pas de borne : Aux paysans un peu plus futés, des Chinois « experts » viennent conseiller une augmentation de revenu avec l'élevage d'une variété de bulot (pomacea), de homard d'eau douce (procambarus) ou de tortue rouge, dont la chair est en effet prisée. Or, ce sont trois espèces importées d'Amérique, terriblement invasives, qui ne tardent pas à envahir rizières, fleuves et lacs, canaux..., tuant la faune et la flore locale, en particulier les jeunes plants de riz à un degré tel que la FAO en est alarmée.

Mieux ou pire encore, des inconnus ont été surpris en train de jeter des bébés crocodiles dans le Mékong. Ce n'est peut-être qu'une rumeur, mais le mois dernier, au vu et au su de centaines de personnes, un bonze, « élu » même député, -- connu pour avoir publiquement pris à partie Lý Thường Kiệt, le grand général vainqueur des Song dans une guerre pour la première fois offensive et non pas défensive en 1075, pour son « insolence » envers l'Empire, -- certainement un espion chinois, a jeté dans le Fleuve rouge, sous couvert d'un rite de délivrance des âmes, dix tonnes de piranhas, de quoi infester tout le fleuve et y interdire désormais toute activité. Pouvez-vous imaginer un tel acte ? Et où ce bonze a-t-il trouvé ces poissons originaires d'Amérique latine sinon dans des élevages spéciaux en Chine ? Et bien sûr (!) cela s'est fait sans aucune réaction des autorités malgré une indignation générale exprimée sur le Net (mais naturellement pas sur les media officiels).

Les plantations de café pour lequel le Vietnam est le 2e producteur du monde (et le 1er pour la variété robusta), ne subissent pas de destruction en règle de la part des Chinois, d'abord parce que c'est plutôt un produit d'exportation (seuls 5% servent à la consommation nationale) non indispensable à la vie de la population, ensuite parce qu'ils veulent s'en rendre maîtres : toujours à l'affût de la moindre occasion de rachat à rabais, ils comptent déjà sur la forte fluctuation du prix du café qui pousse à la ruine les planteurs incapables d'encaisser une chute brutale des cours (comme par exemple en 2012) pour ce faire.

Destruction des forêts, poumon du Vietnam :

Trente ans de guerre avec des bombardements massifs n'ont détruit que 32% (et non 60% comme le clame la propagande officielle) des forêts vietnamiennes d'après un calcul basé sur les chiffres donnés dans divers articles dont il ressort qu'en 1943 le Vietnam était boisé à 43% en 1943, c'est-à-dire sur 14,276 millions km² et que de 1943 à 1973 les forêts détruites couvraient 22000 km², mais sur une période analogue en temps de paix, de 1973 à 2009 le Vietnam a perdu 43% de sa couverture en forêt, ce qui le met à la 2e place des pays frappés par la déforestation, derrière le Nigéria. En 2013, les forêts ne recouvrent plus que 39% du territoire, dont 25% sont constitués par le reboisement en essences peu ombrophiles et pauvres en diversité comme le pin et l'eucalyptus. Et avec la déforestation vient l'érosion et la dégradation des sols nus dont 40% devient impropre à la culture.

Parmi les causes de la déforestation, la principale est certes la croissance démographique avec ses conséquences en besoin d'espace, de construction, de bois de chauffage (cuisine) et en développement agricole et industriel, mais le facteur le plus funeste est le pillage organisé par les trafiquants de bois dont les chefs sont d'ordinaire des Chinois de mèche avec les autorités locales qui tirent de ce commerce illégal représentant la moitié du commerce du bois un profit de 2,5 milliards USD par an ; parce que les forêts qu'il ravage comprend les belles forêts pluviales, surtout les forêts primaires autant rares que précieuses par leur biodiversité (elles abritent ou abritaient plus de mille espèces différentes, dont 8,2% endémiques et 3,4% protégées par l'ONU): de 10% encore en 1996, il n'en reste que 0,6% soit 80000 ha en 2012.

Pollution de l'environnement :

Devant la pollution empoisonnant son propre pays, Pékin eut l'idée d'utiliser l'intoxication chimique pour se débarrasser des Vietnamiens. Par des pressions politiques autant que financières, elle fit accepter par Hanoi l'implantation par tout le Vietnam de ses industries les plus polluantes. Déjà en 1990, après à la fin de la guerre sino-vietnamienne, de nombreux Chinois venus ou revenus au Vietnam se sont remis à faire du commerce et à ouvrir de petites entreprises en prenant des Vietnamiens d'abord comme prête-nom puis comme partenaire d'entreprise-conjointe. Même lorsqu'à partir de 2005 sont acceptées des entreprises 100% étrangères, sachant la méfiance des Vietnamiens envers la Chine, beaucoup d'entreprises 100% chinoises préfèrent se prétendre joint-venture en s'alliant avec des cadres corrompus, et on peut dire qu'aujourd'hui la grande majorité des entreprises présentes au Vietnam ont des Chinois pour propriétaires.

Profitant de l'ignorance de la population et de la carence des lois vietnamiennes, les petites unités chinoises, comme celles des Vietnamiens eux-mêmes, il faut le reconnaître, rejetaient à gogo leurs déchets dans les fleuves au grand dam des riverains. Pour Pékin ce n'était pas assez, et le pouvoir chinois se détermina à passer à la vitesse supérieure. En 2007, alors que la Chine elle-même avait fermé toutes ses usines de bauxite pour cause de dégâts environnementaux, Pékin fit signer par le premier ministre Nguyễn Tấn Dũng l'accord pour un projet de 6 usines de bauxite sur une surface de 1800 km² concédées, à exploiter en commun par les deux pays sur les Hauts plateaux du Centre, où se trouvent les troisièmes plus riches gisements de bauxite du monde. L'emplacement des deux premiers sites choisis, à DakNak et Lâm Đồng, une fois connu, suscita pour la première fois au Vietnam

communiste une levée de protestation de scientifiques, d'intellectuels et de personnalités diverses dont le général Võ Văn Giáp (pétition de 2600 signatures) qui évoquaient des dangers considérables pour l'environnement et partant pour les hommes et la culture des théiers et caféiers dans les alentours, sans compter, comme le remarquent les militaires, le danger d'une installation de milliers de Chinois censés être ouvriers sur le « Toit de l'Indochine ». Le gouvernement passa outre, arrêta les meneurs de la révolte, les usines furent donc mises en construction en 2009 ; et l'on interdit au peuple de s'aventurer dans leur zone comme c'est devenu la règle pour toute grande entreprise chinoise. Qu'en résulte-t-il ? Pour implanter les usines on a sacrifié des milliers d'hectares de forêts primitives et de terres de plantation, provoquant la paupérisation des habitants (des montagnards sans défense), la pénurie d'eau douce dont une bonne partie est captée pour la fabrication de l'alumine, et le risque de déversement des boues rouges hors des deux fosses où elles sont stockées à l'air libre en cas de pluie diluvienne. Et les travailleurs chinois y vivent toujours dans des quartiers réservés sans que l'on sache exactement leur nombre ni leur réelle fonction. Quant aux deux usines censées rapporter plein de devises au Vietnam, elles n'ont pas cessé d'être déficitaires au point qu'en 2016 le Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce a dû réclamer de l'aide gouvernementale pour remplacer les équipements chinois vieillots et inefficaces par des machines à la technologie plus avancée des autres pays.

Le summum de la duplicité et de l'inhumanité chinoise (jusqu'à présent au moins) comme de la complicité gouvernementale vietnamienne est atteint avec l'entreprise Formosa. En 2008, Pékin fit pression sur Hanoi pour que fût accordée à la Formosa Plastics group, une compagnie taiwanaise habituée des procès environnementaux, la permission d'implanter une aciérie dans la province de Hà Tĩnh au Centre Vietnam. Pour ce projet, le groupe constitua une filiale, la Hung Nghiep Formosa Ha Tinh Company, appelée simplement Formosa au Vietnam, dont les parts furent bientôt rachetées par des compagnies chinoises, ce qui fait en réalité d'elle une compagnie chinoise et non plus taiwanaise comme beaucoup encore le croient. En 2010, toujours par la concussion et l'intimidation, Formosa se fit obtenir la concession pour 70 ans de 3300 ha à Vũng Áng dans le district de Kỳ Anh, juste devant un port d'eau profonde de grande importance militaire puisque des bateaux de 500 tonnes et des sous-marins peuvent s'y abriter. Outre cet énorme privilège (selon la loi vietnamienne en vigueur qui ne reconnaît pas la propriété foncière mais seulement l'utilisation de terrain, aucun particulier ou groupe au Vietnam ne peut se voir délivrer un permis d'utilisation dépassant 45 ans), Formosa bénéficia aussi d'une remise de taxe foncière et de taxe sur l'importation des marchandises, ce qui ne l'empêcha pas de pratiquer la fraude dans leur paiement (découverte en 2016) pour près de 300 millions de dollars, et du droit de développer les infrastructures à sa guise !

Malgré les protestations des habitants expropriés, l'usine fut mise en construction en 2012 et l'on vit surgir en 2015 sur son emplacement un immense complexe dont on peut avoir un aperçu en tapant sur Google map.

Le 6 avril 2016, alors que l'usine était à peine terminée, les habitants de Vũng Áng découvrirent sur leurs plages un nombre effrayant de poissons morts ; les jours suivants, jusqu'au 18 avril, le phénomène s'étendit sur les côtes du Centre, offrant le spectacle de kilomètres de poissons morts estimés au nombre de plusieurs millions. Cette mort de la mer qui s'avérera être la plus grande catastrophe écologique jamais vue jusqu'ici, ne suscita d'abord aucune réaction des autorités. En cherchant la cause du désastre, des pêcheurs-plongeurs détectèrent des conduites provenant de Formosa qui crachaient des jets continuels d'un liquide étrangement rouge. Commencèrent alors des manifestations dans tout le pays contre la compagnie chinoise. Les autorités vietnamiennes ne se réveillèrent que 6 semaines après l'hécatombe pour parler de catastrophe et amener Formosa à accepter sa responsabilité. Mais au lieu de fermer aussitôt l'usine et d'ordonner une enquête sur les effets de la pollution, le gouvernement se contenta d'un dédommagement de 500 millions de dollars dont la somme dérisoire par rapport aux dommages causés n'est toujours pas distribuée aux victimes au point qu'on se demande si elle a été effectivement versée et dans ce cas empochée par qui. Or, selon les quelques scientifiques venus constater les dégâts, il faudra des dizaines d'années voire des siècles pour que la mer guérisse de ces millions de m3 de liquide remplis de métaux lourds (plomb,

mercure, cadmium, phénol, pcp, etc., selon un laboratoire ami des « démocrates » vietnamiens) que Formosa rejetait et rejette dans ses eaux. Et ce n'est plus aujourd'hui les deux provinces avoisinantes de Formosa mais toutes les 4 provinces centrales (Hà Tĩnh, Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên - Huế) qui sont touchées et la nappe des eaux rouges continue de s'étendre et commence à gagner les côtes méridionales. Pour survivre les pêcheurs essaient d'aller chercher du poisson au grand large où ils risquent d'être abattus par les pêcheurs armés chinois et la marine chinoise qui se sont appropriés la mer orientale.

Comme si Formosa ne suffit pas, dans la même région, profitant de la saison des pluies, une vingtaine d'usines hydroélectriques détenues par les Chinois déversent sans crier gare l'eau de leur bassin sur la campagne environnante, détruisant les cultures et tuant plusieurs centaines de personnes. Ce genre d'inondations causées sciemment et souvent sans préavis par les usines hydroélectriques ont fini par susciter dans la population un sentiment de détestation envers les 7000 barrages qui produisent 40% de l'électricité nationale, que Hanoi parsème dans tout le pays à l'imitation des Chinois en Chine.

Plus grave, en pleine tempête Formosa, pour se moquer du monde, les Chinois, sous leur faux nez, une compagnie vietnamienne Hoa Sen, se firent accorder la licence pour l'implantation d'une autre aciérie d'égale ampleur à Cà Ná, province de Ninh Thuận, dans le Sud du pays. Si cette usine voit le jour et se met à rejeter ses déchets dans la mer comme celle du Centre, nul doute que toutes les provinces littorales vietnamiennes deviendront inhabitables pour ses autochtones et que l'économie maritime s'effondrera complètement.

Pour parfaire la destruction du Sud, en 2008 les Chinois, via la compagnie Lee & Man, se firent accorder la construction d'une gigantesque papeterie devant produire 420 000 tonnes de papier par an sur le Sông Hậu, le grand fleuve nourricier du delta, au fi des protestations unanimes. Cette usine qui entre en principe en fonction cette année tuera certainement le fleuve avec ses énormes quantités de rejets de soude et d'autres produits toxiques et ruineront riziculture comme aquaculture dans l'Ouest.

A la différence d'autres entreprises étrangères, peu nocives, les entreprises chinoises installées sur tout le territoire vietnamien, sont toutes très polluantes par la nature de leurs produits et rejettent allègrement leurs déchets dans l'atmosphère, dans le sol comme dans les eaux. Lacs et rivières vietnamiens sont déjà noirâtres ou rougeâtres selon les substances qui s'y déposent. Le sol imprégné d'engrais et de pesticides contamine les récoltes. On soupçonne même la Chine d'exporter avec ou non l'agrément de Hanoi ses propres déchets toxiques au Vietnam où ils sont enfouis dans divers endroits du pays, sur la foi des témoignages de quelques complices repentis. D'ailleurs d'où Formosa tire-t-elle tant de déchets quand sur sa propre déclaration ses fourneaux ne sont pas tout à fait prêts ?

Conséquences de la pollution :

La population vietnamienne a extrêmement peur maintenant pour sa santé. Outre l'air qu'elle respire, l'eau dont elle sert pour ses ablutions et sa lessive, tous ses aliments sont désormais susceptibles de l'empoisonner. Fruits et légumes sont non seulement bourrés de pesticides chinois fortement nuisibles mais aussi de produits chimiques chinois dangereux qui les grossissent ou prolongent leur fraîcheur apparente. D'ailleurs, depuis les traités sino-vietnamiens, les produits alimentaires importés de Chine envahissent les marchés vietnamiens et ils sont encore pire : il n'y a pas de semaine sans que les journaux ne rapportent des cas d'intoxication causée par l'un de ces produits, ou ne révèlent des cas de faux riz, de faux œufs, de fausses nouilles, de fausses viandes de faux café, etc. fabriqués tous avec des produits chimiques. Comment alors se protéger puisqu'il faut bien manger pour vivre ? Comment savoir si le fruit ou le légume que l'on mange n'est pas contaminé, si la viande que l'on savoure n'est pas trafiquée, si le poisson que l'on achète n'est pas bourré de métaux toxiques, si le nước mắm que l'on consomme n'est pas fabriqué à partir de ces poissons intoxiqués et si le sel que l'on utilise ne provient pas d'un littoral pollué ? Le Vietnam est devenu le deuxième pays de cancéreux du monde avec un nombre de morts par cancer estimé en 2005 par l'OMS sur la base des déclarations des

hôpitaux vietnamiens à 350 par jour, et un nombre de 130 000 cas nouveaux par an, et on s'attend à ce que ces chiffres augmentent fortement après la catastrophe Formosa.

Cependant le gouvernement complice des pollueurs refuse de prendre des mesures sanitaires, repousse toute demande d'analyse de l'eau, interdisant même après Formosa aux médecins d'examiner le sang des habitants des provinces du Centre par peur d'une exploitation par des « forces ennemies » (terme désignant les groupes d'opposants au régime). Les « génocideurs » de Pékin peuvent se frotter les mains. Le sud-ouest et le centre du Vietnam se vident peu à peu de leur population, poussée par la misère à émigrer à l'étranger sur l'incitation du gouvernement. Et la plupart de ces émigrants peu éduqués n'ont d'autre ressource que de rejoindre le lumpenprolétariat du pays d'accueil qui les reçoit mal et les méprise. Par ironie, à l'instar de Donald Trump, le premier ministre cambodgien a énoncé dernièrement le projet de construction d'un mur sur la frontière vietnamienne pour empêcher les Vietnamiens sans papier d'entrer au Cambodge ! Pendant ce temps viennent s'installer partout au Vietnam des milliers sinon déjà des millions de Chinois auxquels les autorités réservent les meilleurs emplacements, quitte à exproprier contre une indemnisation insignifiante les Vietnamiens qui y habitent depuis des générations, créant ainsi des collectifs de « dân oan » (victimes d'injustice) que l'on peut voir rassemblés autour de la capitale ou des préfectures pour réclamer une réparation qui ne sera jamais faite.

Menaces militaires :

A l'encontre des pays libres qui n'accueillent les entreprises étrangères que dans la perspective de procurer du travail à leurs citoyens, le gouvernement vietnamien souffre sans piper que les compagnies chinoises importent tout leur personnel au nombre de dizaines de milliers, voire bien plus, et se refusent à tout contrôle de la part de son administration. Entre également dans ce comportement de servilité/arrogance un souci de dissimulation d'une réalité bien plus inquiétante. Les terrains immenses concédés à la Chine pour leurs usines qui n'en nécessitent pas tant, situés de surcroît dans les positions les plus stratégiques du pays, protégés de barbelés et interdits aux Vietnamiens, fussent-ils des représentants de l'autorité publique, ne peuvent abriter que des complexes militaires dont le personnel se compose des soi-disant employés d'usines. Armements de toutes tailles passés par la frontière ouverte peuvent y être aisément camouflés, surtout si des tunnels y sont creusés. D'ailleurs, si l'on en croit la rumeur, les Chinois sont en train (ou ont fini) de construire en secret deux tunnels assez grands pour l'usage de tanks et de camions, pour relier la région des hauts-plateaux et le delta du Mékong.

Actuellement, en cas d'invasion armée, la Chine peut mouvoir à tout moment des régiments par le Nord-Vietnam dont la région frontalière et la baie du Tonkin sont déjà sous son contrôle, au Centre elle dispose des bases sur les Hauts plateaux aussi bien que sur la côte avec le port de Vũng Áng où peuvent entrer ses sous-marins et gros navires. Plus éloigné, le Sud sera atteint par des troupes descendues des Hauts-plateaux, et aussi des avions partant des aéroports construits récemment sur les îles Paracel et Spratley volées au Vietnam. Si les intrigues en cours réussissent, la Chine se rendra bientôt maîtresse de plusieurs aéroports régionaux déficitaires qu'elle pourra transformer en aérodromes militaires.

Pour parfaire l'encerclement du Vietnam et empêcher tout approvisionnement en sa faveur par voie terrestre aussi bien que maritime, la Chine a noué une solide alliance avec le Laos et le Cambodge, lequel lui a même loué pour 90 ans une base navale dans le port de Sihanoukville d'où elle peut surveiller la mer du Sud. En cas de nécessité, par exemple d'intervention américaine, elle a déployé une rangée de missiles sol-air aux îles Paracel pointées où sinon sur le Vietnam distant d'à peine une trentaine de km.

Tous ces préparatifs militaires ne font que concrétiser l'ambition belliqueuse de la Chine, ambition qu'elle n'a jamais dissimulée : sur le siteweb sina.com de l'armée chinoise les auteurs des articles publiés le 5/9/2008 puis le 20/12/2014 expliquent comment la Chine peut conquérir

rapidement le Vietnam ! Mais, en bons disciples de Sun Tseu et en amateurs du jeu de go, surtout après l'invasion ratée de 1979, les Chinois préfèrent n'utiliser la force qu'en dernier recours, après avoir étouffé l'adversaire. C'est ainsi que depuis des dizaines d'années la Chine a appliqué patiemment envers son petit voisin « la stratégie du vers à soie » qui vient à bout par grignotage d'un gros tas de feuilles de mûrier.

La population vietnamienne, prise entre le marteau chinois et l'enclume gouvernementale, préfère pour beaucoup vivre dans le déni ou le fatalisme. Mais les négateurs de la menace chinoise ne peuvent contester l'omniprésence des Chinois dans le pays, et depuis la révélation de Wikileaks et surtout depuis le développement de la technique « livestream » sur Facebook qui permet l'échange direct des informations, ils prennent conscience du danger imminent que le pouvoir communiste veut leur cacher. Pour leur part, les traîtres de l'appareil d'Etat, mis au parfum depuis longtemps, ne cherchent qu'à se constituer une fortune conséquente par racket et concussion, puis à la transférer à l'étranger par des moyens plus ou moins licites. Alors que le Vietnam risque la faillite pour une dette actuelle de 167 milliards USD équivalant à 62% du PNB, et que les caisses du pays sont vides, on estime à plus de 600 milliards USD l'argent volé au peuple des apparatchiks vietnamiens déposé aux Etats-Unis, et à plus de 200 milliards USD celui déposé par eux dans les banques suisses. Les Panama papers révèlent que rien qu'en 2015 92 milliards USD ont été sortis illégalement du Vietnam pour rejoindre les banques étrangères. Tous ces félons communistes continuent d'abreuver le peuple de mensonges lénifiants pour leur vanter la douceur de vivre dans un Vietnam en marche vers la modernité, mais eux-mêmes prennent la précaution d'envoyer par avance leurs femmes et enfants dans les pays capitalistes, de préférence chez le plus « honni », les Etats-Unis. Les empêcheurs de tourner en rond, à savoir ceux qui assistent les victimes d'injustice, les « démocrates », les citoyens ouvertement hostiles au Parti ou à la Chine, sont tolérés pendant un certain temps pour faire croire à l'opinion internationale qu'ils vivent dans un pays libre, puis un beau jour ou plutôt une belle nuit (comme c'est la coutume dans les dictatures) ils sont arrêtés, battus, emprisonnés, parfois tués. Il y a quelques jours, la police politique a ainsi kidnappé les démocrates les plus notoires pour les détenir on ne sait où, afin de décourager ceux qui sont tentés de participer à la manifestation générale du 5/3/2017 ; à Saigon, ceux qui ont eu le courage de manifester ont été durement réprimés, et à cette occasion ils ont découvert que les policiers les plus brutaux qui les battent cruellement (une manifestante de 67 ans frappée à la tête est à ce jour entre la vie et la mort) sont en fait des Chinois.


Hormis la minorité des chiens de garde du régime, le peuple vietnamien refuse l'idée de tout rattachement à la Chine. Mais, trahi par ses propres dirigeants devenus « l'ennemi intérieur », comment pourra-t-il s'opposer au puissant « ennemi extérieur » quand viendra l'heure fatidique ? Le seul espoir pour le Vietnam de rester indépendant est un soulèvement général assez considérable pour renverser le pouvoir vendu de Hanoi et mettre à la place un gouvernement démocratique qui prendra à cœur les intérêts nationaux et saura nouer des alliances militaires avec les pays libres. Et cela avant un déploiement militaire chinois. Or, soumis depuis près d'un demi-siècle pour le Sud et d'un siècle pour le Nord, à l'un des plus féroces régimes politiques qui existent, les Vietnamiens ont perdu leur énergie et leur confiance en eux-mêmes. Pour se révolter, ils doivent vaincre la peur paralysante des foudres du régime qui leur est inculquée dès l'enfance.

Cependant le temps presse et nous ne pouvons assister sans réagir à la mort lente d'un peuple jadis fier et courageux. A vous tous les hommes et femmes de bonne volonté, épris de justice et de liberté, je vous adjure de vous pencher sur le drame du Vietnam ! Alerte l'opinion publique internationale pour contrer les menées annexionnistes de Pékin ! Spécialement ceux qui parmi vous avez, par vos vociférations contre la guerre du Vietnam dans les années 1960, contribué à pousser l'Amérique à l'abandon de la république du Sud-Vietnam pour la faire tomber dans les mains de la clique des sinistres assassins de Hanoi, prenez vos responsabilités et rachetez-vous en dénonçant aussi fort qu'autrefois la criminelle politique chinoise ! Montrez aux Vietnamiens qu'ils sont activement soutenus, et par la chaleur de votre sympathie communiquez-leur la flamme qui leur manque pour surmonter leur peur! Aidez-les à reprendre leur droit de vivre libres dans un pays libre!

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Upheaval in East Asia Sea: Progress of the stranglehold of China on the Paracel and Spratly at the expense of Vietnam

Firstly, let us agree on the right name for the Sea that all western media call China Sea while no coastal country in the region calls it by this name. In these times where China wants to take control of all the Sea at the expense of other riparian countries, especially the south part of it beyond the 18th parallel which does not bath any of Chinese coast, to call Chinese, even by acquired use, a sea which shelters the territorial waters of other countries and is the subject of conflicting claims, is to comfort the China's delirium of predatory power and to espouse its claims.

As the concerned sea borders the East Asia countries, we propose to call it simply East Asia Sea (EAS), leave to clarify North of East Asia Sea (NEAS) and South of East Asia Sea (SEAS) if we want to refer to its North and South parts.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, before the prospect of large hydrocarbon deposits beneath its waters arouses the greed of East Asia Sea riparian countries, the ten or so nations that share it did not make it a subject of contention, and Vietnam's authority on the two archipelagos, **Paracel** (15.000 km²) and **Spratly** (160.000 km²), administered by the **Nguyễn** rulers since the 17th century, was not disputed by any country, including China, whose border governors made it a duty to escort to Vietnam the boats stranded on their beaches as the result of storms in the vicinity of the Paracel and Spratly, on the pretext that everything related to these archipelagos belonged to Huế court. It must be said that these archipelagos composed of islets, atolls and reefs, mostly submerged, whipped by the wind, were of interest to anyone, except fishermen and guano collectors.

Things changed starting in 1921 with the “**dreams of a great China**” of the leaders of the new Republic of China (concerning the archipelagos, the claims of non-communist China and communist China are similar), determined to establish Chinese presence in the South of the East Asia Sea, the crossing point for all ships trading between Europe and Asia : based on the report of a reconnaissance trip beyond Hainan island by a small fleet of Qing's admiral Lý Chuấn (name phonetized in Vietnamese) in 1909 which refers to the discovery of islands in the southwest of Hainan, the government of South China declared them Chinese under the name of **Xisha** (name then appeared for the first time), despite the fact that these islands which had already the name of Hoàng Sa in Vietnamese and Paracel in French, were already under the jurisdiction of Vietnam, or rather under that of the General government of Indochina, Vietnam having become French colony ; some Vietnamese fishing families lived there but a pre-reconnaissance patrol under Ngô Kính Vinh's (name phonetized in Vietnamese) command took them prisoners and brought them to Hainan so that the admiral could say them deserted. The Chinese attached the islands to the district of Châu Nhai (name phonetized in Vietnamese) in Hainan, whereas they depended since the 17th century of the provinces of Quảng Nam, then of Thừa Thiên, again of Quảng Nam (the Spratly were incorporated for a long time into the Paracel before being administered separately by the province of Bà Rịa in 1933, then of Phước Tuy in 1956). The manoeuvre of the government of Canton, not recognized by the international community, was not taken seriously by colonial France. But in 1935 the Republic of China officially claimed the property of **all the islands** of the South East Asia Sea, and to reinforce its claims ordered the surreptitiously erecting of backdated stelae on four of Paracel islands!

During the second world war, in 1939, **Japan** took over the Paracel it occupied until 1946. That year, taking advantage of the disarmament of the Japanese entrusted to it by the Allies according to the Postdam agreements, the Republic of China seized the largest island in the Paracel (Phú Lâm, Woody

island, 2.6 km²), then in 1947 the largest island in the Spratly (Ba Binh, Itu-Aba, 46 ha), the only one in this archipelago to have potable water, but following its expulsion from the mainland to Formosa, it had to withdraw from these islands in 1950. At the time of the **San Francisco conference** in 1951 by which treaty Japan returned the two archipelagos to the Vietnamese government, and where Chinese claims on them were unanimously minus three rejected, **Trần Văn Hữu**, king Bảo Đại's Prime minister, was able to declare Vietnam sovereignty on the Paracel and the Spratly without any protestation from the 50 other conference attendees from which, it must be said, the two China were excluded.

In 1948, before packing for Formosa, **Tchang Kai Chek** (Jiang JieShi) had a **map of China** printed with a fancy U shape line called buffalo tongue as its maritime boundary, obtained by joining 11 traits supposed to delimit the territorial waters of China and thus attributing to China 70% of the area of the South East Asia Sea at the expense of the other coastal countries. This map went unnoticed, but in 1953, Beijing made it reprinted with modification to the number of traits, reduced to 9 but located so that the portion of sea the Chinese attributed to themselves now comprised 80% of the total area (3.5 million km²). For internal use, the U line was hardly invoked before 1998 in the various declarations of China on its maritime zones ; however this map is a time bomb because, introduced in teaching, it had since inculcated in the minds of all the Chinese the conviction that the archipelagos and the sea around belong rightfully to China, exacerbating an easily manipulated nationalism.

In 1956, making use of the evacuation of French troops and the quandaries of the new government of South Vietnam to which was devolved the sovereignty over the two archipelagos according to the Geneva Treaty (1954), the two China took over **Itu-Aba** the largest Spratly island and some coral banks nearby **for Taipei**, and **the Eastern part of the Paracel** (which includes Woody island) **for Beijing**, that they hold since. The government of South Vietnam could only protest and strengthen the guard on the remaining islands. In 1959, Beijing sent 82 soldiers disguised as fishers to attack the Western Paracel, but they were unmasked and made prisoners by South Vietnamese soldiers before being sent back to China.

The withdrawing of US troops after the Paris treaty (1973) and the entanglements of the South Vietnam army (ARVN) now alone against Hanoi and its Sino-Russian allies were an opportunity for Beijing to send on the 1/14/1974 two warships to the Paracel to take over its western islands still under Vietnamese administration ; the four South Vietnamese destroyers sent to the rescue could not get through in the ensuing naval battle (1/17-20/1974) although they were more numerous, because the technical staff of the destroyers recently handed over to the ARVN by the US army had not yet received any serious training and because the Americans had removed sophisticated equipment from these ships. The Vietnamese had to retreat after losing 75 sailors against 21 on Chinese side, leaving the Chinese now masters of the **whole Paracel** archipelago. The most outrageous is that the US 7th fleet that sailed off the East Asia Sea refused to lend a hand to the South Vietnamese Navy, on the order of **Washington** itself, supposedly allied to Saigon, and this despite Nixon's promise to intervene in case South Vietnam was attacked. Even worse, Washington put pressure on president **Nguyễn Văn Thiệu** so that he did not let the 5 already paired planes take off to go repel the Chinese from the islands. The fact is that the United States had just renewed relations with China and had somehow "sold" the Paracel to their new partner.

In the 1970s, the weakness of South Vietnam struggling with a murderous war aroused the desire of the other coastal countries to seize at least part of the Spratly, the richness of which in hydrocarbons and fish were now well known. In 1977, president Ferdinand Marcos of the **Philippines**, under the pretext that one of his citizens, Tomas Cloma, had taken possession in 1947 of some Spratly islets deserted by the Japanese to install a Freedom land (Kelayaan) before being expelled in 1956 by the Taiwanese who came to reoccupy Itu-Aba, claimed the sovereignty of his country over the islets and reefs thought to be part of the Kelayaan and over those near its territorial waters. Actually, as early as 1968 the Filipinos had already laid hold of some islets and reefs without garrison. As they were South

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Vietnam's ally in the war, the Saigon government let it go without protest, but managed at the end of the war to take back one islet. And since, the Philippines control 3 reefs and 7 islets (out of 14 in total) including the 2nd largest of the archipelago (Thitu island, Thị Tứ), leaving to Vietnam 21 reefs and 6 islets including Spratly island which gives its name to the archipelago.

In 1979, it was **Malaysia**'s turn to proclaim its sovereignty over all the reefs it believed to be on its continental shelf, and from 1983 garrisoned there to overrun and defend them. Among the 5 reefs and banks it holds, two are also claimed by the Philippines and one by **Brunei**. However, Brunei has no Navy and has so far been content to assert its right without indulging in military violence.

The appetite of the other riparians revived that of China which took part on a much larger scale. At the end of the Sino-Vietnamese war, seizing the defeatist reversal of Hanoi leaders, China decided to take over the Spratly. In 1987-1988, after laying hold of several Vietnamese reefs (Fiery Cross reef, London reef, Gaven reef, Hugh reef) left without guard, three Chinese frigates were sailing towards Johnson South reef (**Gạc Ma**) when, as they were about to disembark, they saw arrive a hundred of Vietnamese on three transport boats that came to build a terminal and plant a flag ; according to the official version, a battle arose (3/14/1988) as the result of which 64 Vietnamese were killed and 9 taken prisoner against 6 dead and 18 wounded on the Chinese side ; unable to withstand the fires of the enemy, the Vietnamese had to run away and let the Chinese take over the reefs. The reality unveiled by General **Lê Mã Lương**, general director of Vietnam's military history museum, was more tragic and revolting : (cf. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/in_depth/who-ord-no-fir-in-garma-03122015052720) The Defence minister Lê Đức Anh, acquired with other leaders at the idea of a general capitulation to China, had prevented the arming of boats and banned the distribution of guns to sailors, and had therefore deliberately sent the hundred or so soldiers to death under Chinese cannons, history to make believe in the opinion that the transfer of the reefs to China was not decided in advance but due to a military defeat. Note in this South Johnson reef case the collusion between Taiwan and the People's republic of China : the Chinese frigates were supplied by Taiwanese soldiers from Itu-Aba (as they will be later in 1995 at the moment of the attack of Filipino Mischief reef) ; besides, their solidarity in the conquest of the archipelagos is confirmed in a statement from the then Taiwan defence minister Cheng Wei-Yuan : "If war breaks out, the national army (of Taiwan) will attend the Popular army in its fight" (cf. [https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%E1%BA%A3i_chi%E1%BA%BFn_G%E1%BA%A1c_Ma-C%C3%B4_Lin-Len_%C4%90ao_\(14-3-1988\)](https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%E1%BA%A3i_chi%E1%BA%BFn_G%E1%BA%A1c_Ma-C%C3%B4_Lin-Len_%C4%90ao_(14-3-1988))).

From the **Chengdu treaty** in 1990, China feels stimulated to accelerate its stranglehold on the East Asia Sea, sure now of the tacit submission of Vietnam, its main opponent : Far from protesting violently against China's growing encroachments in its possessions, even in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) then in its territorial waters as defined by the **United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS)** – according to this Convention a coastal State is sovereign on the soil, the subsoil and the airspace of its territorial waters up to 12 miles or to about 20 km, and beyond up to 200 miles or about 370 km, it is entitled to fishing, building and exploitation of the soil and the subsoil, but cannot oppose the free movement on the waters and above -, in the name of the preservation of peace with the mighty "friend" of the north, Hanoi jails any citizen daring to manifest loudly its hostility to China. Beijing first began by having its parliament ratify in 1992 the historical sovereignty of China over the South East Asia Sea then ordered its historians to search the Chinese archives for supporting evidence. Taipei followed it in 1995 to raise the same claim over the whole sea included in the U line, but unlike China, suspended it in 2015 except for Taiping island (Itu-Aba) and the Pratas already in its hands.

Afterwards, with **bogus historical proofs** that speak mostly of island discoveries during exploration trips, Beijing presented them to UNO in 2009 with the map of its territorial waters delimited by a 9 traits line or in buffalo tongue shape, to claim sovereign rights over 80% of the East Asia Sea, line on which it added in 2014 a 10th feature to encompass this time 90% of the sea. But its evidence has no

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convincing force, especially since UNCLOS considers historical rights only in the case of continuity of peaceful occupation. Besides, in all the maps of China from the oldest to 1933, Chinese territory stops at Hainan island, its extreme point in the south, and the South East Asia Sea as well as the archipelagos within were foreign to it. And in June 2012, regardless of international opinion, Beijing gave the archipelagos and the surrounding U-sea the administrative status of a town named **Sansha** (ie. the three archipelagos : the Paracel, the Spratly and the Macclesfield bank / Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha) whose municipal seat is Woody island. This provocation in addition to the attacks on Vietnamese fishermen triggered among the Vietnamese people regular demonstrations, for once allowed as remotely guided by the faction of power hostile to subjection to China. Actually, this creation of Sansha was already decided in November 2007 but was not officially declared and had raised many protests and demonstrations of Vietnamese from abroad as much as in the country.

Notwithstanding unanimous protests against its pretensions, China consolidates the conquered areas and deploys its new military power there, putting everyday a little more before the fait accompli the world, paralyzed as much by its threats as by its financial blackmails. As soon as 1990, it began to build an aircraft runway on Woody island (Paracel) and one thing leading to another constructed there a real military base with port, airport and missile hangar. In 2013, it was the Spratly's turn to be polderized and militarized on a much larger scale ; on the 9 reefs it occupies, China erected **artificial islands** which form a set of 13,5 km² with ports, airports, etc. (while the total area of the 14 natural islets of the entire archipelago is only 2 km²), at the cost of immense **ecological destruction** : nearly 5 million m³ of sand and corals pumped, displaced and destroyed, 15 km² of coral reefs extremely valuable by the diversity of species that nest there forever extinct, not to mention 104 km² of corals devastated by Chinese trawlers with their scraping of seabed in search of big clams their people are fond of (cf. <https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/southchinaseadispute/china-s-activities-in-the-scs-take-up-huge-toll-on-the-marine-environment-vh-11022016103953.html>).

The first stated goal of the stranglehold on the Spratly is the appropriation of its **oil reserves** (estimated at only 1,5 billion tons by the Americans, but up to 50 billion tons recoverable by the Chinese). The problem of the Chinese is that 90% of the oil is in the continental margins of the riparian countries : a part in its waters of Hainan and Guangdong certainly, but especially in the gulf of Tonkin, the continental shelves of Vietnam and Sonde, north-west of Borneo. As the two last and larger deposits belong to relatively prosperous countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei), to get their hands on more oil in the East Asia Sea, China has no choice but to plunder the submissive Vietnam whose hydrocarbon reserves are in the 3rd place in Asia-Pacific. In 1992, the Chinese national offshore oil company (CNOOC) signed with the Creston Energy company an agreement for oil exploration in **Vanguard Bank (bãi Tư Chính)** in the Vietnamese EEZ, and the Chinese pushed the plug further by preventing PetroVietnam and Conoco Philipps from prospecting in Vietnamese waters near Vanguard Bank (1994) – incidents that led Vietnam to join ASEAN in 1995 -, then kept on causing obstacles to other prospecting or simply scientific research projects of PetroVietnam with other foreign companies (as in 2007 with British Petroleum, in 2008 with Exxon Mobil, in 2011 with Veritas, more recently in 2017 with Repsol). In front of these illegal Chinese oil prospections in the Vietnamese EEZ and the aggressive attacks of the Chinese Navy, what does Hanoi do? It remains silent or declares its concern and at best sends some vessels to take a tour near the incident sites without allowing them to act!

In May 2014, the **arrival of the Chinese drilling and extraction platform HYSY 981** at 20 miles from Vietnamese coast and 30 miles from the Paracel, accompanied by 80 ships including 7 warships, aroused strong indignation in the Vietnamese population, whose demonstrations against China continued sporadically for a year, and gave rise to anti-Chinese riots (attacks of Chinese factories and on Chinese migrants). In fear of Beijing's ire and at its instigation, Hanoi leaders turned then against the "progressist" faction and indulged in a **relentless crackdown on the demonstrators**, thus muzzling the opposition for several years. On the other hand, in the face of the negative reactions of international opinion, the Chinese withdrew their platform in July of the same year, but it is to bring it back some months later, in January 2015, with a threatening escort of military ships. And, sure of their

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impunity, they continue to drill and extract in the Vietnamese fields in the Gulf of Tonkin, even sending other platforms lend a hand to the HYSY 981 (the HYSY 943 in 2016). Since 2017, it is the Spratly reserves' turn to be sacked with the platform HYSY 270 which came in July, accompanied by 40 military vessels and 40 armed fishing boats, taunting Vietnam at 210 km from its coast, around the Vanguard bank where PetroVietnam practiced drilling and mining the Red Emperor Fish deposit with the Spanish Repsol company ; the Chinese were so aggressive that Vietnam had to stop its partnership project with Repsol and let the field free to the invaders, always according to the capitulatory policy of Hanoi which did not allow its navy to react. For not having to pay compensation to Repsol which had already paid 200 million USD for the project, PetroVietnam wanted recently to relaunch it, but on the 3/23/2018 had to stop it again under very strong pressure from China, determined to get its hands on all the oil and gas located in the Vietnamese EEZ (https://www.compuserve.com/entertainment/story/0002/20180323/KBN1GZ0JN_1).

Fishes and crustaceans, another richness of the Spratly, are another object of Chinese lust. As in the East Asia region 15 million people live off fishing, the products of which represent 38% of the world fishery (figures of FAO 2012), China's claims of sovereignty over 90% of this sea can only generate numerous conflicts with the other riparians. Especially as, like oil, 90% of the fish stocks are within 200 miles of the coast, that is in their waters and EEZs. Yet, as a self-proclaimed sovereign of the East Asia Sea, China has unilaterally imposed since 1999 an annual **moratory on fishing** for all fishermen, even foreign, and in 2014 obliges any foreign trawler to ask for its permission to fish there: offenders are exposed to fines (nearly 8000 USD), confiscation of material, up to destruction of the ship and physical violence. To implement its arbitrary measures, it can count on its thousands of armed trawlers (28000 sent to the South East Asia Sea in 8/2012; 18000 after the 8/16/2017 at the end of a general ban of 108 days), a veritable shock troop acting as avant-garde of its navy, always present in the vicinity, ready to come after other fishermen in the area and to drive them out of their "personal" sea.

Regarding Vietnam, after having obtained in 2000 the surrender of 9% of its territorial waters in the **Gulf of Tonkin** by a treaty on maritime borders more advantageous for China (which now holds 47% of the gulf instead of 39% before), Beijing has forced its hands for fisheries "cooperation" in a common area that bites further in 13,5% of Vietnamese waters, which reduces correspondingly the fish stock for the Vietnamese. Moreover, with this agreement, the Chinese don't hesitate to compete with the small and medium-sized Vietnamese fishing boats by means of their big trawlers and even their huge factory boats which often exceed the limit of the common area to fish near the Vietnamese coast (7781 violations of the "cooperation" treaty by Chinese fishing boats and 1800 by other kinds of Chinese boats in 10 years, according to the report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in 2014). With, as a consequence, the depletion of the stocks already steadily declining because of its widespread overfishing. To this is added the poisoning of coastal waters by Chinese factories located along the Vietnamese coast since 2016. To find fishes, Vietnamese fishermen are forced to move away into the national EEZ in **the vicinity of the Parcel and Spratly** where they are harassed, attacked, sunk and killed by armed Chinese trawlers and military ships. We do not count the Chinese exactions on these poor fishermen to whom China refuses even the refuge on a Parcel island in case of a big storm as required by the law of the sea (cf. <https://www.voatiengviet.com/a/3465438.html>).

With more prosperous Malaysians and Indonesians, China is more cautious and Chinese fishermen venture less often into their waters. If Malaysia which is expecting a lot of Chinese investments turns a blind eye to their incursions, since 2016 Indonesia shows its teeth and stands ready to stop them. Remain the **Philippines** without military means against which China multiplies the provocations. In 2012 it sent a real armada to seize the Scarborough reef occupied by the Filipinos to whom it now bans reef access. However, the waters around this reef, rich in high quality fish, provided Filipinos with much of their food. That the Chinese make the Spratly their preserve, "it is a formula for famine; more than a matter of national security, it engages food security" (senator Rudolph Recto). Comparing this annexation of Scarborough reef with that of Czechoslovakia by Hitler, president Benigno Aquino

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III brought the case before **the International Court of Justice in The Hague** (Permanent Court of Arbitration, PCA), which gave its verdict on 7/12/2016, ruling in favour of Manila : “There was no legal basis for China to claim historic right to resources within the sea areas falling within the nine-dash lines”. At the same time, the Court denies to islets, reefs and artificial islands included in the Paracel and Spratly the status of island that is to say the possibility to be entitled to an EEZ, which is also a disavowal of Taiwan claims on Taiping/Itu-Aba. No wonder then that not only Beijing but also Taipei declared that they did not recognize the authority of the PCA, whose judgment “will be a sheet of paper good to throw away”, dixit a Taiwanese press agency.

Logically, the PCA verdict should push the other coastal countries to sue China for the same reason and use the sentence in principle favourable as a weapon in their quarrel with Beijing ; or at least the Asian countries should rely on the verdict to form an united front against China which is bullying them. But Beijing’s blackmails and financial promises in bilateral negotiations with each of them break any solidarity between them, the first to dissociate being the Philippines whose new president **Rodrigo Duterte** places himself under Chinese banner in exchange of fisheries cooperation and monetary arrangements. As for Vietnam which has the biggest litigation with China, its leaders too subservient to Beijing do not dare to call on the PCA despite the demand of public opinion.

Just the day after the sentence, the furious China, in defiance, threatened to establish an Air defense identification zone (ADIZ) on the SEA sea, as it had already done on the NEA sea in 2013 to the great anger of Japan whose Senkaku islands (Diaoyu, claimed by China) fall under this zone. It even pushed the provocation by organizing few days after (7/18/2016) military exercises north of the Paracel. The use of ADIZ as well as the demonstrations of force reveal that the real objective pursued by Beijing by taking control of the archipelagos (Paracel and Spratly) and the surrounding sea is mostly military : to master a **highly strategic territory**, a transit point for maritime transport linking Europe to Far-East-Asia via the Middle-East, accounting for 40% of global sea freight worth 5000 billion dollars a year and especially through which pass $\frac{3}{4}$ of China’s hydrocarbon imports, just upstream of the **Strait of Malacca**, obligatory passage of international traffic. Having already several naval bases in costal islands of the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea ceded by Myanmar (Burma) in 1992 and 1994, downstream of the Strait, also with bases in the Spratly, China will military control the Strait it will have the opportunity to block at its own discretion to harm the economy of such or such enemy country.

The stranglehold on the whole East Asia Sea with the archipelagos within to make it its “Mare Nostrum” is thus a vital necessity for the imperialist China which reinforces every day its military presence in the region, providing the artificial islands with the most modern equipment : ground to air missiles HQ9, radars, control towers, etc., not to mention housing for about 10,000 soldiers, and soon **floating nuclear plants** (portable fast neutron reactors, capable of holding in a 6.1 x 2.6 m container, able to supply electricity for 100,000 inhabitants, very worrying for neighboring countries because of the risk of deadly disaster, the technology for this kind of plant remaining unsafe), and deploying its flotillas of armed trawlers under the protection of helicopters, missile planes, warships, sometimes accompanied by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, and especially **submarines**. Now, the latter with the missiles play a key role in the race for maritime supremacy, even for global one, with the USA, and the SEA Sea would offer Chinese submarines an immense undetectable and unassailable shelter (3 million km²) directly connected to their base in Longpo, Yulin (Hainan). Indeed, under the Spratly, at an average depth of 3000m, winding corridors along east-west and north-south axes allow submarines to move or hide without the knowledge of all spy devices. The fear expressed at the Filipino Ministry of Defence in 1982 : “If a hostile nation can **map** this region to such a degree it can sail a submarine carrying ballistic missiles, this nation can station **Polaris** nuclear submarines and may be able to control or threaten an area within a 4000 km radius containing one-third of the world’s population including the entire ASEAN. The **bathymetry** of the area is such that it is not possible to detect a submarine, so it is impossible to counter-attack” is about to materialize (cf. <https://asialvst.com/fr/2016/10/20/mer-de-chine-du-sud-le-secret-des-routes-sous-marines/>). Since

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July 2017, Chinese submarine robots explore the SEA Sea in order to collect images and measure chemical and physical parameters, while 12 underwater gliders are deployed there to collect data on the marine environment (temperature, salinity, turbidity ...); and the Chinese class JIN 094 submarines are capable of launching the Julang II ballistic missile with a range of 8000 km!

Unperturbed in the face of international disapproval, China behaves in the East Asia Sea as at home, exercising its self-proclaimed sovereignty, and considering the waters surrounding the sea's reefs, atolls and artificial islands as its territorial waters. Thanks to its port and airport facilities, its submarines and its missiles, it is able to establish an **Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD)** system. Ubiquitous patrollers and coastguards monitor all foreign boats and prevent them from approaching the archipelagos within the limit of 12 miles, although the law of the sea authorizes the harmless passage of all foreign ships, including military ships. And in the air space above these waters, its fighters threaten and turn away foreign planes, especially military ones. With Vietnam China shows no compunction and acts already as with a conquered country : From 8/29 to 9/4/2017, it carried out military maneuvers with live ammunition in the Vietnamese EEZ of the Gulf of Tonkin, only 75 miles from the town of Đà Nẵng, prohibiting Vietnamese vessels from approaching the area! Moreover, even on ordinary days Vietnamese boats sailing in their own waters are regularly harassed, ransomed and boarded for having violated the imaginary U line. And in the air overhanging their "territory", if the Chinese are content to hunt and accompany the planes of other countries, with the Vietnamese they shoot without warning, as was the case of two **Sukhoi aircrafts** of the Vietnamese Air Force shot down on the 6/10/2016 by Chinese missiles fired from one of their submarines parked under the waters of Woody Island while they were doing an exercise flight at 32 miles from Vietnamese coast, and thus above Vietnamese EEZ – an act of criminal war that did not raise any protest from the cowardly Hanoi leaders, and that would even be concealed from the population if one of the pilots had not been rescued by fishermen. And since, for fear of firing without warning, the Hanoi-Saigon airliners carefully join their destination by a detour over Laos rather than by the coastline!

Against the aggressive ambition of China whose military budget increases by 132% in 10 years (191 billion USD in 2016, according to France-Info), its Asian neighbours (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam) are pushed to the arms race while pursuing economic relations with it. Even Australia, located far from the East Asia Sea and previously complacent towards Beijing, worries to see China threaten peace in the region and has just ordered 12 submarines to France as part of a program of renewal of its military paraphernalia. By not firmly opposing Beijing's baseless pretensions from the outset, the world ends up with an unrestrained power that brutally appropriates the riches of others, and in order to achieve its ends, engages in blackmail to showdown as well as in the ruse of "fabulous" investments and loans against an asymmetric cooperation that will prove detrimental to the beneficiary. In front of the hold-up of the East Asia Sea and the potential danger it contains, the free states begin to realize that the words peace and peaceful constantly in the mouth of the Beijing leaders must be understood in their opposite meaning like in Oceania of "1984". To make his readers understand the seriousness of the problem, an author, Antoine Brunet, compares the situation to that of a Turkey claiming full sovereignty over the Mediterranean Sea where no riparian country would have access without its permission (cf. <http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/asie-se-livre-plus-grande-course-aux-armements-de>) . In fact this hegemonic aim has already taken place in the 16th century, but was halted by a coalition led by Austria which defeated the Turks in Lepanto (1570).

Is such a coalition against Chinese hegemony possible today? It is doubtful, given the force of attraction of the portfolio stirred by Beijing, to which will gladly give in most countries, especially corrupt, in need of capital and eager for contracts ; and as long as general opinion is not enlightened on the deceitful, cynical and cruel nature of the Chinese communist dictatorship. Yet, there is no shortage of leftists fed against American imperialism to salute the rise of Chinese imperialism, supposed to be fair and generous (let them learn about ongoing Tibetan and Vietnamese genocides!). The USA itself, the only power able to thwart China and that the latter wants to oust from Asia, only worried when the Chinese began to backfill the reefs and raise their "Great wall of sand". Their call to stop this

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polderization remaining without effect, and not be able to pulverize the Chinese constructions without risking a destructive war, they have no other solution but to advocate the maintenance of the liberty of navigation in the vicinity of the archipelagos, because according the law of the sea only inland waters can prohibit the passage of foreign ships. For this, since 2015 they have decided **Freedom of navigation operations** (FONOP) that is to send several times a year ships and planes in the archipelagos including within 12 miles of the islands claimed by China. Each operation provokes protests by Beijing which, however, merely gets the violating vessel or aircraft escorted by its patrollers, except in December 2016 when the oceanographic vessel USNS Bowditch was robbed of a drone, but this stealing as well as that of a sonar of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 is rather in the context of the theft of technological novelties to copy them, practiced systematically by the Chinese. Also attached to the freedom of navigation, Canada decides to participate in the FONOP program with two frigates sent in the contested waters in July 2017, and the Great Britain promises to do the same soon. As for France, without joining the FONOP, it has got a dozen ships transit the same zones since 2014, as in October 2017 with the frigate Auvergne, for as admiral Denis Bertrand says, “if the freedom of navigation is flouted in the China Sea, it will be everywhere”(cf. Le Monde, 30/10/2017).

These symbolic operations that irritate Beijing do not prevent it from continuing the consolidation of its immense marine fortress from where it can control international trade and threaten all states which oppose its hegemony, a fierce hegemony, disrespectful of international law and carefree of the life of others, compared with which US imperialism is a good-natured domination. De facto China reigns already on the East Asia Sea where it is impregnable; but for this authority to be internationally accepted, it must be de jure. Although China has nothing to do with the law and thus sits on the verdict of the PCA, it needs the law to justify its annexation. It is why it is planning the creation of another international court under its thumb which will legalize its actions (cf. <http://www.epochtimes.fr/chine-envisage-de-creer-propres-tribunaux-internationaux-revendications->), whilst knowing that the judgments of the latter will have no more value than its pseudo-historical documents. In the end, it is still through Vietnam, the only country whose right to the archipelagos has long been recognized, that it will be able to obtain, following an official transfer of sovereignty, a certain legitimacy. Fortunately, so far, despite its tacit submission, for fear of unanimous disapproval as the revolt of its nationals, the power of Hanoi refuses to publicly declare its surrender to China. If the free world wants to stay free, it is in its interest to take advantage of this reluctance, that will not last, to help the Vietnamese people to shake off the communist yoke and therefore the dependence on Beijing, against which free Vietnam will be a strong bulwark.

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La mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est en ébullition : Progression de la mainmise de la Chine sur les Paracels et les Spratly aux dépens du Vietnam

Tout d'abord, entendons-nous sur le terme idoine pour désigner cette mer que tous les media occidentaux appellent Mer de Chine alors qu'aucun pays riverain autre que la Chine ne l'appelle ainsi. En ces temps où la Chine veut se l'approprier entièrement aux dépens des autres riverains, surtout la partie Sud au-delà du 18^e parallèle qui ne baigne aucune de ses côtes, qualifier de chinoise, fût-ce par un usage acquis, une mer qui abrite les eaux territoriales d'autres pays et fait l'objet de revendications conflictuelles, c'est conforter le délire de puissance prédatrice de la Chine et épouser ses prétentions.

Puisque la Mer concernée borde les pays de l'Asie de l'Est, nous proposons de l'appeler simplement Mer de l'Asie de l'Est (MAE), quitte à préciser Mer septentrionale de l'Asie de l'Est (MsAE) et Mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est (MmAE) si on veut se référer à ses parties Nord et Sud.

Jusqu'au début du 20^e siècle, avant que l'éventualité de gros gisements d'hydrocarbures sous ses eaux n'excite la convoitise des pays riverains de la Mer de l'Asie de l'Est, la dizaine des nations qui se la partagent n'en faisaient guère un sujet de discorde, et l'autorité du Vietnam sur les deux archipels Paracels (15.000 km²) et Spratly (160.000 km²), administrés par les souverains **Nguyễn depuis le 17^e siècle** n'était contestée par aucun pays, y compris la Chine, dont les gouverneurs frontaliers se faisaient un devoir de reconduire vers le Vietnam les bateaux échoués chez eux à la suite des tempêtes dans les parages des archipels, sous prétexte que tout ce qui s'y rapportait relevait de la Cour de Hué. Il faut dire que ces archipels composés d'îlots, d'atolls et de récifs, pour la plupart immergés, fouettés par le vent, n'intéressaient personne, à part les pêcheurs et les recueilleurs de guano.

La donne changea à partir de 1921, avec les « **rêves d'une Grande Chine** » des dirigeants de la nouvelle république (en ce qui concerne les archipels, les prétentions de la Chine non communiste/Taiwan et Chine communiste sont semblables), déterminés à asseoir la présence chinoise dans le Sud de la mer orientale, lieu de passage de tous les navires faisant le commerce entre l'Europe et l'Asie : Se basant sur le rapport d'un voyage de reconnaissance au-delà de l'île de Hainan d'une petite flotte de l'amiral Lý Chuân (nom phonétisé à la vietnamienne) des Qing en juin 1909 qui faisait état de la découverte d'îles dans le Sud-ouest de Hainan, le gouvernement de la Chine du Sud les déclara îles chinoises sous le nom de Xisha (nom apparu alors pour la première fois), en dépit du fait que ces îles, qui portaient déjà le nom de Hoàng Sa en vietnamien et **Paracels** en français, étaient déjà sous la juridiction du Vietnam, ou plutôt sous celle du gouvernement général de l'Indochine, le Vietnam étant devenu alors colonie française, et étaient habitées par des pêcheurs vietnamiens que la patrouille de pré-reconnaissance commandée par Ngô Kinh Vinh (nom phonétisé à la vietnamienne) s'était permis de faire prisonniers puis d'emmener à Hainan avec leurs familles pour que l'amiral pût dire que c'étaient des îles désertes ; les Chinois rattachèrent ces îles au district Châu Nhai (nom phonétisé à la vietnamienne) de l'île Hainan, alors qu'au Vietnam elles dépendaient depuis le 17^e siècle du district de la province Quảng Nam avant de l'être de celle de Thừa Thiên puis de nouveau de celle de Quảng Nam (les Spratly étant longtemps incorporés aux Paracels avant d'être gérés séparément par la province de Bà Rịa en 1933, puis celle de Phước Tuy en 1956) . La manoeuvre du gouvernement de Canton, non reconnu par la communauté internationale, ne fut pas prise au sérieux par la France coloniale ; mais en 1935 la république chinoise revendiqua officiellement la propriété **sur toutes les îles** de la mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est, et pour renforcer ses dires fit ériger subrepticement 12 stèles antidatées jusqu'en 1908 sur 4 îles des Paracels !

Pendant la 2^e guerre mondiale, en 1939, le **Japon** s'empara des Paracels qu'il occupa jusqu'en 1946. Cette année-là, profitant de la mission de désarmement des Japonais qui lui était confiée par les Alliés selon les accords de Postdam, la république chinoise se saisit de la plus grande île des Paracels (Phú Lâm, île Boisée, 2,6km²) puis au début de 1947 de la plus grande île des Spratly (Ba Binh, Itu-Aba, 46ha), la seule de cet archipel à posséder de l'eau potable, mais suite à son expulsion du continent pour Formose, elle dut se retirer de ces îles en 1950. Lors de la **Conférence de San Francisco** en 1951 par le traité duquel le Japon restituait les deux archipels au gouvernement vietnamien et où les revendications chinoises sur eux furent rejetées à l'unanimité moins trois, Trần Văn Hữu, le premier ministre du roi Bảo Đại, put déclarer la souveraineté du Vietnam sur les deux archipels sans aucune protestation de la part des 50 autres pays participants à la conférence, dont les deux Chines étaient, il faut le dire, exclues.

En 1948, avant de plier bagage pour l'île de Formose, **Tchang Kai Chek** (Jiang JieShi) fit imprimer une carte de la Chine avec pour frontière maritime une ligne fantaisiste en forme de U appelée langue de buffle obtenue en joignant 11 traits censés délimiter les eaux territoriales de la Chine et attribuant ainsi à la Chine 70% de la superficie de la mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est, au détriment des autres riverains. Cette carte passa inaperçue, mais en 1953, Pékin la fit réimprimer avec des modifications sur le nombre de traits, réduits à 9, situés cependant de telle sorte que la portion de mer que les Chinois s'attribuent comprend maintenant 80% de la superficie totale (3,5 millions de km²). A usage interne, la ligne U n'était guère invoquée jusqu'en 1998 dans les diverses déclarations de la Chine sur ses zones maritimes ; cependant cette carte est une bombe à retardement car, introduite dans l'enseignement, elle inculque depuis dans l'esprit de tous les Chinois la conviction que les archipels et la mer qui les entoure appartiennent de plein droit à la Chine et exacerbe un nationalisme aisément manipulé.

En 1956, profitant de l'évacuation des troupes françaises et des balbutiements du nouveau gouvernement du Sud-Vietnam auquel était dévolue l'administration des archipels selon le traité de Genève, **les deux Chines** s'emparèrent, Taipei de la **plus grande île des Spratly** (Ba Binh, Itu Aba, Taiping) ainsi que d'un banc attenant, et Pékin de la **partie Est des Paracels** (comprenant la grande île Boisée, Phú Lâm, Yongxing) qu'elles détiennent depuis. Le gouvernement sud-vietnamien ne put que protester et surtout renforcer la garde sur les îles restantes. En 1959, Pékin envoya 82 soldats déguisés en pêcheurs sur 5 bateaux armés pour s'attaquer aux îles de l'Ouest des Paracels, mais ils furent démasqués par les soldats sud-vietnamiens et faits prisonniers avant d'être renvoyés en Chine.

Le retrait des troupes américaines après le traité de Paris (1973) et les empêtements de l'armée sud-vietnamienne désormais seule dans la guerre contre Hanoï et ses alliés sino-russes furent l'occasion pour **Pékin** d'envoyer le 14/1/1974 deux navires de guerre aux Paracels pour s'emparer des îles de l'Ouest encore sous administration vietnamienne ; les quatre destroyers sud-vietnamiens dépêchés à la rescousse n'en purent venir à bout pendant la bataille navale qui s'ensuivit (**17-20/1/1974**), quoique qu'ils fussent plus nombreux, parce que le personnel technique des destroyers récemment remis au Sud-Vietnam par les Etats-Unis n'avait pas encore reçu de formation sérieuse et que les Américains en avaient enlevé les équipements sophistiqués. Les Vietnamiens durent battre en retraite après avoir perdu 75 marins contre 21 du côté chinois, laissant les Chinois maîtres désormais de **tout l'archipel des Paracels**. Le plus révoltant, c'est que la 7^e flotte américaine qui patrouillait au large de la Mer de l'Asie de l'Est, refusait de prêter mainforte à la marine sud-vietnamienne **sur ordre même de Washington**, censée pourtant être alliée de Saïgon, et ce malgré la promesse de Nixon d'intervenir au cas où le Sud-Vietnam était attaqué. Pire encore, Washington fit pression sur le président **Nguyễn Văn Thiệu** pour qu'il ne fit pas décoller les 5 avions déjà appareillés pour aller repousser les Chinois des îles. La raison était que les Etats-Unis venaient de renouer des relations avec la Chine et avaient en quelque sorte « vendu » les Paracels à ce nouveau partenaire.

Dans les années 1970, la faiblesse du Sud-Vietnam aux prises avec une guerre meurtrière éveilla chez

les autres riverains le désir de s'emparer au moins d'une partie des Spratly dont les richesses en hydrocarbures et poissons étaient devenues notoires. En 1977, le président Ferdinand Marcos, sous le prétexte qu'un citoyen philippin, **Tomas Cloma** avait pris possession en 1947 de plusieurs îlots des Spratly désertés par les Japonais pour y installer un Freedomland (Kelayaan) avant d'en être chassé en 1956 par les Taïwanais venus réoccuper Itu-Aba, revendiqua la souveraineté des **Philippines** sur les îlots et récifs estimés faire partie de Kelayaan et ceux situés à proximité de ses eaux territoriales. En fait dès 1968, les Philippines étaient déjà allés occuper les îlots et rochers sans garnison. Comme ils étaient des alliés du Sud-Vietnam dans la guerre, le gouvernement sud-vietnamien laissa faire sans protester mais à la fin de la guerre réussit à leur reprendre un îlot. Et depuis les Philippines contrôlent 7 îlots (sur 14 au total) dont le 2^e plus grand de l'archipel (Thitu island, Thj Tú) et 3 récifs, laissant au Vietnam 6 îlots, dont celui de Spratly qui donne son nom à tout l'archipel, et 21 récifs.

En 1979 ce fut au tour de la **Malaisie** de proclamer sa souveraineté sur tous les récifs relevant, selon elle, de son plateau continental, et à partir de 1983 elle y envoya des garnisons pour les occuper et les défendre. Parmi les cinq récifs et bancs occupés par la Malaisie deux sont revendiqués par les Philippines et un par **Brunei**. Cependant Brunei, qui n'a pas de marine, s'est jusqu'ici contenté d'affirmer son droit sans se laisser aller à la violence militaire.

L'appétit des autres riverains raviva celui de la **Chine** qui se mit dans la partie et à bien plus grande échelle. Vers la fin de la guerre sino-vietnamienne, saisissant le revirement défaitiste des dirigeants de Hanoï, la Chine décida de s'emparer des Spratly. En 1987-88, après avoir pris possession de plusieurs récifs (đá Chũ Thập/Fiery Cross, đá Châu Viên/London Reef, đá Gaven, đá Tur Nghĩa/Hugh Reef) vietnamiens laissés à l'abandon, trois frégates chinoises se dirigeaient vers celui de **Gạc Ma** (Johnson South Reef) quand, au moment où elles allaient y débarquer, elles virent arriver une centaine de Vietnamiens sur trois bateaux de transport venus construire une borne et planter un drapeau ; selon la version officielle, une bataille en découla (le **14/3/1988**) à la suite de laquelle 64 Vietnamiens furent tués et 9 faits prisonniers par les Chinois qui eurent 6 morts et 18 blessés ; incapables de résister aux feux de l'ennemi, les Vietnamiens durent s'enfuir et laisser les Chinois s'emparer des récifs. La réalité dévoilée en mars 2015 par le général **Lê Mã Lương**, directeur du musée d'histoire militaire vietnamien, fut plus tragique et révoltante (cf. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/in_depth/who-ord-no-fir-in-garma-03122015052720) : Le ministre de la défense **Lê Đức Anh**, acquis avec d'autres dirigeants à l'idée d'une capitulation générale devant la Chine, avait empêché l'armement des bateaux et interdit la distribution des fusils aux marins, et avait donc envoyé délibérément la centaine de soldats à la mort sous les canons chinois, histoire de faire croire à l'opinion que la cession des récifs à la Chine n'était pas décidée à l'avance mais due à une défaite militaire. A noter dans cette affaire de Gạc Ma la collusion de Taïwan avec la République populaire de Chine : les frégates chinoises étaient ravitaillées par les soldats taïwanais d'Itu-Aba (comme elles le seront plus tard en 1995 lors de l'attaque du récif Mischief des Philippines) ; leur solidarité dans la conquête des archipels se confirme d'ailleurs dans une déclaration du ministre de la défense taïwanaise de l'époque Cheng Wei-Yuan : « Si la guerre éclate, l'armée nationale (de Taïwan) assistera l'armée populaire dans son combat » (cf.

[https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%E1%BA%A3i_chi%E1%BA%BFn_G%E1%BA%A1c_Ma-C%C3%B4_Lin-Len_%C4%90ao_\(14-3-1988\)](https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%E1%BA%A3i_chi%E1%BA%BFn_G%E1%BA%A1c_Ma-C%C3%B4_Lin-Len_%C4%90ao_(14-3-1988))).

A partir du **traité de Chengdu** en 1990, la Chine se sent stimulée à accélérer sa mainmise sur la mer de l'Asie de l'Est, sûre désormais de la **soumission tacite du Vietnam**, son principal opposant : Loin de protester violemment contre les empiètements de plus en plus poussés de la Chine dans ses possessions, jusque dans sa zone économique exclusive (ZEE) puis ses eaux territoriales comme définies par la **convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer** (CNUDM) de 1982 -- selon ladite convention, un Etat côtier est souverain sur le sol, le sous-sol et l'espace aérien de ses eaux territoriales jusqu'à 12 milles marins ou environ 20 km, et au-delà jusqu'à 200 milles ou environ 370 km il a droit de pêche, de construction et d'exploitation du sol et du sous-sol mais ne peut s'opposer à la libre circulation sur les eaux et au-dessus --au nom de la préservation de la paix avec le puissant

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« ami » du Nord, Hanoï met en prison tout citoyen osant manifester haut et fort son hostilité à la Chine. Pékin commença d'abord par faire entériner en 1992 par son parlement la souveraineté historique de la Chine sur la Mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est puis ordonna à ses historiens de chercher dans les archives chinoises des « preuves » à l'appui. Taïpei lui emboîta le pas en 1995 pour élever la même revendication sur toute la mer comprise dans la ligne U mais, à la différence de la Chine, l'a suspendue en 2015 sauf en ce qui concerne l'île Taiping (Itu-Aba) et les Pratas déjà entre ses mains.

Puis, muni de **preuves historiques** bidons qui parlent surtout de découvertes des îles lors de voyages d'exploration, Pékin les présenta à l'ONU en 2009 avec la carte de ses eaux territoriales délimitées par une ligne aux 9 traits ou en forme de langue de buffle pour revendiquer des droits souverains sur 80% de la Mer de l'Asie de l'Est, ligne sur laquelle en 2014 elle ajouta un dixième trait pour englober cette fois 90% de la Mer. Mais ses preuves n'ont aucune force convaincante, d'autant plus que la CNUDM ne considère les droits historiques qu'en cas de continuité d'occupation pacifique. D'ailleurs dans toutes les cartes de la Chine, depuis les plus anciennes jusqu'en 1933, le territoire chinois s'arrête à l'île d'Hainan, son point le plus extrême dans le Sud, et la Mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est tout comme les archipels qui s'y trouvent lui étaient étrangers. Et en juin 2012, sans tenir compte de l'opinion internationale, Pékin donna aux archipels et la mer environnante en U le statut administratif d'une ville appelée **Sansha** (c'est-à-dire les trois archipels : les Paracels, les Spratly et le banc Macclesfield / Xisha, Nansha et Zhongsha) avec l'île Boisée (Yongxing) comme siège municipal. Cette provocation en plus des attaques contre les pêcheurs vietnamiens déclencha chez les Vietnamiens des manifestations régulières, pour une fois permises car téléguidées par la faction du pouvoir hostile à la sujétion à la Chine. En fait cette création des Sansha était déjà décidée en 11/2007 mais non proclamée officiellement et avait soulevé de nombreuses protestations et manifestations des Vietnamiens de l'étranger autant que dans le pays.

Nonobstant les protestations unanimes contre ses prétentions, la Chine consolide les étendues conquises et y déploie sa nouvelle puissance militaire mettant chaque jour un peu plus devant le fait accompli le monde tétanisé autant par ses menaces que par ses chantages financiers. Dès 1990 elle commença à construire une piste d'aviation sur l'île Boisée (Paracels) et de fil en aiguille y bâtit une véritable base militaire avec port, aéroport et hangar pour missiles sol-air. En 2013, ce fut le tour des Spratly d'être poldérisés puis militarisés, à une échelle encore plus importante ; sur les 9 récifs qu'elle occupe, la Chine fit élever des îles artificielles qui forment un ensemble de 13,5 km² avec ports, aéroports, etc. (alors que la surface totale des 14 îlots naturels de tout l'archipel ne mesure que 2 km²) au prix d'une immense **destruction écologique** : près de 5 millions de m³ de sable et coraux pompés, déplacés et détruits, 15 km² de récifs coralliens extrêmement précieux par la diversité des espèces qui s'y nichent à jamais disparus, sans compter 104 km² de coraux dévastés par les chalutiers chinois avec leur raclage des fonds à la recherche de grosses palourdes dont leur peuple est friand (cf. <https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/southchinaseadispute/china-s-activities-in-the-scs-take-up-huge-toll-on-the-marine-environment-vh-11022016103953.html>).

Le premier but affiché de la mainmise sur les Spratly est l'**appropriation de ses réserves de pétrole** (estimées seulement à 1,5 milliards de tonnes par les Américains, mais jusqu'à 50 milliards de tonnes récupérables par les Chinois). Le problème pour les Chinois est que 90% du pétrole se trouve dans les marges continentales des pays riverains : une partie dans ses eaux de Hainan et Guangdong certes, mais surtout dans le golfe du Tonkin, les plateaux continentaux du Vietnam et de la Sonde, au nord-ouest de Bornéo. Comme ces deux derniers et plus gros gisements appartiennent à des pays relativement prospères (Indonésie, Malaisie, Brunei) pour mettre la main sur plus de pétrole en Mer de l'Asie de l'Est, la Chine n'a d'autre choix que **piller le Vietnam** « soumis » dont les réserves en hydrocarbures sont à la 3^e place de l'Asie-Pacifique. Dès 1992 la Chinese national offshore oil company (CNOOC) signa un accord de prospection pétrolière dans le banc de **Tur Chinh/Vanguard Bank** situé dans la ZEE vietnamienne avec la compagnie Creston Energy et les Chinois poussèrent le **bouchon plus loin en empêchant PetroVietnam et Conoco Philipps de prospecter dans les eaux**

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vietnamiennes à côté de Tur Chinh (1994) - incidents qui amenèrent le Vietnam à rejoindre l'ASEAN en 1995 -, puis ne cessèrent de causer des obstacles à d'autres projets de prospection ou simplement de recherche scientifique de PetroVietnam avec d'autres compagnies étrangères (comme en 2007 avec British Petroleum, en 2008 avec Exxon Mobil, en 2011 avec Veritas, plus récemment en 2017 avec Repsol). Devant ces prospections illégales de pétrole chinoises dans la ZEE vietnamienne et les menées agressives des navires militaires chinois, que fait alors Hanoï ? Elle se tait ou déclare son inquiétude et au mieux envoie quelques vaisseaux faire un tour près des lieux d'incident sans leur permettre d'agir !

En mai 2014, l'arrivée de la plate-forme de forage et d'extraction chinoise HYSY 981 à 120 milles marins des côtes vietnamiennes et à 30 milles des Paracels, accompagnée de 80 navires dont 7 bâtiments de guerre, suscita une vive indignation dans la population vietnamienne, dont les manifestations contre la Chine se continuaient sporadiquement depuis une année, et donna lieu à des émeutes anti-chinoises (attaques d'usines, agressions de Chinois). Par peur de l'ire de Pékin et à son instigation, les dirigeants de Hanoi se tournèrent alors contre la faction « progressiste » et se livrèrent à une **répression implacable des manifestants**, muselant ainsi pour plusieurs années l'opposition. D'autre part, devant les réactions négatives de l'opinion internationale, les Chinois retirèrent leur plate-forme en juillet de la même année, mais c'est pour la faire revenir quelques mois après, en 1/2015, avec une escorte menaçante de navires militaires ; et sûrs de leur impunité, ils continuent de forer et d'extraire dans les gisements vietnamiens du golfe du Tonkin, envoyant même d'autres plates-formes prêter main forte à la HYSY 981 (la HYSY 943 en 2016). A partir de 2017, c'est au tour des réserves dans les Spratly d'être mises à sac avec la plate-forme HYSY 270 qui vint en juillet, accompagnée de 40 bâtiments militaires et 40 bateaux de pêche armés narguer le Vietnam à 210 km de ses côtes, autour de la **Vanguard Bank** (bãi Tur Chinh) où PetroVietnam s'exerçait au forage pour l'exploitation du gisement du Poisson empereur rouge (Cá rồng đỏ) avec la Repsol espagnole ; les Chinois se montrèrent tellement agressifs que le Vietnam dut arrêter son projet de partenariat avec Repsol et laisser le champ libre aux envahisseurs, toujours selon la politique capitularde de Hanoï qui ne permit pas à sa marine de réagir. Pour ne pas avoir à payer des indemnités à Repsol qui a déjà déboursé 200 millions USD pour le projet, PetroVietnam a voulu le relancer ce mois de mars 2018 mais a dû encore une fois le stopper (le 23) devant des menaces très violentes de la Chine, déterminée à s'emparer de tout le pétrole et le gaz situé dans la ZEE vietnamienne (cf. https://www.compuserve.com/entertainment/story/0002/20180323/KBN1GZ0JN_1).

Poissons et crustacés, une autre richesse des Spratly, constituent un autre objet de la cupidité chinoise. Comme dans la région de la mer de l'Asie de l'Est 15 millions de personnes vivent de la pêche dont les produits représentent 38% de la pêche mondiale (chiffre de la FAO de 2012), les prétentions de souveraineté de la Chine sur 90% de cette mer ne peuvent que générer de nombreux conflits avec les autres riverains. D'autant plus que, comme pour le pétrole, 90% des stocks de poissons se situent à moins de 200 milles marins des côtes, c'est-à-dire dans leurs eaux et ZEE. Or, en tant que souveraine auto-proclamée de la mer de l'Asie de l'Est, la Chine impose unilatéralement depuis 1999 un **moratoire annuel** de la pêche à tous les pêcheurs même étrangers, et en 2014 oblige tout chalutier étranger à demander sa permission pour y pêcher : les contrevenants s'exposent à des amendes (près de 8000 USD), des confiscations de matériels, allant jusqu'à la destruction du bateau et les violences physiques. Pour appliquer ses mesures arbitraires, elle peut compter sur ses milliers de chalutiers armés (23.000 envoyés en mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est en 8/2012 ; 18.000 après le 16/8/2017 à la fin d'une interdiction générale de 108 jours), une véritable troupe de choc agissant en avant-garde de sa marine toujours présente dans les environs, prête à chercher noise aux autres pêcheurs de la région et à les chasser de leur mer « personnelle ».

Vis-à-vis du Vietnam, après en avoir obtenu en 2000 la cession de 9% de ses eaux territoriales dans le **golfe du Tonkin** par un traité sur les frontières maritimes plus avantageux pour la Chine (qui détient maintenant 47 % du golfe au lieu de 38% auparavant), Pékin lui a forcé la main pour une **« coopération » halieutique dans une zone commune qui mord encore dans 13,5% des eaux**

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vietnamiennes, ce qui diminue d'autant le stock de poissons pour les Vietnamiens ; de plus, forts de cet accord, les Chinois ne se gênent pas pour venir concurrencer les petits et moyens bateaux de pêche vietnamiens avec leurs gros chalutiers et même leurs énormes bateaux-usines qui dépassent souvent la limite de la zone commune pour pêcher près de la côte vietnamienne (7781 violations du traité de « coopération » par les bateaux de pêche chinois et 1800 par d'autres genres de navires chinois en 10 ans, selon le rapport du Ministère de l'Agriculture et de développement rural de 2014) ; avec pour conséquence l'épuisement des stocks déjà régulièrement en baisse à cause de la surpêche généralisée. A cela s'ajoute l'empoisonnement des eaux du littoral par les usines chinoises implantées le long de la côte vietnamienne depuis 2016. Pour trouver des poissons les pêcheurs vietnamiens sont obligés de s'éloigner dans la ZEE nationale du côté des **Paracels et Spratly** et y sont harcelés, attaqués, coulés et tués par des commandos de chalutiers armés et de navires militaires chinois. On ne compte pas les exactions chinoises sur ces pauvres pêcheurs auxquels les Chinois refusent même le refuge sur une île des Paracels en cas de grosse tempête comme l'exige le droit de la mer (cf. <https://www.voatiengviet.com/a/3465438.html>).

Avec les Malaisiens et les Indonésiens, plus prospères, la Chine observe une certaine prudence et les pêcheurs chinois s'aventurent moins souvent dans leurs eaux ; si la Malaisie qui attend beaucoup des investissements chinois fait encore le gros dos devant leurs incursions, depuis 2016 l'Indonésie montre les dents et se tient prête à les arrêter. Restent les **Philippines** sans moyen militaire contre lesquelles la Chine multiplie les provocations. En 2012, elle envoya une véritable armada s'emparer du récif de Scarborough occupé par les Philippins auxquels elle en interdit désormais l'accès. Or les eaux autour de ce récif, très riches en poissons de grande qualité, fournissaient aux Philippins une bonne partie de leur alimentation ; que les Chinois fassent des Spratly leur chasse gardée, « c'est une formule pour la famine ; plus qu'une question de sécurité nationale, elle engage la sécurité alimentaire » (sénateur Rudolph Recto). Comparant cette annexion du récif de Scarborough à celle de la Tchécoslovaquie par Hitler, le président Benigno Aquino III porta en 2013 l'affaire devant la **Cour internationale de justice de La Haye** (Cour permanente d'arbitrage, CPA) laquelle rendit son verdict le 12/7/2016, donnant raison à Manille : « Il n'y a aucun fondement juridique pour que la Chine revendique ses droits historiques sur des ressources dans les zones maritimes à l'intérieur de la ligne en 9 traits ». En même temps, la Cour dénie aux îlots, récifs et îles artificielles compris dans les Paracels et Spratly le statut d'île c'est-à-dire la possibilité d'avoir droit à une ZEE, ce qui constitue aussi un désaveu des prétentions de Taïwan sur Taiping/Itu-Aba. Pas étonnant donc que non seulement Pékin mais également Taïpei déclarèrent ne pas reconnaître l'autorité de la CPA dont le jugement « sera une feuille de papier bonne à jeter », dit une agence de presse taïwanaise.

Logiquement le verdict de la CPA devrait pousser les autres pays côtiers à tenter le même procès à la Chine et à se servir de la sentence en principe favorable comme arme dans leurs démêlés avec elle ; ou tout au moins ces pays de l'ASEAN devraient s'y appuyer pour former un front uni contre la Chine qui les brime. Mais les chantages et promesses financières de Pékin dans les négociations bilatérales avec chacun d'eux brise toute solidarité entre eux, le premier à se désolidariser étant les Philippines dont le nouveau président **Rodrigo Duterte** s'est mis volontiers sous la bannière chinoise contre « coopération » halieutique et arrangements pécuniers. Quant au Vietnam qui a le plus gros contentieux avec la Chine, ses dirigeants trop inféodés à Pékin n'osent guère faire appel à la CPA malgré l'opinion publique qui l'y presse.

Dès le lendemain de la sentence, la Chine furieuse, par défi, menaça d'instituer sur la mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est une zone d'identification aérienne (Air defense identification zone, ADIZ) comme elle l'a déjà fait dans la mer septentrionale en 2013 à la grande colère du Japon dont les îles Senkaku (Diaoyu, revendiquées par la Chine) relèvent de cette zone. Elle poussa même la provocation en organisant quelques jours après (18/7/2016) des exercices militaires au nord des Paracels. Le recours à l'ADIZ tout comme les démonstrations de force révèlent que l'objectif réel poursuivi par Pékin en faisant main basse sur les archipels (Paracels et Spratly) et la mer de l'Asie de l'Est environnante est surtout militaire : se rendre maître d'un territoire hautement stratégique, lieu de transit du transport

maritime reliant l'Europe à l'Extrême-Orient en passant par le Moyen-Orient, représentant 40% du fret maritime mondial d'un montant de 5000 milliards de dollars par an, et surtout par où passent $\frac{3}{4}$ des importations d'hydrocarbures de la Chine, juste en amont du **détroit de Malacca**, passage obligé du trafic international. Déjà pourvue de plusieurs bases navales dans des îles côtières de la baie du Bengale et de la mer d'Andaman cédées par le Myanmar (Birmanie) en 1992 et 1994, en aval du détroit, avec aussi des bases dans les Spratly, la Chine contrôlera militairement le détroit qu'elle aura la possibilité de bloquer à sa guise pour nuire à l'économie de tel ou tel pays ennemi.

La mainmise sur l'ensemble de la mer de l'Asie de l'Est avec les archipels qu'elle abrite pour en faire sa « mare nostrum » est donc d'une nécessité vitale pour la Chine impérialiste qui renforce chaque jour sa présence militaire dans la région, dotant les îles artificielles d'équipements militaires les plus modernes : missiles sol-air HQ9, radars, tours de contrôle, etc., sans compter des logements pour soldats au nombre d'environ 10.000, et bientôt des **usines nucléaires flottantes** (des réacteurs à neutrons rapides portatifs, capables de tenir dans un container de 6,1 x 2,6 m, pouvant fournir de l'électricité pour 100.000 habitants, fort inquiétants pour les pays voisins à cause du risque de catastrophe meurtrière, la technologie pour ce genre de centrale restant peu sûre !), et déployant ses flottilles de chalutiers armés sous la protection d'hélicoptères, d'avions porte-missiles, de navires de guerre accompagnés parfois du porte-avions Liaoning et surtout de **sous-marins**. Or, ces derniers avec les missiles jouent un rôle clé dans la course à la suprématie maritime voire mondiale avec les Etats-Unis, et la mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est de ce point de vue offrirait aux sous-marins chinois un immense abri (3 millions de km²) indétectable et inattaquable relié directement à leur base de Longpo, Yulin (Hainan). En effet, sous les Spratly, à 3000 m de profondeur en moyenne, des corridors sinueux suivant deux axes est-ouest et nord-sud permettent aux sous-marins de se cacher ou de se déplacer à l'insu de tous les appareils espions. La crainte exprimée au ministère philippin de la défense en 1982 : « Si une nation hostile peut **cartographier** cette région avec un degré tel qu'elle peut faire naviguer un sous-marin porteur de missiles balistiques, cette nation peut stationner des sous-marins de type **Polaris** et pourrait être capable de contrôler ou menacer une région dans un rayon de 4000 km contenant un tiers de la population mondiale dont l'ensemble de l'ASEAN. La **bathymétrie** de la région est telle qu'il n'est pas possible de détecter un sous-marin, donc il est impossible de contre-attaquer » (cf. <https://asialyst.com/fr/2016/10/20/mer-de-chine-du-sud-le-secret-des-routes-sous-marines> /) est en passe de se concrétiser. Depuis juillet 2017 des robots sous-marins chinois explorent la mer méridionale de l'Asie de l'Est dans le but d'y collecter des images et mesurer des paramètres chimiques et physiques, cependant que 12 planeurs sous-marins y sont déployés pour récolter des données sur le milieu marin (température, salinité, turbidité, etc.) ; et les sous-marins chinois de classe Jin 094 sont capables de lancer le missile balistique Julang II dont la portée est de 8000km !

Imperturbable devant la réprobation internationale, la Chine se conduit en mer de l'Asie de l'Est comme chez elle, exerçant sa souveraineté auto-proclamée, et considérant les eaux entourant ses récifs, atolls et îles artificielles comme ses eaux territoriales. Grâce à ses installations portuaires et aéroportuaires, ses sous-marins et ses missiles, elle est capable d'y instaurer un **déni d'accès et d'interdiction de zone** (Anti Access / Area Denial ou A2/AD). Patrouilleurs et garde-côtes chinois omniprésents surveillent tous les bateaux étrangers et les empêchent de s'approcher des archipels dans la limite des 12 milles, bien que le droit de la mer autorise le passage inoffensif de tous les navires étrangers, navires militaires compris. Dans l'espace aérien au-dessus de ces eaux, ses chasseurs menacent et éconduisent les avions étrangers, en particuliers militaires. Avec le Vietnam, elle ne se gêne absolument pas, et agit d'ores et déjà comme avec un pays conquis : du 29/8 au 4/9/2017 elle a procédé à des **manœuvres militaires** avec des tirs à balles réelles dans la ZEE vietnamienne du golfe du Tonkin à seulement 75 milles de la ville de Đà Nẵng, interdisant aux bateaux vietnamiens de s'approcher de la zone ! D'ailleurs même en jours ordinaires, les bateaux vietnamiens naviguant dans leurs propres eaux se font régulièrement harceler, rançonner et arraisonner pour avoir « violé » la ligne U imaginaire. Et dans les airs surplombant « leur territoire », si les Chinois se contentent de chasser et d'accompagner les avions d'autres pays, avec les Vietnamiens ils tirent sans sommation, comme ce fut

le cas de **deux appareils Sukhoi** de l'armée de l'air vietnamienne abattus le 14/6/2016 par des missiles chinois tirés d'un des sous-marins stationnés sous les eaux de l'île Boisée alors qu'ils faisaient un vol d'exercice à 32 milles de la côte et donc au-dessus de la ZEE vietnamienne – un acte de guerre criminel qui ne souleva aucune protestation des lâches dirigeants de Hanoï et qui serait même caché à la population si l'un des pilotes n'était pas secouru par des pêcheurs -- ; et depuis, par peur des tirs sans sommation, les avions de ligne Hanoï-Saïgon joignent prudemment leur destination par un détour au-dessus du Laos plutôt que par le littoral !

Face à l'ambition agressive de la Chine dont le **budget militaire** augmente de 132% en 10 ans (191 milliards USD en 2016, selon France-info), ses voisins asiatiques (Japon, Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Indonésie, Malaisie et Vietnam) sont poussés à la course aux armements tout en poursuivant des relations économiques avec elle. Même l'Australie située loin de la mer de l'Asie de l'Est et jusqu'ici plutôt complaisante à l'égard de Pékin, s'inquiète de la voir menacer la paix dans la région et vient de commander 12 sous-marins à la France dans le cadre d'un programme de renouvellement de son attirail militaire. En ne s'opposant pas fermement dès le début aux prétentions sans fondement de Pékin, le monde se retrouve avec une puissance sans retenue qui s'approprie brutalement des richesses des autres et qui, pour arriver à ses fins, se livre au chantage à l'épreuve de force ainsi qu'à la ruse des investissements et prêts « fabuleux » contre une coopération asymétrique qui s'avèreront préjudiciables au bénéficiaire. Devant le hold-up de la mer de l'Asie de l'Est et le danger potentiel qu'il renferme, les Etats libres commencent à réaliser que les mots paix et pacifique constamment dans la bouche des dirigeants de Pékin doivent se comprendre dans leur sens contraire comme dans l'Océanie de « 1984 ». Pour faire comprendre à ses lecteurs la gravité du problème, un auteur, Antoine Brunet, (cf. <http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/asia-se-livre-plus-grande-course-aux-armements-de>) compare la situation à celle d'une Turquie revendiquant la pleine souveraineté sur la mer Méditerranée où plus aucun riverain n'aurait accès sans sa permission. En fait cette visée hégémonique a eu lieu, au XVIe siècle, mais fut enrayée par une coalition menée par l'Autriche qui défit les Turcs à Lépante (1570).

Une telle coalition contre l'hégémonie chinoise est-elle possible aujourd'hui ? On en doute, vu la force d'attraction du portefeuille agité par Pékin à laquelle cèdent volontiers la plupart des pays, surtout corrompus, en mal de capitaux ou avides de contrats ; et tant que l'opinion générale n'est pas édifiée sur la nature mensongère, cynique et cruelle de la dictature communiste chinoise. Or, il ne manque pas de gauchistes nourris contre l'impérialisme américain pour saluer la montée de l'impérialisme chinois, censé être juste et généreux (qu'ils se renseignent sur le génocide au Tibet et contre les Vietnamiens en cours !). Les **Etats-Unis** eux-mêmes, seule puissance capable de contrecarrer la Chine et que cette dernière veut évincer de l'Asie, ne se sont inquiétés que lorsque les Chinois se sont mis à remblayer les récifs et à élever leur « grande muraille de sable ». Leur appel à l'arrêt de cette poldérisation restant sans effet, et ne pouvant pulvériser les constructions chinoises sans risquer une guerre destructrice, ils n'ont d'autre solution que celle de prôner le maintien de la **liberté de navigation** dans les parages des archipels, car selon le droit de la mer seules les eaux intérieures permettent d'interdire le passage des navires étrangers. Pour ce, ils ont décidé depuis 2015 des opérations de liberté de navigation **FONOP** (freedom of navigation operation) qui consiste à envoyer plusieurs fois par an des navires et avions dans les archipels y compris à moins des 12 milles marins des îles revendiquées par la Chine. Chaque opération suscite des protestations de Pékin qui se contente cependant de faire escorter le vaisseau ou l'avion « violateur » par ses patrouilleurs, sauf en décembre 2016 quand le navire océanographique USNS Bowditch se fit dérober un drone, mais cette subtilisation tout comme celle d'un sonar de l'USNS Impeccable en 2009 entre plutôt dans le cadre du vol des nouveautés technologiques pour les copier, pratiqué systématiquement par les Chinois. Attaché aussi à la liberté de navigation, le Canada décide de participer au FONOP avec deux frégates dans les eaux contestées en juillet 2017, et la Grande-Bretagne promet de faire de même prochainement. Quant à la France, sans adhérer au FONOP, elle fait transiter depuis 2014 une dizaine de navires dans les mêmes zones comme en octobre 2017 avec la frégate Auvergne, car comme le déclare l'amiral Denis Bertrand, « si la liberté de

navigation est bafouée en mer de Chine, elle le sera partout » (cf. Le Monde du 30/10/2017).

Ces opérations symboliques qui irritent Pékin ne l'empêchent pas de poursuivre la consolidation de son immense forteresse marine d'où il pourra contrôler le commerce international et menacer tous les Etats qui s'opposent à son hégémonie, une hégémonie féroce, irrespectueuse du droit international et insoucieuse de la vie d'autrui, auprès de laquelle l'impérialisme américain fait figure de domination bon enfant. De facto la Chine règne déjà sur la mer de l'Asie de l'Est et en est inexpugnable ; mais pour que son autorité soit admise internationalement, elle doit l'être de jure. Bien qu'elle n'ait que faire de la loi et s'assoie ainsi sur le verdict de la CPA, elle a besoin de la loi pour justifier son annexion. C'est pourquoi mijote-t-elle la création d'un autre tribunal international à sa botte (cf. <http://www.epochtimes.fr/chine-envisage-de-creer-propres-tribunaux-internationaux-revendications->) qui légalisera ses actions, tout en sachant que les jugements de ce dernier n'auront pas plus de valeur que ses pseudo-documents historiques. En fin de compte c'est encore par le Vietnam, le seul pays dont le droit sur les archipels a été longtemps reconnu, qu'elle pourra obtenir, suite à un transfert officiel de souveraineté, une certaine légitimité. Heureusement, jusqu'ici, malgré sa soumission tacite, par peur de la réprobation unanime comme de la révolte de ses ressortissants, le pouvoir de Hanoi refuse de déclarer publiquement sa reddition à la Chine. Si le monde libre tient à rester libre, il a intérêt à profiter de cette réticence, qui ne durera pas, pour aider le peuple vietnamien à secouer le joug communiste et donc la dépendance envers Pékin, contre lequel le Vietnam libre constituera un solide rempart.

Dang Phuong Nghi (sosvietnam.net)

Battle for the Paracel islands 1974



In February 1972, Richard Nixon along with Kissinger made a historic trip to China. In Beijing on June 22, 1972, Kissinger told Zhou the U.S. acknowledged its North Vietnamese enemy was a "permanent factor" and probably the "strongest entity" in the region. "And we have had no interest in destroying it or even defeating it," he insisted.

After more than a year of testing to make sure that the messages were right and "sincere," on January 16, 1974, the Communist China took the advantage of the opportunity and made a move to take over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.

While Uncle Sam looked the other way and considered that was a local dispute, the Navy of The Republic of Vietnam made a stand and fought back, repeating an epic episode of Vietnam history. But before reading on the article of Battle For Paracel, let's take a look at some historical photos below and thank plenty to DINH TRONG VU, VU KHAI CO, TRUONG VAN QUANG, T.NGUYEN, and FRANCOIS B. who have made this page possible and so unique with their contribution of rare VN Navy's image collection, correction and research.

BATTLE FOR THE PARACEL ISLANDS

...Thirty two years ago, US Navy officers stationed in Vietnam thought that the South Vietnamese Navy should have quietly withdrawn from the Paracels. They never did expect that "Little South Vietnam" would pick a fight with the giant China.

"Why would you engage a superior force with no hope of succeeding?" Even those who did not directly participate in the battle would answer as follows:

"To defend my country, even to the death. The South Vietnamese Navy was determined to fight. The Paracel Islands were and are a part of Vietnam's heritage. The Vietnamese vowed to defend it. Our ships exchanged fire with the invaders and fought with all their strength. Many worldwide observers, who at first wondered at our actions, later looked on with admiration at our courage.

A nation's destiny is in the hands of its own people. "...

By Thomas J. Cutler, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD

A small group of islands named Paracel (Hoang Sa) are located approximately 200 nautical miles due east of Danang. And, although too small to be inhabited by a permanent population, they were nevertheless an important historical and strategic possession of Vietnam. This claim of sovereignty dates

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back centuries. However, the Peoples Republic of China felt they could displace this claim based upon a proclamation made by them in September 1958, and acknowledged by then North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham-Van-Dong.



Contradicting this disputed proclamation, the South Vietnamese Government continued to maintain a small weather observation garrison on Pattle Island, the largest island in this group. And no action was initiated by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to displace this presence.

Until January of 1974.

On January 16, after delivering six South Vietnamese Army officers and an American observer to the Paracels for an inspection tour, the former USS Bering Strait (AVP-34), WAVP-382/WHEC-382 Bering Strait, now Vietnamese Navy Patrol Cruiser Ly-Thuong-Kiet HQ-16, discovered two Chinese "armored fishing trawlers" were laying off Drummond Island supporting troops from the PLA that had occupied the territory. In addition, Chinese soldiers were observed around a bunker on nearby Duncan Island, with a PLAN landing ship moored directly on the beach.

The CO of HQ-16, CDR Le-Van-Thu, reported his findings back to the regional headquarters in Da Nang, and also sent over 15 people to guard the small island of Money. CDR Thu's report was routed immediately over to Saigon, where a hastily formed meeting by President Thieu and his cabinet decided to attempt eviction of the PRC forces.

Overnight on January 18, a small South Vietnamese force comprised of Destroyer Escort Tran-Khanh-

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Du HQ-4 (ex-USS Forster, DER-334) and the Patrol Cruiser Tran-Binh-Trong HQ-5 (USS Chincoteague (AVP-24), USCGC Chincoteague (WAVP-375)(WHEC-375)) were dispatched from the Da Nang area under the overall command of Captain Ha-Van-Ngac. Patrol Craft Nhat-Tao HQ-10 (ex-USS Serene AM-300) which was proceeding to Da Nang for repair of one of her engines, was also diverted to join the small flotilla of VNN ships that was converging on the Paracels.

While waiting for the arrival of the other ships, CDR Thu on HQ-16 landed a team of Vietnamese



commandos on Robert Island (Cam Tuyen) to investigate some PRC flags installed on this tiny spit of land. No PLA forces were present on the island, so the naval commandos returned to their ship. However, shortly after their arriving back aboard, two PLAN Kronstad-class guided missile gun boats started churning up the waters in the vicinity of the collection of small islands.

The possibility of peaceful restoration of the islands became highly unlikely.

Permission to attack the intruding PRC forces was transmitted to Captain Ngac later in the day of January 18, with one stipulation: President Thieu wanted the navy to try to "parley" with the Chinese first. Accordingly, the commander of the VNN task force arrayed his ships around Duncan Island during the evening in preparation for a confrontation early on the morning of the 19th.

Meanwhile, two additional PLAN T48-class gunboats arrived in the area. This had the effect of further deterioration to an already very tense situation.

As the tide crested on the following morning, HQ-5 lowered a brace of rubber landing craft over the side, heading for Duncan. Twenty Vietnamese Navy commandos, led by a lieutenant junior grade

(Trung Uy), waded through the surf and onto the high ground waving a white flag, indicating a desire to talk. Instead, the larger than expected Chinese ground force began advancing toward the small party from several directions. Captain Ngac ordered a retreat. As the Vietnamese began nudging their boats back into the water, the PLA troops opened fire. The Trung Uy and two of his men fell dead in the raging surf.

The flotilla commander, in direct radio communications with the VNN Headquarters staff in Saigon, requested instructions. After only a short period of deliberations, the word from Saigon was emphatically relayed:

"SHOOT!!"

Captain Ngac immediately translated the order into action as his four vessels began moving toward and taking on the two armed trawlers, one landing craft and four missile gunboats with devastating fire. The melee that resulted was fast paced, close in, and deadly. The two groups of ships were some times as close as only 1600 yards as they blasted away at one another. One of the PLAN gunboats (K-274) was sunk outright. And another (T-389) was damaged so badly that it was beached on Duncan and lost. The remaining two PLAN gunboats were also damaged.

But HQ-10 took a direct hit from a surface-to-surface missile and, spewing smoke and fire from her bridge, went dead in the water with her guns silent. HQ-16 also received damage from an errant five inch round from HQ-5 but continued to fight on, scoring additional hits.

A seaman below decks on the Nhat-Tao rushed up to the gun deck to find the gun crew dead and the 40 mm weapon jammed. Although not a gunner's mate, Seaman (Ha Si) Tay cleared the gun and resumed firing on the PLAN vessels. The Chinese concentrated their firepower on this renewed source of danger, and Tay quickly went down fighting as the fate of his ship became all too evident.

"HQ-10 was going under" After only thirty-five minutes (10:25 to 11:00 AM), the furious battle was over. Both groups of ships began rapidly pulling away from one another. The PLAN toward Hainan, and the South Vietnamese in the opposite direction toward Da Nang.

As the disengagement took place, word reached Saigon from the Americans that, although the US would not provide assistance in what they deemed to be a local dispute, they did advise that radar reports from US Naval sources indicated that a flight of MIG-21's had taken off from Hainan headed toward the Paracels, with at least one Chinese Guided Missile Cruiser also moving in that direction at high speed.

With this news, and indications of rapidly moving surface radar contacts approaching the area from the north, the only recourse for the Vietnamese was to retire completely. Captain Ngac ordered HQ-4 to escort the crippled HQ-16 back to Da Nang. HQ-5, with the commander of the flotilla on board, would begin an "expanding square" search for survivors from HQ-10.

But even the search effort was abandoned and further emphasis made for all South Vietnamese ships to withdraw as it became increasingly clear that further threats from the PLAN could be expected. Information obtained in later years proved this to be a wise decision, as two PLAN Hainan Class submarines were directed to guard the approaches to the Paracels on October 19.

Therefore, it would not be until several days later that a Dutch tanker and a Vietnamese fishing boat pulled only thirty-seven survivors of the sunken Nhat-Tao out of the South China Sea. This from the eighty-two sailors on board HQ-10 when the battle began. Commanding Officer Nguy-Van-Tha was not among those who were rescued, having been killed when the missile hit the bridge area.

A few days later, the Chinese returned in force to finish the occupation of the entire chain of islands of the Paracels. The Chinese government announced to the world that they had captured forty-eight prisoners, including the one American. These were the garrison forces on Pattle and neighboring Money plus the six ARVN officers that had arrived in the days just before the battle.

Up until today, the Government of North Vietnam has not lodged a formal protest, and the Paracels remain claimed and in the control of the PRC.

Why did the South Vietnamese Navy challenge China with its more powerful fleet? That seems like a logical question. Perhaps best answered by men who fought there.

From a Vietnamese language article published in 1998:

Twenty four years ago, US Navy officers stationed in Vietnam thought that the South Vietnamese Navy should have quietly withdrawn from the Paracels. They never did expect that "Little South Vietnam" would pick a fight with the giant China. "Why would you engage a superior force with no hope of succeeding?" Even those who did not directly participate in the battle would answer as follows:

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A nation's destiny is in the hands of its own people." (Source: VNN Coastal Group 16)

PHOTOS OF THE BATTLE AND AFTERMATH




Photo of Red China's Nam Ngu 407 (taken from HQ4, ten minutes before it was rammed on the left side by HQ4)




Naval canon 76.2 on HQ.4 contributed the great effect in sinking the Red China's Kronstadt (Photo taken on Jan. 01, 1974, day of the battle).





Trước thái độ hiếu hòa, của nhân dân và Quân Lực VNCH Trung Cộng đã ngang nhiên dùng võ lực, cưỡng chiếm quần đảo Hoàng Sa của ta. Toàn dân Việt Nam vùng lên phản pháng quân xâm lăng Trung Cộng bằng những cuộc biểu tình lên án trên toàn quốc.





Hộ tống hạm Kronstadt của Trung Cộng.
A Kronstadt escort vessel of Communist China.

Vào trung tuần tháng 1-74 Đế Quốc Trung Cộng đã đưa tới vùng đảo Hoàng Sa nhiều chiến đĩnh với chủ dích xâm lăng các hải đảo V.N.C.H. Chiến hạm Trung Cộng bất chấp luật lệ hải hành quốc tế đã cắt mũi tàu ta từ tả hạm hoặc đâm thẳng vào chiến hạm ta.

In the middle of January 1974, Chinese Communist imperialists sent several warships to the Paracel islands with the purpose of seizing the Republic of Vietnam islands. Chinese Communist ships, disregarding international marine law, cut in front of our ships or rammed them.



Tuần dương hạm Lý Thường Kiệt HQ 16, một trong những chiếc chiến hạm VN lập thành tích đánh chìm tàu Trung Cộng đã trở về tới Sài Gòn, Thủy thủ đoàn của chiến hạm anh hùng đã được đồng bào thủ đô các đoàn thể chính trị, nam nữ học sinh các trường, các giới chức Quân lực VNCH tiếp đón.

The HQ 16 Ly Thuong Kiet, one of the Vietnamese ships to sink Chinese Communist boats, arrives at Saigon. The crew of this victorious ship receives a warm welcome from the Capital population, political and civic groups, students and personalities of the RVNAF.



Chinh Luận

TRÍCH THUẬT BÁO CHÍ NGOẠI QUỐC ĐỀ BÀY TÓ LẬP TRƯỞNG

Nga lên án TC đánh chiếm Hoàng Sa thúc LHQ buộc TC phải thương thuyết

ban sánogian
UNO



CO HAI QUAN THEO TA
NGUYỄN THANH TRÌ
Phó Giám đốc ĐD 10-83
được "thứ thân" sau những
giờ hành động chiến đấu trên
mặt biển Hoàng Sa.

* Tổng Liên Đoàn Lao Công Thế Giới trách các đại cường im lặng
đề cương quốc TC đánh chiếm lãnh thổ nước nhược tiểu VN

MẠC TỰ KHÓA. 26-11(AFP).— Nhật báo Reuters, em quan ngại lập các chính phủ Nga và
các đại TC cường quốc Quốc Bản Hoàng Sa. Sau khi tranh đấu không đươc các
đại cường quốc, thế đứng của họ tranh chấp.

bên này
ngươi quá
nhập hiệu
giữ nước

Bác Trư
hàng biển
quân dân
gây nên
các quốc
dân bản
biên dân

GIỜ PHÚT CHÓT CỦA TY KHÍ TƯỢNG HOÀNG SA CHỨNG NHÂN 24 NĂM QUA TẠI VÙNG TRANH CHẤP



Tại Hội Nghị La Celle Saint Cloud
**VC bác bỏ đề nghị VNCH
lên án vụ TC chiếm H. Sa**

ĐA LÊ (T.P.H.) — Tại Hội
nghị La Celle Saint Cloud, phái đoàn
MTCP báo cáo Số 25-1 đã báo cáo
về đề nghị của VNCH phản đối
trước 1 báo quyết nghị không cho
biên Đông của Trung cộng tại Hoàng
Sa.

Tuyên đề nghị của VNCH lại
biên miền Nam VN làm tại La Celle.

LHQ các tài lý không tiếp
đành nghị để duy trì hòa bình tại
BNA.

Phó Thủ tướng Nguyễn lưu Văn
truyền số : "Không 1 người VN nào
có thể chịu sự ra mắt họ bằng nước
của họ bằng tiếng nói của Trung cộng
Chúng tôi làm sự này để họ
biên miền Bắc Đông của chúng ta có
biên sự Bắc

PTT Việt
Đ. 26-11-63

AM LE TIEN XUONG ĐÀO TRUOI M TAU CHIEN PHI CO ĐUA RA ĐA UOC LINH CAP TOC TRINH DIEN Đ

ĐUONG

Chỉ Nhiệm kiêm Chủ Bút : Bà Quê Phở VÂN SON PHAN-MỸ-TRÚC Tôn soạn và Trj sự : 96 Võ Tánh * Đ.T. 22.709 — 94.630



Chiến Sĩ Hải Quân VN đã ghi chiến tích oai hùng chống ngoại xâm Trung Cộng tại Hoàng Sa. Toàn quân toàn dân không quên những chiến sĩ đã bỏ mình để giữ vững từng thước đất quê hương ở giữa trùng dương. Nhất là những khuôn mặt điển hình như cố Trung Tá Ngụy Văn Thà, hạm trưởng hộ tống hạm Nhật Tảo, Cố Thiếu Tá Nguyễn Thành Tri, hạm phó cố Trung Sĩ vận chuyển Lê Văn Tây, Hạ Sĩ I cơ khí Đinh Hoàng Mai, v...v.

The Vietnamese Navy men have recorded a valiant feat of arms in the fight against the Chinese Communists at the Parcel islands. The entire People and Army are not forgetting those who gave their lives to protect every inch of their Fatherland in the open sea. The memory of men such as the late Commander Nguy Van Tha, Commander of the escort vessel Nhat Tao Lieutenant Commander Nguyen Thanh Tri, Deputy Commander of the ship, Transport Petty Officer Second Class Le Van Tay and Mechanic Mate Dinh Hoang Mai, will remain forever in the mind of everyone.



A Chinese Vessel heavily damaged after the Paracel battle



The Chinese Kronstadt 274 was greeted in China after the battle

By vnafmamn.com

A tribute to the navy of the Republic of Vietnam



By Hai Tran, LT, Vietnamese Navy

On January 19, 1974 this proud Navy fought against the huge Chinese Navy in Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) archipelagos without any help or support from the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Sailors who abandoned ships scattered to the sea. The U.S. Navy offered no assistance. U.S. Naval Historians have never mentioned a word about this sea battle.

The ill-equipped former DER Foster (VNN HQ 4), with torpedo tubes without torpedoes, long range radar that had been stripped off after changing hand from the US Navy, was all but useless. Former U.S. Coast Guard WHEC craft, with slow 5" guns, could not get the upper-hand on the high speed Chinese gunboats. The aftermath was VNN PCE (HQ 10) was sunk. Two Chinese gunboats were sunk and some were damaged. The Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) were lost.

After 1973 the U.S. sharply reduced its support. The VNN had to use its ammunition sparingly. A victory at Tuyen Nhon changed the Viet Cong's movements towards Saigon. The Viet Cong commander offered millions of dong for Lt. Commander Le Anh Tuan's head.

On April 1975 Task Force 99 blocked a Viet Cong attack on Saigon from Tay Ninh and alerted a surveillance post for the VNN fleet to evacuate via the Long Tao waterway to safety.

On April 30, 1975, after Duong Van Minh called Republic of Vietnamese Armed forces to surrender, Lt. Commander Le Anh Tuan committed suicide when his river flotilla was ambushed by Russian made T-54 tanks. Many boats were abandoned in Vung Tau and in South Vietnams waterways. Officers and enlisted sailors felt betrayed by their comrades and allies. The only way they could save their miserable lives was to draw close to their families. Sadly, Commander Ha Ngoc Luong killed his wife, children and then committed suicide at the Nha Trang Naval Academy.

After April 30, 1975 some LST crewmen, with AK-47s held behind their backs, trained Viet Cong sailors to run those types of ships. They did so while watching dirty pigs and chickens feeding on the former proud ships decks.

Officers were separated from their families. They had to do duty in forced labor Re-education Camps for years. They tried to escape Vietnam by all possible ways. With their experiences as sea going sailors, many were successful. Some succeeded in reaching free countries and began rebuilding their lives.

The Viet Cong Navy updated the former DER Foster (HQ 4) and began using her as a training ship. They armed WHECs with missiles. Today they are still using some former VNN LST for cargo ships. Their fleet has dozens of gas turbine Petya gun boats with torpedo launchers. The Ukraine is planning on selling them some 2,000 ton Gepard frigates and Molniya missile boats equipped with Moskit supersonic anti-ship missiles under Ukrainian license. Vietnamese shipyards will build these type of ships for Viet Cong Navy.

THE RVN NAVY'S OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SAILORS





Admiral Tran Van Chon inspects a line of SEA Commando team



Admiral Tran Van Chon at a RVN Navy's ceremony at Bach Dang Square



D.T.Vu's Collection



D.T.Vu's Collection





High ranking officers and dignitaries at a RVN's ceremonies



Kronstadt 271 & 274 (Photo taken one hour before the battle from HQ 4)

Sources: <http://www.vnafmamn.com/paracel.html>



Republic of Vietnam's White Paper on Paracel and Spratly islands

Republic of Vietnam

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Saigon, 1975

Foreword

The Vietnamese archipelagoes of Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) are both situated in the South China Sea off the Republic of Vietnam's shore. Their very modest size by no means lesser the importance given them by the Vietnamese:

to Vietnamese hearts, these remote insular territories are as dear as could be any other part of the fatherland.

The Hoang Sa Islands to the North were occupied by force of arms by the People's Republic of China on January 20, 1974, following a brazen act of invasion which left the world extremely indignant. As for the Truong Sa Islands 500 km to the South, two other foreign powers are illegally stationing troops on four of the main islands in the archipelago. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people, determined to defend their sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country, solemnly denounced the occupation of these Vietnamese territories by foreign troops. Regarding the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands, not only was the gross violation of Vietnamese sovereignty by the People's Republic of China a defiance of the law of nations and the Charter of the United Nations: in-as-much as this involved the use of force by a world power against a small country in Asia, it also constitutes a threat to peace and stability in South East Asia. In the case of the Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands, although foreign occupation was not preceded by bloodshed, it nevertheless represents a grave violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Vietnam. The rights of the Vietnamese people over those islands have been as firmly established there as on the Hoang Sa archipelago.

The Republic of Vietnam fulfils all the conditions required by international law to assert its claim to possession of these islands.

Throughout the course of history, the Vietnamese had already accomplished the gradual consolidation of their rights on the Hoang Sa Islands. By the early 19th century, a systematic policy of effective occupation was implemented by Vietnamese emperors. The Truong Sa Islands, known to and exploited by Vietnamese fishermen and laborers for many centuries, were formally incorporated into Vietnamese territory by France on behalf of Vietnam. On both archipelagoes, Vietnamese civil servants assured a peaceful and effective exercise of Vietnamese jurisdiction. The continuous display of state authority was coupled with the constant Vietnamese will to remain the owner of a legitimate title over those islands. Thus military defense of the archipelagoes and diplomatic activities were put forth in the face of false claims from other countries in the area. Vietnamese rights being indisputable, the People's Republic of China chose to resort to military force in order to assert her sudden claims to the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands. Two other foreign powers took advantage of the war situation in Vietnam to militarily occupy some of the Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands over which they have no legal rights. Since both the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes are situated below the 17th parallel, this is primarily a matter of concern for the Republic of Vietnam. This White Paper is designed to demonstrate the

validity of the claims made by the Republic of Vietnam. It is also an appeal for justice to the conscience of all law-abiding and peace-loving nations in the world.

Proclamation by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (1974)

The noblest and most imperative task of a Government is to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Nation. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is determined to carry out this task, regardless of difficulties it may encounter and regardless of unfounded objections wherever they may come from. In the face of the illegal military occupation by Communist China of the Paracels Archipelago which is an integral part of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam deems it necessary to solemnly declare before world opinion, to friends and foes alike, that :The Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes are an indivisible part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Government and People of the Republic of Vietnam shall not yield to force and renounce all or part of their sovereignty over those archipelagoes. As long as one single island of that part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam is forcibly occupied by another country, the Government and People of the Republic will continue their struggle to recover their legitimate rights. The illegal occupant will have to bear all responsibility for any tension arising therefrom (therefrom). On this occasion, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam also solemnly reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam over the islands off the shores of Central and South Vietnam, which have been consistently accepted as a part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam on the basis of undeniable geographic, historical and legal evidence and on account of realities. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is determined to defend the sovereignty of the Nation over those islands by all and every means. In keeping with its traditionally peaceful policy, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is disposed to solve, through negotiations, international disputes which may arise over those islands, but this does not mean that it shall renounce its sovereignty over any part of its national territory. (Proclamation by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam dated February 14, 1974)

CHAPTER I

The Early Historical Rights of Vietnam

The Vietnamese have had knowledge of the Hoang Sa Islands long before the arrival to the South China Sea of Westerners who publicized internationally the name of "Paracels" for this part of their territory. It has been scientifically determined that the Vietnamese presence on this archipelago started in the 15th century.

The systematic exploitation of the islands' resources started early and gradually developed Vietnamese interest in these territories, leading in the 18th century to official state decision such as the formation of the Hoang Sa Company to ensure a rational exploitation of those islands. As evidenced by reliable Vietnamese and foreign sources, Vietnam progressively asserted her rights and the Hoang Sa archipelago was formally taken possession of by the Vietnamese authorities in the year 1816.

Geographic position.

The Hoang Sa Archipelago is a string of islets off the Vietnamese coast between 111 and 113 degrees longitude East of Greenwich, and between 15

0

45' and 17

0

15' North latitude. The nearest island in the archipelago is roughly at equal distance from the coast of Vietnam and the southern shore of Hainan Island in China. Using Pattle Island (dao Hoang Sa), the largest of the group, as a point of reference, the distances are as follows: Pattle to the Vietnamese harbor of Danang: 200 nautical miles. (Pattle to the closest shore of Cu Lao Re' Vietnam: 123 nautical miles). Pattle to the closest shore on Hainan (Island): 150 nautical miles. Pattle to the closest shore in the Philippines: 450 nautical miles. Pattle to the closest shore in Taiwan: 620 nautical miles. The Hoang Sa Islands are divided into two groups: to the East lies the Tuyen Duc (or Amphitrite) Group and to the West lies the Nguyet Thiem (or Crescent) Group. The main islands are:

Tuyen Duc Group:

Dao Bac-North Island

Dao Trung - Middle Island

Dao Nam - South Island

Phu Lam-Wooded Island (French: Ile Boisee)

Hon Da - Rocky Island

Dao Linh Con -Lincoln Island

Dao Cu Moc-Tree Island

Con Nam - South Bank

Nguyet Thiem Group:

Dao Hoang Sa - Pattle Island

Dao Cam Tuyen - Robert Island

Dao Vinh Lac- Money Island

Dao Quang Hoa - Duncan Island

Dao Duy Mong - Drummond Island

Dao Bach Qui - Passu Keah Island

Dao Tri Ton - Triton Island.

Apart from Pattle, the only other large island is Phu Lam or Wooded Island in the Amphitrite Group. The total surface area of the isles in both Groups barely exceeds 10 square kilometers or about 5 square miles. Most Islets were originally coral reefs and have the appearance of bare sand-banks, except for Wooded Island and Pattle Island, which is known for its coconut trees. The islands are surrounded by rings of reefs which make the approach by vessels very dangerous. An abundance of tortoises, sea slugs and other marine creatures are found there. Rich beds of phosphate have been produced by the interaction of the sea birds' guano with tropical rains and the coral limestone. The climate on the

archipelago is marked by constant humidity and little variation in mean temperatures. In economic terms, the Hoang Sa Islands have been frequented long ago by Vietnamese fishermen and in recent times have attracted many companies exploiting phosphate.

First Vietnamese document on the Hoang Sa Islands.

Evidence showing Vietnamese sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands extends back over three hundred years. The oldest Vietnamese document on this part of the national heritage is the work done sometime between 1630 and 1653 by a scholar named Do Ba and also known under the penname of Dao Phu.

It is a series of maps of Viet Nam which constitutes the third part of the "Hong Duc Atlas" (1): the Atlas started under the reign of Emperor Le Thanh Tong alias Hong Duc (1460-1497). Notes accompanying the maps clearly indicate that as far back as the early 17th century, Vietnamese authorities had been sending, on a regular basis, ships and men to these islands, which at that time were named "Cat Vang" (both "Cat Vang" and "Hoang Sa" mean "yellow sand").

These are the islands now known internationally by the name "Paracels".

The following is the translation of Do Ba's remarks:

"At the village of Kim Ho, on both banks of the river, stand two mountains each containing a gold deposit exploited under government control. On the high sea, a 400-ly long and 200-ly large archipelago (2) called " Bai Cat Vang " (Yellow sand banks) emerges from the deep sea facing the coastline between the harbor of Dai Chiem and the harbor of Sa Vinh (3). During the South-West monsoon season, commercial ships from various countries sailing near the coasts often wreck on the insular territories. The same thing happens during the North-East monsoon season to those ships sailing on the high sea. All the people on board wrecked ships in this area would starve. Various kinds of wrecked cargoes are amassed on these islands. Each year during the last month of winter, the Nguyen rulers send to the islands an 18-junk flotilla in order to salvage them. They obtain big quantities of gold, silver, coins, rifles and ammunitions. From the harbor of Dai Chiem the archipelago is reached after a journey of one-and-a-half day, while one day suffices if one embarks from Sa Ky. (4) "Although geographical descriptions of former times are not as precise as they are now, it is clear from the above that the " yellow sand" or Hoang Sa Islands have been part of the economic heritage of the Empire of Vietnam at least before 1653, the latest year when Do Ba could have completed his map drawing. Moreover, an eminent Vietnamese historian and scholar, Vo Long Te, has been able to determine that, taking into account other factors in the Do Ba's text (e.g. historical references and linguistic style), the salvage expeditions described therein actually started in the 15th century (5).

First evidence from foreign sources.

Vietnamese scholars are not the only people to record that Vietnam, formerly known as the 'empire of Annam', had early displayed state authority over the Hoang Sa Islands. Actually, foreign sources have been even more accurate in regard to the dates concerning Vietnamese sovereignty. As presented above, on the basis of the Do Ba document, economic exploitation of the Hoang Sa Islands by Vietnamese started, at least, before 1653. However as early as 1634, the Journal of Batavia.

Published by the Dutch East Indies Company, recorded incidents showing that Vietnamese jurisdiction was then already recognized by citizens of other countries.

According to the Journal of Batavia published in 1634-1636, (6) on July 20, 1634, three Dutch ships named Veenhuizen, Schagen (7) and Grootebroek left Touron (present-day Da Nang) on their way to Formosa, after having come from Batavia (present-day Jakarta). On the 21st, the three ships were

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

caught in a tempest and lost contact with one another. The Veenhuizen arrived in Formosa on August 2 and the Schagen. on August 10. But the Grootebroek capsized near the Paracel Islands, north of the 17th Parallel. Of the cargo estimated at 153,690 florins, only 82,995 florin-worth of goods were recovered by the surviving crew; the rest went down to the bottom of the sea. Of the ship's company nine men were also missing. After he had taken every disposition to have the remains of the cargo safely stored on the islands, under the guard of 50 sailors, the captain of the Grootebroek took to sea with another 12 sailors and headed toward the Vietnamese coast to seek help in the realm of the Nguyen Lords. However, when the group reached the mainland, they were taken prisoners by fishermen and their money was confiscated. This led to a dispute with the Vietnamese authorities. The dispute resulted in further visits by Dutch ships to the Vietnamese Court (and ultimately, to the granting of free trade rights to Dutchmen and the establishment of the first Dutch factory in Vietnam, headed by Abraham Duijcker). For our purposes here, however, the significant fact was that, when the Grootebroek sank, the sailors chose to go to Vietnam instead of China, although China was nearer. This is undoubtedly because they assumed the country exercising jurisdiction over the site of the wreckage would naturally provide rescue and be more responsive to their claims.

Testimony by Vietnamese historian Le Qui Don.

Other references to the early historical rights of Vietnam over the Hoang Sa Islands (called "Pracels" in the Journal of Batavia account) are made by the Encyclopedist Le Qui Don (1726-1784) in his history work Phu Bien Tap Luc (Miscellaneous Record on the Pacification of the Frontiers).

Le Qui Don was a mandarin sent to the South by the Court in order to serve as administrator in the realm recently taken over by the Court from the Nguyen Lords (hence the appellation of "Frontier Provinces" for these lands in the title of the book). In his work, Le Qui Don recorded many of the things he saw or heard while on duty in the southern realm. As a consequence, there were several references to the islands belonging to the Nguyen realm.

The most extensive and precise reference to the Paracel Islands occurs on pages where it is said:

"The village of An Vinh, Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Prefecture, is close by the sea. To the northeast (of the village) there are many islands and miscellaneous rock heads jutting out of the sea, totaling 130 altogether. From the rock heads out to the islands, it sometimes takes a day (by sea) or at least a few watches. On top of the rocks there sometimes are freshwater springs. Linking the islands is a vast strip of yellow sand of over 30 ly in length, a flat and vast expanse where the water is clear and can be seen through to the bottom."

On a following page, the fauna and flora of the Paracels are described in detail, thus allowing one to compare them with later scientific descriptions made in the twentieth century: sea-swallows and their valuable nests (among the thousands of varieties of birds found on the islands), giant conches called "elephant-ear conches", mother-of-pearls, giant tortoises and smaller varieties of turtles, seaurchins, and so forth.

Regarding the usefulness of these islands and their exploitation, Le Qui Don has this to say: "When they encounter strong winds, large sea-going ships usually take shelter in these islands,".

"In the past, the Nguyen had created a Hoang Sa Company of 70 men, made up of people from An Vinh village. Every year they take turns in going out to the sea, setting out during the first month of the lunar calendar in order to receive instructions regarding their mission. Each man in the company is given six months worth of dry food. They row in five fishing boats and it takes them three days before they reach the islands. They are free to collect anything they want, to catch the birds as they see fit and to fish for food. They (sometimes) find the wreckage of ships which yield such things as bronze swords and copper horses, silver decorations and money, silver rings and other copper products, tin ingots and

lead, guns and ivory, golden bee-hive tallow, felt blankets, pottery and so forth. They also collect turtle shells, sea urchins and striped conches in huge quantities.

"This Hoang Sa Company does not come home until the eighth month of the year. They go to Phu Xuan (present-day Hue) to turn in the goods they have collected in order to have them weighed and verified, then get an assessment before they can proceed to sell their striped conches, sea turtles and urchins. Only then is the Company issued a certificate with which they can go home. These annual collections sometimes can be very fruitful and at other times more disappointing, it depends on the year. It sometimes happens that the company can go out and return empty-handed.

"I (Le Qui Don) have had the opportunity to check the records of the former Count of Thuyen Duc and found the following results:

" In the year of Nham Ngo (1702), the Hoang Sa Company collected 30 silver ingots.

" In the year of Giap Than (1704), 5,100 catties of tin were brought in.

" In the year of At Dau (1704), 126 ingots of silver were collected.

" From the year of Ky Suu (1709) to the year of Quy Ti (1713) i.e. during five consecutive years, the company managed to collect only a few catties of tortoiseshell and sea urchins. At one time, all they collected included a few bars of tin a few stone bowls and two bronze cannons ". It is clear from the above that in the eighteenth century at least, the Nguyen Lords of southern Vietnam were very much concerned with the economic possibilities of the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and in fact actually organized the annual exploitation of this archipelago.

The fact that no counterclaims were made by any other nation is patent proof that the Nguyen's sovereign rights over the islands were not challenged by any country.

Elsewhere in the book, Le Qui Don also records an incident dating from 1753 which throws some light over the question of Chinese-Vietnamese relationships regarding the Paracel Islands.

"The shores of the Hoang Sa Islands are not far from Lien-chou Prefecture in Hainan Province, China. (For that reason) our ships sometimes meet with fishing boats from our Northern neighbor (China) on the high sea. Ship-mates from both countries inquire about one another in the midst of the ocean... On one occasion, there was a report coming from the hall officer in charge of sea traffic investigations in Wen-ch'ang District, Ch'iung-chou Prefecture (Hainan Island, China), which says: " In the eighteenth year of Ch'ien-lung (1753), ten soldiers from An Binh Village belonging to the Cat Liem Company, District of Chuong Nghia, Quang Ngai Prefecture, Annam, set out during the seventh month to go to the Van Ly Truong Sa (7) to collect sea products. Eight of the ten men went ashore for the collection of products, and two remained on the ship to watch it. A typhoon soon developed which caused the anchor cord to split, and the two who remained in the ship were washed into the port of Ch'ing-lan. After investigation the Chinese officer found the story to be correct and consequently had the two Vietnamese escorted home to their native village. Lord Nguyen Phuc Chu subsequently had the Governor of Thuan Hoa (present-day Thua Thien) Province, the Count of Thuc Luong, write a courtesy note to the hall officer of Wen-ch'ang to acknowledge his help. "This story illustrates a number of points, besides the general civility of intercourse already evinced at the time between China and Vietnam.

It is apparent from the story that the Chinese officer from Wen-ch'ang was not bothered by the fact that the Vietnamese were intruding into Chinese territorial waters when they went to the Van Ly Truong Sa.

The only concern of the officer was to find out whether the statements made by the two Vietnamese

sailors had any basis in fact. In other words, the Chinese officer was only worried about the possibility of the Vietnamese being spies sent into Hainan under the pretense of a storm encountered at sea. When this was disproved, the Chinese immediately had the Vietnamese released and dealt with them very kindly by having them escorted home. The whole incident clearly proves that Vietnamese exploitation of the economic resources on the Paracels in the eighteenth century was a very open activity, carried out peacefully and acknowledged by the Chinese to be an exercise of legitimate rights over the islands.

A famous geography book written by Phan Huy Chu and printed in 1834 by the name of Hoang Viet Dia Du Chi contains a text on the Hoang Sa Islands which does not present much that is new in comparison to the information in Le Qui Don's work.

Only two minor differences are found:

- The Hoang Sa Company, according to this geographical work, was still composed of 70 men from An Vinh Village. However, they receive dry food and get instruction to go out to sea in the third month of the lunar calendar (rather than in the first, as recorded by Le Qui Don. They begin their return journey in the sixth month.

- In the eighth month, they arrive home through the port of Eo (Thuan An).

From the above, it can be seen that exploitation of the Paracel Islands was becoming an operation of diminishing return in the early nineteenth century, thus necessitating an excursion of two months only, instead of the six-month excursion needed in the eighteenth century. However Vietnamese interests in the islands were not merely economic, as can be seen in the following testimonies.

Confirmation by other foreign sources.

Various foreign authors confirmed that the Hoang Sa Islands were fully part of the Vietnamese territory as early as the 18th century. For instance, testimony in 1701 by a missionary traveling on the Amphitrite (reportedly the first French ship to enter South-China Sea late in the 17th century) describing frightening dangers experienced by ships in the vicinity of the Paracels, mentioned specifically that this archipelago belonged to the Empire of Annam i.e., a former name for Vietnam (8).

Another document dated April 10, 1768 and called "Note sur l'Asie demandee par M. de la Borde a M. d'Estaing" (now held in French archives) (9) provides evidence of intense patrol operations between the Paracels and the coast of Vietnam by Vietnamese naval units.

When French Admiral d'Estaing was planning a raid against the Vietnamese city of Hue in order to set a French establishment in Indochina, he reported that Vietnamese vessels frequently cruised between the Paracels and the coast and thus, "would have reported about his approach". This fact apparently caused him to cancel the raid planned against Vietnam. This demonstrates that as long as two centuries ago, the Hoang Sa Islands were already included in the Vietnamese system of defense and that the most evident acts in the exercise of state jurisdiction were regularly performed by Vietnamese authorities.

In the same document, Admiral d'Estaing also gave various detailed descriptions of the defense installations on the shore. He wrote that "the Hue citadel contained 1,200 cannons, of which 800 were made of bronze, many bearing the arms of Portugal and the date 1661. There were also some smaller pieces (bearing the arms of Cambodia and the monogram of the British Company of India) that had been salvaged from driftwood of wrecked vessels in the Paracels."

In another proposal made in 1758-59 for a French attempt against Vietnam and presented in his *Memoire pour une entreprise sur la Cochinchine proposee a M. de Magon par M. d'Estaing* (10),

admiral d'Estaing made another mention of the Hoang Sa Islands in his description of the defense of Lord Vo Vuong's palace. Built on the bank of a river, he reported "the palace was surrounded by an 8 to 9-foot high wall without any kind of fortification. There were many cannons that were designed for decoration, rather than for use. Admiral d'Estaing put the number of cannons at 400, many being Portuguese pieces "taken here from ships wrecked on the Paracels. "

In a book published in London in 1806: "a Voyage To Cochinchina", John Barrow told the story of a British journey to Vietnam and indicated that the Paracels were part of the Vietnamese economic world. The journey described in the book was made by Count Maccartney, then British Envoy to the Chinese Court. Leaving England on September 2, 1792, Count Maccartney stopped in Tourane (Danang) between May 24 and June 16, 1793 in order to enter into contact with the King of Cochinchina. The 3-week long stay gave John Barrow leisure to study Vietnamese vessels. Therefore, he provided in his book a detailed description of different types of boats used by the Cochinchinese in order to reach, among other places, the Paracel Islands where they collected trepang and swallow nests (11).

Thus Vietnamese and foreign sources agree that the Hoang Sa Islands have for centuries been included within the scope of Vietnamese interests and aims. These sources recognize the perfection of the sovereign title upheld by the Vietnamese in the course of time in relation to a growing number of states. The progressive intensification of Vietnamese control over the Hoang Sa Islands reached a decisive and irreversible point at the beginning of the 19th century, when the reigning Nguyen dynasty developed a systematic policy toward complete integration of the archipelago into the national community.

CHAPTER II: THE EXERCISE OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE HOANG SA ISLANDS

Historical consolidation of the Vietnamese title to the Hoang Sa Islands continued under the Nguyen dynasty' i.e., after 1802. From that date, it is possible to speak of a Paracel policy , by the successive emperors of Vietnam as manifested through systematic measures taken in the fields of administration, defense,. transports and economic exploitation.

Formal taking of possession by Emperor Gia Long.

The first emperor of the Nguyen dynasty, Gia Long, consecrated the will of the Vietnamese to confirm their sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands by formally taking possession of the archipelago. According to various historic sources, in the year 1816 the Vietnamese flag was planted in a formal ceremony on the Paracels. In 1837 the Reverend, Jean-Louis Taberd, then Bishop of Isaupolis, wrote the following in his "Note on the Geography of Cochinchina printed in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, India, (12):

"The Pracel or Paracels is a labyrinth of small islands, rocks and sand-banks, which appears to extend up to the 11st degree of north latitude, in the 107th parallel of longitude from Paris. Some navigators have traversed part of these shoals with a boldness more fortunate than prudent, but others have suffered in the attempt. The Cochinchinese called them Con-Vang. Although this kind of archipelago presents nothing but rocks and great depths which promise more inconveniences than advantages, the king GIA LONG thought he had increased his dominions by this sorry addition. In 1816, he went with solemnity to plant his flag and take formal possession of these rocks, which it is not likely any body will dispute with him."

The Reverend Jean Louis Taberd was not the only one to give testimony in support of Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracels. Another foreigner, a Frenchman who spent many years in the Far East and who was a contemporary eyewitness, wrote (13):

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

“Cochinchina, of which the sovereign king today carries the title of Emperor, includes Cochinchina proper, Tonkin: a few scarcely inhabited islands not far from the coastline and the Paracel archipelago made up of islets, coral reefs and uninhabited rocks. It was in 1816 that the present Emperor (Gia Long) took possession of this archipelago.”

Consolidation of sovereignty under subsequent emperors.

Numerous documents in Vietnamese archives give the most convincing facts about the display of the Nguyen dynasty’s authority over the Hoang Sa Islands. One of the striking facts was the order given in 1833 by Emperor Minh Mang to his minister of Public Work to plant trees on some of these islands because “trees will grow up and will offer a luxuriant vegetation that would allow navigators to reconnoiter these vicinities so to avoid having their ships being wrecked in these not very deep waters. This will be for the profit of ten thousand generations to come” (14). Considering the fact that most ships that sank in the area were foreign-owned, there is no doubt that the Vietnamese executed this act to meet their international responsibilities. Thus, by offering certain guarantees to other states and their nationals, by being an identifiable addressee of international claims regarding the Hoang Sa Islands, Vietnam further asserted her title to the property of these territories (15).

One year later, in 1834, the same emperor Minh Mang sent Garrison Commander Truong Phuc Si and 20 other men to the Hoang Sa archipelago in order to make a map of the area (16). This mission apparently was not carried out to the satisfaction of officials in the Ministry of Public Works who, two years later, reported to the Emperor that because of the size of the area, “only one island had been drawn on a map which is not as precise and detailed as we would wish “. The report added that since these islands were “of great strategic importance to our maritime borders”, it would be appropriate to send out missions each year in order to explore the whole archipelago and to get accustomed to the sea routes there.

The report further pointed out that all the islands, islets and mere sand-banks must be surveyed in order to get a description of their relief and size, and to determine coordinates and distances. The Emperor approved the recommendations and sent a Navy team to the Hoang Sa Islands for the purposes set in the report (1836). Ten markers were taken along on the vessel to be planted on the islands which the team would reconnoiter. On each marker was the inscription: “In the year Binh Than, 17th Year of the reign of Minh Mang, Navy Commander Pham Huu Nhat, commissioned by the Emperor to Hoang Sa to conduct map surveyings, landed at this place and planted this marker so to perpetuate the memory of the event” (17). The data gathered in the survey were used in the drawing of the remarkable “Detailed map of the Dai Nam ” (see Fig. 8) (18) achieved circa 1838. Although not locating the two archipelagoes of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa at their proper place, the “Detailed Map ” had the merit of mentioning these archipelagoes specifically by their names. The islands later known as Paracels and Spratlys were then clearly and indisputably considered parts of the Vietnamese territory.

In other action lying within the normal display of state jurisdiction. Emperor Minh Mang ordered, in the 16th year of his reign (1835), the building of a temple on one of the Hoang Sa Islands. The following is recorded in Vietnamese annals (19) : “Among the Hoang Sa Islands located in the territorial waters of Quang Nghia (present day Quang Nam) Province, there exists the island of Bach Sa (white-sand island) where the vegetation is luxuriant. In the middle of the island is a well and in its South-West part, a temple with a sign on which is, engraved the sentence , “Van Ly Ba Binh” – (the waves calm down over ten thousand leagues). To the North of this isle is another one built with coral with a perimeter measuring 340 truong 2 xich and an altitude of 1 truong 3 thuoc (20). It is as high as the Island of White-Sand and called Ban Than Thach (21). Last year (1834), it was the intention of the Emperor to build there a temple and a stele, but the project was postponed because of unfavorable winds and waves. This year, the Emperor ordered Navy Commander Pham Van Nguyen to head an

Elephant Garrison Detachment and boatmen hired in the provinces of Quang Nghia and Binh Dinh to transport materials for the purpose of building a temple on that island. This temple is 7 truong distant from the old one, and has a stonemark to its left and a brick screen in front. Upon completion of the work which lasted 10 days, the team returned home” (22). Another document indicates that the stonemark just mentioned was 1 thuoc 5 tac high and 1 thuoc 2 tac wide (23). Under the reign of Emperor Minh Mang, communications between the Hoang Sa islands and the mainland were intense enough to justify the construction of a temple dedicated to the Gods of Hoang Sa right on the beach of Quang Ngai in 1835. That city was a main harbour from which boats going to these islands originated (24).

Time has probably erased traces of these works performed almost 140 years ago and for which light materials were largely used. But all the Vietnamese documents quoted are official publications kept until now in Vietnamese archives or prestigious foreign institutions. These reliable recordings of facts in Vietnam’s national life demonstrate clearly that one of the major concerns of the Nguyen emperors’ territorial policy was to consolidate sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands. As a result, Vietnamese jurisdiction became so obvious that contemporary foreign witnesses never thought of it as a contested matter. We already mentioned Bishop Jean-Louis Taberd’s and J.B. Chaigneau’s testimonies, but other foreign publications of the 19th Century also recognized the Vietnamese possession : a western map drawn in 1838 showed the – Paracel or Cat Vang Islands as part of the Annam Empire (5). A geography book written under the auspices of the (French) Ethnography Society mentioned the Paracels or Kat Vang as one of the very numerous islands and archipelagoes belonging to Vietnam (26). It must be stressed that all French works quoted had been produced at a time when the French did not yet control Vietnam and, therefore, had no interest in defending French claims to sovereignty over these islands.

Preservation of rights under French colonial rule.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Southern part of Vietnam, named Cochinchina, became a French possession (1867). This was followed by the establishment of a French protectorate over the remaining Vietnamese territory (1883). Therefore the French temporarily took over the responsibility to defend the territorial integrity of the “Annam Empire”. On behalf of Vietnam, the French continued the normal exercise of sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands (Paracels).

They did fulfil their responsibilities. Although kept busy by the task of strengthening their authority on the Indochina mainland, the French colonial government did not forget the far-off islands and took all the necessary measures to ensure an orderly administration, an adequate defense and a better knowledge of what a French author called in 1933 “the infinitely small Paracels of our colonial domain” (27). The Vietnamese title to sovereignty was not only preserved, it was reinforced. On the other hand, numerous scientific studies about the islands were produced which could only be conducted if the Paracels were firmly under French-Vietnamese control.

The international responsibility that the Nguyen emperors had already accepted in regard to navigation of foreign vessels was not neglected by the French, who completed in 1899 a feasibility study for the construction of a lighthouse on one of the Hoang Sa Islands. Unfortunately, this project, which was supported by Indochina Governor General Paul Doumer, could not be realized for lack of funds. However, French patrol vessels assured the security of sea traffic and conducted many rescue operations for wrecked foreign ships in the Paracel. Beginning in 1920, apparently worried by the suspect presence of various kinds of vessels in the Hoang Sa area, the Indochinese customs authorities started making regular inspections to the islands for the purpose of checking illegal traffic. As early as the end of World War I, the French control was so evident that Japanese nationals called on French Indochina’s authorities for the exploitation of phosphate. This was the case of the Mitsui Bussan

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

Kaisha Company, which extracted phosphates for many years from two islands, Ile Boisee (Phu Lam) and Ile Roberts (Cam Tuyen). The Japanese Government, on its part, implicitly recognized French jurisdiction in 1927. In a report to the Minister of Colonies in Paris dated March 20, 1930, the French Governor of Indochina wrote that in 1927, the Japanese consul in Hanoi, Mr. Kurosawa, was instructed by his government to inquire with the French authorities about the status of some groups of islands in the South China Sea. But the Consul declared that, according to instructions from the Japanese Government, the Paracels were expressly left outside of the discussions, the question of ownership of these islands not being a matter of dispute with France (Japan was then involved in controversies over the Truong Sa or Spratly Islands).

The French jurisdiction was sufficiently firm and peaceful to permit such actions as the conduct of scientific surveys on the islands. An impressive list of superior-level scientific studies in all- fields was made available by colonial institutions or private authors. Starting in 1925, with the first recorded scientific mission on the vessel De Lanessan by scientists from the famed Oceanographic Institute of Nha Trang, knowledge about this part of Vietnamese territory increased. The trip by the De Lanessan confirmed the existence of rich beds of phosphate, which became the object of many detailed studies. For example:

- Maurice Clerget, Contribution a l’etude des iles Paracels; les phosphates. Nhatrang, Vietnam 1932.
- A. Lacroix, Les ressources minerales de la France d’Outre-Mer, tome IV (Paracels’ phosphate: p. 165), Paris 1935.
- United Nations, ECAFE, Phosphate Resources of Mekong Basin Countries; 4. Vietnam, (1) : Parcel Islands; Bangkok 1972.

The De Lanessan survey mission also proved the existence of a continental shelf which reaches out in platforms from the Vietnamese coast into the sea: the Paracels rest on one of these platforms, and thus are joined to the coast of Vietnam by a submarine plinth. In the following years, the names of many French ships have entered the history of both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes: the *Alerte*, *Astrobale*, *Ingenieur-en-Chef Girod* made other survey trips to the Hoang Sa Islands. The result was an increasing number of other scientific publications about these islands in all fields of human concern and activities. Some of these are:

- A. Krempf, La forme des recifs coralliens et le regime des vents alternants, Saigon 1927.
- J. Delacour and P. Jabouille, Oiseaux des iles Paracels, Nha-trang, 1928.
- Numerous reports called Notes of the Oceanographic Institute of Indochina in Nhatrang containing valuable scientific data about the Paracels, for instance the “5th Note” (1925-26) and the “22nd Note” (1934).

French scientists continued to work for Vietnam-in its early years of independence and continued to contribute to our knowledge of these Vietnamese islands. Among them was Mr. E. Saurin, the author of numerous studies of great scientific value:

- Notes sur les iles Paracels (Geologic archives of Vietnam No. 3), Saigon 1955.
- A propos des galets exotiques des iles Paracels (Geologic archives of Vietnam No. 4), Saigon 1957.
- Faune Malacologique terrestre des iles Paracels (Journal de Conchiliologie, Vol. XCVIII), Paris 1958.

– Gasteropodes marins des îles Paracels, Faculty of Sciences, Saigon, Vol. I: 1960; Vol. II: 1961.

Another French scientist, H. Fontaine, produced, ‘in cooperation with a Vietnamese colleague a remarkable study of the islands’ flora called “Contribution de la connaissance de la flore des îles Paracels” (Faculty of Sciences, Saigon 1957). These scientific achievements, accomplished over a long period of time, could only have been achieved by a country exercising sovereignty over these islands to the fullest extent. As a matter of fact, Vietnam would not run any risk by challenging other countries having a pretense to sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands to show the list of scientific publications they had made available in the past.

In their acts mentioned above, the French, who merely took over rights and responsibilities temporarily transferred to them by the people under their “protection”, simply assured a normal continuation of jurisdiction on behalf of the Vietnamese. However, in the face of unfounded Chinese claims over and illegal actions connected with, the Hoang Sa Islands in 1932, the French felt that it was necessary to take defensive measures. Since 1909, China has made sporadic claims over the islands. On one occasion during that year, the provincial authorities of Kuang Tung sent gun-boats to conduct a reconnaissance mission there. On March 20, 1921 the Governor of Kuang Tung, signed a peculiar decree annexing the Hoang Sa Islands to the Chinese Island of Hainan. However, his action went unnoticed because it is recorded only in the provincial records therefore, nobody could know about it in order to make comments or to protest. Although not followed by occupation of any sort, actions such as these were enough to cause some preemptive actions by the French. For instance, in 1930 crew-members of La Malicieuse landed on many of the Hoang Sa Islands to plant flags and set up “sovereignty columns “.

More serious was the Chinese intention to invite bids for the exploitation of the islands’ phosphate. When the Chinese intent became known, the French Government protested to the Chinese Embassy in Paris by a note dated December 4, 1931. A few months later, when the Chinese effectively called for bids, the Paris Government renewed the protests by a Note dated April 24, 1932. This time the French strongly reaffirmed their rights with substantive supporting arguments, e.g. the former rights exercised by the emperors of Vietnam, the official taking of possession by Emperor Gia Long in 1816, and the sending of Indochinese troops to guard the islands, etc... On September 29, 1932, the Chinese Government rejected the French protest on the ground that at the time Gia Long took possession of the islands, Vietnam was a vassal state of China. It may be true that, as in other periods of its history, Vietnam was then a nominal vassal of China (although it was never quite clear when this situation started or ended),. but it is certain that by this reply China implicitly recognized that Vietnam had asserted its claim to the Hoang Sa Islands. The Chinese Government also appeared confused about the legal distinction between suzerainty and sovereignty : even if Vietnam was a vassal state of China in 1816, the formal relationship of suzerainty could not preclude such Vietnamese acts of sovereignty as the incorporation of new territories.

Convinced of her legitimate rights in the dispute, France by a diplomatic note to China dated February 28, 1937, proposed that a settlement of the conflicting claims be reached through international arbitration. But China knew the risks involved in such a challenge and declined the offer. Thus, the Chinese government simply responded by reaffirming its claim to the islands. That negative attitude caused the French to send military units, composed of Vietnamese soldiers and called Garde Indochinoise, to many of the Hoang Sa Islands (28). These units built many – sovereignty columns -, of which there exists photographic records. The column on Pattle Island contained the following inscription in French:

Republique Francaise

Empire d’Annam

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Archipel des Paracels

1816 – Ile de Pattle 1938

These dates marked the taking of possession -by Emperor Gia Long and the year the column was erected (29).

These troops, commanded by French officers, were to stay on the islands until 1956 with a brief interruption after 1941. Men the Japanese seized the Paracels (and the Spratlys) by force in -that year, France was the only power to officially protest against it. ‘ In 1946, shortly after their return to Indochina at the end of World War II, the French sent troops on. the vessel Savorgnan de Brazza to re-occupy the archipelago. However, events in the French-Vietminh war compelled these troops to withdraw from the Paracels in September, 1946. Informed that Chinese troops (who had supposedly arrived to disarm defeated Japanese troops pursuant to agreements between the Allied powers) continued to stay on the islands, the French issued a formal protest on January 13, 1947. Then they dispatched the warship Le Tonkinois to the area. Crewmembers found Boisee Island (Phu Lam) still occupied (January 17, 1947). The Chinese troops refused to leave and, being outnumbered, the French-Vietnamese soldiers left for Pattle Island where they established their headquarters. They also rebuilt the Weather Station which had operated for 6 years in the past, between 1938 and 1944. The new station became operative in late 1947 and, under international station code 48860, provided the world with meteorological data for 26 more years, until the day when Communist Chinese troops seized the Hoang Sa archipelago by force (January 20, 1974).

Beginning in the 1930’s, these disputes, with China had already motivated the French authorities in Indochina to take stronger measures in administrative organization. By Decree No. 156-SC dated June 15, 1932 the Governor General of Indochina gave the Hoang Sa Islands the name of “Delegation des Paracels” – and the status of an administrative unit of Thua Thien Province. This decree was later confirmed by a Vietnamese imperial ordinance signed by Emperor Bao Dai on March 30, 1938 (the confirmation was necessary because, as the ordinance recalled, the Hoang Sa Islands had traditionally been part of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, from whence communications with the islands had originated). A subsequent Decree of May 5, 1939 by the French Governor General divided the archipelago into two Delegations: Crescent et Dependences, and Amphitrite et Dependences.

These administrative measures were adequately completed by the organization of services on the islands. For instance, health checks were regularly made on the workers, called coolies by the French, during their stay there. Consequently, civil service officers were appointed on a regular basis. These officers had to stay permanently on either Pattle Island (for the Crescent and Dependences Group) or Boisee Island (for the Amphitrite and Dependences Group). However, because of the islands’ bad climate, they were allowed long vacations on the mainland and were relieved after short periods. One of these former civil servants is Mr. Mahamedbhay Mohsine. a French citizen of Indian origin who.. outraged by the Chinese invasion of 1974, has offered to testify anywhere on the legitimacy of Vietnamese rights. Between May 5, 1939 and March 13, 1942, Mr. Mohsine served as Administrative Officer or DeLegue administratif for the Paracels. He was first posted on Pattle, then on July 16, 1941 was ordered to relieve a colleague, Deputy-Inspector Willaume, on Boisee. Later Mr. Mohsine was officially recommended for an award of distinction in consideration of his contribution to French colonial expansion in the remotest parts of Indochina (30).

Mr. Mahamedbhay was only one of the many civil servants and military personnel who, by serving the French colonial cause on the Hoang Sa Islands, directly contributed to the preservation of Vietnamese rights which had only temporarily been exercised by the French. At an early stage,, French action had been only intermittent – intermittence which is not at all incompatible with the maintenance of the rights but in the last 30 years of their presence, the French did fulfill all the obligations of a holder of

title. Thus the French accomplished a valuable conservator act in the safeguarding of legitimacy for the Vietnamese sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands.

Return to Vietnamese sovereignty.

After the French-Vietnamese Agreement of March 8, 1949, Vietnam gradually regained its independence. Although some French troops were intermittently stationed on some of the Hoang Sa Islands until 1956, it was on October 14, 1950 that the French formally turned over the defense of the archipelago to the Vietnamese. General Phan Van Gao, then Governor of Central Vietnam, went in person to Pattle Island to preside over the ceremony. The general made the trip to the remote and isolated island because, as he reported to Prime Minister Tran Van Huu in Saigon:

“I was persuaded that my presence among the Viet Binh Doan (Regional Guard Unit) would have a comforting impact on its morale on the day the unit took over heavy responsibilities ” (31).

No doubt Premier Tran Van Huu was pleased by the Governor’s initiative, since in the following year (1951) he was to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference with Japan where he solemnly and unequivocally reaffirmed the rights of his country over both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes. After its defeat in 1945, Japan had relinquished all its claims to these islands that their forces had occupied. This matter will be discussed further in another chapter.

Reassuming all responsibilities for the Hoang Sa archipelago, the Vietnamese felt that it was more practical to re-incorporate it as part of Quang Nam Province (as things were before the French decree of 1932) because links between these insular territories and the mainland had always originated from the Quang Nam provincial capital of Da Nang. A proposal to that end was made in 1951 by regional authorities in Hue (32), but it was a full ten years later that the President of the Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem, signed a Decree (33) transferring the Hoang Sa Islands from the jurisdiction of Thua Thien Province back to Quang Nam. The entire archipelago was given the status of a “Xa” (village on the mainland).

Administrative organization was again perfected 8 years later: by a Prime Minister’s Decree (34) the islands became part of a village on the mainland of Quang Nam, the village of Hoa Long, Hoa Vang District.

Most Vietnamese officials posted on the Hoang Sa Islands were thus from Quang Nam Province and usually detached for about a year from their regular position on the mainland. The first civilian officer to be appointed by an independent Vietnamese Government was M. Nguyen Ba Thuoc (appointed December 14, 1960 by Arrete No. 241-13NV/NV/3). After 1963 however, due to war conditions in the Republic of Vietnam, the administrative officers- assigned there have always been military men. They were usually NCOs in command of the Regional Forces stationed on Duncan Island. Thus they bore the title of “Duncan Island Chief”, concurrently in charge of Administrative affairs for the Hoang Sa Islands.

Whether civilian or military, these officers helped ensure peaceful Vietnamese sovereignty over the islands. Scientific surveys continued, with Vietnamese scientists joining their French colleagues in order to deepen the knowledge about these remote territories. Manned by Vietnamese technicians, the Pattle Weather Station continued providing the world with meteorological data until its forced closure in 1974. The exploitation of phosphate resumed after 1956 with the following yields:

1957-58-59: 8,000 metric tons

1960: 1,570 metric tons

1961: 2,654 metric tons

1962 and after: 12,000 metric tons extracted, but left on the islands.

In 1956 the Ministry of Economy granted the first license to exploit phosphate on the 3 islands of Vinh Lac (Money Island), Cam Tuyen (Roberts) and Hoang Sa (Pattle) to a Saigon businessman named Le Van Cang. In 1959, a license was issued to the “Vietnam Fertilizers Company ” which contracted actual extraction and transportation to a Singapore company Yew Huatt (4, New Bridge Road, Singapore 1). Among other clauses, the Vietnamese Company committed itself to obtain from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam the granting of fiscal exemptions and the privilege to use radio facilities 4 the Pattle Weather Station. After 1960, commercial exploitation of Pattle was granted to the Vietnam Phosphate Company, which stopped all operations in 1963 because of insufficient returns. Interests in phosphate exploitation surfaced again in 1973 when the Republic of Vietnam faced serious problems of fertilizer shortage.

In August of that year, the ” Vietnam Fertilizer Industry Company” finished a feasibility study conducted jointly with a Japanese partner, Marubeni Corporation of Tokyo. The survey on the islands lasted two weeks, and Marubeni Corporation provided the engineers needed.

It is no wonder that the exercise of normal sovereignty by the Republic of Vietnam has had to be coupled with actions which are more or less military-oriented. Confronting unfounded claims by China in the Hoang Sa Islands, the Armed Forces of the Republic have been required to display constant vigilance in the defense of this part of Vietnamese territory. As an example, when the Chinese nationalist troops which had refused to leave Phu Lam (Wooded or Boisee) Island in 1947 withdrew in 1950 following Marshall Chiang Kai Shek’s defeat, Communist Chinese troops landed there immediately to continue the illegal occupation. A Vietnamese Navy unit assumed responsibility for the defense of the archipelago in 1956. This unit was relieved the following year by a Marine Company. After 1959, the task was assigned to Regional Forces of Quang Nam Province. Vietnamese warships have patrolled the Hoang Sa waters regularly in order to check illegal occupants on the many islands. In this regard, the People’s Republic of China appears to have followed guerrilla-type tactics: it surreptitiously introduced first fishermen, then soldiers onto Vietnamese territory. They even built strong fortifications on the two islands of Phu Lam and Linh Con.

On February 22, 1959, the Republic of Vietnam’s Navy thwarted this tactic by arresting 80 fishermen from mainland China who had landed on the three islands of Cam Tuyen, Duy Mong and Quang Hoa. These fishermen were humanely treated and promptly released with all their equipment after being taken to Da Nang.

The broad range of actions by the Vietnamese authorities regarding the Hoang Sa Islands provides an undeniable evidence of Vietnamese sovereignty. These actions include, among others, the approval of international contracts connected with the islands’ economy ; police operations against aliens; extraction of natural resources ; the providing of guarantees to other states; and so forth. Vietnamese sovereignty was first built between the 15th and 18th centuries, consecrated by the Nguyen emperors, then temporarily assumed by the French, and finally continued in a normal manner by independent Vietnam. The exercise of Vietnamese jurisdiction was effectively displayed under a large variety of forms. It was open, peaceful, and not, like the Communist Chinese claim, asserted *jure belli*. Any interruption of Vietnamese sovereignty was due only to foreign powers’ illegal military actions against which Vietnam, or France on behalf of Vietnam, had always protested in a timely fashion. Convinced of their legitimate rights over the Hoang Sa Islands, the Vietnamese will never indulge in compromises in the defense of their territorial integrity (see Chapter IV).

CHAPTER III: THE TRUONG SA (SPRATLY) ISLANDS BELONG TO THE VIETNAMESE

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

The Vietnamese islands of Truong Sa, known internationally as the Spratly archipelago, are situated off the Republic of Vietnam's coast between approximately 80 and 11040 North latitude. In the course of history, the Vietnamese people have had intermittent contact with these islands known for their dangerous grounds and access. Unlike the case of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands, the former emperors of Vietnam did not have the time to strengthen these contacts through the organization of an administrative jurisdiction. However, the French, who occupied the Southern part of Vietnam known as Cochinchina, took all those measures necessary for the establishment of the legal basis for possession of the Spratly Islands. In 1933, the Spratlys were incorporated into the French colony of Cochinchina and from that year forward have had an adequate administrative structure.

It is true that French jurisdiction was disrupted by the Japanese invasion of 1941. However, shortly after the Japanese defeat in 1945, France returned Cochinchina to Vietnam, which then recovered all the rights attached to the former French colony. Immediately thereafter, Vietnamese sovereignty over the Truong Sa Islands faced groundless claims from other countries in the area which military occupied some of the islands of the archipelago.

Geographic and historic background.

The Truong Sa archipelago is spread over hundreds of miles in the South China Sea. However, it only contains 9 islands of relatively significant:

- Truong Sa or Spratly Island proper.
- An Bang or Amboyna Cay.
- Sinh Ton or Sin Cowe.
- Nam Yet or Nam Yit.
- Thai Binh or Itu-Aba.
- Loai Ta.
- Thi Tu.
- Song Tu Tay or South West Cay.
- Song Tu Dong or North East Cay.

Because of the size of the area, the archipelago is divided into many groups. Using the main island of Spratly (which gave its name to the whole archipelago) as a point of reference, the distances to the shores of surrounding countries are as follows:

- Spratly Island to Phan Thiet (Republic of Vietnam) 280 nautical miles
- Spratly Island to the closest shore of Hainan Island (People's Republic of China) 580 nm
- Spratly Island to the closest shore on Palawan Island (Philippines) 310 nm
- Spratly Island to the closest shore of Taiwan 900 nm

Like the Hoang Sa Islands, the Truong Sa archipelago is composed of little coral islands which are

often surrounded by smaller reefs. Because of their proximity to the coast of Vietnam, these islands have always been frequented by fishermen from the southern part of Vietnam. These fishermen made regular expeditions to the islands and sometimes stayed there for prolonged periods of time. Vietnamese history books often made reference to the ,Dai Truong Sa Dao-, a term used to designate both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes and, more generally, all insular possessions of the Vietnamese (50). The map published circa 1838 by Phan Huy Chu and called “Dai Nam Nhat Thong Toan Do” (fig. 8, page 32) expressly mentioned the Spratlys, under the name Van Ly Truong Sa, as part of Vietnamese territory, although the archipelago was not located at its proper place because of the use of ancient geographic techniques.

These distant islands were often neglected by the Vietnamese authorities of the time. The emperors did not implement a systematic policy of occupation on the Truong Sa Islands as they had for the other archipelago, Hoang Sa. Furthermore, the Empire of Vietnam lost interest in the islands off the Cochinchinese shore as the French occupation of Cochinchina began in 1852. For their part, the French took some time before consolidating their rights to the Truong Sa archipelago. Their first recorded action was a scientific reconnaissance of the Spratlys by the vessel De Lanessan following its exploration of the Paracels (1927). This scientific mission was followed by an official expedition in 1930 on the sloop la Malicieuse, in the course of which the French flag was hoisted on the highest point of an island called Ile de la Tempete.

Legal basis of Vietnamese possession.

In 1933, the French Government decided to take official possession of the islands. Three ships, the *Alerte*, the *Astrolabe* and the *De Lanessan* took part in the expedition. The following are relevant quotations from an account given by H. Cucherousset in *L’Eveil economique de l’Indochine* (No. 790 of May 28, 1933) :

“The three vessels first of all visited Spratley and confirmed French possession by means of a document drawn up by the Captains, and placed in a bottle which was subsequently embedded in cement.

“Then the *Astrolabe* sailed south west to a point 70 miles from Spratley and 200 miles from Borneo, and arrived at the caye (sandy island) of Amboine, at the northern extremity of the Bombay Castle Shallows. Possession was taken of the island in the manner related above. This cave protrudes two meters 40 cm above the sea at high tide.

“Two-thirds of the rock which forms the caye is covered with a thick layer of guano, which the Japanese do not seem to have completely exploited.

“Meanwhile, the *Alerte* sailed towards the atoll Fiery Cross (or Investigation) at a point about 80 miles north-west of Spratly and equidistant from Cape Padaran and the southern point of Palawan Island. The whole of this vast reef protrudes only at a few points above the surface of the sea.

At the same time the *De Lanessan* proceeded towards the London reefs, at about 20 miles north-east of Spratly. There it discovered the wreckage of the *Francois Xavier*, which was wrecked there in 1927 while on its way from Noumea to Indochina via this part of the China Sea, in which, in spite of its great depth, navigators are not advised to sail too boldly.

“*Itu Aba*, which is surrounded by a reef, is mentioned in the naval instructions of 1919 as being covered with bushes and thickets with the nests of many sea birds, and a number of banana and coconut trees growing around a well....

“The *De Lanessan* and *Astrolabe* later sailed north where, about 20 miles from the Tizard bank, is

situated the Loaita bank, an atoll of the same kind. The two vessels took formal possession of the main island, on which are also to be found the remains of plantations and an unexhausted phosphate working. Loaita Island is a sandy isle, low, covered with bush, and a bare 300 metres in diameter.

“The *Alerte* for its part visited the Thi-Thu reef, at about 20 miles north of the Loaita bank, and took possession of an island and of this atoll. still by means of the same ritual. This little low and sandy isle possesses a well, a few bushes, and some stunted coconut trees. A fair anchorage is to be found on the southern bank.”

Further north still, at the level of Nhatrang, is the atoll named “North Danger” , the *Alerte* took possession of two sandy islands (cayes) where it found some Japanese fishing. The *De Lanessan* went there too and explored the little island. The latter is perceptibly higher than the others, the highest point reaching 5 metres. The phosphate beds are considerable and were much exploited by the Japanese.

After possession had been taken, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the following notice in the French Journal Officiel dated July 26, 1933 (page 7837)

“Notice concerning the occupation of certain islands by French naval units.

The French government has caused the under mentioned isles and islets to be occupied by French naval units:

1. Spratley Island, situated 8o39' latitude north and 111o55' longitude east of Greenwich, with its dependent isles (Possession taken April 13, 1930).

2. Islet caye of Amboine, situated at 7o52' latitude north and 112o55' longitude east of Greenwich, with its dependent isles (Possession taken April 7, 1933).

3. Itu Aba Island situated at latitude 10o2' north and longitude 114o21' east of Greenwich, with its dependent isles (Possession taken April 10, 1933).

4. Group of two islands situated at latitude 111o29' north and longitude 114o21' east of Greenwich, with their dependent isles (36) (Possession taken April 10, 1933).

5. Loaita island, situated at latitude 10o42' north and longitude 114o25' east of Greenwich, with its dependent islands (Possession taken April 12, 1933).

6. Thi Tu Island. situated at latitude 11o7' north and longitude 114o16' east of Greenwich, with its dependent islands (Possession taken April 12, 1933).

The above-mentioned isles and islets henceforward come under French sovereignty (this notice cancels the previous notice inserted in the Official Journal dated July 25, 1933, page 7784).

Notification of the occupation was made by France to interested countries between July 24 and September 25, 1933. With the exception of Japan, no State which could have had an interest in the matter raised any protest against this act. Three powers in the area remained silent and unconcerned: the United States (then occupying the Philippines), China, and the Netherlands (then occupying Indonesia). In Britain, Foreign Under-secretary Butter declared 6 years later that France exercised full sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago and that all matters relevant to these islands were primarily a French concern (37).

The Japanese protested the French occupation on the ground that, in the past, Japanese subjects had carried out exploitation of phosphate on some of these islands. It was true that Japanese companies had operated on the Spratlys without the permission and knowledge of French authorities. But Japan had never made any attempt toward taking possession of these islands. In 1939., claims by the Japanese militarist government then in power assumed a tougher tone: Japan declared that she had decided to – place the Spratly or Tempest Islands off the coast of Indoch’na under Japanese jurisdiction -. The decision first appeared merely on paper, but was followed two years later by forcible military occupation of the archipelago (1941). In any case, in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan relinquished all titles and claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

It should also be noted that the French occupation of the Spratly Islands in 1933 did not arouse any protest from the United States government, which was then acting on behalf of the Philippines. Five years earlier, the United States did engage in a dispute with the Netherlands over the island of Palmas off the Philippine coast (38). Since the United States did not act where a Philippine claim could have been made, this indicates that there was no ground for a challenge of French rights on behalf of the Philippines. It was only 35 years after the French took possession of the Spratly Islands that Philippine troops, taking advantage of the war situation in the Republic of Vietnam, surreptitiously occupied some islands in the Vietnamese archipelago:

Loai Ta 10o41’N – 114o25’E

Thi Tu 11o03’N – 114o17’E

Song Tu Dong 11o27’N – 114o21’E

All of these three islands are in the list of islands published in the French Official Journal of July 26, 1933 which recorded the possession of the Spratlys by French naval units. The present position of the Philippine government that these islands are not part of the Spratly archipelago but only *res nullius* when Philippine troops occupied them is, therefore, obviously erroneous. All three islands (which were artificially given Malayo-Spanish sounding names) are an integral part of the Vietnamese Truong Sa archipelago. Moreover, it remains to be determined in a common and friendly spirit whether or not some other, smaller, islands occupied by Philippine soldiers are dependent islets of these Vietnamese main islands. In this regard, it should be recalled here that when the French took possession of the Spratlys, they only listed the major islands in the official act and indicated that these islands were incorporated – with their dependent islets.

The Philippine government has also argued that the remaining islands of the Spratly archipelago (i.e., those not occupied by Philippine troops) are still -subject to the disposition of Allies in the past world war-. According to this theory, when Japan relinquished its rights over the Spratlys by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, its jurisdiction was assumed by the Allied powers who have,not yet ceded the archipelago to any particular country. No reasoning can be more disputable, since the Spratlys were already and fully part of Vietnamese territory before World War II. These islands were merely seized militarily by Japan and, just like Mindoro or Guam, must simply return to their legitimate owner. It is obvious that military occupation by Japan could not result in any transfer of sovereignty over those islands and that Vietnam was ipso facto reinstated in her lawful rights after the defeat of Japan. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it was simply said that:

“Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.”

Previously, the Cairo Declaration (1943) the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which are the basic documents for postwar territorial settlements, contained no clause contrary to the sovereignty of Vietnam over both archipelagoes. There have not been any other legal texts that

attribute these territories to any country – as was correctly pointed out by the Philippine government. Thus, all sovereign rights must be returned to their legal titular, i.e., Vietnam which, since 1949 had inherited (or rather retaken) all of the former French rights over these territories. Therefore, the short clause about the Paracels and Spratlys in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was merely designed to confirm that Japan withdrew all her claims in earlier disputes with France.

It is to the credit of the Philippine government that it has not associated itself with the burlesque adventure of one of its private citizens, Mr. Tomas Cloma, who has pretended to – discover – the Vietnamese Truong Sa islands in 1956 and has proclaimed an independent – Freedomland – covering most of this archipelago (39). But the fact remains that Philippine troops are presently stationed on some of the islands described by Mr. Cloma as part of K Freedomland v. This matter must be settled in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The Vietnamese people are entirely confident that the legal and peaceful channels available to solve such disputes will confirm the legitimacy of their rights.

Regarding China, it must be stressed that few people have had knowledge of any Chinese claims over the Spratlys in the past (40). In a sudden move on August. 24, 1951, New China in Peking attacked both French and Philippine claims regarding these islands and stated that they must be considered to be – outposts of Chinese national territory -. Subsequently, the People’s Republic of China continued to issue statements filled with threats to use force in order to seize the Truong Sa archipelago (41). But it was the Republic of China’s government which took the initiative and sent troops from Taiwan to occupy Thai Binh Island (Itu-Aba) on June 8, 1956. Itu-Aba is the largest island of the Spratlys and thus was a kind of – capital – where all French services were centered. As late as December 1973, the Far Eastern Economic Review of Hongkong reported that a marker still stood there with the inscription: (France – Ile ItuAba et Dependances – 10 Aout 1933 – (42).

Exercise of normal state authority.

The headquarters of a French administrative officer, who also commanded a guard detachment ‘ was located on Itu Aba Island. Because of the isolation and the hard living conditions on the island, only volunteers to the post were sent there. Sometimes, no government official would volunteer, so the Indochinese authorities had to recruit private citizens by means of contracts which lasted one year. These contracts contained generous allowances and other largesses in an attempt to retain volunteers on the island. One of the a “contract officials,” was Mr. Burollaud who held out for 2 years (1938-1940). It was apparently difficult to find a successor for Mr. Burollaud, since the Governor General in Hanoi had to send a note dated August 22, 1940 throughout Indochina (and to the French possession of Kouang-Tcheou-Wan in Ichina) to look for a volunteer – who must be a European. The official finally recruited turned-out to be most unlucky, since, according to an eyewitness named Tran Van Manh who was serving at that time with the Itu-Aba Meteorological Station, he was seized and tied to the flag pole by Japanese troops occupying the Spratlys in 1941 (43). Regarding administrative organization, 3 months after the official incorporation of the Spratlys, the Governor General of Indochina signed Decree No. 4762-CP dated December 21, 1933 making the archipelago a part of the Cochinchinese province of Ba-Ria. After Cochinchina was returned to Vietnam, this organization was confirmed in 1956 by a Decree of the President of the Republic of Vietnam (44). Seventeen years later, the Spratlys were attached to a village of the same province (the name of which had in the meantime changed to Phuoc Tuy), the village of Phuoc Hai, Dat Do district (45). State activities on the Spratlys were necessarily restricted because the islands were uninhabited and situated too far away from the mainland. In 1938, the Indochina Meteorological Service set up a weather station on Itu-Aba, which was considered the best place in the South China Sea to provide meteorological data for neighbouring countries. The Station functioned in French hands for over 3 years after which it was reported to have continued operations under Japanese military occupation. Before the Japanese seizure, the Itu-Aba station was important enough to be given an international code number: 48919. Data provided by the Station were recorded all over the world and were listed under – French

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

Indochina – Cochinchina,. The French also continued scientific surveys of the Spratlys after 1933. For instance, a valuable geographic and aeologic study of the Spratlys was made available in the 22nd Report of the Oceanographic Institute of Indochina (46).

Thus, on behalf of Vietnam, the French conducted various kinds of activities which substantiate the right to sovereignty over a territory. These also include diplomatic activities to ensure the protection of possession by the authority in control. France defended with success the Spratlys against Japanese aims. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris protested energetically on April 4, 1939 when Japan announced that she had “placed the islands under her jurisdiction”. France remained active right until 1956, the year when all her troops finished their withdrawal from Indochina. ‘ As late as May 1956, after Mr. Tomas Cloma created his so-called “Freedomland”, the French Charge d’Affaires in Manila was reported to have reminded the Philippine government of the French rights resulting from the 1933 occupation (47). At the same period, the French Navy vessel Dumont d’Urville made a visit to Itu-Aba in a demonstration of the French – Vietnamese interest in the archipelago. The Republic of Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, issued a statement on June 1, 1956 recalling the Vietnamese rights. Two weeks later, Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau of the Republic of Vietnam reaffirmed at length the rightful position of his country (48). He recalled, among other facts, that five years earlier the head of the Vietnamese Delegation at the San Francisco Peace Conference had solemnly reaffirmed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Truong Sa archipelago and that the statement was not challenged by any participating country, including China and the Philippines.

From 1956 on, in the face of Chinese and Philippine groundless pretenses, the Republic of Vietnam’s Navy began to launch various operations to reassert control over the Truong Sa Islands. Crewmembers erected sovereignty steles on almost all of them and built poles to hoist the Vietnamese flag. The cruiser Tuy Dong (HQ-04) was assigned these missions in August 1956. In 1961, the two cruisers Van Kiep and Van Don landed on the islands of Song Tu Tay (South-West Cay) Thi Tu, Loai Ta and An Bang. Two other islands, Truong Sa (Spratly proper) and Nam Ai (Nam Yit) were visited the following year by the cruisers Tuy Dong and Tay Ket. Finally, in 1963, all of the sovereignty steles on the main islands were systematically rebuilt by crew members of the three vessels Huong Giang, Chi Lang and Ky Hoa:

May 19, 1963 steles on Truong Sa Island (Spratly proper)

May 20, 1963 steles on An Bang Island

May 22, 1963 steles on Thi Tu and Loai Ta Islands

May 24, 1963 steles on Song Tu Dong (North East Cay) and Song Tu Tay (South West Cay).

The pace of these patrol and control operations were reduced after 1963 due to the war situation in the Republic of Vietnam. That does not mean, however, that Vietnamese rights on the Truong Sa archipelago have been diminished, even if foreign powers were then able to take advantage of the situation to commit illegal intrusion in some of these islands. These rights had been openly established in the name of Vietnam when the French incorporated the archipelago into Indochina. Moreover, these territories were traditionally known and frequented by Vietnamese in the past. The French action of 1933 was entirely in conformity with international rule and practice. It was challenged by no one except Japan, who later relinquished all her claims. An effective presence and a peaceful exercise of sovereignty have been firmly assured. This has only been interrupted once and temporarily when Japan seized the Truong Sa Islands by force in 1941. As in the case of the Hoang Sa Islands, a foreign military presence has not and will not break the will of the Vietnamese to remain as the owner of all their territories. Therefore, let it be reminded that the islands now illegally occupied by foreign troops are indivisible parts of the Truong Sa archipelago which belong to the Vietnamese people.

CHAPTER IV: THE DEFENSE OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF VIETNAM

In preceding Chapters, it has been mentioned that the Vietnamese have always assured an appropriate defense of their rights over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands. Vietnamese or French troops were stationed permanently on both archipelagoes in a display of authority that is inherent to rightful sovereignty. In the diplomatic field, it has been recalled that France remained active until 1956 in the defense of the legitimate title it held on behalf of Vietnam. In 1932, then again in 1939, France issued particularly strong protests against pretenses from China concerning the Paracels and from Japan concerning the Spratlys.

Independent Vietnam had later to confront serious challenges to her sovereignty over these islands. At the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951, Vietnam unequivocally reaffirmed its rights over both archipelagoes. The Vietnamese chief delegate clearly stated the position that, in settlement of territorial problems resulting from World War II, only Vietnam was entitled to recover the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands from Japan. The defense of this cause continued actively during the following years. In response to the Chinese invasion of January 19-20, 1974, the Republic of Vietnam's soldiers fought heroically in the face of superior military force. Backed by all segments of the population, they kept alive the Vietnamese tradition that the temporary loss of physical control over a territory does not mean the relinquishing of a legitimate right.

From the San Francisco Peace Conference to 1973.

When Japanese military control ended in 1945, the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands returned ipso facto to their legitimate owners. However, the confusion resulting from the war allowed other countries make bolder moves toward asserting their groundless claims. Specifically, the Republic of China illegally continued to station on some of the Hoang Sa Islands the troops that had been sent there to disarm Japanese soldiers in implementation of the Potsdam agreement. Thus the successive governments of newly independent Vietnam assumed the task of doing their utmost to protect the territorial integrity of the country. The first opportunity to do so was at the San Francisco Conference held in 1951 to work out a peace treaty with Japan. The gathering was attended by delegates from 51 countries. According to agreements reached, Japan renounced all rights and claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The head of the Vietnamese delegation to this Conference was Prime Minister Tran Van Huu, who was also Minister of Foreign Affairs. On September 7, 1951, during the seventh plenary session of the Conference, the Vietnamese delegate made the following statement:

“...as we must frankly profit from all the opportunities offered to us to stifle the germs of discord, we affirm our right to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which have always belonged to Vietnam “.

The statement aroused no objections from any of the 51 countries attending the Conference. This must be considered as having been the universal recognition of Vietnamese sovereignty over these islands. The declaration by Premier Huu was designed to reaffirm an existing right, therefore it has an effect erga omnes, i.e., even vis-a-vis those countries not represented at the Conference (for instance, the People's Republic of China).

On the other hand, the full text of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty shows that the two archipelagoes were considered as one single entity in the settlement of territorial matters:

Chapter II Territory

Article 2

a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea renounces all right, and claim to Korea, including the

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nation Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

The Treaty does not specify which countries were to recover which specific territories renounced by Japan. However, from the above, it is clear that each sub-paragraph is relevant to the rights of one particular country, for example:

sub-paragraph (b) : rights of China.

sub-paragraph (c) : rights of the USSR.

sub-paragraph (d) : rights subsequently conferred upon the United States.

sub-paragraph (f) : rights of Vietnam.

This interpretation was confirmed by the refusal by the Conference to consider a Soviet amendment that would include the Paracels and Spratlys into the sphere of Chinese rights. The Soviet amendment reads as follows:

“1. To Article 2.

“(a) To include, instead of paragraphs (b) and (f), a paragraph reading follows: Japan recognizes full sovereignty of the Chinese People’s Republic over Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all the islands adjacent to it, the Penlinletao Islands (the Pescadores), the Tunshatsuntao Islands (the Pratas Islands), as well as over the Islands of Sishatsuntao and Chunshatsuntao (the Paracel Islands, the group of Amphitrites, the shoal of Maxfield) and Nanshatsuntao Islands including tile Spratly, and renounces all right, title and claim to the territories named here in.”

The Soviet Amendment was defeated during the 8th plenary session of the Conference. The President of the Conference ruled it out of order, the ruling being sustained by a vote of 46 to 3 with 1 abstention (49). Chinese claims to the Paracels and Spratlys were thus overwhelmingly disregarded.

At a later date, the government of the Republic of China restated its claims based on the separate peace treaty between it and Japan (April 28, 1952). Actually, the provision concerning the Paracels and Spratlys in that treaty was an exact restatement of Article 2 (f) of the San Francisco Treaty. Once again, Japan declined to specify in favor of which country it renounced its occupied territories. In any case, it must be stressed again that there exists an elementary principle of law that a state (in this case Japan) cannot transfer more rights than it itself possesses, in accordance with the maxim *Nemo dat quod non habet*. Generally speaking, the illegitimacy of China’s claims over the Hoang Sa and Truong

Sa archipelagoes is due to the lack of animus occupandi on Chinese's part. It is true that fishermen from Hainan Island have frequented these islands in the past and that Chinese travelers occasionally stopped there. But unlike what has been done by Vietnam, activities by private Chinese citizens were never followed by governmental action. As late as 1943, although Marshall Chiang Kai Shek represented the only country having claims to the Paracels and Spratlys at the Cairo Conference, he did not have any reference to these islands included in the final Declaration (which did state that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores must be returned to China). Because of the weakness of its argument, China has always declined all suggestions, repeatedly made, in the past by France, that the dispute be settled before international courts.

For the same reason, the People's Republic of China had to resort to gratuitous affirmations, threats and violence to assert her claims to the Vietnamese Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands. These claims are a mere revival of the old Chinese imperialistic drive known to all South-East Asia nations. The islands, islets, shoals and banks that the People's Republic of China claims as a the outposts of Chinese territory)) cover the entire South China Sea, and would virtually convert the whole sea into a communist Chinese lake.

After the San Francisco Peace Conference, successive Vietnamese Governments have assured a systematic defense of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa islands by all means available to a sovereign state. After 1956, when stability had returned to the Republic of Vietnam following the Geneva Agreement of 1954, military and diplomatic activities became more intense. As mentioned before, navy patrols were conducted on a regular basis. When deemed necessary, the government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly reiterated its rights over the islands (statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 1, 1956 and July 15, 1971). Necessary steps were also taken vis-a-vis foreign governments in order to assert the Vietnamese title. For instance, a note to the Malaysian Government dated April 20, 1971 contained all the convincing arguments in support of Vietnamese sovereignty. This sovereignty was so evident that it could only be contested through military actions.

The Chinese invasion of January 19-20, 1974.

Before 1974, the People's Republic of China had aired sporadic claims to the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Islands. Occasionally, it conducted secret actions against the islands, such as the intrusion of – fishermen , into Vietnamese uninhabited territories. However, at the beginning of 1974, the People's Republic of China resorted to blatantly aggressive tactics in order to militarily seize the Hoang Sa archipelago. The following is an account of the invasion made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam. In the face of the extremely grave situation created by the PRC's imperialistic action, RVN Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac summoned the heads of all diplomatic missions in Saigon on January 21st, 1974 and made the following statement:

“Excellencies,

“Gentlemen,

” I have invited you to gather here today to inform you of recent events which have taken place in the area of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago off the central coast of Vietnam. These events have created an emergency situation susceptible of endangering peace and stability in South East Asia and the world.

” The Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes are a part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam. The sovereignty of our country over these archipelagoes based on historical, geographical and legal grounds as well as on effective administration and possession, is an undeniable fact.

” On the 11th of January 1974, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Red China suddenly claimed sovereignty over these archipelagoes. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately rejected those unfounded pretensions.

” From then on, Communist China chose to use force to seize that portion of our national territory. It sent men and warships into the area of the islands of Cam Tuyen (Robert), Quang Hoa (Duncan) and Duy Mong (Drummond) of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, and landed troops on these islands.

” On January 16, 1974, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam issued a statement to denounce these unlawful acts.

” In the meantime, in accordance with international regulations, naval units of the Republic of Vietnam instructed those men and ships violating the land and sea territory of the Republic of Vietnam to leave the area.

“The Red Chinese authorities not only refused to put an end to their unlawful incursions but also sent in additional reinforcements in troops and warships. They opened fire on the troops and naval units of the Republic of Vietnam, causing casualties and material damages. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam issued a communiqué on the 19th of January alerting world public opinion on these serious acts of hostility.

” On the 20th of January 1974, the Red Chinese authorities escalate further in the use of force against an independent and sovereign country. They sent their warplanes to bomb three islands : Cam Tuyen (Robert), Vinh Lac (Money) and Hoang Sa (Pattle) where units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam were stationing, and also ‘landed their troops -with the aim of capturing these islands.

” Communist China is therefore openly using force to invade a portion of the Republic of Vietnam’s territory in violation of international law, of the Charter of the United Nations, of the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973 which it pledged to respect and of the Final Act of March 2, 1973 of the International Conference on Vietnam to which it is a signatory.

” The Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam shall not yield to such brazen acts of aggression. They are determined to safeguard their national territory.

” I kindly request you to report to your Governments on this grave situation. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam also wishes that your Governments would adopt an appropriate attitude and take appropriate action in view of those acts committed recently by the Communist Chinese authorities in the Hoang Sa (Paracels) archipelago, in complete disregard for international law and the sovereignty of other nations.

“Thank you.”

In the naval battle, the soldiers of the Republic of Vietnam fought heroically although they were outnumbered and outgunned. They suffered 18 deaths and 43 wounded, and, in addition, 48 Vietnamese personnel were illegally detained by the PRC’s invaders. Among those were four civilian employees of the Pattle Meteorological Station: this is an evidence that Vietnamese authorities were conducting peaceful activities on the islands before troops had to be sent in to cope with PRC’s provocations. Strongly condemned by world opinion, the PRC government had to release these personnel within 3 weeks in an attempt to appease the indignation caused by its blatant violation of the law of nations. Opinions sympathetic to the Republic of Vietnam were expressed everywhere in the world, especially in Asia where Vietnam was often hailed as the nation resisting communist Chinese expansionism. Even the Soviet newspaper Pravda accused the PRC a not to hesitate to resort to arms

in order to impose its will in Southeast Asia, specifically on the Paracel and Spratly Islands – (50). Also in Moscow, Tass provided a summary of an article from “New Times – (a Soviet political weekly). The article quoted the PRC’s support of separatist movements in Burma, Bangladesh and India among other Peking’s provocations in order to – intensify pressures on independent countries of Asia)-. According to -New Times,, this coincided with Peking’s military actions on the Paracels (51).

Convinced of its rightful position, the Republic of Vietnam appealed to world opinion and sought the intervention of all bodies that could contribute to a peaceful settlement. As early as January 16, 1974 its Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations to bring to his attention the grave tensions created by the PRC’s false claims. After he had presented arguments in support of Vietnamese’ sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Islands, Minister Vuong Van Bac wrote: “In view of all the Precise facts listed above,, the sudden challenge by Communist China of the Republic of Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracels archipelago and its violation of the Republic of Vietnamese sovereignty are unacceptable. They constitute a threat to the peace and security of this region.

“The Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam are determined to defend their sovereignty and their territorial integrity and reserve the right to take all appropriate measures to this end.

“The Republic of Vietnam considers the situation created by the above People’s Republic of China’s action as one which is likely to endanger international peace and security. Therefore the Government of the Republic of Vietnam wishes to request the Security Council to take all appropriate measures that the Council deems necessary to correct that situation.”. The Minister addressed the United Nations again on January 20. 1974, while troops of the Republic of Vietnam were still fighting back the PRC’s invaders in the Hoang Sa waters. He wrote to the Secretary General of the U.N. to inform him of the hostilities that started on January 19, 1974 when the Chinese landing party opened fire on Vietnamese defenders. After denouncing the clear case of aggression across international borders, against an independent and sovereign state,, Minister Vuong Van Bac requested that the Secretary General, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, draw the attention of the Security Council on the grave situation. For its part, K the Government of the Republic of Vietnam accepts in advance the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter of the United Nations, and – reaffirms its faith on the United Nations and its acceptance of the purposes and principles enunciated in the Charter of the Organization . Although the Government of the Republic of Vietnam was fully aware that the PRC, as a permanent member of the Security Council had the power of veto (a fact which left little hope for any constructive debate or positive action), it chose to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The attention of the Council must be drawn on the grave situation resulting from the PRC’s aggression because, as Minister Bac pointed out in his note of January 24, 1974 to the Council’s President (Ambassador Gondola Facio) : “It behooves the Security Council and its members to fulfill their responsibilities and to decide on what to be done to correct that situation “. Indeed, the PRC promptly tried to justify its blatant act of invasion by presenting a completely distorted version of the facts. A PRC’s statement referred to actions by the Saigon authorities in South Vietnam which sent naval and air forces to encroach on the Yungle Islands of China’s Hsisha Islands , (!).”

In a press conference on January 25, 1974, the President of the Security Council stated that the Vietnamese request had all legal grounds to deserve consideration, therefore he regretted that a Council meeting could not be convened for that purpose.

The legitimacy of its rights motivated the Republic of Vietnam to use all available means of action to defend its just stand. A recourse to the International Court of Justice has been contemplated. On January 22, 1974 the President of the Republic of Vietnam wrote personal letters to the Heads of State in all friendly countries. After he had presented how the PRC’s violation of Vietnamese sovereignty created a threat to peace in South East Asia, President Nguyen Van Thieu concluded:

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

“I am therefore writing to you.... to kindly request that you raise your voice in defense of peace and stability in this area of the world and resolutely condemn the violation by the PRC of the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam over the archipelago of Hoang Sa”.

In other actions taken in defense of Vietnamese sovereignty, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly reaffirmed before the 3rd United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Caracas that the Vietnamese people will not yield to the PRC’s act of violence and that they will never renounce any part of their insular territories (June 28, 1974). The Government of the Republic of Vietnam also sent a note on January 21, 1974 to the signatories of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam (March 2, 1973). This document, signed in Paris by 12 countries including the PRC and in the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations acknowledged, and provided guarantees for, the provisions of the agreement to end the war signed on January 27, 1973. First the Vietnamese note presented the facts related to the PRC’s aggression, then it pointed out that:

“It is clear from these developments that the government of the People’s Republic of China is deliberately resorting to the use of force as a means of acquiring territories, which is a gross violation of... the Agreement to End the War and Restore Peace in Vietnam signed in Paris on January 27, 1973 and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam signed at Paris on March 2nd, 1973.

“The Government of the Republic of Vietnam wishes to call the particular attention of the Parties to Article 1 of the Paris Agreement and Article 4 of the Act of the Paris International Conference, which both solemnly recognize that the territorial integrity of Vietnam must be strictly respected by all states and especially by the signatories of the Final Act.

“In view of the seriousness of the present situation, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam appeals to the Parties, in the interest of peace and stability in the Western Pacific area, to take all measures which the Parties deem appropriate as provided in Article 7 of the Act of the international Conference on Vietnam – (52). The PRC’s aggressive aims is not limited to the Hoang Sa Islands. There were indications that Chinese troops were preparing to head for the Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago after they had seized the Paracels on January 20, 1974 (53). On the other hand, in February 1974, the Philippines and the Republic of China also restated their claims to the Truong Sa Islands. The Republic of Vietnam rejected these unfounded claims by separate notes to the Republic of China (January 29, 1974) and to the Philippines (February 12, 1974). But the Government of the Republic of Vietnam also deemed it necessary to make its position clear to friends and foes alike , and to reiterate its right before an universal audience. Thus, a solemn proclamation at the governmental level was issued on February 14, 1974. This declaration is the text reproduced at the beginning as an introduction to this White Paper.”

CONCLUSION

UNANIMITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AGAINST AGGRESSION

The events of January 1974 had the effect of cementing the entire Vietnamese nation into a bloc resolutely united in order to defend the national sovereignty. After the invasion by troops of the People’s Republic of China, all newspapers (including those of the Opposition) and other media in Saigon unanimously backed the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in its determination to fight for the Hoang Sa Islands. The media’s opinion and the feeling of the people can be summarized by the following editorial in the Dan Chu daily: ” In the middle of a difficult battle to repulse 400,000 North Vietnamese back to the North and a struggle for economic development, the Paracels battle is another burden on our shoulder. The naval battle between us and China has temporarily ceased with both sides suffering heavy casualties and material damages. But in reality, it was only just a beginning. The

method to carry on the fight will be flexible depending on the development of the situation but the goal remains the same. The South Vietnamese will not stay idle, crossing their arms, to see their ancestral inheritance stolen away.” Although the Vietnamese are known to be war-weary, enthusiastic mass rallies were held in virtually every city and town to condemn the PRC’s aggression. Everywhere the people unanimously adopted resolutions denouncing before public opinion the violation of Vietnamese sovereignty. Most of these resolutions also asked the Government and Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam to take appropriate measures against the invaders. The warship Ly Thuong Kiet received a hero welcome by an overwhelmingly enthusiastic crowd upon its return from the Hoang Sa battle. On January 21, 1974 the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor stated that Communist China committed a an extremely serious act infringing on the Republic of Vietnam’s sovereignty and crudely challenging the national spirit of the Vietnamese people living from Nam Quan Pass (54) to Ca Mau Cape. The Saigon Students Union issued a declaration which vehemently denounced the invasion to University students over the world. The War Veterans Association made a solemn proclamation to condemn the – Red China’s violation of international law – and expressing deep gratitude to the Vietnamese combatants or their heroic fight against the aggressors. Abroad, Vietnamese students and residents in several countries demonstrated in an attempt to alert world opinion: in Tokyo, Ottawa, New York etc.... Vietnamese students marched against the PRC’s diplomatic mission; in Geneva, Vietnamese students went on a hunger strike to draw attention on the PRC’s violation of international public order. The indignation of the entire Vietnamese people at home and abroad was reflected in a true manner in the declaration of the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) of the Republic of Vietnam. This declaration says, in part, that Communist China... has clearly demonstrated her scheme of invasion and expansion, (and) poses a serious threat to peace in the Pacific Region. Therefore, the National Assembly denounces to the public opinion at home and abroad Communist China’s brutal act of invasion, seriously infringing upon the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam and – urgently appeals to the United Nations Security Council, the International Court of Justice and peace-loving countries in the world to take positive actions to put an end to the above-mentioned brutal act...” The people of the Republic of Vietnam are thus unanimous in their determination to defend the integrity of their territory. On behalf of the Vietnamese nation, the Republic of Vietnam resolutely demands that all portions of her territory that are illegally occupied be restored to Vietnamese sovereignty. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly condemns the brazen act of invasion of the Hoang Sa Islands by troops of the People’s Republic of China in January, 1974. It strongly denounces illegal actions against its Truong Sa territories by any other country. It rejects all claims by any power over these Islands and regards attempts to occupy them as violations of international law and of Vietnamese sovereignty. Although deeply committed to the cause of peace, the Republic of Vietnam must reserve the right to consider all means of action if occupying powers decline to follow the lawful and peaceful channels of settlement to restore Vietnamese rights.

The Hoang Sa archipelago and some of the Truong Sa Islands have temporarily been lost. But these insular territories will live for ever in Vietnamese hearts and will some day be restored to the Fatherland.

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Notes:

We are sorry! Due to the printing difficulties, we can not complete the auditing this paper.

1. The Atlas is being kept at the ” Ecole Francaise d’Extreme Orient”, Tokyo Bunko Library in Tokyo, Japan, has a microfilm of it under reference number 100891.
2. Ly is an ancient unit of measure (1 ly: 483 meters or 528 yards).
3. Dai Chiem: present-day Cua Dai, province of Quang Nam; Sa Vinh: present-day Sa Huynh, province of Quang Ngai.
4. The author assumedly included in three Hoang Sa archipelagoes main islands and reefs closer to the Vietnamese shore than the islands designated as the Paracels in the 20th century...
5. Internationally-known Vietnamese historians have, directly or indirectly, contributed to the task of determining the date of the Do Ba document. Among them are Prof. Hoang Xuan Han and historian Truong Buu Lam, who has been associated with many American universities. Details on this question

can be found in Vo Long Te, *Les Archipels de Hoang Sa et Truong Sa selon les anciens ouvrages Vietnamiens d'Histoire et de Geographie.* – Saigon. 1974.

6. Summarized and commented in *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient*, Vol. XXXVI, 1936.

7. This term is often used to designate all the distant insular possessions of Vietnam.

8. *Lettres edifiantes et curieuses des Missionnaires de Chine*, quoted in the *Revue Indochine*, No. 46, p.

9. The document was reprinted in *Bulletin des etudes indochinoises*, tome XVII, No. 1 Hanoi, 1942.

10. Archives of the French Navy, *Ministere de la Marine*, Paris. The document was reprinted in *Bulletin de la Societe des Etudes indochinoises*, tome XVIII, No. 1, Hanoi, 1942.

11. Translation into French from Arrow's book is available in Paul Boudet and Andre Masson. *Iconographie historique de l'Indochine Francaise*, p. 250-300. Paris, editions G. Van Oest. 1907.

12. Issue of April 1837. pp. 737-745.

13. Jean Baptiste Chaigneau, *Notice sur la Cochinchine*, presented and commented by A. Salles in *Bulletin des amis du Vieux Hue*, No. 2, April – June 1923, p. 253-283.

14. History annals called – *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien*, 1833, 104th Volume).

15. Principle of international law established after the Palmas Island dispute (1928). See United Nations – *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, pp. 829-855.

16. History annals *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien*

17. History annals *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien*, 165th volume.

18. In Vietnamese: – *Dai Nam Nhat Thong Toan Do* – *Dai Nam* is a former name for Vietnam.

19. *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien*, 154th Volume. The same description is given by the *Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi* (*Dai Nam Comprehensive Encyclopedia*). 6th Volume devoted to Quang Nghia, present day Quang Nam, Province.

20. *Truong*, *xich*, *thuoc* are ancient units of measure (1 *truong*: 3.91 yards or 3.51 meters ; 1 *xich* or *thuoc* : 14.1 inches or 0.36 m.).

21. This isle is erroneously named *Ban-Na* in other publications, for example Sauvaire Jourdan "Les Paracels infiniment petits de notre domaine colonial.

22. *Annals Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien*, 154th Volume.

23. *Kham Dinh Dai Nam Hoi Dien Su Le*, or Administrative records of the Dai Nam, Ministry of Public Works, p. 25.

24. *History Annals Su Quoc trieu chanh bien toat yeu*; Year of original publication unknown. Reprinted in 1935.

25. Map named *Tabula Geographica Imperii Annamitici* 1838, reprinted in J. Silvestre, *l'Empire*

d'Annam et le peuple annamite, Paris 1889., Felix Alean, editeur

26. E. Cortambert and L. de Rosny, Tableau de la Cochinchine, Paris 1862.-Armand.

27. Sauvaire Jourdan “Les Paracels infiniment petite de notre domains colonial” in La Nature, issue of November 1, 1933, Paris.

28. Reported by the French Daily...

29. The French engineer who supervised the work, Mr. Andre Faucheux, is presently 75 years old and lives in Paris.

30. ...

31. Memorandum No. 1104 VP/CT/M dated October 30, 1950.

32. Memorandum No. 1220-VP/CT/M dated September 17, 1951 and signed by the Director of Political and Legal Affairs, Government Delegation to Central Vietnam

33. Decree No. 174-NV dated July 13, 1961.

34. Decree No. 709-BNV/HCDP/26 dated October 21, 1969 signed by Mr. Tran Thien Khiem.

35. ...

36. The coordinates correspond to those of S6ng Tu D6ng (North East Cay) and Shira Island.

37. ...

38. It may be noted that the principles established by the international Court of Justice in the Palmas decision (1928) cannot but reinforce Vietnamese rights, for instance, the emphasis given to the actual exercise of sovereignty over mere geographic contiguity (see Reports of International Arbitral Awards, United Nations. p. 829).

39. The lack of seriousness in this undertaking does not deserve further comments. Mr. Tomas Cloma was reported arrested by the Philippine police in November 1974 on charge of committing acts detrimental to state authority on insular territories.

40. For instance, a comprehensive study of the Spratlys question by Professor Charles Rousseau in Revue Generale de Droit International Public, July-September 1972, does not mention any sort of Chinese claims to this archipelago prior to 1951.

41. New China; bulletin dated February 4, 1974.

42. Far-Eastern Economic Review, HongKong, Dec 21, 1973

43. Mr. Tran Van Manh is presently the Chief of Tuy Hoa Meteorological Service, Republic of Vietnam.

44. Decree No. 143-NV signed on October 22, 1956 by the laie President Ngo Dinh Diem.

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47. Reported by Prof. Charles Rousseau in Revue General de Droit International Public July-September 1972, p.830.

48. Vietnam Press

49. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty with Japan – Record of Proceedings : U.S. Dept. of State Publication 4392, December 1951. page 292.

50. Agence France Presse news dispatch sent from Moscow, February 10, 1974.


51. Reuter news dispatch from Moscow, February 21, 1974.

52. Article 7 (a) : In the event of a violation of the Agreement or the Protocols which threaten the peace, the independence, sovereignty, unity or territorial integrity of Vietnam, or the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination, the parties signatory to the Agreement and the protocols shall, either individually or jointly, consult with the other Parties to this Act with a view of determining necessary remedial measures.

53. As presented in Chapter III. on February 4, 1974 the PRC issued a particularly aggressive statement on the Truong Sa archipelago.

54. The Nam Quan pass marks the border between Vietnam and China.

Source: paracelspratlyislands.blogspot.com)



Proclamation by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (1974)

The noblest and most imperative task of a Government is to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Nation. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is determined to carry out this task, regardless of difficulties it may encounter and regardless of unfounded objections wherever they may come from.

In the face of the illegal military occupation by Communist China of the Paracels Archipelago which is an integral part of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam deems it necessary to solemnly declare before world opinion, to friends and foes alike, that :

The Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes are an indivisible part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam. The Government and People of the Republic of Vietnam shall not yield to force and renounce all or part of their sovereignty over those archipelagoes.

As long as one single island of that part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam is forcibly occupied by another country, the Government and People of the Republic will continue their struggle to recover their legitimate rights.

The illegal occupant will have to bear all responsibility for any tension arising therefrom.

On this occasion, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam also solemnly reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam over the islands off the shores of Central and South Vietnam, which have been consistently accepted as a part of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam on the basis of undeniable geographic, historical and legal evidence and on account of realities.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is determined to defend the sovereignty of the Nation over those islands by all and every means.

In keeping with its traditionally peaceful policy, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is disposed to solve, through negotiations, international disputes which may arise over those islands, but this does not mean that it shall renounce its sovereignty over any part of its national territory.

(Proclamation by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam dated February 14, 1974)

See more details in "RVN White Paper"

<http://paracels.freetzi.com/rvndeclarations.htm>



China Propaganda

PEKING' S PROPAGANDA

By Luu Van Loi

Being aware that its historical and juridical titles are not easily defendable before an impartial judge. Peking does its best to exploit the negative points of Hanoi and to abuse the good disposition of the readers in order to have its argumentation approved of.

I. PEKING ALLEGES THAT THE HOÀNG SA AND TRƯỜNG SA OF VIETNAM ARE NOT THE XISHA AND NANSHA OF CHINA

The document of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs quotes two excerpts from the Vietnamese white book of 1979:

"On the high sea, there is an oblong sand shoal called Bãi Cát Vàng (yellow sand shoal). From the Đại Chiêm port, this sand shoal can be reached by crossing the sea in a day and a half, and if one departs from the Sa Kỳ port, the journey will take only half a day" (excerpt from the book Thiên nam tứ chí lộ đồ thư (Collection of Road Maps of the Southern Country) - the intentional omission of the detail: a sand shoal 400 dặm long and 20 dặm wide - Author).

"The An Vĩnh village, Bình Sơn district, Quảng Nghĩa prefecture, is in proximity of the sea. To the northeast of this village, there are islands forming over 130 scattered summits. The hills are separated from each other by one day or a few geng. On some hills, source water is found. Among these islands, there is the Hoàng Sa Chử, over 30 li long: it is a flat and vast island provided with limpid water" (Bad translation, it should be replaced by the following: The An Vĩnh commune, Bình Sơn district, Quảng Nghĩa prefecture, lies in proximity of the sea, off-shore and to the Northeast there are numerous islands forming over 130 summits, separated by the sea from one another by one day or a few geng of sailing in junks. On the islands, there is drinking water, in the archipelago, there is a yellow sand shoal 30 dặm long, flat and vast, where the water is clear to the bottom. Note by the author(39).

And the said document concludes that "the Hoàng Sa archipelago mentioned by Vietnam do not absolutely constitute the Xisha of China, it can only be the islands and the sand shoals near the Central coast of Vietnam", for the following three reasons:

1. The Hoàng Sa are half a day from Sa Kỳ and a day and a half from Đại Chiêm are at 200 li from the Central coast of Vietnam, a distance that could not be covered in one day, considering the technique of that time.
2. In the Xisha archipelago, there is no island 2 km long, but the Vietnamese documents speak about a 30 li long shoal.
3. The Xisha archipelago is composed of 35 islands reefs and shoals in all; there are not the so-called 130 summits (39).

Regarding the Trường Sa archipelago of Vietnam, the document gives no clear argumentation, it only vaguely affirms that many ancient books of China and Vietnam mention the Great Trường Sa. But in view of its position, it is clear that it is not the Nansha archipelago of China but the coastal islands and shoals of Vietnam(39).

It is important, first of all, to reach agreement on one thing: the Paracels are the Hoàng Sa of Vietnam and the Xisha of China, and the Spratly are the Trường Sa of Vietnam and the Nansha of China. What is, at least, unexpected is that since 1956 to this day, Vietnam and China have several times stuck to the Paracels. China actually occupied the eastern part of the Paracels in 1956, failed in the attempt to land on the western part of this archipelago in 1959, but succeeded in occupying it at last in 1974. This area is precisely the Hoàng Sa of Vietnam. Since 1988 China has advanced in the region of the Spratly, where it still occupies a number of shoals. This area is precisely the Trường Sa archipelago of Vietnam. Why is it now that China realizes the existence of other Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa? When the Government of the RVN reproached it for having occupied the Hoàng Sa, would it then become the coastal islands and shoals of Central Vietnam? Concerning the three reasons invoked by China, they are not convincing to anyone:

1. For the distance between the Hoàng Sa and the Vietnamese coast, Peking quoted an excerpt saying a day and a half's voyage. But why did it not quote the passage just following the page of the same White Book published by Vietnam in 1979?

"Quảng Nghĩa prefecture: at sea from the port of An Vinh commune, Bình Sơn district, there is the Ré island over 30 dặm large where Tư Chính village was formerly found. Practising the cultivation of beans, this island can be reached in 4 geng; beyond the Re island, there is the Great Trường Sa three days and three nights away from the coast, in proximity of the Sea of the North, where the Hoang Sa company was previously dispatched to catch sea products and to gather the merchandise coming from wrecked ships".

It is clear that:

- The Re island (what the Chinese called Wailasan) is 4 geng sailing from the coast.

- From the Re island, it takes three days and three nights to reach the Great Trường Sa (i.e. the Hoàng Sa). The Lịch triều hiến chương loại chí (Settlements of matters by the successive dynasties) by Phan Huy Chú, the Việt sử cương giám khảo lược (Brief history of Vietnam) by Nguyễn Thông all speak that it takes 3-4 days and nights to reach Hoàng Sa.

2. The Thiên nam tứ chí lộ đồ thư (Collection of road maps of the South Country) writes: "In the middle of the sea there is a long sand shoal called Bãi Cát Vàng (yellow sand shoal) about 400 dặm long and 20 dặm wide which spreads out on the high sea" (the calligrapher mistakenly put a day and a half). The Đại Nam thực lục tiên biên (1844) (True writings on the Đại Nam), in the part about the Nguyễn seigneurs, writes: "At sea, beyond the An Vinh commune, Bình Sơn district, Quảng Nghĩa province, there are over 130 sand shoals and reefs separated from one another by one day or several geng of navigation. No body knows how many dặm the length is (but commonly called Vạn Lý Hoàng Sa). The Đại Nam nhất thống chí (Geography of the Unified Đại Nam) claims:

"To the East of the Ré island (Lý in Sino-Vietnamese), Bình Sơn district, are the Hoàng Sa which, from the coats of Sa Kỳ, one can reach in 3-4 days and nights in favorable wind. The archipelago is composed of at most 130 summits, distant from one another by one day or some geng of navigation. In the middle of the archipelago is the shoal Hoàng Sa (yellow sand) which spreads out one doesn't know how many thousand dặm, commonly called Vạn Lý Trường Sa (shoal of ten thousand miles)".

3. At first, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, the Portuguese, and the Spanish, all knew only of the existence in the middle of the Biển Đông of innumerable islands, islets, and reefs forming an archipelago. Only in 1787-1788 did the French Kergariou-Loxme expedition determine exactly the position of the Paracel archipelago (Hoàng Sa). It was known then that to the southeast of the Paracels, at a distance of 500 km, there was another archipelago, which would be named the Spratly. At the start, discovering the Hoàng Sa, the Vietnamese knew also that it was a region strewn with a multitude of islands, islets, and shoals, which spread in length without knowing that there were two distinct archipelagoes there. They were aware that the Hoàng Sa (i.e. the two archipelagoes, Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa) was composed of approximately 130 islands, islets, and sand shoals. Now, the number of islands, islets, reefs, and shoals of the two archipelagoes taken together gives a figure of about 130, depending on the way of counting.

That the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa of Vietnam is considered different from the Xisha and the Nansha of China cannot be viewed as a contribution to geographic science. Indeed, it can no way strengthen the argumentation on the Chinese sovereignty vis-a-vis the two archipelagoes.

The Chinese researchers are also to be reproached for having simply quoted an excerpt of Archbishop J.L. Taberd, written in 1837, saying that the southern end of the Paracels was at the 11th parallel and to conclude that this was a serious error, without making allusion to the map An nam Đại quốc họa đồ (Map of the Great Country Annam), published in 1838 and attached to the Dictionarium latino-annamiticum. On this map, one can see that between approximately the 17th parallel and longitude 110°, a few islands are drawn with the mention:

PARACELS Seu CAT VANG

For Archbishop Taberd, Paracels and Cát Vàng were very clear notions and he exactly located a part of the Paracels in its place. In front of the Paracels are drawn the coastal islands of the Đà Nẵng-Quảng Nghĩa region: Cù Lao Chàm, Cù Lao Ré seu Poulo Canton and the two ports, Sa Kỳ and Cửa Đại. This intentional failure to refer to this map is, at the least, indicative of a nonscientific attitude.

II. TO PRESENT PUBLIC OPINION WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLIS

Situated in the middle of the Bien Dong and disputed by several states, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa have, after all, not attracted the attention of public opinion in general. The problem is complex in itself, so it is primarily known to researchers. With these conditions, Peking has taken advantage of all possible opportunities to obtain a de facto recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the said archipelagoes.

1. The true significance of zone 6G

In March, 1978 the World Conference on radio-communications administration of the mobile aeronautic service was convened in Geneva without the presence of the delegation of the General Direction of the PTT of Vietnam. The final act of the Conference stipulates: "In the regions where the subdivisions 6D, 6F, and 6G are common, the frequencies allotted to the subdivision of zone 6G must be used uniquely by the aeronautic stations of the People's Republic of China"(40). This means that China has the monopoly on a number of frequencies over a region covering all the Biển Đông, in which there are naturally the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagoes.

The SRVN protested against the decision of the UIT and refused to accept it because the rules of the UIT clearly stipulate: "The mention of the name of a country or of a geographic zone in the descriptions of maps, as well as the delineation of frontiers on the maps do not imply any UIT taking of position regarding the political status of that country or that geographic zone, nor any recognition of

these frontiers"(41).

In the course of the same Conference, and in spite of that stipulation, in the case of the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa where there is a conflict of territorial sovereignty, the behaviour is as if the zone belongs to China; whereas, an identical case, that of the Sensaku archipelago where there is a conflict of territorial sovereignty between Japan and China, is treated as a disputed zone and the problem of allotment is left pending.

2. The dangerous zones

On 23rd July, 1979 the Chinese General Direction of Civil Aviation published a communique creating four "dangerous zones" Southwest of the Hainan island and composed of the air space of the Paracels, and demanded that foreign civil airplanes pass it in hours fixed by the Chinese authorities. On 1st September, 1979 Peking published the regulation to be observed by foreign civil planes in the air space of China, that of the Paracels included. Through these acts, China wants to show that it is effectively the sovereign of the airspace over the Paracels and to oblige other states to recognize its de facto rights over the Paracels.

3. At the 26th International Geological Congress in Paris

At this Congress, held in Paris from 7th to 17th July, 1980, the Chinese delegation refrained from speaking about the Xisha and Nansha in plenary sessions, which would have been inappropriate at a scientific congress; but it circulated behind the scenes documents saying that the Xisha and the Nansha belonged to China.

4. The FIR Canton and Sanya

As everyone knows, the ICAO has established on a world scale flight information regions (FIR) managed by determined states. In Vietnamese airspace, there have been created the FIR Ho Chi Minh and the FIR Hanoi that are confined to the North of the FIR Canton and Hongkong.

Preparing for the 3rd RANS (Conference on air transports in the Asia Pacific region) which would be held in Bangkok from 20th April to 10th May, 1993, as early as the beginning of 1992, China proposed the creation of a new FIR called FIR Sanya, between Canton and Hongkong, including the airspace of the Paracels. The FIR, Canton and Hongkong have been ensuring excellent service; the creation of the FIR Sanya is clearly futile and may even cause difficulties for the air transports in the region. But China persists in maintaining its proposal at RANS III, which, in consequence, hindered the determination of the northern limits of the FIR Ho Chi Minh. In fact, the idea of creating the FIR Sanya is not prompted by a technical necessity in the interest of international air navigation, but by a political need of China: to obtain once again the de facto recognition of its sovereignty over the Xisha.

5. The two Vietnamese meteorological posts in the Paracels

Since 1938 the French authorities had installed two meteorological posts on Hoang Sa island (Pattle) and Phú Lâm island (Woody island). Later WMO included these two posts in its world network under the code number 48859 (for Phú Lâm) and 48860 (for Hoàng Sa). After occupying the western part of the Hoàng Sa archipelago in January, 1974, on 18th September of the same year, the Chinese delegation, at the Meteorological Conference of the Asian region held in Colombo, declared the cessation of the activities of the Vietnamese post installed on Pattle island and registered by the WMO under the code number 48860 and proposed its replacement by a Chinese post installed on the same island under the code number 59985.

All specialized international organizations have stipulated in their regulations that the mention of the

name of a country or of a geographic zone on the map does not mean in any way the recognition by these organizations of the political status of the country or the geographic zone. Evidently, anything contrary to this stipulation is null and void. In spite of this, China has always demanded that the Paracels belong to China, in an attempt to affirm its sovereignty.

III. PEKING AFFIRMS THAT VIETNAM HAS RECOGNIZED THE CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE XISHA AND NANSHA

In its propaganda, Peking affirms that Vietnam has recognized the sovereignty of China over the Xisha and has later changed its attitude. As proof, it cited the letter addressed by Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng to Prime Minister Zhou Enlai regarding the question of the territorial waters of China, the Declaration of the Government of the DRVN in 1965, where it is said that the Xisha belong to China.

First, about Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng's letter. It should be recalled that it was the period of the cold war. The US imperialists had interfered in Vietnamese affairs in South Vietnam to contain socialism. In spite of their failure in Korea, the hawks in the US military circles called for war against China and the US fleet crisscrossed the Taiwan straight. China had to prepare itself for an eventual adventure with the US fleet, especially since the continuous pounding of Quemoy and Matsou. It is in this context that China announced on 4th September, 1958 its 12-mile territorial waters. On 14th September, 1958 Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng addressed to Prime Minister Zhou Enlai a note, the full text of which reads:

"Comrade Prime Minister,

We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government of the DRVN acknowledges and approves the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 of the Government of the PRC fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters. The Government of the DRVN respects this decision and will give instructions to its State bodies to respect the 12-mile width of the territorial waters of China in all their relations in the maritime field with the PRC. I address to you, comrade Prime Minister, the assurance of my distinguished consideration".

Here, Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng had no intention of tackling a juridical question, the question of territory or sovereignty, nor spoke of the Hoàng Sa and the Trường Sa. He was thinking only of one thing: the bellicosity of US imperialism and the activities of the 7th fleet in the Taiwan straight which were threatening China. These factors led him to make as soon as possible a gesture of support for the fixation of the 12-mile width of the territorial waters so as to help create an obstacle to the US schemes.

Honest Vietnamese and Chinese who lived in the 1950s and 1960s should remember the extremely close ties between the two peoples "who are at the same time comrades and brothers", with the same idea as "Chinese and Vietnamese are of the same family"; for them, Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng's note was a symbol of Sino-Vietnamese friendship. Any person seeing the note as the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the Xisha and the Nansha would have gone beyond its content and aim, and would have denied the sacred sentiments which inspired the Vietnamese and the Chinese of that time. In its 1965 Declaration regarding the fixation of the limits of combat zones by the US military, the DRVN Government said that the Xisha belonged to China. That was true, but it was not a statement abandoning the sovereignty vis-a-vis the Hoàng Sa archipelago nor vis-a-vis the Trường Sa archipelago. It is important to place these facts in their historical context: the years from 1956 to 1965, when the Vietnamese people had to struggle against the intervention and aggression of the US imperialists in the two zones. We must see the situation of Vietnam at that moment in the light of two factors.

From an administrative point of view, under the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Vietnam

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was temporarily divided into two zones on either side of the 17th parallel, which was considered the provisional military demarcation line, pending reunification. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) administered the northern part, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) the southern part. The Government of RVN took charge of the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagoes in 1956, when France withdrew from Indochina, and since then, it had organized the administration, exploration and exploitation of maritime resources, remaining determined to defend the two archipelagoes against the acts and schemes of aggression of Peking, as well as of other countries. It had defended the interests and the sovereignty of Vietnam in different international conferences and organizations. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, together with that of Saigon, signed the Paris Act on Vietnam and reaffirmed the sovereignty of Vietnam vis-a-vis the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagoes. The responsibility for the administration of the territory is here evident.

From the point of view of defense of territorial sovereignty, since 1965 the Vietnamese people had to cope with a local war in the South and a war of destruction in the North, both waged by the US. It was an extremely atrocious war, the most atrocious since World War II, in which the US extremely powerful armed forces resorted to all their war machinery, flying fortresses, electronic machines, and chemical weapons. It was a battle between David and Goliath; it dominated the conscience of the era. Determined not to lose their freedom again, the Vietnamese people were resolute in doing everything possible to repulse aggression; it was a matter of life or death. The People's Republic of China had raised high the banner of struggle against imperialism after its founding. Ever since, the colonial peoples or those who had just recovered their independence had found in it faith and hope. China did not want a new confrontation with the US, but it strove to raise high the anti-imperialist banner and to continue assistance to the just struggle of various peoples. Moreover, Vietnam was a socialist country, a neighbour and brother of China, with "rivers and mountains joining one another". In such conditions, China had, in fact, become an ally of Vietnam. It did its utmost to help the Vietnamese people politically, morally, and materially as well. It sent to Vietnam armaments, ammunitions, food, and vehicles, and let the aids of the USSR and the East European and other countries pass in transit to Vietnam. The Chinese people were bound to the Vietnamese people like "lips to teeth". As the US also did not want to have a new confrontation with China, Vietnam tried to involve China as much as possible in its war of resistance. It had sincere confidence in China and thought that once the war ended all territorial problems would be satisfactorily settled between those who were simultaneously "comrades and brothers". In theory as well as in practice for the Vietnamese, it was international solidarity. The Declarations should be recalled in the spirit of the Vietnamese and the events of the 1950s and 1960s to understand their true meaning, and also to comprehend the actions of their allies at that time.

During the first Indochina war, in 1949, at the request of the Chinese communists in the South, the troops of the People's Army of Vietnam came into the region of One Hundred Thousand Mountains, the great mountain chain between Guangdong and Guangxi, destroyed many military positions of the Tchang Kaishek troops and finally liberated Tchuksan (a locality on Chinese territory). They then handed over Tchuksan to the liberation troops. In implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, in 1955, the French completed their evacuation from North Vietnam, North of the 17th parallel, the island Bạch Long Vĩ included. Busy taking charge and organizing the administration of the land handed over by French troops, North Vietnamese troops were practically incapable of administering an island situated 130 km from Hai Phong, so they had to request China to provisionally ensure the government of that island. The Chinese had agreed finally to return it to the Vietnamese in 1957, to whom they even offered a motor-launch to keep liaison between the island and Hai Phong. The confidence of the Vietnamese in China was at that time so great that after the reconstruction of the Hanoi Đồng Đăng railroad, the General Direction of Railway of Vietnam accepted minutes which mentioned that the juncture, of "the two railways passes by the State frontier" and is actually at a point on the Vietnamese territory 316 m far from the official frontier between the two countries, as marked

in the Vietnamese-Chinese Railway Agreement dated 25th May, 1955(42).

Vietnam acted in the same way with regard to their Laos brothers. At the start of the resistance against the US aggression, the Vietnamese side temporarily put certain Vietnamese territories at the disposal of the Lao patriotic forces as bases, such as Na Mèo (Thanh Hóa province), Keng Đu (Nghệ An province). This is just like when the Laos patriotic forces gave their consent to the construction of the Ho Chi Minh trail on part of the Laos territory bordering Vietnam (the liberated regions under the control of the Laos patriotic forces). At the end of the anti-US war, the SRVN and the LPDR settled in a satisfactory way all their problems: Vietnam gave back to Laos the territories that had been put at its disposal and vice-versa. On 18th July, 1977, the two countries signed the Treaty of delimitation⁷⁷ of the frontier existing at the moment of the Declaration of Independence of their countries in 1945.

In many respects, the present relations between the PLO and the Arab States can be compared to the Sino-Vietnamese relations in the past, both bearing the marks of the combatant solidarity against the common enemy. It is no exaggeration to say that it is a characteristic of the era. The aforesaid explanations can be either totally accepted or partly accepted or rejected. In spite of that, the above-mentioned declarations cannot be considered an abandonment of the Vietnamese title vis-à-vis the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagoes; they continue to remain the image of the finest period of Sino-Vietnamese friendship.

* * *


China has attached great importance to the question of maps and has published many of them. It is not an important question however:

1. China has incessantly pretended that the Nanhai islands constitute its southernmost end and marked the fact by many maps. But it has refrained from citing, as proofs, ancient books or maps, saying that the Chinese territory stops at the island of Hainan. For instance, the part in Generalities of the Manual of Geography of China writes:

"In the South, at 18°13' of latitude North, the terminus being the coast of Yazhou, island of Hainan; in the North, at 53°50' of latitude North, the terminus being the confluence of the Amour river and the Oussouri river. In the West, as far as 42°11' of longitude East, the terminus being the mount Tunglinh. From South to North there are over 36° measuring 7,100 li, from East to West, over 61° measuring over 8,000 li. The area is 32,605,156 square li or 1/4 of Asia, 1/10 of the continents, larger than Europe". This general view completely corresponds to the Da Qing Zhi Sheng Quan Tu, published in 1862, Dong Si reign, and the Huang Chao Yi Tong Yu Di Zen Tu (General Map of the Unified Empire), published in 1894, Guang Zi reign, which are all official maps and which have not drawn the Xisha and Nansha archipelagoes.

In the Guangdong Yu Di Tu published in 1897 under the reign of Guang Zi and prefaced by the Governor of the two Guang, Zhang Renjun, there is a map of the province of Guangdong and one of Guangzhou, both of them present no archipelago in the South Sea, in conformity with the map-legend marking that the southernmost end of the Chinese territory is "the external point of the port of Yulin, Yazhou". According to jurisprudence, the value of maps in conflicts about sovereignty is but relative. Regarding the affair Palmas, arbitrator Max Huber made the following remark:

"It is with the greatest circumspection that one can take into account maps to settle a question of sovereignty"(43). Even more explicitly, he said: "When the arbitrator is convinced of the existence of determining juridical facts which contradict the affirmations of cartographers whose information sources are unknown, he is at liberty to give no value to the maps, however numerous and appreciated they may be"(44). The problem of the value of the maps presented by the Chinese side is thus clear.



WU JING ZONG YAO

WU JING ZONG YAO (Part of the book presented with cuttings and amendments):

"Ordered the royal troops to keep a garrison, create posts of sea patrol in the Quang nam (presently, Quangdong) at the two ports of East and West, 260 *li* long wide, 200 *li* from the Tumenan, to construct keeled war vessels. From this point in the South East to the high sea, it is 40 *li* long, 420 *li* in the East is Hai Zhou, 240 *li* in the West is Toan Zhou, 750 *li* in the South is An Zhou, 150 *li* in the North is Tiao Zhou. The route to the Southeast is 400 *li* long, after 20 *li*, one will arrive in Tumenan. Water is not deep there; one can cover 50 *li* in a day; the width is 200 *li*. From Tumenan, by the East wind, one goes in the South-west direction, one will arrive in Jiaruozhou in seven days; in Palaosan (the limits of Huazhou) in three more days, then going to the South 300 *li* more, one will arrive in Lingzhangong (potable water is found here). Going in the South-west direction, one will reach the leads of Dashifa, Sixi, Southwest Qianchi. It is impossible to calculate the distances".



EXCERPT FROM THE CHAPTER "GENERALITIES OF THE MOUNTAINS of Geography of China:

"In the South at 18°13' latitude North, the terminus being the coast of Yansu, island of Hainan; in the North at 53°50' latitude North, the terminus being the confluence of the Amour and the Ononou rivers; in the West at 42°11' longitude East, the terminus being the mount Tungling. From the North to the South there are over 36° measuring 7,100 li; from the East to the West there are over 61° measuring over 8,800 li. The area is 32,665,156 square li or 1/4 of Asia, 1/10 of the continents, larger than Europe".




CHINA IN THE TIME OF THE YUAN (According to *Li Dai Gong Yu Biao* - Maps of frontiers in different successive epochs - by Duan Changji)

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DA QING DI GUO QUAN TU (General map of the Great Empire of the Qing) The map *Da Qing Di Guo*, official map of the Great Empire of the Qing published in 1905, shows the extreme south of the Empire is the island of Hainan; no mention is made of the Xisha and the Nansha.

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Map of Zheng He's voyages in the China Sea and Indian Ocean in the 15th century (Modern map taken from the book: *Map of the Maritime Itineraries of Zheng He*, edited by the Peking Publishing House in 1961)

(Source: CHAPTER V, LUÛ VĂN LỢI's book entitled "THE SINO-VIETNAMESE DIFFERENCE ON THE HOÀNG SA AND TRƯỜNG SA ARCHIPELAGOES", THẾ GIỚI PUBLISHERS, HANOI — 1996).

<http://paracels.freetzi.com/chinaLuuVanLoi.htm>



THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
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Open letter to the President Donald Trump by The Government de Jure of the Republic of Vietnam in North America, Europe and Australia

Prime Minister Le Trong Quat

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February 1, 2018

To His Excellency the President of the United States Donald J Trump
The White House, Washington D.C.

(In communication to the Presidents and Prime Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Hungary, Indonesia and the General Secretary of the United Nations)

Mr. President,

The situation has worsened day by day in the South Asia Sea. Next to the aggressive attitude of President Kim Jong Un of North Korea, threatening to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads at the U.S, communist China continues to militarize the Paracels and Spratley peninsulas despite the U.S. repeated warnings, reigning supreme in the maritime space of many countries, thus reducing their confidence in American power. The rapprochement of the Philippines with China is clear proof. This nefast influence has spread to countries formerly allies of the U.S. that have become progressively interested in China's current projects-Infrastructure Investment Bank and The New Silk Route-aiming to develop its commercial and economic relations in a vast region encompassing 68 countries, 4.4 billion men, 62% of the world's GDP. This gigantic economic and territorial expansionism has encountered no obstacles, even in South East Asia. The surprising indifference has undoubtedly taken its course in the monumental errors of the foreign policy of the Democratic Party of the U.S. for the past 72 years.

- In fact, Democrat president Harry Truman abandoned many East European countries in the arms of
The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha)
islands of the Vietnamese people

Joseph Stalin at the end of World War II. Worse, he also abandoned the Republic of China in 1949 to communist Mao Zedong, despite the fact that China just fought the Japanese forces along the U.S. and joined the Security Council of the United Nations. After Truman, Democrat president John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara continued on the wrong path by committing 2 extremely grave errors: the military doctrine of containment in Vietnam, through limited and graduated response aiming to stop the communists in their advance and not fighting to win, conceived by McNamara, perpetuating the war until the withdrawal of American forces, while the war could have been won, stemming communist China's expansion in South-East Asia.

- The Kennedy administration had also orchestrated the military coup of November 1, 1963, overthrowing the first Republic of Vietnam, killing president Ngo Dinh Diem, the most efficient leader of Vietnam, seriously weakening the defense capabilities of South Vietnam, causing the U.S. having to send hundreds of thousand troops between 1965 and 1973, leading to countless expenses and sacrifices, to finally suffer defeat

- Pursuing the war of containment strategy, Washington promptly stopped the two weeks of intense air attacks before Christmas 1972 to sign the Paris Peace Agreement on January 27, 1973 and the Final Act on March 2nd, offering the Republic of Vietnam to the communists while they were actually ready to surrender.

Regarding this event, president Nixon wanted to keep his promise of bringing a honorable peace to Vietnam, committed himself to president Nguyen Van Thieu, to intervene strongly and immediately should a violation of the agreement by the communists occurs. That commitment, formulated in several official acts, was not executed after Nixon's resignation following the Watergate scandal. The democrat majority in congress also forbid any military operations in Vietnam

Recently, various former intelligence officers, among them Ted Gunderson, revealed publicly that Hanoi had sent a message asking to surrender after the 2 weeks of heavy bombings before Christmas 1972 but U.S. officials of the State Department decided to suppress that message in order to continue the Paris talks. We ask you to order an inquiry into this event, given its importance. If this was true, this would have been a grave treason towards the Republic of Vietnam, an ally of the U.S., and the 57,000 American soldiers who paid the ultimate price on the battlefields of Vietnam.

- Finally, it was also the democrat majority in Congress that forbade U.S. troops to intervene against North Vietnamese troops who violated the Paris Peace Agreement of January 27, 1973, of which the Final Act was signed on March 2nd by the U.S. government as well as 11 other countries, in the presence of General Secretary Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations, an intervention committed by president Nixon to president Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, as previously mentioned. And worse, with its majority in Congress, the Democratic Party opposed the release of the 375 million dollars that remained in the budget of military aid for Vietnam that the South Vietnamese army badly needed to strengthen its fighting capabilities in the decisive battle for the fate of South Vietnam.

- An outpost on the path of Chinese expansion to South-East Asia, Vietnam continues to be under the yoke of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), comrade to its big brother the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Due to its submission on many respects: ideological orthodoxy, gratitude to the Chinese's immense aid during the invasion war of South Vietnam, the VCP will never be able to escape from the strict control of the CCP. Furthermore, the Thanh Do Agreement of 1990 will make Vietnam an autonomous region of China by 2020.

- In order to defend our country's fate, closely linked to the security and peace of South-East Asia and the Pacific region, we solemnly call, as the de jure government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

expressing faithfully the will of the Vietnamese people, both at home and abroad, to president Donald Trump of the U.S., urging him for the common interests of his country and others in the region, to sanction and put an end to the bellicose Chinese expansion: flagrant violation of international law invading peninsulas belonging to other countries to build military bases, control of the air and maritime space of the most neuralgic region of the India and Pacific Oceans, seriously impeding the fishing industry and oil exploitation in the South-East Asia sea (abusively called China Sea!)

- In addition, please apply the law PL93-959-Dec-30, 1974, 4/ of U.S. Congress aiming to “reconvene the Paris Conference with the goal to fully implement the provisions of the Paris Peace Agreement of January 27, 1973 concerning the parties involved in the Vietnamese conflict”, of which our Republic of Vietnam is one of the main entitie

With the effect of this law and that of the Paris Peace Agreement-an inprescriptible international treaty and in this case, not subject to caducity due to the obstinate fight of the government of Vietnam before and after 1975 and the population of South Vietnam with all their means, both at home and abroad, for the implementation of the above agreement, we believe that a fair, feasible solution, and compliant to international law can be found so that the Vietnamese people can fully exercise their right to self-determination, to free themselves from the totalitarian communist yoke and to effectively help stem the red tide towards South-East Asia.

- To accomplish this mission and at the same time rebuild and develop fully its country from north to south, the future Republic of Vietnam will have to cooperate closely, permanently, and in absolute priority with your country in all fields and this, both for our common interests and for the security and peace in this highly strategic region of the globe.

- Persuaded that you have already seen the monumental errors of the Democratic Party during the past seven decades, we urge you to remedy their extremely negative consequences for Vietnam and other countries of the world and this, not only for the practical and legitimate interests of the United States, but also to fulfill their historic mission of contributing to the protection of liberty and peace of the world.

With your exceptional abilities to have in just one year of exercising power, accomplished tremendously for American prosperity, we firmly believe that you can achieve this noble mission.

- Once delivered from the Vietnamese Communist Party, indentured to the Chinese Communist Party, our compatriots of about 100 millions, united, will build an indestructible wall against any enemy coming from the north and will bring our real part to the maintaining of security and peace for the whole Asia-Pacific region.

- From our Vietnamese people thirsting for freedom, justice and democracy, please accept, Mr. President, the tribute of our very distinguished consideration and our deepest gratitude.

The Prime Minister



Le Trong Quat

Former Premier Minister of State

Justice of The Constitutional Court, Republic of Vietnam (<http://vietnamconghoaphapdinh.com/>)



**RÉPUBLIQUE DU VIETNAM
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE JURE**

EN AMERIQUE DU NORD- EUROPE- AUSTRALIE
ltqvina@gmail.com

Le Premier Ministre Le Trong Quat

A Son Excellence Le Président des Etats Unis Donald Trump

La Maison Blanche, Washington D.C.

Le 1er Février 2018

(En communication à Leurs Excellences Présidents et Premiers Ministres de la France, du Royaume-Uni, du Canada, de la Pologne, de la Hongrie, de l'Indonésie et Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies),

Monsieur le Président,

La situation s'est de jour en jour aggravée dans la mer de l'Est-Asie.

A côté de l'attitude agressive du Président Kim Jung Un de la Corée du Nord menaçant de lancer vers les Etats-Unis des missiles munies de têtes nucléaires, la Chine communiste continue de militariser les presqu'îles Paracels et Spratleys en dépit de leurs avertissements répétés, régissant en maître dans l'espace maritime de nombreux pays, réduisant ainsi leur confiance en la puissance américaine. Le rapprochement des Philippines vers la Chine en est la preuve formelle.

Cette néfaste influence s'est étendue vers les pays amis des Etats-Unis, qui se sont intéressés progressivement vers ses projets en cours de réalisation - La Banque d'Investissement dans les Infrastructures et La Nouvelle Route de la Soie – visant à développer ses relations commerciales et économiques dans une vaste région englobant 68 pays, 4,4 milliards d'hommes, 62% du PIB du monde.

Ce gigantesque expansionnisme économique et territorial n'a rencontré aucun obstacle même en Asie du Sud-Est. La surprenante indifférence a sans conteste pris sa source dans les erreurs monumentales de la politique étrangère du Parti Démocrate des Etats-Unis depuis 72 ans.

- En effet, le Président démocrate Harry Truman avait lâché plusieurs pays de l'Europe de l'Est dans les bras de Joseph Staline après la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et pis encore, abandonné en 1949 la République de Chine au communiste Mao Tsé Tung alors qu'avec les Américains elle venait de combattre les forces japonaises et de prendre sa place de membre permanent au Conseil de Sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

- Après Truman, ce fut le Président démocrate John F. Kennedy avec ses lourdes responsabilités dues à ses deux erreurs et fautes extrêmement graves : la doctrine d'endiguement par riposte limitée et graduelle appliquée au Vietnam visant à stopper l'ennemi sans intention de le vaincre, conçue par son ministre de la Défense MacNamara et faisant perpétuer la guerre jusqu'au retrait des forces américaines alors qu'à tout moment, elles auraient pu la terminer victorieusement pour endiguer l'expansion de la Chine communiste en Asie du Sud-Est.

- Le gouvernement de Kennedy avait aussi fomenté le coup d'Etat militaire du 1er Novembre 1963 renversant la Première République du Vietnam, tuant son Président NGO DINH DIEM, le leader le plus efficace du Vietnam, ouvrant la voie à l'infiltration massive des forces communistes Nord-Vietnamiennes au Sud Vietnam, affaiblissant considérablement les capacités de défense de la République du Vietnam, obligeant ainsi les Etats-Unis à y envoyer plusieurs centaines de milliers de combattants entre 1965 et 1973, entraînant d'innombrables dépenses et sacrifices pour enfin subir la défaite.

- Poursuivant ainsi la stratégie de combattre sans intention de vaincre l'ennemi, Washington arrêta promptement ses deux semaines de foudroyantes attaques aériennes avant Noël 1972 pour signer les Accords de Paris le 27 janvier 1973 et l'Acte final du 2 Mars, offrant la République du Vietnam aux communistes alors qu'ils étaient prêts à capituler. Concernant particulièrement cet événement, le Président Nixon qui avait voulu tenir sa promesse d'apporter une paix honorable au Vietnam, s'est engagé avec le Président Nguyen Van Thieu à intervenir puissamment et immédiatement après toute éventuelle violation desdits Accords par les communistes Nord-Vietnamiens. Cet engagement formulé dans plusieurs actes officiels n'a pas été exécuté après sa démission suite à l'affaire Watergate mais aussi par la majorité démocrate au Congrès qui interdisait désormais toute opération militaire américaine au Vietnam.

- Tout récemment, des anciens cadres des services de l'Intelligence américaine dont M. Ted Gunderson ont révélé publiquement que Hanoi avait demandé la capitulation sitôt après les bombardements avant Noël 1972 mais des autorités responsables américaines l'avaient passé sous silence pour reprendre les derniers pourparlers à Paris. Nous vous demandons en effet de bien vouloir en ordonner une enquête, compte tenu de l'importance de cette affaire et si c'était vrai, ce n'aurait pas été une faute mais une trahison gravissime envers l'allié République du Vietnam et 57.000 combattants américains sacrifiés sur le champ de bataille vietnamien.

- Enfin, c'était aussi la majorité démocrate au Congrès qui interdisait les forces américaines d'intervenir contre les troupes communistes Nord-Vietnamiennes qui violaient les Accords de Paris du 27 janvier 1973, dont l'Acte final venait d'être signé le 2 Mars par le gouvernement américain et onze autres gouvernements en présence du Secrétaire général Kurt Waldheim de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, laquelle intervention avait été engagée par le Président Nixon avec le Président Nguyen Van Thieu de la République du Vietnam, comme ci-dessus mentionnée. Mais, pis encore, toujours avec sa majorité au Congrès, le parti Démocrate s'est opposé au déblocage de 375 millions de dollars restant dans le budget d'aide militaire au Vietnam dont l'armée vietnamienne avait grandement besoin pour renforcer ses moyens de combat dans cette bataille décisive pour le sort de son pays.

- Avant-poste sur le chemin de l'expansion chinoise vers l'Asie du Sud-Est, le Vietnam ne devrait continuer de rester sous le joug du Parti Communiste Vietnamien (PCV), camarade du grand frère Parti Communiste Chinois (PCC). De par sa soumission à plus d'un égard : orthodoxie idéologique, reconnaissance due à l'immense aide chinoise à sa guerre d'invasion de la République du Vietnam, le PCV ne pourra jamais échapper au strict contrôle du PCC sans compter les Accords de Thành Đô de 1990, en vertu desquels le Vietnam devra devenir dans 30 ans une région autonome de la Chine.

- Aussi, pour défendre notre pays dont le destin est étroitement lié à la sécurité et la paix en Asie du Sud-Est et dans l'ensemble de la région du Pacifique, faisons-nous solennellement appel, en tant que Gouvernement De Jure de la République du Vietnam qui exprime fidèlement la volonté du peuple vietnamien tant au pays qu'à l'étranger, au Président Donald Trump des Etats-Unis en lui demandant instamment pour les intérêts communs de son grand pays et d'autres dans la région, de bien vouloir sanctionner et mettre fin effectivement à l'expansion belliqueuse chinoise : violation flagrante du droit international en envahissant des îles appartenant aux autres pays et y construisant des bases militaires, contrôlant l'espace aérien et maritime de la région la plus névralgique des deux océans Indien et Pacifique, entravant gravement les activités de pêche et d'exploitation pétrolière dans la Mer de l'Est d'Asie (abusivement appelée Mer de Chine).

Par ailleurs, nous vous prions d'appliquer la Loi PL93-959-Dec.30,1974, 4/ du Congrès USA visant à « réunir la Conférence de Paris en vue d'appliquer entièrement les clauses des Accords du 27 janvier 1973 concernant les parties vietnamiennes du conflit » dont notre République du Vietnam est l'une des principales.

Avec l'effet de cette loi et celui des Accords de Paris - traité international imprescriptible et en l'occurrence, non frappé de caducité en raison du combat opiniâtre du gouvernement de la République du Vietnam avant et après 1975 et des Sud Vietnamiens avec tous leurs moyens tant au pays qu'à l'étranger pour l'application desdits Accords - nous croyons qu'une solution juste, réalisable et conforme au droit international pourrait être trouvée afin que le peuple vietnamien puisse exercer pleinement son droit à l'autodétermination, s'affranchir du joug communiste totalitaire et contribuer efficacement à endiguer le déferlement de la marée rouge vers l'Asie du Sud-Est.

-Pour accomplir cette mission et en même temps reconstruire et développer pleinement son pays du Nord au Sud, la future République du Vietnam devra coopérer étroitement, durablement et en priorité absolue avec votre pays dans tous les domaines et ce, aussi bien pour nos intérêts communs que pour la sécurité et la paix dans cette région hautement stratégique du globe.

-Persuadés que vous aurez déjà constaté les erreurs monumentales du parti Démocrate pendant les sept décennies passées, nous vous prions instamment de remédier à leurs conséquences extrêmement néfastes pour le Vietnam et autres pays du monde et cela, non seulement pour les intérêts pratiques et légitimes des Etats Unis mais aussi pour accomplir leur mission historique de contribuer à la protection de la liberté et de la paix du monde.

Avec vos capacités exceptionnelles d'avoir en un an d'exercice du pouvoir, accompli de performances considérables pour la prospérité américaine, nous croyons fermement que vous puissiez réussir cette noble mission.

Une fois délivrés du PCV inféodé au PCC, nos compatriotes d'environ 100 millions, unis et solidaires, bâtiront une indestructible muraille contre tout ennemi venant du Nord et apporteront notre véritable part au maintien de la sécurité et à l'œuvre de paix pour l'ensemble de l'Asie-Pacifique.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'hommage de notre très distinguée considération et la profonde gratitude de notre peuple vietnamien assoiffé de liberté, de justice et de démocratie

Le Premier Ministre

Gouvernement De Jure de la République du Vietnam



Le Trong Quat

Ancien Premier Ministre d'Etat

Conseiller à la Cour Constitutionnelle Việt Nam

Qing dynasty map dated 1904 does not include Vietnam Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha) Spratlys (aka Trường Sa; Sansha, Nansha) Islands



(Last update on 2/23/2013 at 13:44)

The China's all-provinces Imperial map created under the Qing Dynasty, published in 1904, states that the southernmost pole of China is Hainan, not showing the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

In July 2012, after holding the old map for more than 30 years, and with thorough researching and translating notes printed on the map, Dr. Mai Hong, the former Head of the Library Records Department of the Viet-Sino Institute, shared his conclusion as shown in the following interviewing:

* Can you tell how this map reach to your hands?

- I obtained the map sometime in 1977-1978, during that time, my duty was to manage a large storage of Viet-Sino materials. Interestingly, the collection of mapping documents was not part of my scope. Frankly, I did not understand what luck caused an old book salesman named Nguyen Van Cong who used to sell old books to the Institute, introduced the map and advised me to buy it. I took out more than a month of my salary to buy the map without telling my family about the spending.

* We were told that the map was known to be developed with skillful handwork. Wasn' it?

- It is true. The China's all-provinces Imperial map was published by Shanghai Publishing company in 1904; was printed in color with hardcover, folded like a book. Inside, there are more than 35 paper patches bonded together on the canvas floor; and thanks to this material, the map remains intact over a long period. The size of each patch is about 16cm x 27.6cm. After reading the Chinese characters on the map, I translated about 600 Chinese words which have clearly explained the origin, time and date of the map.

Accordingly, this is a collection of documents originated from the Qin Dynasty, then Han Dynasty,

and was written continuously for nearly two centuries (1708-1904), from the reign of King Kangxi to the reign of King Quang Tu. The map was developed by Western missionaries of knowledgeable Chinese astrologist under direct and personal supervisions of several emperors of the Qing dynasty.

As the matter of fact, in the 47th year Kangxi (1708), initially with the goal of creating a clearer map for the Great Wall, The Kangxi emperor recruited Western missionaries such as Bach Tan Loi Hieu, Tu Do Duc My; however, in 1711, the king changed his mind by sending missionaries to survey the land mas of 13 provinces across the kingdom. From then on, for nearly 200 years, Chinese and Western artists collected Chinese artifact objects, the mapping materials on Chinese territories which were left by the previous efforts of the earlier missions. There are some very famous Western missionaries who have helped to create China map such as Matteo Ricci, Joannes Adam Schall Von Bell, Ferdinandus Verbiest...

In 1904, the Shanghai publishing company officially published a geographic map of al the provinces under Qing dynasty ruling with the introduction of the Superscript, Chief Sai Thuong Chat, the General Director of Xa Son Observatory.



The meaning of large Chinese text on the top of this map (read from the right to left: The China's all-provinces Imperial map

* What are the useful historical impacts from this map, Sir?

- In this map, Chief Sai Thuong Chat has very humble words which appreciated the accomplishments of Western missionaries who renown Chinese astrologist and mathematics. The main wording also noted that the map appeared "as clear as in the palm of his hand," especially "at the river openings to coastal areas portraying the waterway vessels sailing to port." All of these wordings have never mentioned anything about any land mass or any islands in the south of Hainan Island.

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

* What do you have in your mind when deciding to publish this material?

- In my opinion, this original map provides some very good information for the international debate. With a material originated from China itself which will help to prevent us from being continuously bullied. This may also be a good document for use in the study of the sovereignty of islands.

...

Mai Hồng – Autor

English version by V.G. Tran

Dai Viet Tran – Updated (April 21, 2017)

<http://www.vietnamparacels.org/paracel-spratly-islands-history/qing-dynasty-map-dated-1904-does-not-incl-vnparacels-spratlys-islands.html>

Indisputable Historical Facts: French has proved that Hoang Sa (aka Paracel; Xisha) and Truong Sa (aka Spratly; Sansha) Islands are Vietnam's sovereignty



SERVICE DU SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRAL

Vietnam was a French colony.

During World War II, Japan has been staying a long time in Vietnam. Vietnam and Japan have abundant evidence that the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands belong to Vietnam.

This fact frightens the Chinese communists.

On the continuity of real possession, Dr. Tran Cong Luc has given some very concrete and meaningful historical milestones: As the representative of the State of Vietnam in foreign affairs during the Vietnam period was a French colony, France continued to exercise Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos.

Under the Treaty of Patenotre in 1884, the French colonial administration carried out activities representing the Vietnamese State in the continuation of the protection, governance, and affirmation of Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos.

Specifically, after a period of research and fieldwork conducted by scientists and exchanges between French politicians related to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, on 8/3/1925, Governor-General of Indochina declared that Paracel and Spratly archipelagos are part of French colonial territory.

On March 19, 1926, the governor of "Cochinchine" granted a mining license to Spratly Island for the phosphate company of Tonkin.

On April 13, 1930, an "information ship" named Malicieuse commanded by Captain De Lattre headed for the Spratly Islands under the directions of the Governor-General of Indochina to set up the sovereign marks of the Indochinese Islands. De Lattre also stationed at the Spratly Islands and supervised surrounding the smaller islands and shoreline landing strips as well...

On September 23, 1930, following the international protocol, the French government sent diplomatic correspondence to the great powers over the fact that the Spratly Islands were occupied by the French.

On December 31, 1930, the Foreign Relations Office of the Governor-General of Indochina sent a report to the Prime Minister, Minister of the French Colonies on the activities of occupying the Spratly Islands and its surrounding islands along with the research materials regarding the Legal matter of this occupation.

On January 4, 1932, the French Government sent a governmental note to the French embassy in Paris confirming French sovereignty over the Paracels and proposed settlement of the dispute through friendly negotiations or international arbitration. The Communist Chinese denied this offer.

On February 18, 1937, France formally requested the Chinese to apply international arbitration to determine the sovereignty over Paracel archipelago; Again, Chinese rejected.

On November 26, 1937, France sent Chief Engineer J. Gauthier to Paracel to study the locations for building the lighthouses, parking lots for hydroplanes; and studying the settlement conditions in the archipelago.

In 1938, France dispatched its "Regional Security" forces to station on the islands and built a lighthouse; a meteorological station which was registered with the World Meteorological Organization (registration # 48859) on the island of Phu Lam; a wireless station TSF on the Paracel Islands.

On March 30, 1938, Emperor Bao Dai signed the Ordinance No. 10 to merge Paracel into Thua Thien province rather than (Quang) Nam – (Quang) Ngai as before.

On June 15, 1938, France completed the meteorological station on Ba Binh Island, a part of Spratly archipelago

On June 15, 1938, Governor-General of Indochina Jules Brevie signed Decree # 156-S-V to establish an administrative unit for Paracel archipelago in Thua Thien province.

Also in June 1938, a unit of Vietnam's Regional Security Forces was stationed in the Paracel archipelago. An Event Mark of sovereignty has been erected on the island of Paracel inscribed with the words as follows: "The Republic of Franco-Empire of Vietnam's Paracel archipelago since 1816, dated 1938."

During World War II, Japan declared merging islands in the South China Sea into territories occupied by Japan. On April 4, 1939, the French Government sent a Governmental Note of protest to the mentioned-above Japanese decisions; and protect the French right over the Paracels and Spratly islands.

On August 15, 1945, Japan lost the war; and withdrew from Indochina;

and on August 26, 1945, Japanese troops had to withdraw from Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos.

Right after the Japanese withdrawal, an extremely complex situation opened up a new and strange era.

Dr. Truc said that in the historical context of late 1946, early 1947, despite Vietnam's declaration of independence on September 2, 1945, no longer tied to the 1884 Patenotre Agreement. On the other hand, the French Government, According to the preliminary agreement of March 6, 1946, the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (aka the Communist Vietnam) was still part of the French Union. As such, the French diplomacy was still responsible for enforcing Vietnam's right to represent Vietnam in the fight against any foreign forces trying to violate the Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Under the Treaty of March 8, 1949, France established a pro-French government, called the Vietnamese State, headed by former Emperor Bao Dai. However, in practice, French troops still had the East Sea in their control, including the Paracels and Spratlys.

Also in 1949, the World Meteorological Organization accepted the French's application to list the French-based meteorological stations in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands as a list of world meteorological stations: Phu Lam number 48859, Hoang Sa Station number 48860, and Ba Binh Station number 48419.

On October 14, 1950, the Governor General of Central Vietnam Phan Van Giau chaired the handover over the Paracel archipelago between the French Government and Bao Dai Government.

From September 5 to September 8, 1951, the San Francisco Symposium was attended by representatives from 51 countries who signed the treaty with Japan. At the plenary session on Sept. 5, with 48 abstentions, three votes in favor, the conference rejected the proposal made by Secretary of State Gromyko (former Soviet Union) to amend paragraph 13 of the Draft. The Draft contains: Japan acknowledges the People Republic of China (Communist China)'s sovereignty over the Paracels and the islands further south.

On September 7, 1951, Prime Minister and (in lieu) Minister of State of Vietnam Tran Van Huu solemnly declared the two archipelagos Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) as the territory of Vietnam. No participant in this conference commented anything on this statement.

On September 8, 1951, the treaty with Japan was signed. Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Treaty, states: "Japan renounced its sovereignty, title, and ambition for the Paracel and Spratly Islands" (Paragraph f).

On July 20, 1954, the signed Geneva Agreement recognized Vietnam as a country with independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity. Article 1 of the Agreement provides for the Ben Hai River (parallel 17) as a temporary demarcation line to distribute territorial management rights between the two North-South regions of Vietnam. This temporary frontier is also extended by a straight line from the coast to the sea (Article 4). The Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are located under the 17th parallel, so they are under the administration of the South Vietnamese government.

In April 1956, when the French Expeditionary Army withdrew from Indochina, the Vietnamese National Army, later the Republic of (South) Vietnam, took over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago. Before the invasion of some islands in the Paracels and Spratly Islands by the Chinese Communists at the time of this transition, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has voiced its opposition.

On May 24 and June 8, 1956, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam issued a statement stressing that the Paracel and the Spratly Islands "were always part of Vietnam" and claimed assertion of sovereignty; Long ago in Vietnam.

On July 13, 1971, at the ASPEC Manila Conference, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet Nam Tran Van Lam declared the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes under Vietnamese sovereignty.

From January 17 to January 20, 1974, the Chinese Navy mobilized military forces to occupy the western part of the Paracel Sa archipelago. On the diplomatic front, the Republic of Vietnam has

strongly protested against the United Nations and the international community.

Translated English version by Van G. Tran

(Source: NGUYEN VAN MUI's blog)

<http://www.vietnamparacels.org/paracel-spratly-islands-history/indisputable-historical-facts-paracels-spratly-vietnams-sovereignty.shtml>



The European Union: Stop the one belt one road initiative and TGV Pekin-Geneva in 10 days from China

To: The European Union leaders

C/c: International leaders participating the 2018 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting from Jan. 23 to 26 at Davos, Switzerland.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Southeast Asia Sea belongs to the people of Viet Nam. Our people have been residing at the sea region for over 10 thousand years, according to historians. Before 10 thousand years, the Chinese were not present at this Asian region and at the Southeast Asia Sea area. In the modern time, over several recent decades the Southeast Asia Sea region was controlled by the Republic of Viet Nam and recognized by the international community. However, the Southeast Asia Sea is not at peace and always in turmoil since the Chinese Communist Party appeared on the China soil on July 1, 1921 until now.

On March 09, 2015, Wang Li, foreign minister of China declared that the Southeast Asia Sea is Peking's "house foundation". This is preposterous and false. Professor Carl Thayer says that he was "shocked" in reading Mr. Wang's expression, especially before the 27th anniversary of the Chinese Communist attack of the Vietnamese ships near the Johnson reef on March 14, 1988 – end quote-. Next, Le Yucheng, Chinese Ambassador to India declared that the Southeast Asia Sea is always "peaceful".

We drafts this indictment to counter strongly and definitively the two above-mentioned declaration of Wang Li and Le Yucheng and to denounces to the public and international opinion the multiple crimes against human beings, of aggression and of genocide toward the Vietnamese ethnic, the Tibetans and Falun Gong over the last 94 years committed by the Communist Party of China since it was founded by Mao Zedong and still today, in 2018, under Xi Jinping.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Last year on January 2017, for the first time, Xi plans to attend this World Economic Conference to promote his questionable scheme of Globalization and inviting the foreign investments into China as well.

The globalization doctrine (globalization), can be defined as an ideology to undertake the Sovereign Nation-State as its main enemy, essentially because the State is mandatory to put the interests of the majority above the that of the minority. So that Globalization seeks to weaken, disintegrate, and finally destroy the true foundation of State sovereignty as a basic social institution; instead, it aims to replace individual states with the new global structure and so-called a Super Nation to take charge of Social, political, economic, financial, and the military needs. -end quote- Freemasonry and the super power of the ILLUMINATI, Jewish – dinhsong's social network.

Xi Jinping advocating that globalization mainly pertains to weaken the Government of the Sovereign States to cater for the dishonest expansion toward the outside world - Similarly to the paragraph just mentioned above.

The world economy last year was and stirred up through the currency manipulation by the Chinese (Chinese Currency Manipulation Could Become A Global Problem in 2017 - <http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2017/01/12/chinese-currency-manipulation-could-become-a-global-problem-in-2017/#70711a029215>), therefore, we petitions the The European Union leaders, Swiss Government, International leaders participating the World Economic Forum first to be very careful while listening to what Chinese Xi Jinping is going to say and secondly looking into what he is doing in the Vietnam Sea (Southeast Asia Sea) and to the world as well.



Sources: photo (qz.com); Title (bloomberg.com)

In 2018, according by bloomberg news: China's economy begins 2018 facing what its own leaders call three years of "[critical battles](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-01/china-warms-up-for-2018-critical-battles-with-cooling-economy)." ... "China GDP growth expected to slow" -end quote- (<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-01/china-warms-up-for-2018-critical-battles-with-cooling-economy>)

Professor Van Canh Nguyen in "Paracels & Spratleys and National Sovereignty", Center for Vietnam Studies, 5th edition, 2014; and "Territorial Sovereignty and Chinese Expansionism", Center for Vietnam Studies, 2010 has also warned that the Chinese Communist is building a series of military bases on the Spartly Islands, stole from Viet Nam in 1988 (Johnson archipelago etc.). If there were no complicity, why the Vietnamese Communist let the Chinese Communist free hand to do as they wish right on Viet Nam's waters? This building is obviously a serious threat to the security of the international shipping lanes between Asia-Pacific and other continents.

Chinese Formosa' disaster poisoned and destroyed marine on Vietnamese Sea from April 2016 to present day of January 2018, for example.



Formosa's Mass Fish Deaths from April, 2016 to January, 2017 (Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien - Hue provinces, Vietnam Central)

The Sri Lankan people demonstrated to protest Chinese investment in the Southern Hambantota, Sri Lanka, on 7 January 2017. They said that the Government of Sri Lanka had made grave mistakes when it chased away and vacated thousands of local families to hand the 6,070 hectares of land to the Chinese for the construction of the airport and port. Sri Lankan are fully aware that the Chinese will cause heavy pollution and destroy the marine environment; use the port of Hambantota to control the vessel navigating across the Indian Ocean, the Sri Lanka to Europe and the Middle East; threaten the security and peace of the region and the world.

We pray the European Union will stop the dangerous project or nevert participate in the so-called Plan Silk Road (one belt one road initiative) that Chinese Xi Jinping advocates. The European Union as well as Switzerland and European Union citizens should decisively reject the project of high speed trains direct from Péking to Geneva in 10 days.

If the said project high speed trains would realized the Switzerland and the European Union have inadvertently brought the war and violence into Europe. It is totally a self-destruction plan.

For over 70 years, the Communist Party, especially that of the so-called “People's Republic of China” has always been the source of pain for humanity. Today, in 2018, with ill-spirit political ambition, Xi Jinping is the character who is much more dangerous than Adolf Hitler's Nazis and Islamic State (IS) combined.

The 21st century marks the tremendous progress of humanity in all aspects, and has a connection people of all races very closely. Therefore, the areas of politics, computing, economics, military, financial, maritime security are equally important.

Thank you for your consideration of this indictment document.

Respectfully submitted

Friday January 19, 2018. 44th Anniversary battle of the Paracels islands (Jan 19, 1974 – Jan 19, 2018)

Re-edited by vietnamparacels.org open forum; English version by V.G.Tran

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People Republic of China wrecking the eco-sys-tem scouring the ocean floors

"China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world." Napoléon Bonaparte, at St Helena Island 1816

NGÔ THẾ VINH

To the Friends of the Mekong



Picture 1: Chinese trawler that can scour the ocean floor: those mega trawlers equipped with driftnets are roaming offshore the coast of West Africa and other places to carry out illegal search and destroy fishing and depleting our planet's resources. [source: India Live Today, July 8, 2016]

THE PEOPLE REPUBLIC OF CHINA DEPLETING THE FISH STOCKS OF THE WORLD

The time the oceans were still teeming with fish, life was good and plentiful for the fishermen. However, as it now stands, fishermen in West Africa like Guinea, Senegal, on the opposite side of the globe, are complaining that the nets they reel in were almost empty. (1,2)

Meanwhile, in eastern China, Zhu Delong, 75, shook his head looking at the few tiny fish and red shrimps in his net. He reminisced: "When I was a kid, you could cast a line out your back door and hook huge yellow croackers. Now the sea is empty."

The Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that due to over fishing, the world's fish stocks are approaching the point of near total depletion. In all the earth's oceans, the search and destroy method of fishing - done mostly by China's fishing fleets - had a direct impact on the livelihood of the millions of fishermen in poor nations whose food and main source of income are derived from the sea.



Picture 2: The number of China's fishing fleet continues to grow without pause and their fraudulent catches become more frequent day and night along the coast of West Africa. [source: Greenpeace Africa 20.05.2015]



Picture 3: With its fleet of over 2,600 large ships, China's presence can be felt everywhere: the East Sea, Australia, Indian Ocean, West Africa and South America. China is proclaimed the "King of the Sea" [source: The NYT 04.30.2017]

With a population of almost 1,4 billion – or 1/5 that of the world - today's China no longer suffers from food penury thanks to its fairly developed economy. The rising income of the Chinese allows them to develop a taste for good eating and sea food has become their favorite choice. To meet that demand, China has built a fleet of large iron fishing vessels, designed not only for the catch but also for para military purposes i.e. to patrol the sea. The Chinese government provides its fishermen with money to build their boats; buy the navigational equipment, fuel and even refrigeration facilities in order to preserve the catches during their weeks-long distant trips to West Africa and South America. Furthermore, those fishing flotillas also receive the protection of the Chinese Navy's gunships.

To the leaders in Beijing, those fishing fleets represent an instrument of power they can use to assert their country's sovereignty over the maritime territories currently under dispute in the East Sea. The administrators of Hainan Province never tire of encouraging their fishermen to sail to the Paracel islands that belong to Vietnam or to the Spratly islands that are contested by both the Philippines and Vietnam to show their nation's flag.

Most worrisome of all are the activities of the Chinese trawlers equipped with driftnets that can drop miles-long nets capable of reaching down and scour the seafloor to catch all the marine lives including corals and oyster beds. When returned to the sea afterwards, about 90% of them cannot survive. The use of those trailers has already been banned in many countries on account of their extensive nefarious impacts on the overall eco-system of the oceans. Ironically, on its part, China is pushing their use to the maximum. [Picture 1]

The almost depleted fish stocks in China's sea prompt the Chinese government to encourage its fishing fleets to venture into faraway waters of other countries to fish.

They are not only content to roam freely in the East Sea but sail half way around the globe to West Africa and as far as to South America. [Picture 2, 3] According to a research conducted by Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, in the 2011-2015 period, the Chinese fishing industries received a total subsidy of US\$ 22 billion from its government – a threefold increase compared to the previous 4 years. The Chinese distant-water fishing vessels number 2,600 (10 times those of the United States). In the case of Senegal, in a week, those mega ships can haul in the equivalent of what the local fishermen catch during an entire year.

As far as the world's fisheries are concerned, China is the “king of the sea”. This country leads the world in the export of marine food. The Chinese consume 1/3 of their catch while exporting the remainder. The sea food industry employs 14 million Chinese. In reality, what is known as traditional fishing in the waters bordering China only exists in name only. “For China's leaders, ensuring a steady supply of aquatic products is not just about good economics but social stability and political legitimacy” remarked Mr. Zhang Hongzhou of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

CHINA, THE ROBBER OF POOR PEOPLE LIVELIHOOD

It would be advisable that we take some time to help our young people who grew up overseas understand the meaning of the Vietnamese idiom "cướp cơm chim." It refers to the act of the rich or powerful who stoop so low as taking away the little food on which the poor and powerless depend on for their subsistence. This is the exact image the Chinese fishing fleets project when they illegally carry on their trade and steal the livelihood of the poor fishermen all over the world.

Senegal, the typical image of a poor country in West Africa, has a population of 14 million, a 300-mile long seacoast, and fish stocks that are its lifeline. That lifeline is being relentlessly depleted by China. (1)

How can we expect the local fishermen sailing on flimsy wooden pirogues confront the iron mammoths of the Chinese flotillas that can deploy miles-long nets? [Pictures 1,4] It's no surprise then that the already destitute Senegalese can no longer depend on the sea for food and a living income.

Alassane Samba, former director of Senegal's Oceanic Research Institute offers this observation: “We are facing an unprecedented crisis. If things keep going the way they are, people will have to eat jellyfish to survive.” (1)

The World Bank reported that fishery not only provides the protein source for the Senegalese but also accounts for a significant segment of that country's export revenue. In addition, this sector offers work to as much as 20% of the national work force.

In the old days, fishermen frequently caught large groupers and tunas. Now, they have to compete fiercely with each other just to haul in tiny sardines. The Senegalese have to brave dangers and venture into the high seas on wooden vessels to fish. On top of the uncertainties posed by the weather, they may encounter big bands of Chinese super trawlers that can ram and sink them. As a result, they have to be content with their catches of tiny fish while facing a hopeless future.

Furthermore, droughts caused by climate change force hundreds of thousands to migrate from the countryside to the coasts to make a living. Consequently, the country becomes more dependent on the sea at the time when its resources are on the verge of being depleted.

The waves of immigration to the coasts have transformed the small fishing village of Joal with a few fishing boats into a sprawling city of 55,000 souls and 4,900 wooden pirogues. Abdou Karim Sall, president of the local fishermen association, was considered a hero when he single-handedly detained the captains of two Chinese boats that were poaching offshore from Senegalese's coast. He stated: "We always thought that sea life was boundless. Now, we are facing a catastrophe."

The increasingly dire conditions of life have turned them into reluctant economic refugees flooding into the countries of Europe. Moustapha Balde, 22, whose teenage cousin drowned while trying to cross the Mediterranean, stated: "Foreigners complain about Africa migrants coming to their countries, but they (referring to the Chinese) have no problem coming to our waters and steal all our fish."

Dyhia Belhabib, a fisheries expert, attempted to put a dollar figure on the illegal fishing along the coastlines of West Africa. In her eyes, the worst offenders are the Chinese. Within Senegalese waters, they account for an illegal catch of 40,000 tons per year amounting to a loss of US\$ 28 million for that country. The actual loss is much larger considering that the Chinese boats do their illegal fishing most actively at nighttime.

The same tragedy of illegal fishing by the Chinese also befalls Guinea, another West African nation. The Bonfi seaport in Conakri Province looks dour. The wooden boats painted in vibrant colors can no longer haul in an abundance of fish like before. The inhabitants of Bonfi though angry could only watch in complete desperation the Chinese pirate ships. The government of Guinea lacks the means to defend its territorial waters but at the same time is paralyzed by corruption.

As far as China is concerned, a bane for others is a boon for them. Greenpeace reported that China showed the most blatant and ruthless behaviors during the time Guinea was struck by the disastrous Ebola epidemic in 2014. Instead of lending a helping hand, the Chinese rushed in additional boats to increase its illegal fishing activities off the coast of that unfortunate nation.

According to the Environment Justice Foundation (EJF), West Africa is where illegal fishing occurs the most. And the number one culprit is China that has enriched its coffers by engaging in stealing the fish, the most important food source, of the poorest people in the West African countries of Cape Verde, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Senegal... Poor, devoid of any means to protect themselves, they are being bullied by the big country of China. The corrupt governments in West Africa [corruption also counts as a soft power weapon used by the Chinese] do not run short of slogans exhorting the efforts to protect the sea. However, their people are fully aware that those slogans are devoid of any real meanings. Forced to deal with a big country like China, previously known as "a pirate nation", it can be assumed that those West African nations are fighting an uphill battle. And there is a good chance that they would end up with the short end of the stick.



Picture 4: Flimsy wooden pirogues used by Guinean fishermen - like this one - constantly run the risk of being chased away or overpowered by the super trawlers from China [source: BBC World-Africa 8 July 2016]

China commands the world's largest fishing fleet that can undertake months-long journeys to faraway destinations all over the world in order to fish illegally in the territorial waters of other nations. It is safe to assume that no country that borders the sea can claim it is exempt from that scourge.

The United Nations documents showed that illegal fishing, mostly perpetrated by China, resulted in a loss of US\$23 Billions to the world's economy each year. And the waters offshore of West Africa is where those activities are most active. The Environment Justice Foundation (EJF), a British NGO, remarked: "The people who commit those illegal high sea robberies have enriched themselves at the expense of the most destitute inhabitants of the West African nations."

TURNING ONE'S EYES TO THE EAST SEA AND VIETNAM

Thousands of Filipino fishermen had been chased away from their traditional fishing areas – the surrounding waters of the Spratlys - by the Chinese Navy. Fishermen from Palawan can no longer rely on the sea to earn a living. They must turn to burning the forests to farm but due to soil erosion caused by the rain, the parched fields are no longer arable. (1) Vietnam is blessed with a 1,367 mile-long coastline. The “golden” jungles and “silver” seas much praised in the past by the elementary school text book Quốc Văn Giáo Khoa Thư now belong to the long gone days. The jungles are disappearing due to deforestation, the seas polluted and stripped of fish. The Vietnamese fishermen face a lot much worse than that of their brothers in West Africa. They not only are deprived of their fish but also lost control of their seas. Should they decide now to sail into the waters that for ages belong to their forefathers, it would be at the risk of their lives.



Picture 5: The fleet of fishing boats of the East Sea on the Sông Tiền gets ready to sail out unprotected. They are constantly harassed by the Chinese even within the territorial waters of Vietnam [source: photo by Ngô Thế Vinh]

- 06/7/2015: the Chinese used water canons to damage the Vietnamese fishing boats
- 6/10/2015: four Chinese boats surrounded a Vietnamese one subduing its crew of 11, robbing it of 6 tons of fish
- 6/19/2015: Chinese soldiers boarded a Vietnamese fishing vessel, destroyed its nets, confiscated its communication equipment and compass, and stole its catch of 5 tons
- 9/29/2015: an armed group on a Chinese boat boarded a Vietnamese one, confiscated its navigation equipment and 2 tons of fish then sank it 12 hours later.
- 11/14/2015: a Chinese flotilla surrounded 5 Vietnamese fishing ships in the Gulf of Tonkin then destroyed all their nets. The incident only ended 12 hours later when they were rescued by the Vietnamese Coast Guard.
- 01/01/2016: a Chinese ship rammed and sank a Vietnamese boat near Cồn Cỏ only 40 miles offshore from Quảng Trị, the 11-member crew was later rescued by their countrymen
- 03/06/2016: 11 members from two Coast Guard cutters flying the Chinese flag took over a Vietnamese fishing boat in a surprise attack near the Paracels. They not only destroyed its navigation equipment, nets, all the food supply, reserve fuel but also stole the entire catch.
- 5/13/2016: a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat off the coast from Quảng Nam, 350 nautical miles North East of Danang in the vicinity of the Paracels. The Vietnamese lost all their fishing equipment and 30 tons of cuttlefish worth US\$ 450.000.
- 07/09/2016: a Vietnamese fishing boat with a crew of 5 on board was given the chase by a Chinese Coast Guard cutter and sank near the Paracels 34 nautical miles from the Bông Bay island and left them to their fate.
- 11/10/2016: the Vietnamese fishing boat KH 97580-TS was rammed by a Chinese Coast Guard cutter and chased off the waters of the Paracels near the Phú Lâm and Linh Côn

Islands.

- 05/01/2017: most recently the Vietnamese fishing boat BÐ 93241-TS and a crew of 15 was rammed and sunk by an “unidentified” vessel causing one dead and one injured.

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China continuously attacks the Vietnamese fishing boats (3). Obviously, those attacks are not isolated but fall within a deliberate strategy. Beijing gave the green light to those repeated belligerent acts. This is a policy aiming at “*killing two birds with one stone*”. On one hand, this country wants to assert, by force of arms, its sovereignty over the disputed sea. On the other, it pushes ahead with the exploitation of the entire natural resources, oil deposits, and fish stocks of not only the two Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes but also of the near coast that apparently belongs to the inviolable sovereignty of Vietnam.

The Vietnamese fishermen valiantly cling to the sea in spite of the empty declaration of support coming from the spokesperson for the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *“We strongly condemn the inhuman treatment, use of force against the Vietnamese fishermen and request that China investigate and take appropriate measures against its coast guard personnel who intentionally sank Vietnamese fishing vessels, left the crew to their own devices under perilous conditions that might imperil their lives. Vietnam requests that China observe international laws, prevent similar incidents from reoccurring and make commensurate restitutions to the Vietnamese fishermen.”* VnExpress 13.07.2016

Did such letters of protestation bring about any results? Have those victims received any satisfactory compensations from the Chinese Government? The surviving victims know the answers to those questions too well! As is always the case, the relationship between Vietnam and China has unfailingly been described and claimed by the Vietnamese Politburo to be good in line with the terms in the “16 Word Guideline”.



Picture 6: A Chinese ship ramming a Vietnamese fishing boat on the East Sea. This is only a specific incident in a continuous chain of events of Vietnamese fishing boats being attacked by the Chinese. [source: thoibao.today, photo by VOV] (7)

We need to pause a moment here to take note of this regrettable fact: the Vietnamese fishermen cannot expect any protection from their own government while at the same time are prevented by China from fishing in their traditional waters. In their desperation, in order to survive, a number of them have taken the risk of plying the waters of neighboring countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and

lately all the way to Australia to fish. Those few and tiny fishing boats would present a poor match to the large Chinese flotillas that do illegal fishing with the ample military protection from the Chinese Navy. Beijing adheres to this practice to meet its economic, social as well as military needs as dictated by its expansionist policy.

THE “MALLEABILITY” IN CHINESE BEHAVIOR

The fact that China steals the fish and violates the territorial waters of other nations has resulted in many disputes. The reactions to and intensity of those disputes depend largely on the relative strength of China’s opponents.

Just in the Pacific Area alone – not counting the Paracels and Spratlys now under Chinese occupation – that nation’s fishing boats are known to poach in the waters belonging to Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Phillipines, and Vietnam. The preferred behavior displayed by the Chinese fishing flotillas is that of a bully. They threaten weaker opponents but beat a hasty retreat in the face of the powerful Japanese and South Korean coast guard vessels.

Considering they do not have the ability to defend themselves militarily, the West Africans nations are reduced to a posture of anger and resignation. Vietnamese fishermen, however, still persevere in their defence of their right to fish in their ancestral waters in spite of the pressure and threat coming from China.

However, things are different with some other nations. In the case of Indonesia, its government has seized many Chinese boats fishing illegally in its waters. It also ordered its Air Force to fly 5 F-16s to the Natuna island and sink boats that violated its territorial waters. As recently as April of this year, Indonesia destroyed 81 foreign ships caught fishing illegally including a number of Chinese ones. Since 2014, President Joko Widodo’s government has carried out the demolition of over 300 fishing ships. Indonesia is resolute in protecting its territorial waters and fish stocks in total disregard for the diplomatic tensions with Beijing that ensued.

Thanks to its very powerful coast guard, South Korea conducts a very vigorous enforcement policy. Its naval forces never hesitated to fire at and overpowered the Chinese fishing boats that encroached on its waters resulting in several deaths. The Chinese just fled the scene. [Picture 7]



Picture 7: Chinese fishing boats fleeing from the South Korean Coast Guard patrol ships. When will Vietnam be able to command such a powerful naval force [source: Dong-A Ilbo Newspaper]

On March 15, 2016, the Argentinian Coast Guard, South America, spotted a large Chinese ship illegally fishing in its waters and ordered it to sail away. Its crew refused and resisted. The ship was sunk by the Argentinian Coast Guard and four Chinese fishermen captured. The rest of the crew fled on board of another Chinese vessel.



Picture 8: A Chinese's fishing ship is sinking after being hit near Argentina, South America [source: AFP/ Getty Images 15 March 2016]

NAPOLÉON AND THE LAND OF THE SLEEPING DRAGON

Napoléon, a 19th century French military genius, offered this warning about China: *"China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world."*

At the threshold of the third millennium, two centuries after Napoléon, China has awakened. It does not only move but tilts the axis of our earth in a negative way. This giant, with the world largest population, is the bearer of ominous tidings: the leading polluter of land and air, oppressor of Tibet, the "third axis" of the earth and source of the major rivers in Asia, the exploiter and exterminator of the oceans' marine life. Nowadays, with its "one border one road" strategy, this country harbors the ambitious desire to conquer and harness the natural resources of our entire planet relying on "the reason of the strongest".

Turning our attention to Vietnam, with a population of over 95 million, this country ranks 14th in the world. Disregarding a minority of super rich cadres, the rest of the people share a common and modest dream: having clean air to breathe, clear water to drink, and enough food to eat daily like rice, fish soups and some clean vegetables.

However, with red sludge oozing out from a bauxite mine in Tây Nguyên, the paper mill Lee & Man polluting the Sông Hậu River, Formosa steel factory near Hà Tĩnh discharging an unending flow of toxics into the sea... the pollution in Vietnam has reached a red alert level. Under such conditions, even that modest dream for a daily meal would prove to be beyond the Vietnamese people's reach. The question to be asked would be: who is the perpetrator?

A history lesson to remember: to survive our people have to rely on their own strength, be united internally as well as externally and must learn to say "NO" to China.

NGÔ THẾ VINH

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Chinese Communists destroy ecological environment by dredging the Ocean

" *China is a giant who is asleep, let him sleep because when he awakens, he will move the world .* " – Napoleon Bonaparte, 1816 à Saint Hélène

NGÔ THẾ VINH



Figure 1: The Chinese trawler with the ability to dredge to the bottom of the sea: This kind of trawler illegally fish along the West Africa and other coasts with the strange technich; and destroy all resources on this planet. [Source: India Live Today, July 8, 2016]

Chinese communist exhausted the fish resources

During the period when the sea was full of fish, the fishermen's life was good and plentiful. But now on the other side of the world, West African fishermen like Guinea, Senegal are lamenting that the sea of fishes only pulls up the almost empty grid. (1,2)

Meanwhile, in the eastern province of Zhuhai, the 75-year-old Zhu Delong also shook his head at the net with scattered little fish and red shrimp. He recalled, "When I was young, I could catch the big yellow croakers, but now they are empty."

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, due to over-net fishing, global fish stocks are slowly depleting. Across the oceans, due to fishing and hunting, most of which are Chinese fleet vessels, which directly affect the lives of millions of poor fishermen whose marine resources are the source: Their main income and also their food.



Figure 2: The Chinese fishing fleet grows bigger and bigger, So do its smuggling fishing along the West Africa coastline [Source: Greenpeace Africa 20.05.2015]



Figure 3: With more than 2,600 trawlers, Chinese communists are present everywhere: East sea, Australia, Indian sea, West Africa and South America. They were dubbed "King of the Ocean" [Source: The NYT 04.30.2017]

With a population of nearly 1.4 billion people, accounting for one-fifth of the global population, economic growth, past famine, and rising incomes each year, they have demand for food, and seafood is as a popular source of food. To provide that need, the Chinese Communist Party has established a large fleet of iron ships, not only fishing vessels but also militaries/militia in the ocean, shipbuilding, maritime equipment, fuel, and even ice chambers that keep fish alive for weeks on long trips to West Africa or South America. These fishing fleets are also protected by Chinese communist guards.

For Beijing, these fishing fleets help Chinese determine its sovereignty over territorial waters over disputes in the South China Sea. The provincial government of Hainan always encourages trains to the Paracel / Paracels in Vietnam and Spratlys, where both the Philippines and Vietnam claim sovereignty.

The most frightening thing to mention is that the Chinese ships have been able to launch long-haul flights to the depths of the sea, scraping every creature in the ocean, picking up coral reefs and dumps oyster beds; and 90% died when thrown back into the sea. This type of trawlers is banned in many countries as a result of extensive damage to the ocean habitat but is being utilized by the Chinese. [Figure 1]

As fish stocks in the Chinese water are almost exhausted, Chinese fishermen are encouraged by the state to bring fishing fleets to distant waters of other countries.

These Chinese fleet vessels not only flutter in the South China Sea but also go beyond halfway across the globe, to West Africa and even to South America. [Figure 2, 3]

The Chinese state has financed the \$ 22 billion MK for its fishing industry, which is three times more than four years ago (2011-2015), according to a University of Singapore study.

The fleet of Chinese vessels to distant-water areas has reached 2,600 units (the number of US fishing vessels is only one-tenth). In the waters of Senegal, these iron ships could net the number of fish numbers in a week equal to net catch for a year by a local fisherman.

When it comes to global fishing, Chinese is king of the sea. China is the largest exporter of seafood in the world; China consumes 1/3 of fish caught, 2/3 of fish is exported. The seafood industry has also employed 14 million Chinese.

"In essence, the so-called traditional fishing in the Chinese sea is just a name. For the Chinese leadership, ensuring the supply of seafood is not only good for the economy but also contributes to social and political stability." According to Zhang, from Nanyang University.

Chinese Communist robs the staple foods of the birds

It should be reminded here to explain to young people raised abroad on the expression "robbing the staple food from the birds"; It was something very essential, like the little rice of the poor but still robbed ruthlessly by the rich. It is also the image of Chinese fishing fleet steals and robs from the poor fishermen around the world.

Senegal is typical of a poor country of West Africa with 14 million people and 300 miles of coastline and fish resources as its lifeblood. The circuit is being dredged to exhausted by the Chinese. (1)

How can local fishermen with fragile wooden boats confront the massive fleet of iron-and-mortar ships of the Chinese Communists? As a result, poor Senegalese fishermen, now with no income, no longer have enough fish to eat as their main source of protein.

"We are dealing with an unprecedented crisis, and if that continues, the Senegalese people will have to eat jellyfish for survival," said Alssane Samba, former director of research at the Senegalese Navy Academy.(1)

Seafood is not only a source of protein for the Senegalese people but also a source of income for the fisheries industry and provides 20% of their employment.

In the past, fishermen caught big groupers and mackerel and tuna, but now they have to scramble on small pieces of sardine. Senegalese fishermen today want to catch fish, they have to accept the danger of daring to get away with their wooden boats, regardless of the weather, but when encountering Chinese Communist's super trawlers fleet. Their fragile wooden boats may be sunk. With small fish catch also, their future is seemingly hopeless.

Adding drought to climate change has pushed hundreds of thousands of Senegalese farmers from the countryside to coastal areas, making it more dependent on the sea, while marine resources have been exhausted.

As migration to coastal waters has turned the coastal town of Joal from a small fishing village with several dozen fishing boats, it has become a town of 55,000 with 4,900 wooden boats. Abdou Karim Sall, the president of the local fishermen's association, was seen as a hero when he captured two

captains of smuggled Chinese fishing boats, saying: "We still think that sea life is endless, but now we are confronted with a disaster."

Life is increasingly difficult; deadlock finally pushed them into the boat refugee of reluctantly economic poured into the European countries. Moustapha Balde, 22, has a cousin who died from a shipwreck in the Mediterranean, saying: "Foreigners complain about immigrants from Africa, but no one cares about them. – implying the Chinese ships come and steal all the fish in our waters."

Dyhia Belhabib, a fishery expert, is trying to assess the status of smuggling along the West African coast and especially worst with the Chinese fishing fleet. In Senegal alone, Chinese Communist has stolen 40,000 tonnes of fish per year, damaging up to 28 million tonnes. The damage figures are much greater as the Chinese fishing boats operate in the restricted area, especially at night.

The tragedy of fish stealing from the Chinese also occurred in Guinea, another West African country. The harbor of Bonfi in the town of Conakry is also gloomy with the colorful wooden boats that no longer bring the same abundant fish. The people of the port of Bonfi only show anger but do not do anything with the fleet of Chinese fishing boats. The Guinean government not only lacked the means to protect the sea but was paralyzed by corruption.

For the Chinese, disaster in other countries is their opportunities. According to the Greenpeace organization, it is extremely bad, and even Chinese's heartless is that when Guinea is in trouble in the face of the terrible epidemic of Ebola 2014, then instead of participating in the relief It was when the Chinese fleet accelerated to bring more fleet to exploit smuggled fish of this country.

According to the Environment Justice Foundation (EJF), West Africa is home to the world's largest smugglers. The Chinese communists have enriched themselves by robbing fish as well as essential food from the poorest of West Africa such as Cape Verde, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Senegal. Poor people, lack means of self-defense, they are bullied by the Chinese Communist. The corrupted West African government / [maintaining the corruption is also Chinese's benefits], with no shortage of slogans to protect the sea but people understand that they are just empty cliches. Having encountered such a large country as the Chinese Communists, once known as the "pirate nation," this was an uphill battle, the losing part of which was always their side.



Figure 4: the skimpy fishing boat of Guinea fishermen. They are bullied by the Chinese's /super trawlers [Source: BBC World-Africa 8 July 2016]

Chinese communists have the largest fleet of fishing vessels in the world, capable of traveling monthly to distant oceans around the globe, and smuggling in the waters under the sovereignty of other nations. It can be said that no country has the sea without suffering from the Chinese pirate fishing fleet.

According to UN estimates, smuggled fishing fleets, especially the Chinese Communists, have cost the

global economy \$ 23 billion a year. And West Africa is home to the world's largest smugglers, according to the Environment Justice Foundation (EJF), a non-governmental organization in the United Kingdom. "The operators of these smuggling cases have enriched themselves with the exploitation of the poorest of the West Africans."

A look from Esat Sea and Vietnam

Thousands of Filipino fishermen have been driven away by fishing vessels from the fishing grounds around the Spratly Islands, which have traditionally been their fishing grounds. Palawan fishermen, due to their inability to live on the sea, have turned to swarming forest for farming, but due to the erosion and desertification of the land, they cannot live on the farm. (1)

Vietnam with 2,200 km of coastline, with elementary text book's sentences: "golden forest, silver sea" has now gone into the past. Most of the forest is destroyed, the sea is poisoned, and fish is exhausted. Vietnamese fishermen have two yokes on their neck comparing to people of Western Africans. Not only did they lose their fish, but their seas were also robbed. If they want to go to the sea which was their ancestors', they have to risk their lives.



Figure 5: Vietnamese fishing boats prepared to go for fishing trips. They are not protected by Vietnamese government and always attacked by Chinese ship right in the Vietnam water [Source: photo by Ngô Thế Vinh]

- June 07, 2015: Chinese communist vessels use water cannons to damage Vietnamese fishing vessels
- June 10, 2015: four Chinese communists vessels cornered a Vietnamese fishing vessel, overtook 11 Vietnamese fishermen and plundered 6 tons of fish on their four ships.
- June 19, 2015: Chinese troops land on a Vietnamese fishing vessel, destroying fish nets, confiscating navigational equipment and compasses; robbed 5 tons of fish
- September 29, 2015: Chinese communists and armed group landed on a Vietnamese fishing vessel, seized navigational equipment and took 2 tons of fish and sank the ship 12 hours later.
- November 14, 2015: A fleet of Chinese communists' ships encircles 5 Vietnamese fishing boats in the Tonkin Gulf, destroying all fishing nets until they are rescued by Vietnamese ships.
- January 01, 2016: Chinese communists' ships sank Vietnamese fishing boats 40 miles off Con Co, Quang Tri, 11 Vietnamese fishermen were rescued by boatmen.

- March 6, 2016: 11 people from two ships flying the flag threatened to break into a Vietnamese fishing vessel off the coast of Hoang Sa, not only destroying fishing vessels and fishing net but also completely confiscated foods, stockpile and steal all fish caught

- May 13, 2016: A Chinese ship sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel off the coast of Quang Nam province, 350 nautical miles northeast of Da Nang in the Paracel archipelago, losing all its fishing equipment and equipment; robbed 30 tons of squids; damage up to 450,000 MK.

- 09 July 2016: Vietnamese fishing boats and five fishermen were attacked by Chinese coast guards in the area near Hoang Sa archipelago 34 nautical miles from the island of Bong Bay and then abandoned them on.

- November 10, 2016: fishing vessel KH 97580-TS of Vietnam was hijacked by sea vessels and chased out of Hoang Sa in Phu Lam island and Linh Con island.

- May 01, 2017: The newest vessel BÐ 93241-TS on board with 15 crew members was stranded and killed a Vietnamese fisherman and one injured.

...

Chinese communists Continuous attack on Vietnamese fleet(3), clearly not separate events, but a consistent strategy. Beijing has given the green light to these repeated attacks; policy "a stone kill two birds." By violence, Chinese communists determine sovereignty over the disputed waters; At the same time, exclusive exploitation of resources, oil, and fish resources, not only in the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos but also encroaching on the coastal areas, is obviously the inviolable sovereignty of Vietnam.

Vietnamese fishermen still bravely stick to the sea. They are protected by the state through the repetitive, empty statements of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam such as "Strong condemnation of acts of inhuman treatment, using force against Vietnamese fishermen, requesting the Chinese to investigate and deal with the crew of the cruise ship that intentionally submerges the Vietnamese fishing vessel, leaving fishermen in danger of death. Chinese wharf complies with international law, does not allow the recurrence of similar actions and takes the form of adequate compensation for Vietnamese fishermen." (VnExpress 13.07.2016)

As a result of these objections, the victims have the right compensation by the Chinese government? The survival fishermen know very well. And as ever, the relationship between Vietnam and China has been praised by the Hanoi Politburo as good with the motto "4 good and all 16 golden letter."



Figure 6: Chinese ship struck and sunk Vietnamese fishing boat. Within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Vietnam; This is an example of a series of continuous attack from Chinese communists toward Vietnamese fishing boats. [Source: Bloomberg News May 26, 2014]

There should be another question here, a sad fact that Vietnamese fishermen, unprotected by the state, have been chased by the Chinese for fishing in their familiar waters. In such a distressing matter, some have risked their lives steaming into the waters of neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and recently down to Australia. The small number of spontaneous Vietnamese fishermen is nothing compared to the Chinese fleet of heavily pirated fishing vessels fully backed by the state of Beijing to meet the Chinese economy needs simultaneously with the military advance of expansion doctrine by Chinese Communist.

The Policy of "Soft squeeze, hard let go."

Chinese fishermen illegally fish and blatantly violate the territorial waters of other countries has led to the dispute. The extent of the dispute with the Chinese communists and how it reacts depends on the strength of the host country. In the Pacific alone, notwithstanding the large seas surrounding the Paracel, Spratly Islands that Chinese communists currently possesses, Chinese communists also sends smugglers into territorial waters under the sovereignty of other nations. Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam. "Soft squeeze and hard let go" is the policy of "bullying" of the Chinese fishing fleet. With countries like Japan, South Korea who have powerful coast guard forces to chase, the smuggling Chinese communists no longer dare to pursue.

Anger and resignation are the plights of West African states that are not able to defend themselves. Vietnamese fishermen despite being pursued and suppressed by the Chinese, they persistently persevere.

But to other countries, the matter is different. Indonesia had seized several Chinese ships in their pirate fishing areas, and even airstrikes with F-16s on the Natuna Islands sank the invaders. Only recently, in April 2017 Indonesia re-destroyed 81 more smuggled foreign vessels, of course including Chinese ships, raising the total to more than 300 since 2014's President Joko Widodo. Indonesia is determined to protect its seas and fisheries despite the diplomatic strains with Beijing.

South Korea because of a strong maritime patrol force and a tough policy, when they discovered that the Chinese Communist-led smugglers attacked and overturned, resulting in some fatalities and the smuggling Chinese Communists had to flee. [Figure 7]



Figure 7: smuggling Chinese fishing fleet runs away when South Korea's coast guard chase them out. When will it happen for Vietnamese people? [Source: Dong-A Ilbo Press]

On March 15, 2016, the Argentine Coast Guard reported a large vessel of Chinese communists was smuggling fish in its waters and ordered the ship to leave, but they resisted. Argentina sunk the ship. Four Chinese fishermen were captured alive, and the remaining crew escaped on another Chinese communists ship.



Figure 8: Argentina sunk a smuggling Chinese fishing boat [Source: AFP/ Getty Images 15 March 2016]

Napoleon and China

Napoleon, a nineteenth-century French military genius, prophesied of a country of China: "It is a giant who is asleep, let him sleep because when he awakens, he will move the world."

Beginning in the third millennium, more than two centuries after Napoleon, a Chinese Communist woke up. Not only does it shake, but it also rotates the planetary axis in a destructive sense. The

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

world's largest populace has brought bad signals to the planet: the champion of land and air pollution, the destruction of Earth's third pole, Tibet, where the source of the line Asian River; destroys the life of the oceans / marine life. Now with the "one border one road" strategy, the Chinese are trying to conquer and capture the world's resources with "the strongman's argument."

Returning to Vietnam, apart from a minority of the red capitalists, with more than 95 million people, ranked 14th among the world's most populous countries, they have a common denominator, a very normal dream. To be able to breathe fresh air, drink a glass of pure water, have family meals with fish bowls and fresh vegetables.

But with the red bauxite mud poured out on the Central Highlands, with the Lee & Man paper mills on the bank of Song Hau River, with the Formosa steel plant in Ha Tinh sea still pouring out the toxins, such a mundane dream seems to be slipping away from the hands of the Vietnamese. And the question is what caused this mayhem?

There is still a lesson in history: the people who want to survive must have inner strength, the power to unite inside and outside and must say "no" to the Chinese Communists.

English version by V.G. Tran January 13, 2018

NGÔ THẾ VINH

California, 21 Tháng 5, 2017

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**Open letter to Sundar Pichai, Jen Fitzpatrick, CEO of Google Inc., Eric E. Schmidt Google Inc.:
no south China sea on Vietnam sea map, May 21, 2017**

Please support our petition on: <https://www.causes.com/campaigns/107706-no-south-china-sea-on-the-vietnam-sea-map>

From: The Vietnam Sea and the No South-China-Sea social networking social networking

To: Sundar Pichai CEO of Google Inc., Jen Fitzpatrick Vice President of Maps and Local of Google Inc., Eric E. Schmidt Executive Chairman of Google Inc.

Subject: No south China sea on Vietnam sea map, May 21, 2017



Ladies and Gentlemen,

Southeast Asian populations have been present in South-East Asia for over 70,000 years ago. The people of Southeast Asia living here included our ancestors, the Vietnamese. They were courageous navigators who crossed the big oceans; left their footprints, and their way of life through many continents, such as Africa, America, etc., These facts are recorded by famous historians such as Malcolm F Farmer, Christian J. Buys and Sheli O. Smith, Chester Norman, Wilhelm G. Solheim, Peter T. White, etc.

During the ice age, prehistoric Vietnamese already left footprints around the seas and lands in the world. At that time, the Chinese did not even exist, let alone the argument Chinese territory. They, the Chinese, were only present around 2600 years ago; and the Chinese did not develop maritime way until the fifth century AD.

Therefore, in fact, there is no such name called the “South China Sea.” Besides, due to the many mistakes made by some inexperienced cartographers who inadvertently imposed the waters of the South China Sea into our Vietnamese waters.

Vietnam nation independently developed with culture, civilization Hoa Binh, Dong Son, as well as lowland rice harvesting the tens of thousands of years before the Chinese’s. There is no reason why

our country would depend on their cultural development or influence. The reality is quite the opposite.

They, the Chinese, have the tricks of borrowing and copying - taking what others have done and claiming to be their own, as Confucius says: copying, not self-creating.

We present some old maps of the Southeast Asia Sea (see below map) in which the Vietnamese Sea is part of the South Asia Sea. There is no such thing as the “South China Sea” within the Vietnamese waters. The Qing Dynasty’s map only recorded their territory as far south as to Hainan Island.



The map was drawn in the 17th century by a Frenchman to correct confusion about the position and form of the Gulf of Tonkin according to Ptolemy's old maps. “Ocean Oriental” is “East Sea” instead (Source map: Water culture from marine activities - Vu Huu San)



Google maps only the waters of “Yüeh” (Vietnam), not the “South China Sea.”



<http://ecomeye.com/blog/southeast-asia/what-is-the-startup-scene-in-southeast-asian-countries/>



ontheworldmap.com



Map by robinsonpharma.com draws the water area in South China just above Hainan Island. Note, Hainan Island is not a peninsula. As such, it is not applicable for the Economic Privilege Zone under UNCLOS.



*From China's Hainan Island to the Paracel Islands of Vietnam at a distance of 200 nautical miles.
According to author Vu Huu San - Gulf of Tonkin Geography & territorial waters*

Due to the ambitious expansion its territory to Southeast Asia, China has mapped the so-called “cow's tongue” and claimed the waters around it onto Chinese sovereignty. With the name of “South China Sea,” the Chinese blatantly claimed the surrounding waters as theirs. This imposition causes the world's marine cartographers to follow the irrational approach mentioned above inappropriately.

On January 19, 1974, the Chinese Communist Navy forcefully took over the Paracel islands archipelago of the Republic of Vietnam. These islands have been internationally recognized since World War II; On March 14, 1988, Chinese invades the “Gac-Ma” Island of Spratly islands archipelago.

To expand its military muscles to control navigation in the South China Sea, the Chinese Communist Party has carried out a series of construction works and accretion of the islands captured from the Vietnamese people. The act of accretion of these islands was quickly completed with the supports of the Vietnamese Communist naval command of the 4th military region (see attached file: Petition and Emergency Petition (4th time) of Cam Ranh fishers in Vietnam). These are activities that seriously harm the environment and environment of the South China Sea as well as the maritime security of humanity.

We call on President Donald Trump for the interests of the United States in particular, humanity in general, to actively stop this insane acts of the Chinese communists and its counterpart Vietnamese Communist as well.

We urge the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, Japan, Australia, etc., to take strong sanctions against the authorities in Beijing and Hanoi; to order them ending their implementation of building military bases; to force them to fulfilling the duties of being a member of the council, members of the international community, not invading other nations, including Vietnam, Vietnam Sea, and Southeast Asia.

As long as the name of “South China Sea” still exists, China also has the pretext, the reasons for expanding the threat to the maritime security of the Asia-Pacific region in particular, of humanity in

general. Communist China is the greatest threat to the world in all respects, a threat greater than that of the Islamic state.

Thus, Senators Rubio and Cardin have issued a bill to penalize the East Sea's aggression. The bill's excerpt states: "Advising the President to impose sanctions and prohibit entry into the individuals and entities of the Chinese Navy engaged in construction and development projects in the relevant sea areas, as well as a threat to peace, security or stability in the South China Sea (SCS) or East China Sea (ECS); Prohibition of publication of materials describing the South China Sea or East China Sea as part of the Chinese Communist Party, investment projects in the South China Sea or East China Sea, or recognition of the East Sea or East China Sea merger."

We urge the world cartographers to adjust, as well as to return the name of South China Sea back to the position of China's waters and not to mistakenly name it upon our Vietnam Sea map (see Attachments).



Our Vietnam Sea is part of the Southeast Asian Sea and not part of the South China Sea.

Updated by Dai Viet Tran (May 21, 2017)_English version by Van Giang Tran

3/31/2017

Tran-Dai-Viet, The Vietnam Sea and the No South China Sea social networking

http://www.vietnamparacels.org/nosouthchinasea/open-letter-to-sundar-pichai_google_national-geographic.shtml

Cam Ranh fishermen's Urgent Request Submittal (4th trial)



People of Cam Lap Ward - Cam Ranh City are calling for help when thugs attack them

We recommend that the authorities to investigate quickly, to take severe measures against individuals and organizations who deliberately do not comply with the law.

From the beginning of 2015 until now, our fishermen families have lost shrimp, fish, oysters... worth of hundreds of billions Đồng (Vietnamese currency); and the fishermen have lost all the investment money that they borrowed from banks, from independent money lenders. We would like you to pay immediate attention to the current poverty conditions of our people, especially our children.

We only want to live and have the right to live.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Independence - Freedom - Happiness

Cam Phúc Bắc the 20th day of March 2017

Petition and Emergency Request Submittal (4th trial)

- Firstly, Cai Mep Green Environment Company illegally exploits Cam Ranh Bay sand in Cam Phuc Bac district causing considerable damage to fishermen's property.
- Secondly, the thugs have the permission to using a knife, hammers... to threaten the people.
- Thirdly, 4th Naval Zone's troops protect organized-crime thugs.

Dear all:

- First Secretary of Khánh Hòa province
- Chairman of People Committee of Khánh Hòa;

- Chief Inspector of Khánh Hòa;
- Director of Resource and Environment of Khánh Hòa;
- Police Chief of Khánh Hòa;
- First Secretary of city of Cam Ranh;
- Chairman of People Committee of Cam Ranh;
- Chief Inspector of Cam Ranh;
- Director of Resource and Environment Cam Ranh;
- Police Chief of Cam Ranh;
- First Secretary of Cam Phúc Bắc District;
- Chairman of People Committee Cam Phúc Bắc District;
- Police Chief of Cam Phúc Bắc District;
- 4th Naval / Military Zone Commander at Cam Ranh;
- Commander of Coast Guard at Cam Ranh;

Copied to:

- Đài tiếng nói Việt Nam;
- Đài truyền hình Việt Nam;
- Đài truyền hình quốc phòng Việt Nam;
- Đài phát thanh truyền hình Hà Nội;
- Đài phát thanh truyền hình TP Sài Gòn;
- Đài phát thanh truyền hình Vĩnh Long;
- Đài phát thanh truyền hình Long An;
- Đài phát thanh truyền hình Khánh Hòa;

-

We, the undersigned, are:

1. Phan Thị Hồng – Year of birth: 1970

ID Card # 220716417 issued on 8/198/2014 by Khánh Hòa Police

2. Nguyễn Chiến – Year of birth 1981

ID Card # 225172645 issued on 6/10/2015 by Khánh Hòa Police.

Representing the people of Cam Phuc Bac District, Cam Ranh city, Khanh Hoa province would like to present to you the urgent matters as follows:

We have repeatedly submitted to the authorities of Cam Ranh City - Khanh Hoa Province – Central Administration for immediate solutions in resolving of the incidents that Green Steel Company and Environment mining Cam Ranh Bay's sand in Cam Phuc Bac district without a license. These companies' works cause great damages to the fishermen's property; The troops of the 4th Naval Zone has sunk the fishermen's boats and inflicted injuries to fishers. It has been a long time since we filed the petition, but we have yet to see any actions from the said authorities regarding the incidents. The delay of the settlement process has severely affected the rights and legitimate interests of our fellow fishers.

On 1/18/2016, at the "Citizens Reception Center" in Hanoi, we have been handed the official letter No. 326 / TDTW stating: "... Over the telephone conversation with the head of the Citizens Reception of Khanh Hoa province, the Khanh Hoa People's Committee has worked with the Ministry of Defense and asked the governmental directions; and the government has agreed to halt the sand mining project.

Our people are waiting for the settlement of the Khanh Hoa Province and Cam Ranh City to compensate for damages done by the Cai Mep Environmental Company and Green Environment; however, nothing has been solved yet.

About 9:00 AM on March 10, 1977, five barges of two said companies, Cai Mep and Green Environment, entered the fishery and aquaculture areas of our fellow fishers. The organized-crime thugs were also present on the barges using knives, hammers... attempted to attack us. At the scene, we realized that the Marine of the 4th Naval Zone was assigned to assist the thugs too.

Now, our fellow fishermen submit this urgent petition to the local authorities, Cam Ranh city, Khanh Hoa province, Command of the 4th Naval Zone at Cam Ranh.

- Firstly: Immediately stop the illegal sand mining of the two companies: Cai Mep and the Green Environment.

According to Decision No. 1821 / QD-UBND dated 16 July 2014 of the People's Committee of Khanh Hoa province which stipulated in Clause 6, Article 1, the duration of project implementation is one year from the date of commencement of works. Then, according to the document No. 1760 / CV-V4 "on the relocation of cages of aquacultural households in dredging areas managed by Zone 4," the dredging began. Accordingly, based on the above two documents, the dredge project implementation period starts on November 5, 2014, and ends on November 5, 2015.

However, for some unknown reasons, document No. 5531 / UBND-KT dated August 24, 2015 stated: "Regarding the response of some fishermen in Cam Phuc Cam District, Cam Ranh city about status Dredging of sand causes environmental pollution," then Khanh Hoa People's Committee said that the Naval Command approved the dredging plan in Decision No. 1970 / QD-BTL dated 03/4/2014" and the allowed dredging period is from 2014 to 2018. In fact, the decision mentioned above of the Naval Command did not stipulate the time allowing for dredging, but only the "Dredging design blueprint approval, lowering the approved depth and adjusting the flow direction of the material port and the port of Armed Forces Zone 4 / Naval Forces." So, here Khanh Hoa People's Committee seemingly / arbitrarily lengthen the sand mining to help the two companies Cai Mep and Green environment to scrape the resources of the country to optimize their profits.

- Secondly, Decision No 1821 / QĐ-UBND dated 16 July 2014 of the Khanh Hoa People's Committee stipulates: Green Environment Company "when conducting the dredging, must set the boundary of the permitted area dredging." In actual practice, however, when performing dredging and sand mining, Greenfield did not undertake the demolition work, they took advantage of the failure to demarcate the sand for fishing and aquaculture causing severe damages to fishers (from 2015 to 2016).

- Thirdly, also in Decision No. 1821 / QĐ-UBND dated July 16, 2014, by the People's Committee of Khanh Hoa Province regulated on Green Environmental Company to make Environmental Impact Assessment Report to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. The school appraises and approves, and coordinates with Cam Ranh City People's Committee to work with organizations and individuals engaged in production and business activities affected by dredging activities to agree on the compensation plan. Usually relocated support by regulations. The environmental impact assessment has not been implemented by Cai Mep Company and Green Environment, because since the time of dredging, fishermen's aqua breeds of fishers Die a lot, causing extremely severe damages. Therefore, we think that the implementation of environmental impact assessment is very poorly done so the consequences for our fishers are so dangerous.

Regarding the implementation of the compensation and relocation plan for our fishers, this is practically impossible: our fishers have worked in fisheries and aquaculture for decades; It is a traditional business of the people here for generations. Now all the sudden, the Khanh Hoa People's Committee, Cai Mep Company and Green Environment co-operated with one another and forced us to relocate to another place. We ask the authority What the appropriate places would be? Regarding the compensation of cages, the majority of fishers did not get compensated; or the list of payment is so sketchy, not satisfactory at all. Who is the responsible party?

- Fourthly, we demand that the Command of 4th Navy zone paying attention to the property of fishermen: Do not to allow their squads to illegally protect the "sand thieves" in exploiting the sand; to use the processing to cause severe damages (killing shrimp, fish...) The destruction of the marine ecological environment will certainly lead to the landslide on shore and destroyed the homes of coastal people as well.

- Fifthly, we request you to immediately incarcerate all the organized-crime thugs whom the Cai Mep and Green Environment employed to violate the human rights, to threaten the lives of the innocent people in the region.

Dear, Sirs!

We recommend that the authorities to investigate quickly, to take severe measures against individuals and organizations who deliberately do not comply with the law.

From the beginning of 2015 until now, our fishermen families have lost shrimp, fish, oysters... worth of hundreds of billions Đồng (Vietnamese currency); and the fishermen have lost all the investment money that they borrowed from banks, from independent money lenders. We would like you to pay immediate attention to the current poverty conditions of our people, especially our children.

We only want to live and have the right to live.

Sincerely,

Attachments:

- Emergency appeal application on 25/11/2015.

- Application for urgent resolution on 17/01/2016
- Official Documentary by Central citizens reception office #326/TDTW dated 1/18/2016.
- Official Decision # 1821/QĐ-UBND dated 16/7/2014 by Khanh Hoa People's Committee.
- Documentary # 1760/CV-V4
- Documentary #553/UBND-KT dated 8/24/2015.
- Official Decision # số 1970/QĐ-BTL dated 4/3/2014



Thugs use knives, hammers ... to suppress people

English version by Van Giang Tran

<http://www.vietnamparacels.org/nosouthchinasea/cam-ranh-fishermens-urgent-request-submittal-4th-trial.html>

No South China Sea on the Vietnam Sea: Letter to Donald Trump and Chinese communist Xi Jinping at US-Sino Summit April 6-7, 2017

From: The Vietnam Paracels, The Vietnam Sea, and the No South-China-Sea social networking

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

To: Sundar Pichai CEO of Google Inc., Jen Fitzpatrick Vice President of Maps and Local of Google Inc., Eric E. Schmidt Executive Chairman of Google Inc.

Subject: No south China sea on Vietnam sea map, May 21, 2017

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Updated by Dai Viet Tran (May 21, 2017)_English version by Van Giang Tran

3/31/2017

Tran-Dai-Viet, The Vietnam Sea and the No South China Sea social networking

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No China globalization, Zürich, Bern, Graubunden (Davos) Switzerland January 15-20, 2017

Please sign the petition and follow us on change.org: <https://www.change.org/p/hon-doris-leuthard-president-of-the-swiss-confederation-and-no-china-globalization-bitte-please/>

To: Hon. Doris Leuthard, President of the Swiss Confederation

Hon. Mario Fehr, President of the Government Council (Zürich)

C/c: International leaders participating the World Economic Forum

Subject: NO CHINA GLOBALIZATION PLEASE!

Ladies and gentlemen,

On May 15, 2017, Zürich will roll out its red carpet to receive Mr. XI Jinping, the Chinese President, who is on his way to take part in the Economic Conference held in Graubunden (Davos) from January 17 to January 20, 2017.

It is very unfortunate that Swiss Government disallowed the Tibetan to organize a peaceful protest against Xi Jinping's presence in Zürich; However, for God's sake, at the moment, for the peace-loving and civilized Swiss, the horrible weather with freezing temperatures ranging from -3 to -15 degrees Celsius is not in favor of the visit of worst dictator in modern history with serious crimes and genocide against Vietnamese, Tibetan, Falun Gong followers; let alone his brutal crackdowns on human right activists and movements.

This year, for the first time, Xi plans to attend this World Economic Conference to promote his questionable scheme of Globalization and inviting the foreign investments into China as well.

The globalization doctrine (globalization), can be defined as an ideology to undertake the Sovereign Nation-State as its main enemy, essentially because the State is mandatory to put the interests of the majority above the that of the minority. So that Globalization seeks to weaken, disintegrate, and finally destroy the true foundation of State sovereignty as a basic social institution; instead, it aims to replace individual states with the new global structure and so-called a Super Nation to take charge of Social, political, economic, financial, and the military needs. -end quote- Freemasonry and the super power of the ILLUMINATI, Jewish – dinhsong's social network.

Xi Jinping advocating that globalization mainly pertains to weaken the Government of the Sovereign States to cater for the dishonest expansion toward the outside world - Similarly to the paragraph just mentioned above.

The world economy last year was and stirred up through the currency manipulation by the Chinese (Chinese Currency Manipulation Could Become A Global Problem in 2017 - <http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2017/01/12/chinese-currency-manipulation-could-become-a-global-problem-in-2017/#70711a029215>), therefore, The Vietnamese Sea Social Network petitions the Swiss Government first to be very careful while listening to what Xi Jinping is going to say and secondly looking into what he is doing in the Vietnam Sea (Southeast Asia Sea) and to the world as well.

Chinese Formosa' disaster poisoned and destroyed marine on Vietnamese Sea from April 2016 to present day of January 2017, for example.



Formosa's Mass Fish Deaths from April, 2016 to January, 2017 (Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien - Hue provinces, Vietnam Central)

The Sri Lankan people demonstrated to protest Chinese investment in the Southern Hambantota, Sri Lanka, on 7 January 2017. They said that the Government of Sri Lanka had made grave mistakes when it chased away and vacated thousands of local families to hand the 6,070 hectares of land to the Chinese for the construction of the airport and port. Sri Lankan are fully aware that the Chinese will cause heavy pollution and destroy the marine environment; use the port of Hambantota to control the vessel navigating across the Indian Ocean, the Sri Lanka to Europe and the Middle East; threaten the security and peace of the region and the world.

While Swiss Confederation was NOT very excited about joining the EU and Euros. Then, there is no sensible reason to participate in the join-venture economic with Chinese XI Jinping.

Please maintain and promote the good motto SWISS MADE FIRST in a real way.

We urge you to make consensus and/or get the approval opinions of the Swiss beforehand.

We pray the Swiss Confederation will nevert participate in the so-called Plan Silk Road that Xi Jinping advocates. The Government of Switzerland; the European Union as well as Switzerland and European Union citizens should decisively reject the project of high speed trains direct from Péking to Geneva in 10 days.

If the said project high speed trains would realized the Switzerland and the European Union have inadvertently brought the war and violence into Europe. It is totally a self-destruction plan.

The City of Geneva had sued the Center for Nuclear Power at Bugey (Ain) France about the water environmental pollution and danger to life caused by this center; then why should Geneva open rail speed for Beijing which has been known for world-class pollution in the world? There seems to be an obvious conflict.

We wish your Global Economic Conference a big success and **NO CHINA GLOBALIZATION PLEASE!**

Van Giang Tran revised EN version.

Europa_Switzerland, January 14, 2017

The Vietnamese sea.org social networking

<http://www.vietnamparacels.org/paracel-spratly-islands-history/no-china-globalization.html>



Peaceful Declaration for the World's Contested Sea in 2016 - China Must Go

Twitter.com: <https://t.co/2XzzYgq3GS>; <https://t.co/rQdijdecyL>

To:

- United Nations Security Council
- United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- The Hangzhou 2016 G20 Leaders Summit,
- Various world leaders and the international media,

Foreword: *The Southeast Asia Sea belongs to the Vietnamese. Our people have been residing and administering the East Sea region for seventy thousand years, according to worldly historians. The Chinese have not been ever present at this Asian region and the Southeast Asia Sea area as well. In recent decades, the Southeast Asia Sea region was administered by the Republic of Viet Nam and recognized by the international community. However, the Southeast Asia Sea is not at peace and always in turmoil since the Chinese Communist Party appeared on the China mainland on July 1, 1921.*

Ladies and Gentlemens,

On 19 January 1974, the so-called People's Republic of China (PRC) invaded the Paracel Islands which was occupied by the Republic of Vietnam's forces. Seventy-five Navy men of The Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVN Navy) had heroically sacrificed due to this Chinese invading.

In 1988, Chinese marines invaded Gac Ma Islands (aka Johnson South Reef) and killed 64 Vietnamese men from the Communist Vietnam Navy.

From 1974 to 2016 China has aggressively militarized the Paracels and the Spratly islands by building the naval base, the military garrison, air strips, lighthouses; and customs controlling the strategic waterway on the Southeast Asia Sea. They deployed air missile platforms of all sorts (sea-to-air, surface-to-air). Their nuclear submarine fleets are also seen present in the region.

To build military bases and man-made islands around, Chinese ruthlessly ravaged thousands of coral reefs beneath the Paracel and Spratly Islands. These cause serious ecological damages to marine lives and environment as well.

On April 2016, Formosa, a steel-making company owned by Chinese, located in Vung Anh, Ha Tinh province, Central Vietnam, dumped illegal toxic chemical waste into the Vietnam shores and the Pacific Ocean which killed thousands of tons of fish and other marine species. The dead fish and other species spread over several hundred miles on Vietnamese shoreline.

July 12, 2016, the permanent court of international arbitration in The Hague the Netherlands has ruled against China; and rejected China's false sovereignty claim on the entire Southeast Asian Sea. Unfortunately, the International Court is unable to enforce the ruling upon the Chinese continuing bullying.

China has unruly refused to comply with the Court's judgment because The Hague Tribunal Court has no efficient authority to impose any sanctions against China; meanwhile, Vietnam and South East Asian countries vividly support the Court's ruling.

Currently, a deadly Formosa-like factory is in the making within the industrial zone Cai Cui, Hau Giang Province, South Vietnam. That is the Lee & Man Paper Plant. The plant is built right on the Hau Giang river bank. This project is another soon-to-be disaster. Note that the area is rich in fruit growing (especially grapefruit, orange, durian, mangosteen, rambutan, longan, plum, guava ...) and fish farming. People's future, lives, and harvest in the Hau Giang region totally rely on clean water. The plant certainly would pollute the water sources, and could spell death to all living body and animal in the region. It is one of three military bases disguised as factory set up by the Chinese invasion of Vietnam and South East Asian countries



Position three military bases of China disguised in Hau River, Southeast-Asia-Sea, South Vietnam

From the above-mentioned facts, we strongly oppose and utterly denounce the half-baked Chinese behavior before international opinion, the United Nations Security Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Hangzhou 2016 G20 Leaders Summit, as follows:

- 1 / The presence of Chinese in the Southeast Asia Sea systematically threatens the habitat of marine lives and the sovereignties of the countries in the region.
- 2/ The People's Republic of China should immediately withdraw unconditionally its entire military force, marine police, and paramilitary forces (disguised as fishermen) from the East Sea surrounding Paracel and Spratly islands.
- 3/ China's aggression in the contested region must be condemned. Particularly, China wrongly attackings on the Vietnamese fishermen, and their fishing boats should be warned and stopped. China must compensate the Vietnamese fishermen and their families with appropriate monetary for the damages that Chinese have incurred to the Vietnamese fishermen.

The Vietnamsea.org social networking pray that people who love the peace, the coexistence and especially the sea would support our Declaration to preserve the purity of the sea, and the Southeast Asian Sea as well. They are the future of humanity.

Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia Sea will all rest peacefully when the ugly shadow of Chinese

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

ships vanish from the contested areas.

As a member United Nations Security Council, also G20, China has an obligation to comply with international law, and must adhere to the decision of the international arbitration court.

Please forward this message of peace to the Southeast Asian countries and the world.

Southeast Asia Sea obviously isn't the South China Sea. The Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands belong to the Vietnamese for seventy thousand years; not Chinese this decade.

Thank you for your consideration of this submittal.

Respectfully submitted

Van Giang Tran revised EN version.

Secretary-Général of The Vietnamese sea association Tran Dai Viet

August 17, 2016

<http://www.vietnamparacels.org/paracel-spratly-islands-history/peaceful-declaration-for-the-worlds-contested-sea-in-2016-china-must-go.html>

Campaign to Rename the ‘South China Sea’ into ‘Vietnam Sea.’

Started by: The Vietnamese Sea Association – <http://www.vietnamsea.org>

at 9am on September 27th, 2016

Please sign the petition and follow on - Vui lòng ký tên ủng hộ ở trang: [Change.org](http://www.vietnamsea.org)

<http://www.vietnamsea.org/vietnamese-sea-association/campaign-rename-china-sea-into-vietnam-sea-27-09-2016.html>

Background



Rename South China Sea to Vietnam Sea, send your support this petition to e-mail: vietnamsea@vietnamsea.org (Only your name and your country are required)

To:

The Presidents and Prime Ministers of 11 countries of Southeast Asia

The United Nations Environment Organization

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

The President of United Nations Atlas of the Oceans, and the CEOs and Presidents of 11 Geographic Organizations

The Vietnamese compatriots

The media organizations of Vietnamese and international

Le Monde Michelin, Larouse Dictionary, Oxford Dictionary, Encyclopedia Dictionary, Edition Reader Digest, Doctors Without Border, Reporter Without Border

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Maritime history of the world was formed, survived and developed for over 70 thousand years. Particularly in Southeast Asian according to world historians.

In the Southeast Asian is recognized as the cradle of human civilization development for the peaceful coexistence of races in the region, including our Vietnamese people.

At the beginning of maritime developing tens of thousands of years ago, China had not even existed. China's presence was only around 2500 BC. At this time, the words such as "marine," "Ocean" are all unfamiliar to the Chinese, let alone the records.

Thousands of years ago, the Sea of Southeast Asia known as "Yüeh sea" – That means "Viet sea."

Not until the 16th century, the Portuguese merchant came and did the mapping of the Southeast Asia. They callously called it the "South China Sea" – a lazy way. This is short-sighted, and this is a huge mistake because Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia are simply NOT China or any parts of China. They are different and independent nations. They have their own cultural, civilization, the shoreline, and trans-oceanic maritime way before Chinese came.

Note that the Western merchants and missionaries as well have arrived from Southeast Asia by first landed on the Vietnamese ports, then on the road to China mainland afterward.

Due to the wrong and unfortunate name was called the "South China Sea," it causes the Chinese communist today (founded on 1949) to take advantage. They sent troops to invade the Paracels islands (1974); Gac Ma, Spratly Islands (1988) from the Vietnamese people.

From 1974 to 2016 China has aggressively militarized the Paracels and the Spratly islands by building the naval bases, the military garrisons, airstrips, lighthouses. They also control the customs duty along strategic waterway on the Southeast Asia Sea. They deployed air missile platforms of all sorts (sea-to-air, surface-to-air). Their nuclear submarine fleets are also seen present in the region.

July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of International Arbitration in The Hague the Netherlands has ruled against China; and rejected China's false sovereignty claim on the entire Southeast Asian Sea; however, the Court has no authority to impose sanctions against any countries which are not complying with the ruling.

Six years ago, Nguyen Thai Hoc Foundation (<http://nguyenthaihocfoundation.org>) had launched a campaign to change the name South China Sea to Southeast Asia Sea and attracted more than 85,566 signed-up supporters (September 26, 2016) from 134 countries.

Today, once again we the Vietnamese call on the consciousness of the international, especially

Southeast Asian opinions. We solemnly launch the online campaign to rename the “South China Sea” into the “ Vietnam Sea.”

The last campaign (carried out on 2010) and the present one (2016) are all in synch with each other to re-enforce the utter rejection of the wrong and unfortunate use of the “China South Sea” name on the Vietnamese coast.

There are four reasons for the new campaign:

1 / Philippines with the Philippine Sea and West Philippines Sea, Indonesian Natuna Sea, Amalda Sea for Thailand, Malaysia has the Java Sea.

2 / Vietnamese’ coastline is up to 11 409, 1 kilometer - three times the previous calculation according to the World Resources Institute (Word Resources Institute) and the United Nations Environment Organization. Vietnam Sea area has over 1 million kilometers under The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 - accounted for almost 30% of the Southeast Asia Sea.

3 / Freedom of navigation is the sacred right of humanity. There is no single country which can militarily control and or prohibit the exploration of natural resources of the sea; as China has been doing.

4 / The renaming from the South China Sea to Vietnam Sea is consistent with international law, regional and geographical reality. Also, this will contribute positively to the promotion of world peace.

The Vietnamese Sea Association, we do not oppose the name the South China Sea, but this name needs to be adjusted to suit the geographical reality. It means that the name of China South Sea is to be used and recorded in the adjacent of China coastline, not use and recorded for Vietnamese coastline. Note that the Southern coast of China is measured only about 2,800 km (1,750 miles).

The South China Sea is recorded only from the coast of China's Hainan Island to the boundary. Hainan Island has never been 200 nautical miles “territory waters” (i.e mer territorial).

China Nation as a G20 and the Security Council member, needs to respect international law and justice.

Please join the campaign to demand the Presidents, Prime Minister of 11 Southeast Asian nations, the UN, the CEOs and Presidents of 11 geographic organizations around the world, the CEOs Dictionary Editors to rename the South China Sea to the Vietnam Sea.

Russian and China launched joint naval drill in Vietnam Sea (Southeast Asia Sea) from 14-09 to 20-09-2016. This provocative act couldt early start the war in the East Sea between China and its neighboring countries. The renaming of the South China Sea to Vietnam Sea is imminent for this moment and the Vietnamese people.

Please take just action by signing the petition. Your signature is crucial to make a maritime history of this 21st century and will forever be remembered in Vietnam Sea, Southeast Asia Sea modern history.

This campaign is your campaign. We respectfully call for your participation to change the name of “South China Sea” into “Vietnam Sea.” The campaign has no time limit.

Van Giang Tran révisé EN version.

September 27, 2016

Secretary-Général of The Vietnamese Sea Association Tran Dai Viet

It is time to rename the South China Sea

<https://t.co/TNrplMsh6j>



For all the complexities of the territorial struggle between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea, there's a growing recognition that part of the problem is simply the name of the place.

Indonesia became the latest country to propose a renaming last week, when the government [announced it will submit](#) a proposal to the United Nations regarding the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding its Natuna Islands. "If no one objects... then it will be officially the Natuna Sea," [said Ahmad Santosa](#), who heads an agency combating illegal fishing.

In 2012 the Philippines [officially renamed](#) part of the South China Sea on its own maps and government correspondence. Manila declared that waters falling within its EEZ would be called the West Philippine Sea, an important step to clarifying "which portions we claim as ours," president Benigno Aquino said at the time. The nation [submitted its administrative order](#) and an official map to the United Nations.

Of course, getting the international community to go along with a name change is another matter. Government agencies in Manila might use "West Philippine Sea," but "South China Sea" is still common usage. UN submission or no, "Natuna Sea" might be similarly ignored outside of Indonesian government circles.

Vietnam, for its part, has long called the waterway the East Sea. Malaysia goes with South China Sea, although after the tribunal's ruling some are [questioning why that is](#).

China claims nearly all the strategic waterway as its own territory, based on a [nine-dash line](#) drawn up after World War 2. Though an international tribunal invalidated the line in [a July ruling](#), Beijing continues to uphold its expansive claims.

A contested sea.

A ‘Change.org’ campaign started about five years ago that [proposes a name change](#) to the “Southeast Asia Sea” brings up some interesting points. Among them:

The countries of Southeast Asia encompass almost the entire South China Sea with a total coastline measuring approximately 130,000 km (81,250 miles) long; whereas the Southern China’s coastline measured about 2,800 km (1,750 miles) in length.

Other proposals have included the “[Indochina Sea](#)” and the “Asean Sea,” though that last one bumps into the problem of Cambodia, a member of ASEAN, [siding more with China](#) (and [earning Beijing’s appreciation](#) along the way).

The sea has had a variety of names throughout history, with “South China Sea” being a [relatively recent invention](#) (paywall), coming into use in the 1930s as a way to distinguish the waterway from the East China Sea.


China can play the name game, too. In the Chinese language, the sea is called simply Nanhai, or the South Sea. Some [have proposed](#) renaming the southern Hainan Province, which faces the sea, to “Nanhai Province.” Proponents contend the name change would help fortify China’s claims to the sea.

In English, changing the name of the sea to “South Sea” might work, argued Ellen Frost, a senior adviser at the [East-West Center](#), earlier this year. Chinese nationalists would surely reject the “Southeast Asia Sea,” [she noted](#) (pdf). But they’d have a harder time arguing against the “South Sea”—even though it removes “China”—since in Chinese the name “Nanhai” has been around for centuries.

That change, she contended, “would signal a small, seemingly technical, but meaningful contribution to peace.”

Trần Văn Giang (sưu tầm) <http://qz.com/763161/it-is-time-to-rename-the-south-china-sea>

<http://www.vietnamparacels.org/paracel-spratly-islands-history/it-is-time-to-rename-the-south-china-sea.html>



The Vha denounces the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping for its crime against human beings, of aggression and of genocide toward the Vietnamese ethnic, the Tibetans, Falun Gong and Philippines

To: - Mrs. Fatou Bensouda ICC Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

C/c: - President Dean Spellman European Court of Human Rights Council of Europe; U.S. President Barack Obama, U.S. Congress, Paulson Institute, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates, John W. Thompson (Chairman), Apple CEO Tim Cook, Facebook CEO, IBM CEO, Google CEO, Uber CEO, Various governments of the world and the international media.

Foreword: *The Southeast Asia Sea belongs to the people of Viet Nam. Our people have been residing at the sea region for over 10 thousand years, according to historians. Before 10 thousand years, the Chinese were not present at this Asian region and at the Southeast Asia Sea area. In the modern time, over several recent decades the Southeast Asia Sea region was controlled by the Republic of Viet Nam and recognized by the international community. However, the Southeast Asia Sea is not at peace and always in turmoil since the Chinese Communist Party appeared on the China soil on July 1, 1921 until now.*

On March 09, 2015, Wang Li, foreign minister of China declared that the Southeast Asia Sea is Peking's "house foundation". This is preposterous and false. Professor Carl Thayer says that he was "shocked" in reading Mr. Wang's expression, especially before the 27th anniversary of the Chinese Communist attack of the Vietnamese ships near the Johnson reef on March 14, 1988 – end quote-. Next, Le Yucheng, Chinese Ambassador to India declared that the Southeast Asia Sea is always "peaceful".

The Vietnamese historical association drafts this indictment to counter strongly and definitively the two above-mentioned declaration of Wang Li and Le Yucheng and to denounces to the public and international opinion the multiple crimes against human beings, of aggression and of genocide toward the Vietnamese ethnic, the Tibetans and Falun Gong over the last 94 years committed by the Chinese Communist Party since it was founded by Mao Zedong and still today, in 2015, under Xi Jinping.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, during the 30's, 40's of the 20th century, while in a power grabbing struggle with the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek, had promoted the invasion of Vietnam.

He founded a branch of the Chinese Communist Party on the Vietnamese soil. This branch took various names according to tactical and strategic needs, such as the Indochinese Communist Party, the Viet Minh Front, the Vietnamese Labor Party, the Vietnamese Communist Party. The red flag with a golden star was copied from the flag of Fujian province. Mao Zedong had dispatched a member of the Chinese Communist Central Committee to Viet Nam in order to conduct this invasion. This member was none other than Major Ho Quang, alias Ho-tap-Chuong or Ho-chi-Minh.

Profiting while the Japanese troops was about to surrender to the Allies in Asia, the Chinese Communist sent two spy divisions to support Ho-chi-Minh in taking over the national government of Tran-trong-Kim on August 09, 1945. This is the first evidence of crime of aggression and invasion

The 21st century white paper on Paracels (aka Hoàng Sa; Xisha), Spratly (aka Trường Sa; Sansha; Nansha) islands of the Vietnamese people

against Viet Nam;

The Chinese Communist Party declared war with the people of Viet Nam on September 02, 1945 by the bias of the so-called independence declaration at Ba Dinh, Ha Noi. This is the second evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;



Photo 1: On September 10, 1945, The Chinese Communist Party transported arms to Hai Phong seaport, delivered to the Vietnamese Communist Party, and returned to Peking with 8.622.785,8 kg of gold. Source: Hoa Nam MSS (distributed by Huynh Tam)

The Hoa Nam intelligence agency stole more than 8.622.785,8 kg of gold from Viet Nam on September 10, 1945. This is the third evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The population of North Viet Nam in 1945 was 11 million persons, but 2 million Vietnamese from Nghe-An to Tuyen-Quang provinces died of famine in that At-Dau year due to the policies of “belt tightening resistance” and of “land reform” implemented by the Vietnamese Communist Party. Although it went without saying that the French and the Japanese bore partial responsibility, if the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party did not implement the two above-mentioned policies and did not aim at annihilating the Vietnamese ethnic, the number of famine victims would not be that high. This is the fourth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;



Photo 2: At Dau 1945 famine led the population to a situation in which there remained nothing to eat, worse than what happens in Africa. Photo: Vo An Ninh.

“... The counterintelligence of the Chinese Communist archives the code HN-h497: “The Chinese Communist Party was unfazed in maltreating the Vietnamese people, perhaps more brutal than the

French and the Japanese. However it did not leave any trace behind because it had HTC, and a subtle intelligence force activity, that covered all vehicle tires imprints...” –end quote-. The Vietnamese Communist Party’s report on Chinese Communist intelligence 4th Session (Huynh Tam). HTC means Ho-tap-Chuong, Ho-Quang, Ho-chi-Minh.

After taking control of the entire North Viet Nam through the Dien bien Phu campaign, then the Geneva Accord that cut the country in two on July 20, 1954, Mao Zedong incited Ho-chi-Minh into signing an agreement selling to the Chinese Communist 35% of the Gulf of Tonkin on July 07, 1955, which includes the Bach Long Vi island or Floating Pearl Island, Gray Line Halong Cruise . This is the fifth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

Ho-chi-Minh, alias Ho Quang, a Chinese Communist intelligence agent surreptitiously stole Nam Quan frontier gate of Viet Nam and offered it to the Chinese Communist on January 10, 1950, and renamed it to Muc Nam Quan. In 1953, the Chinese Communist parliament voted that name change. This is the sixth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Vietnamese Communist conducted guerrilla and mobile warfares to attack and to destroy the Republic of Viet Nam from 1960-1975. On January 19, 1974, the Chinese Communist pirates overrun the Paracels Island of the Republic of Viet Nam. This is the seventh and eighth evidences of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

After capturing the Republic of Viet Nam on April 30, 1975, instead of healing the wounds of war, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party continued its aggression with the people. They expelled without mercy all wounded combattants of the Republic of Viet Nam being treated in the hospitals to make rooms for their Communist combattants. “Severely injured soldiers having to leave the hospitals were the most tragic scene that I ever witnessed during the war. They crawled on the dirt, with blood-stained bandages, sweeping the muddy ground, blood still dripping out of bandage; however, they all made the ultimate efforts, trying to drag themselves inch by inch out of the Military Hospital” –end quote- (Tội ác của đảng Cộng sản đối với thương binh VNCH ở Tổng Y Viện Cộng Hòa, Phạm-trình-Viên). In 2015, the Vietnamese Communist still maltreat with discrimination and hate toward the wounded veterans of the Republic of Viet Nam by not allowing them to receive help from humanitarian organizations. This is the ninth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Vietnamese Communist are also cruel in their revengeful treatment of the tombs of the dead of the Republic of Viet Nam soldiers buried in the Bien Hoa Military Cemetery by isolating, by planting trees in between tombs, by destroying headstones and the statue of the Sorrow Soldier erected at the cemetery entrance. All over the South, whenever there are tombs of the Republic of Viet Nam’s soldiers, the Vietnamese Communist forced the relatives to unearth the remains to be removed to some other places; in cases the relatives did not know to come and do the removal, the unclaimed remnants were discarded to other places. The stolen cemetery parcels were used for the economic benefits of the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party members. This is the tenth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Chinese Communist Party through its Vietnamese branch imprisoned without judgment more than 1 million 300 thousand soldiers and officials of the Republic of Viet Nam. The Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party had killed 165,000 thousand political prisoners of the Republic of Viet Nam in re-education camps and more than 100,000 others were executed on the spot after April 30, 1975. They killed 265,000 prisoners (the dead and the dead certificates were not delivered to their relatives) and imprisoned alive 87 million Vietnamese in the colossal Viet Nam prison without freedom, democracy, human rights. Consequently, the Vietnamese Communist country is the place that imprisons the most political prisoners in the world. This is the eleventh evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Vietnamese Communist conducted the campaign of “eliminating the depraved culture of the Americans and their puppet” was nothing other than destroying the culture of openness, democracy, ethnicity of Viet Nam and replaced it with the enslaving culture of the Chinese Communist. This policy continues to be implemented through the welcoming of the National Day of the People's Republic of China Celebration in 2010, the publishing of Chinese language learning books, Chinese law, the establishment of the Confucius Institute, etc... in preparation of the incorporation of Viet Nam into Communist China in 2020. This is the twelfth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Vietnamese Communist forced million of the families of soldiers and officials of the Republic of Viet Nam into exile up to new economic zones. In reality it was done to rob the assets of the people of the South. It was also a policy of discrimination that separated the families belonging to the Republic of Viet Nam from the ones belonging to the invading Vietnamese forces. In 2015, this policy is still in force. This is the thirteenth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Vietnamese Communist launched the money currency exchange from the one of the Republic of Viet Nam to the one of the Vietnamese Communist. In reality, it was a blatant act of robbery aiming of destituting the South Vietnamese people of their wealth. This is the fourteenth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The PAVN 30th division of the Vietnamese Communist massacred 3,157 Ba Chuc villagers in the An-Giang Province from April 18 to April 29, 1978. The Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party blamed it to the Khmer Rouge and started the invasion war of Cambodia under the pretext of international duty on June 15, 1978 to liberate this country from the massacre of the Khmer Rouge. The past event and the ensuing war aimed at four purposes: 1/Kill the male and female elite youth of South Viet Nam; 2/ Destroy the Hoa Hao Buddhist Sect; 3/ Invade Cambodia and invade Southeast Asia. This is the fifteenth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam and Cambodia;

Saigon, the capital of the Republic of Viet Nam is a city with a long history over 300 years. After capturing the Republic of Viet Nam, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party used the name Ho-chi-Minh, a Chinese Communist spy, a war and genocide crime individual to erase the name of Saigon city on February 07, 1976. The forced use of the appellation HoChiMinh City or HoChiMinh Ville is an affront to the human civilization. In the World War II, the Nazi (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) invade France and occupied Paris, they did not erase the name Paris and replace it with the name Adolf Hitler as the Chinese Communist did. This is the sixteenth evidence of crimes of invasion, cultural genocide, insult of human civilization;

The Vietnamese Communists have forced more than 3 million Vietnamese to abandon their homeland by boat, by land through Southeast Asia sea and borders. Refugees by land amounted to over 200 thousand individuals as October 1980. More than 700 thousand individuals died by sea. This is the seventeenth evidence of crimes of invasion, genocide;

Moreover, they also organized unofficial border crossing migration. This means that the police and the army organized the illegal migration and took money, gold and jewelry from the people. When these boats reached near the international waters, the coast guard police used speed boats to chase them and gun them down in order to rob whatever the people carry with them. One of the culprits is no other than Nguyen tan Dung, a policeman of those days. He is now the current prime minister of the Vietnamese Communist government. Thanks to the gold stolen from the unofficial cross border migration, Nguyen tan Dung is the richest man in the Southeast Asia. This is the eighteenth evidence of crimes of invasion, genocide;

The Chinese Communist launched the border war on February 17, 1979. More than 600 thousand People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops swept through 6 provinces at the northern part of Viet Nam. As order by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist troops handedly looted ruthlessly massacred Vietnamese men, old and young, brutally gang-raped Vietnamese women regardless of ages. They also destroyed all infrastructure projects of the six provinces. This is the nineteenth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

Following the Februar 17, 1979 China-Viet Nam border war, the various strategic locations of Viet Nam were successively taken by the Chinese Communist Party which included Nam Quan Pass, Ban Gioc Waterfall, Nui Dat, Tuc Lam Beach, etc. This is the twentieth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

On March 14, 1988, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party set up a stage for the Chinese Communist pirates to shoot and kill 64 sailors of the Vietnamese Communist and to attack the Johnson reef belonging to the Paracel archipelago. The Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party (the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) ordered the Vietnamese Communist troops not to react against the Chinese Communist pirates. This is the twenty-first evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

An agreement was signed between Nguyen-van-Linh and Jiang Zemin at Chengdu in Sichuan in 1990 that relinquishes the entire Viet Nam country to China in 2020. This is the twenty-second evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

On December 25, 2000, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party instructed Nguyen-duy-Nien (foreign minister) to further sell to the Chinese Communsit 12.77% over the Gulf of Tonkin with the "Gulf of Tonkin Delimitation Treaty". Thus the Chinese Communist had stolen 46.77% of the Gulf of Tonkin from the people of Viet Nam. This is the twenty-third evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

On June 21, 2013, Truong-tan-Sang signed with the Chinese Communist in Peking the document "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" –end quote-. This is the twenty-fourth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam;

The Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party colluded with the Chinese Communist Party in the construction of a series of military bases on the Johnson South Reef and on other places to control sea lanes throught the Strait of Malacca. In 2014, this act was denounced by the international media but the Vietnamese Communist still did not take any appropriate response to protect the territorial sea. This is the twenty-fifth evidence of crime of aggression and invasion against Viet Nam.

China's building of military bases on the Spratly Islands, and destroying the coral reefs beneath the Spratly Islands.



Photo 3: The renovation works of the Chinese island in the East Sea is devastating coral reefs.

The four pictures taken via satellite by the Center for International Studies and Strategy (CSIS) show clearly that the Chinese's man-made islands, for the last decade, in the Southeast Asian Seas has destroyed the coral structures of the areas at the alarming rate.

These corals reef are all naturally developed and are the most bio-diversified types of the world. The four islands are photographed via satellites are: the Đá Chũ Thập (Jiery Cross Reef), Đá Subi (Subi Reef), Đá Vành Khăn (Mischief Reef) and đá Gạc Ma (Johnson's Reef). They all are massively transformed and destroyed for Chinese's military-gain purposes. Professor Terry Hughes, an expert on natural coral, seriously announced that over 20 rocky islands in the Spratly area have shown signs of serious ecological damage. This situation, according to him, will inadvertently do serious harms to the fishing industry in the surrounding of the islands, and as on the entire Southeast Asia Sea as well. According to the estimate of the United Nations, the Southeast Asian Seas accounts for 10% of global fish stocks. The reef is a haven for fish with high economic value with regard to their reproductive cycle and thus have an important role in maintaining the fish population.

Source: RFI How the Chinese's man-made islands destroying the coral. (<http://vi.rfi.fr/chau-a/20150917-bd-tq-xd>).

In an interview done by Reporter Amanpour (CNN) in mid-September 2015, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda (ICC Chief Prosecutor) said that the act of IS' destroying important archaeological projects in Syria, Iraq, must be considered as crimes against humanity. So, does the Chinese's Coral destroying in Southeast Asian Sea.

Xi held three key positions at the same time, the communist party leader, president of China, and Central Military Commissioner, therefore he must be person who ordered the destruction of coral reefs beneath Islands Sa for the ambition of military expansion against its neighbors and the world; let alone the decimation of approximately 10% fish stocks in the Southeast Asian Seas water.

The crimes would instigate world war, genocide, serious threat of international maritime security.

This is the namely twenty-six crime.

Another crimes is projected along with Chinese outrageous 9 paragraph imposed illegally on Southeast Asian water which is the international common maritime passage and the neighboring regional countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei. This is considered as the twenty-seven crime;

Chinese's repeatedly hacking the electronic information network/system of the United States is to purposely stealing information related to national security, economy and industrial information. Most recently, mid-June, 2015, the Chinese hacked into Staff Management Division (OPM) in Washington and stole personal information of nearly 4 million US administration.

Mr. Nicholas Thomas, Asian expert from the University of Urban Hong Kong, commented as follows.

"As the matter of fact, day in and day out, China become more and more aggressive in strategic international network. But there is a very important point is whatever the Chinese's stolen, they will hand them to the Chinese companies; consequently given these companies an unfair advantage in the market place; and illegally infringed the copyrights protected by laws."

Source: VOA – Hackers issues over-shadowed the Sino-US Technology Industries (<http://www.voatiengviet.com/content/van-de-tin-tac-bao-trum-hoi-nghi-my-trung-ve-cong-nghe-cao/2966144.html>).

"The Chinese military agencies, the government, enterprises and Academy of interests intertwined over several decades and they are all drilling on a common goal of stealing the trade secrets from the West. The Mafia-like Chinese communist regime is committing thievery crimes without fear of sanctions, in order to strengthening its economic and military power through high technology. The stealing technology from the West could be accounted for trillion dollars yearly."

Source: "Vietdaikynghuyen": EXCLUSIVE NEWS: How the Chinese Hackers and Spies help Chinese economy? (<http://vietdaikynghuyen.com/v3/76691-tin-doc-quyen-hoat-dong-tin-tac-va-gian-diep-giup-trung-quoc-tang-truong-kinh-te-ra-sao/#>).

This is the twenty-eight crime.

Forcefully proceeding invasion, illegally self-claiming the sovereignty of the islands previously belonged to Philippines, Scarborough Shoal for example.

This is the twenty-nine crime.

On September 22, 2015, Washington Free Beacon, a cyber media in the United States has disclosed that, in the week before the date, the Chinese's jet fighter intercepted a US surveillance aircraft (namely the RC-135 reconnaissance) flying over the airspace of Southeast Asian Sea. The US Department of Defense's officials as well as the US Pacific Fleet Commanders have considered this happening as provocative, however, decided to keep it secret.

According to this disclosure in further details, this happening took place near Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Please note that these islands are still in hot dispute: the Japanese has annexed the Senkaku/Diaoyu since 1894, but for now, both Taiwan and Mainland China claim their ownerships over these islands. When the RC-135 aircraft of the US was flying over the region, it has been closely flanked by a Chinese J-11. Both airplanes were dangerously in near-miss situation. This is not the first time the US airplanes encountered this type of provocative acts from Chinese on air. For the last time, it happened on August of 2014, also over the Southeast Asian Sea.

The US Department of Defense and The US Pacific Fleet Commanders did either not disclose, or comment on these near-miss happenings.

Source: The Chinese Jets intercepted US Surveillance airplane Southeast Asian Sea (<http://vi.rfi.fr/chau-a/20150922-tq-hk-qs>).



Photo 4: Aircraft RC-135 reconnaissance week the US. wikimedia

This is a hooligan-like, intentionally provocative act. This Chinese behavior does not justify the responsible role of a United Nations Security Council member. Don't you agree?

Again, these provocative acts could certainly lead to a world war.

This is the thirtyth crime.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Tibet is an independence and autonomous nation for thousands of years. After capturing the territory of China in 1949, Mao Zedong invaded Tibet on July 10, 1950; until now 65 years have past. However, the Tibetans did not succumb to the aggression of the Communist China. They fought back with different forms. In recent years, hundreds of people, Buddhist monks set themselves on fire in self-immolation to demand independence, autonomy, and in protest the destruction of the culture of Tibet. And yet, the Chinese Communist Party remains indifferent. No response is a cruel determination to commit genocide toward the people of Tibet that deserves condemnation.

In the 70 years since September 02, 1945 that the Chinese Communist Party by the bias of the Vietnamese branch declared war and invaded Viet Nam with cruelty and brutality at a higher level than the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler, the Khmer Rouge, and the ISIS.

The international opinion had always been indignant toward the execution of hostage (soldiers, Iraqi and Syrian civilians, etc.), and the cruel maltreatment toward Yazidi women committed by ISIS. The cruelty of the Chinese Communist Party is worse than that!

In the last decades, the public opinion and the free political establishment have repeatedly condemned the Chinese Communist Party's policy of genocide of Falun Gong's followers and the Tibetans through abduction, detention and forced operation. Their organs are for sale to those who needs implants. Chinese criminal or political prisoners suffer the same fate as the Falun Gong members; the Chinese Communist Party has indiscriminately sentenced these individuals to death with the intention to obtain organs for trafficking. The sale prices sometimes amount to 70 thousand dollars or more in exchange for liver in good condition.



Photo 5: The Chinese Communist at all levels, from the lowest level of a policeman up to Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Jiang Zemin; all have participated in the massacre of Falun Gong practitioners, and had transformed the stealing of organs into a business activity. (Data division of Epoch Times)

“On 9 and 17 of March 2006, two witnesses had used the channel of our press (Epoch Times) to shed light that the area of Sujiatun, Shenyang City Liaoning province, China had secretly practiced organ harvesting on Falun Gong practitioners in secret concentration camps for sale, then burned their corpses to destroy evidence.”

The former Minister of Canada in charge of Asia-Pacific Regions, a senior Member of Parliament David Kilgour and international human rights lawyer David Matas had organized to established an independent investigation team, reported on July 6, 2006, announced, criticized and denounced before the international community the practice of organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners. The report concluded the organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners is true, and is considered “the most evil act ever committed on this planet” –end quote- Organ Harvesting from Falun Gong Practitioners Is Revealed to the International Opinion, Viet Epoch Times.

“On December 12, 2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the Chinese government “to immediately terminate activity of organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience”, in which a large number organs are from internal body of Falun Gong practitioners ... Communist China has developed a huge business, shady and unethical in the traffic of organs harvested”- end quote- The European Parliament Adopts the Resolution Opposing Organ Harvesting, Viet Epoch Times.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDay5L6pZq8>

On June 11, 2014, the Parliament Commission of Canada passed a resolution against ‘organ harvesting’ in Communist China –end quote- Parliament Commission of Canada passed a resolution against ‘organ harvesting’ in Communist China, Viet Epoch Times.

On January 30, 2015, the website of the White House has officially responded to a collective petition that request the investigation and punishment of the Communist China for organ harvesting from Falun Gong, and chided the Communist China for illegal organ harvesting and religious persecution – end quote- The White House’s Officially Response to Petition Requesting Investigation of Organ Harvesting of China, Viet Epoch Times.

To avoid being criticized for organ harvesting of prisoners, “Vice Minister of Health Huang Jiefu has just announced that, starting from January 1, 2015, the government of this country would halt organ harvesting from prisoners, instead supply will come from voluntary citizens”. –end quote- ‘ Viet Nam: Endless supply source for China, author Nguyen-vinh long-Ho. To compensate organ harvesting supply to the world market, Chinese Communist troops and traffickers at the Chinese-Vietnamese border provinces had stealthily kidnapped and seduced Vietnamese girls and women to China for organ harvesting. Some provinces had hundreds of birds disappeared at the time.

The international public has seen graphic scenes showing ISIS’s brutality, but has never witnessed ISIS practice organ harvesting and organ traffic to finance their organization. However, what we are saying is that the Chinese Communist has quietly practice organ harvesting for the last decades and now Viet Nam becomes the endless supply source for organ harvesting for China.

Author Nguyen-vinh long-Ho calls “... this is the “BLOODY BUSINESS” of the traffic of organs in China, the price of buying a Vietnamese girl is only 3,000USD, but the profit amounts to 87,000 USD” – end quote- Endless supply source for China, author Nguyen-vinh long-Ho.

At this time there is no official figure for the total number of victims killed from 2014 to 2015. However, more than 10 million people of Viet Nam had been killed by the Chinese Communist Party from 1930-2015 in its invasion objectives.

In the Common Declaration Regarding the Southeast Asia Sea (Final Version) released on June 27, 2011, the Vietnamese Historical Association through Facebook and Internet Media, sounded the alarm that the Chinese Communist Party and its Vietnamese branch (the Vietnamese Communist or Viet Cong) had and have been quietly joining forces to invade Southeast Asia, and they are a danger to the security of the Asian region in particular, and the humanity in general. Recently, in March 2015, the United States discovered the military cooperation of the Viet Cong and the Russian air force to conduct intelligence on American military bases in the Pacific Ocean region. This is a typical example.

Through the Common Declaration Regarding the Southeast Asia Sea and this indictment, the Vietnamese Historical Association calls the United States government and congress not to sell offensive arms to the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party (the Vietnamese Communist).

Furthermore, professor Van Canh Nguyen in “Paracels & Spratleys and National Sovereignty”, Center for Vietnam Studies, 5th edition, 2014; and “Territorial Sovereignty and Chinese Expansionism”, Center for Vietnam Studies, 2010 has also warned that the Chinese Communist is building a series of military bases on the Spratly Islands, stole from Viet Nam in 1988 (Johnson archipelago etc.). If there were no complicity, why the Vietnamese Communist let the Chinese Communist free hand to do as they wish right on Viet Nam’s waters? This building is obviously a serious threat to the security of the international shipping lanes between Asia-Pacific and other continents.

On March 10, 2015, California State Senator Janet Nguyen has filed House Resolution SCR-29 Black April Memorial Month. It denounces the crime of aggression of the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party (Vietnamese Communist) since the last 40 years.

http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SCR29

A recent event occurred on March 17, 2015: the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party in Ha Tinh committed further crime of religious persecution through the mobilization of a massive security force to destroy the church of Dong Yen parish.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWA4OT9gPvE>

On March 23, 2015, Reuters published the comment of the Indonesia President Joko Widodo regarding the Southeast Asia Sea: “one of the main argument that China advances to claim sovereignty over most of the South China Sea does not have a legal basis based on international law” - end quote- Indonesia President rejects China 9-dotted line in the Southeast Asia Sea, Vietnamese VOA.

The Vietnamese Historical Association applauds this declaration of Indonesia President Joko Widodo.

The Chinese Communist Party is a serious threat to the security of the humanity and was and is the one who advocates genocide against the people of Viet Nam.

On March 31, 2015, Admiral Harry Harris Jr, US Pacific Commander, publicly raised concerns about the severity situation of China’s intention to build military bases on Spratly Island of Viet Nam: “When one looks at China’s pattern of provocative actions towards smaller claimant states—the lack of clarity on its sweeping nine-dash line claim that is inconsistent with international law, and the deep asymmetry between China’s capabilities and those of its smaller neighbors—it’s no surprise that the scope and pace of building man-made islands raises serious questions about Chinese intentions,” – end quote- United States: China build the Great Wall at the Southeast Asia Sea, VOA Vietnamese.

He also ... urge all claimants to conform to the Declaration of Conduct, in which the parties committed to “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes”. – end quote - United States: China build the Great Wall at the Southeast Asia Sea, VOA Vietnamese.

The US Pacific Commander firmly states “the United States can easily and rapidly deploy naval forces to the region in order to maintain security and stability of the region.” – end quote - United States: China build the Great Wall at the Southeast Asia Sea, VOA Vietnamese.

This statement is a sparkling slap to the face of Wang Li and Le Yucheng as a lesson of humility and courtesy toward the neighboring countries.

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On July 1, 2015, the Standing Committee of the Chinese National Assembly has adopted a first draft of the new law on National (Chinese) Security, mainly aims at the aggression in Southeast Asia Sea.

On July 24, 2015, in New York City - USA, Ms. Loida Nicolas Lewis, President USP4GG (an organization of Filipinos in the US), led the protesters before the Chinese consulate general, stressed as follows:

"We call on the International Court of Arbitration of the United Nations Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to stop the Chinese’s plan in keeping occupying the South East Asia Sea – This ambition is truly an unprecedented looting in the maritime history."

Source: SOHA – The Filipinos with worldwide march to protest the Chinese’s looting (<http://soha.vn/quoc-te/nguoi-philippines-tuan-hanh-khap-the-gioi-phan-doi-trung-quoc-20150725012240853.htm>)



Photo 6: Protesters carry a boat painted with slogans during a rally outside the Chinese Consulate in Makati city, east of Manila, Philippines, to protest China's reclamations of disputed islands off South China Sea, July 3, 2015. Source: <http://www.voanews.com/content/china-accuses-us-of-militarizing-south-china-sea/2886799.html>

On September 16, 2015, the Japanese government's General Secretary Mr. Yoshihide Suga sent a protest letter to Chinese foreign ministry regarding an illegal petroleum drilling in still-disputed waters of Northeast Asian Sea or the East China between Japan and China.

Authors Peter Warren Singer and August Cole, in the book called "The Ghost Fleet" published in the United States, warned that China will be the cause of World War III.

Source: (<http://vi.rfi.fr/chau-a/20150731-chuyen-gia-my-the-chien-lan-3-se-nham-chong-trung-quoc>).

On September 22, 2015, Washington Free Beacon, a cyber media in the United States has disclosed that, in the week before the date, the Chinese's jet fighter intercepted a US surveillance aircraft (namely the RC-135 reconnaissance) flying over the airspace of Southeast Asian Sea.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression of the Chinese Communist Party against the people of Viet Nam would take up million of pages of presentation instead of these few pages.

The above-mentioned crimes are only big titles. To present them in detail would be an impossible task.

The purpose of our presentation is to warn the international governmental authorities of the threat regarding the international security that originates from the government of China is a reality that surpasses the imagination of human beings.

On the occasion of the Human Rights High Commissioner of the United Nations having the intention of establishing a special criminal court of war crimes in Syria during the meeting of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria on March 19, 2015 in Geneva, Switzerland, we call the Human Rights High Commissioner of the United Nations, the La Haye International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human Rights, to set up a special criminal court to judge war crimes, genocide, crime against humanity committed by the Chinese Communist Party and its Vietnamese branch (the Vietnamese Communist).



Photo 7 : Chinese Communist Intelligence, the Viet Cong beheading people with machetes provided by Chinese Communist soldiers and hooked up heads on sticks. The method was used to killed nationalists, non-communist individuals in the 40's-50's (source of photo Huynh-Tam). This cruel method is similar to the ISIS's in the 2014-2015.

The Communist Party, the people's republic of China is a member of the United Nations Security Council; the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Communist Party (the Vietnamese Communist), the government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is a member of the Human Rights High Commissioner of the United Nations. Both are obliged to respond to the international public opinion and subject to sanctions regarding the 30 major crimes against the people of Viet Nam, as well as in regard to the crime of genocide against the ethnic Tibetna and Falun Gong.

Focusing attention to the Russian Federation, to ISIS while paying only scant attention to acts of aggression, cruelty, expansion of the Chinese Communist Party is a very dangerous attitude for the peace of humankind and the injustice toward millions of victims of our people of Viet Nam.

We pray that Mrs. Fatou Bensouda Attorney for The International Criminal Court proceed to prosecute crimes that Xi and his clique have committed; and list his name onto the most wanted list of the Interpol.

We pray that US President Barack Obama, the US Congress, the European Union parliament, as well as Microsoft CEO, Apple CEO, Facebook CEO, IBM CEO, Google CEO and Uber, media agencies and organizations the Vietnamese human rights, international place above-mentioned issues in front of Mr. Xi; also call this character immediately stop the building of man-made islands in the Southeast Asia Sea for the future military expansionism a real threat to world's peace and prosperity.

We particularly call on the attention of Vietnamese people at home and abroad who are still care about the survival of ethnic Vietnamese, immediately today, make clear and loud complaints of war crimes, aggression, and genocide of Xi Jinping and CCP clique. It's good for the Vietnamese nation as well as for the Falun Gong, Tibet and the Filipinos.

Look! In and out of China, there are more than 160,000 thousand people filed against Jiang Zemin's crimes. (According "vietdaikynghuyen.com.")

Vietnamese people and the victims of communist dictatorship will do the same – Filing against crimes of Xi Jinping.

Justice, Truth, Love and Prosperity of humanity will continue to sustain only when Chinese Communist stops its expansion actions, hegemony over the Southeast Asia Sea, over the Vietnamese sovereignty. To make this stop, we need the strict sanctions from the international criminal court. We

also need the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, the US Congress, parliaments and the European Union to speak out for justice, truth the media and human rights organizations, non-government stop the crimes of the Chinese Communist Party, of which Xi is president, the primary culprit.

For over 70 years, the Communist Party, especially that of the so-called “People's Republic of China” has always been the source of pain for humanity. Today, in 2015, with ill-spirit political ambition, Xi Jinping is the character who is much more dangerous than Adolf Hitler's Nazis and Islamic State (IS) combined.

21st century marks the tremendous progress of humanity in all aspects, and has a connection people of all races very closely. Therefore, the areas of politics, computing, economics, military, financial, maritime security are equally important.

We encourage each person, each organization, and each nation showing solidarity with one another to save the survival of humanity before it's too late. Also please so be aware of the activities and deliberately deceitful words from Xi and his clique.

We sincerely thank you for sparing your precious time viewing this solemn protest letter from ours. The Vietnamese historical association calls the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights Council of Europe, The International Criminal Court and the various government of the international community to stop using the name Hochiminh City and Hochiminh Ville. Ho chi Minh is war and genocide criminal. Please don't fall for this insult against human civilization of the Chinese Communist Party and its Vietnamese branch and reuse the name Saigon City or Saigon Ville that have been adopted over 300 years.

Thank you for your consideration of this indictment document.

Respectfully submitted

Van Giang Tran revised EN version.

Secretary-Général The Vietnamese historical association Truc Lam Tran Nhan Viet Quoc, September 14, 2015, 43-year-anniversary of the day of hoisting up the South Vietnamese flag (with three red stripes on a yellow background) Quang-Tri Citadel.

Co-signed: Trúc Lam Viet Quoc, Suisse; Nguyễn-hữu-Dũng, Germany; Huỳnh-Tâm, France; Liên-Thành, USA; Trúc Lâm Nguyễn-việt phúc-Lộc, Switzerland;

<http://www.truclamventu.info/southeast-asia-sea/vha-denounces-the-chinese-communist-party-for-its-crime-against-human-beings.html>
